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SUMMARY 
Soviet policy makers and international relations 
specialists believe that Soviet foreign policy is 
scientific because it is based on a Marxist-Leninist 
theory of international relations. This is a study of 
the historical origins and contemporary content of that 
theory. It examines those aspects of the writings of 
Marx, Engels and Lenin which have influenced the theory 
and considers the changes which occurred in the theory 
from 1917 until 1982. 
The theory which is said to underlie Soviet relations 
with capitalist states, the colonies and ex-colonie. and 
other socialist states is examined in turn. The 
reflection in the theory of the changes which have 
occurred in the international political system are 
considered by examining Soviet attitudes to war, 
neutrality and peace and the increaSing significance 
accorded by Soviet theorists to the new correlation of 
forces in the world. In each case Soviet theory is 
subjected to critical scrutiny, to establish whether it 
is capable of performing the functions with which is 
credited. 
The examination indicate. that there is an extensive 
body of international relations theory in the Soviet 
Union. Soviet theory i. based on the writinga of Marx, 
Engels and Lenin, but it differs from the original 
theory in significant ways. Each field of relations 
examined revealed certain theoretical problems which 
remain to be resolved. There is a major difficulty when 
the elements of the theory are considered together, 
since proletarian internationalism and peaceful 
coexistence, the two major principles on which Soviet 
theory is based, contradict one another. This suggests 
that Soviet policy is unlikely to be ba.ed on theory in 
a very direct way. Nonethel.s., theory performs 
important functions in Soviet society. The study 
conclude. by suggesting what the.e functions are. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION. 
Soviet policy makers and scholars argue that the foreign 
policy of the USSR is based on an explicit philosophy 
and theory. This is a study of their claim. What is the 
theoretical framework which is said to underlie their 
policy? Is it powerful enough to fulfil the role which 
is claimed for it? 
All policy reflects theory, whether or not that theory 
is articulated or recognized by those who make policy. 
Western foreign policies are usually based on ideas 
about the utility of power as a means of maximizing 
national interest and assuring international order. 
However, the formulation of theory in the West, and the 
use to which theory is put, differ vastly from Soviet 
practice. For one thing, Western theories are not well 
articulated by policy makers. Policy is usually only 
explained in terms of theory on ceremonial occasions. 
For another, more often than not, theorizing takes place 
in a plural system which discourages the notion that 
there can be a monopoly of truth. Competing political 
parties promise alternative policies and scholars 
propose different theories which, they believe, are 
either a better reflection of reality or will lead to a 
better reality. Western theories can, nonetheless, be 
extrapolated, particularly since there is a strong 
tradition of criticizing both policy and the assumptions 
or theory on which it is presumed to be based. 
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Sovie~ policy makers ~end ~o legitimize ~heir policies 
by claiming a conscious a~~emp~ ~o base ~heir practice 
on theory. Their ~heory is, therefore, more frequently 
articulated than Western theory. It is, Soviet 
politicians and scholars argue, Marxist-Leninist theory. 
There is a large body of academic, popular scientific 
and programmatic litera~ure explaining the theory and 
relating it to Sovie~ foreign policy and international 
relations. There is, however, no tradition of criticism 
of either ~heory or practice in the Soviet Union. As a 
result, debates about alternative poliCies or theories 
are not to be found in Soviet literature. There is very 
little open and published discussion of when and where 
the existing theory has been found to be inadequate. And 
there is no mention of occasions when practice has 
diverged from theory. 
In Western analyses of the Soviet Union the question is 
perenially posed whether Soviet foreign policy is 
motivated by Marxist-Leninist ideology, as Soviet 
leaders insist, or by power. The question is considered 
important because if Soviet foreign policy is based on 
an explicit theory, accurate interpretation of past and 
present and reliable prediction of future Soviet policy 
wouid perhaps be possible. It is far less common, 
however, to find in Western li~erature a detailed 
consideration of the contents of Soviet theory and the 
way in which Soviet decision makers and theorists 
describe the international system and the Soviet role 
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wi~hin i~. 
This s~udy, ~herefore, aims ~o recons~ruct the Soviet 
view of the world by examining the theories used to 
analyse key aspects of international relations. The 
~hemes which will be considered are firs~, the 
developmen~ of the inevi~ably conflictual relations 
be~ween opposing social systems in~o peaceful 
coexis~ence; second, the Soviet view of the Third World 
and i~s rela~ionship to ~he socialist system; third, 
prole~arian internationalism (or relations between 
socialists) and ~he development of this concept into 
socialist internationalism (or relations between 
socialist states); fourth, questions of war and peace 
and the Soviet attitude to neutrality and non-alignment; 
and fifth, the nature of the present international 
system and the new correla~ion of forces within it. 
It mus~ be stressed that this is not a study of Soviet 
foreign policy per se. Nor is it an examination of ~he 
differences between Soviet political actions and 
theoretical statements, although from time to time it 
will be apparent that there have been and are 
differences. It should also be emphasized that although 
this is a cri~ical s~udy, i~ is not concerned with 
making value judgements about the moral rightness or 
wrongness of Soviet theory or policy. The aim is to 
examine Soviet theory in two ways. First, the origins 
and development of the theory relating to the key 
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aspects listed above will be described and second, the 
theory will be considered critically in terms of its 
usefulness in the role which Soviet theorists say that 
it plays. In other words, an attempt will be made to 
investigate whether the claims that are made by Soviet 
theorists and policy makers for their theory are 
justified. In the final chapter some suggestions will 
also be offered about other, unacknowledged roles that 
are played by Soviet theory. 
Before any judgement can be made about whether Soviet 
theory justifies the claims made for it by theorists and 
policy makers, the functions it is said to fulfil must 
be understood. This in turn requires some conception of 
the importance accorded to theory in the Soviet Union 
and the connection between theory and ideology. It also 
requires an understanding of who makes theory, 
particularly since the task is not left entirely to 
scholars. Soviet political leaders often use public 
occasions to enunciate or reiterate aspects of Soviet 
theory, Signalling the acceptability of certain 
interpretations and the inadmissability of others. This 
affects the nature of the sources that an analyst needs 
to use in studying Soviet theory. These are the 
questions which will be considered in the rest of this 
chapter. First the nature and status of theory in the 
Soviet Union will be discussed. This will be followed by 
a brief consideration of who makes theory in the USSR 
which, in turn, will lead to an explanation of the 
sources which have been used in this study. The chapter 
will end with a summary of the structure of the rest of 
the work. 
The nature and status of international relations theory 
in the USSR 
In the West the phenomenon of the politician (or indeed 
the academic) who denies the usefulness of theory is 
common. In the Soviet Union the reverse is true. All 
published scholars work within the framework of 
officially accepted philosophy, doing what Kuhn (1970) 
termed "normal science". All politicians maintain that 
they make their foreign policy decisions on the basis of 
the Marxist-Leninist theory of international relations. 
Indeed, a distinction between theory and practice would 
not be accepted in Soviet philosophy. One of the 
methodological principles which forms the cornerstone of 
that philosophy is the unity of theory and practice. 
Marxist social science is said by Soviet theorists to be 
characterized by unity, since it contains "a close 
fusion of theory and practice and •.. unity of theoretical 
and empirical levels of research" (Rumyantsev, 1984, p. 
83). Theory and practice are considered interdependent I 
there can be no practice without theory and no valid 
theory without practice. Soviet philosophers believe 
that theory fulfils the function of organizing, 
mobilizing and transforming. It is also the means of 
foreseeing the outlines of future development and 
therefore of being able to pursue a scientifically 
grounded policy (Kharin, 1981, pp. 41-8). Soviet writers 
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often quote Lenin's dictum that "without a revolutionary 
theory there can be no revolutionary movement" (Lenin, 
1902, p. 369) t~ indicate the importance of theory. 
Stalin maintained that theory gives: 
"confidence, the power of orientation, and an 
understanding of the inherent connection 
between surrounding events; •.• it alone can 
help practice to discern not only how and in 
which direction classes are moving at the 
present time, but also how and in which 
direction they will move in the near future" 
(Stalin, 1924a, p. 15). 
Although Stalin has seldom been cited by name since 
1956, Soviet scholars have continued to use similar 
phraseology to explain the value of theory (see, for 
example, II'ichev et aI, 1958, p. 101). 
But theory, in turn, must be closely connected to 
practice. The classical thinkers discovered the general 
laws of society. Society, however, changes, and Soviet 
philosophers believe that it is the task of 
theoreticians to incorporate the changes into new 
theoretical generalizations (Rumyantsev, 1984, p. 129). 
In other words, the empirical facts which arise from 
practice are vital in updating theory. Soviet scholars 
accept that facts can be misused, for example by 
selecting them carefully to support existing theory. One 
prominent theorist, in defending himself against 
criticism when his conclusions about the probable future 
developments of the capitalist economy offended Stalin, 
warned that "it is not a matter of enumerating all the 
facts so that they inevitably lead to the former 
7 
conclusions of Marxism-Leninism, but to use the 
Marxist-Leninist method in studying these facts" (Varga, 
cited in Hoffmann and Fleron, 1980, p. 286). 
The Marxist-Leninist method which Soviet scholars use to 
study facts is called dialectical materialism, defined 
as "a materialist approach to all real phenomena 
(society included), and the dialectical method of 
cognizing these phenomena" (Rumyantsev, 1984, pp. 
128-9). In relation to international relations, the 
dialectical method "shows the diversity and 
contradictory nature of international developments in 
their interconnection, interdependence and constant 
movement and the dialectical unity of all the 
counteracting factors" (Israelyan, 1967, p. 48).1 
The close connection between theory and practice is said 
by Soviet theorists to apply equally to international 
relations theory and the practice of Soviet foreign 
policy: 
"If the theory of the foreign policy of 
socialism, based on the teachings of 
Marxism-Leninism, has become the political 
compass which determined and determines the 
concrete foreign policy actions of the Soviet 
Union in the world arena, the practice of 
Soviet foreign policy has not only been a 
school for testing the accuracy of theoretical 
concepts, but also the basis for working out a 
number of theoretical propositions and 
conclusions which are in complete accordance 
with the theory of scientific communism" 
(Sanakoyev and Kapchenko, 1977, p. 263). 
The unity of theory and practice and the fact that 
political actions are based on theory are considered to 
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be great strengths of Soviet foreign policy and amongst 
the advantages that the socialist system has over the 
capitalist (Petrenko and Popov, 1981, p. 8). It gives to 
Soviet foreign policy "the strength of an orientation 
which is absent from bourgeois policy" (Il'ichev et al, 
1958, p. 101). 
It is not, however, just the unity of policy and theory 
and the basing of policy on theory that are considered 
strengths by Soviet academics and decision makers. The 
particular nature of the theory is even more important. 
It is Marxist-Leninist theory and it is, therefore, 
scientific, capable of transforming reality and 
accurate. It is axiomatic, in Soviet thinking, that 
Marxism-Leninism is scientific. Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy, for example, is defined as: 
..... a science studying regularities in the 
relationship between matter and consciousness, 
the universal laws of nature, society, and 
thought, and developing a world outlook and a 
method of cognising and transforming reality" 
(Sheptulin, 1978, p. 27). 
Marx's belief that philosophers should do more than just 
interpret the world, but should endeavour to change it 
(Marx, 1845, pp. 421-3) is thus an integral part of the 
function of philosophy in Soviet thinking. But 
Marxism-Leninism consists of more than philosophy. It is 
said to be "a scientifically-based system of 
philosophical, economic and socio-political views" 
(Rumyantsev, 1984, p. 128). Because it is scientific, it 
is thought to reflect the objective laws inherent in any 
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particular manifestation of social life (Sokolovsky, 
1963, p. 3B5). It is this that makes it accurate and 
enables it to give "correct scientific answers about the 
origin and essence of politics in general and of foreign 
policy in particular" (Selektor, 1955, p. 34). 
The fact that the theory has, according to Soviet 
scholars, withstood the test of time attests to its 
accuracy. As both theory and method it has been proven 
by life itself (Trush, 1977, p. 6). As one scholar 
expressed it, "history has, 
certified the' truth of 
in fact, authoritatively 
scientific communism" 
(Shakhnazarov, 19B2, p. B). In other words, the 
predictions made by the founders of Marxism-Leninism are 
thought to have been realized and this proves that the 
theory is accurate: the proof of the accuracy of any 
scientific theory lies in its ability to predict the 
course of historical development (Varga, 1953, p. 11). 
It is believed, moreover, to be self-evidently the only 
system of thought which is accurate. One theorist has 
contended, for example, that "there is no need to prove 
the obvious truth that an analysis of international 
relations can be correct only if it is based on the 
Leninist methodology" (Gantman in "The Moscow Meeting", 
1969, p. 55). The absence of such a methodology in 
bourgeois analyses and the avoidance of a class approach 
makes Western foreign policy theories and concepts 
"pseudo-scientific" (Sanakoyev, 1975, p. lOB). 
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The usefulness of Marxism-Leninism is not confined to 
providing a methodology for historical or contemporary 
analysis. Its value lies also in its ability to 
transform, or to influence historical development 
successfully. Soviet theorists maintain that 
Marxist-Leninist theory has enabled and still does 
enable Soviet politicians to influence the international 
environment. It does this by giving guidance on which to 
base current policy and to analyse the correct foreign 
policy course for the long-term future (Sanakoyev and 
Kapchenko, 1977, p. 296). It makes possible the 
successful forecasting of future international 
conditions (Kokoshin, 1978, p. 3-10). 
Soviet policy makers and theorists contend that because 
their policy is based upon a scientific theory, the 
policy itself is "a model of scientific objectivity" 
(Ermolenko, 1967, p. 17).2 This makes it different from 
(and more efficacious than) bourgeois foreign policy. 
The diplomacy of the capitalist states, for example, 
cannot be considered scientific. It both fails to take 
proper account of the existing state of affairs and it 
has aims which contradict the objective laws which 
determine social development. Indeed, it usually goes 
against the course of that development and this is the 
main reason why there have been so many foreign policy 
miscalculations by the Western countries since the 
Second World War. Soviet diplomacy, on the other hand, 
is scientifici 
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"It is built on the foundation of 
Marxist-Leninist theory, it wields the 
powerful weapon of a Marxist, i.e. a genuinely 
scientific, analysis of reality and of 
knowledge of the laws of historical 
development" (Gromyko et al, 1960, p. 459).3 
The past successes of Soviet foreign policy (and there 
have only been successes, since Soviet writers tend not 
to admit to or write about failures) are attributed to 
the scientific nature of policy and theory. It is this 
that will also guarantee future success, up to and 
including "the final historical victory" (Sanakoyev and 
Kapchenko, 1977, p. 287), in other words, the creation 
of a socialist world. 
Some Western scholars believe that the deference which 
is paid to theory by Soviet decision-makers makes it 
important to know what the theory is, or at least what 
it is said to be (see, for example, McLane, 1966, p. 3 
and Boersner, 1982, p. xii). Few of them, however, agree 
with the Soviet depiction of the relationship between 
Soviet theory and foreign policy. Opinions differ about 
whether there is any relationship at all. The expatriate 
(and ex-Marxist) Polish philosopher, Kolakowski (Vol. 3, 
1978, p. lOS), believes that "Marxism has become simply 
a rhetorical dressing for the Realpolitik of the Soviet 
empire". Other non-Soviet scholars maintain that theory 
fulfils important roles, but that Soviet foreign policy 
is essentially pragmatic (see, for example, Kennan, 
1961, p. 258, McLane, 1966, p. 2, Semmel, 1981, p. 18). 
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Whatever role Soviet theory is thought to play, however, 
considerable scepticism has been expressed in the West 
about whether it retains much connection to Marxist 
theory or to the methodology of dialectical materialism. 
As a result of his investigation into Soviet philosophy, 
Wetter (1958, p. xi), for example, concludes that "there 
is very little left of dialectics ... it consists, rather, 
of a materialistic evolutionism decked out in 
dialectical terminology". Similar criticisms have been 
made of other aspects of Marxism-Leninism, including 
international relations theory. In relation to the 
latter, Kennan has maintained that Commmunist doctrine 
had acquired a "rubbery consistency" which allowed it to 
be used as an "infinitely flexible rationalization for 
anything whatever the regime finds it advantageous to 
do" (Kennan, 1961, p. 258). Even less credence is 
accorded to the claim that Marxism-Leninism, the 
international relations theory which derives from it and 
the foreign policy which is based upon it are 
scientific. Western scholars tend to refer not to Soviet 
theory but to doctrine or ideology. In non-Soviet 
definitions ideology is a term which automatically 
precludes science. 
Soviet scholars also often use the terms ideology or 
doctrine, but they use the words as synonyms of theory. 
They see no contradiction between these terms and 
science. Socialist ideology is invariably called 
scientific. One political philosopher defines socialist 
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ideology as "a scientific 
philosophical, legal, moral 
system 
and 
of political, 
aesthetic views" 
(Mshvenieradze, 1981, p. 122). Elsewhere it has been 
defined as I'a truly scientific world outlook" 
(Milovidov, 1977, p. 221). One of the reasons why 
non-Marxist scholars would disagree with these 
definitions is their strongly held belief that science 
ought to be, or at least to strive to be, objective and 
value-free. While Soviet scholars believe that 
Marxism-Leninism reveals the objective laws of social 
development and that dialectical materialism makes it 
possible to avoid "deviations from objective truth" 
(Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, 1972, p. 387),4 
the notion of objectivity implied here differs greatly 
from Western definitions of the concept. Soviet 
theorists reject the idea that theory or science can be 
value-free in the Western sense. They believe that 
bourgeois scholars who proclaim the objectivity of their 
scientific thought are merely concealing their 
partisanship. All systems of ideas are the product of 
social consciousness and all consciousness is class 
consciousness. Far from pretending to be non-partisan, 
dialectical materialism is said to include partisanship 
in that it "enjoins the direct and open adoption of the 
standpoint of a definite social group in any assessment 
of events" (Lenin, 1894, p. 401). But there ia a great 
difference between bourgeois partisanship and working 
class partisanship. The subjectivism of working class 
partisanship is not thought to preclude objectivity. On 
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the contrary, the subjective interests of the 
proletariat (the class whose consciousness is reflected 
in socialist ideology) coincide with the objective laws 
of development. Thus proletarian partisanship is not 
thought to contradict the scientific character of the 
ideology of the working class (Milovidov, 1977, pp. 
220-1). 
To summarize, Soviet theorists claim that Soviet 
international relations theory both forms the basis of 
Soviet foreign policy and is adjusted as a result of 
that policy. It is a scientific Marxist-Leninist theory 
which reflects the objective laws of historical 
development. But it also influences that development. It 
allows Soviet foreign policy to be formed and executed 
in accordance with objective laws and it gives to policy 
short- and long-term aims which are concordant with the 
interests and demands of social progress. In short it is 
a means of interpreting the past, a reliable guide to 
action in the present and an accurate method for 
forecasting future developments. 
The claims made for Soviet theory are thus rather large. 
Lat us leave aside the insistence that Soviet theory and 
policy are scientific on the grounds that the 
explanation of what makes them scientific is, in the 
final analysis, a circular argument. It can be reduced 
to the contention that the theory is scientific because 
it is true and accurate and it is true and accurate 
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because it is scientific. It is also scientific because 
it reflects objective l~ws. The only proof of the 
objectivity of the laws, however, is that they have been 
observed in the past to hold true. But non-Marxist 
analysts could equally well point to events in the past 
where they have not held true. In other words, the 
Soviet view of what constitutes scientific methodology 
and science is so self-evidently far from Western 
concepts of science that it is simpler to agree to 
disagree arguments about first principles can rarely 
be resolved. In any case, there is a long-standing 
debate in the West about whether social science, 
including international relations, can really be 
scientific, whether it be Soviet Marxist-Leninist or 
Western capitalist. 
But the other claims made for Soviet theory are no less 
extensive. They imply a theory which is sufficiently 
flexible to explain, deal with or encompass any change 
which occurs in the international system. They also 
imply a theory which is general enough to incorporate 
new phenomena in international relations and 'powerful 
enough to influence the way in which international 
relations develop. In fact, Soviet theory has often 
found it difficult to adapt to change. There has tended 
to be a consiaerable lag between change in the real 
world and the adaptation of theory to reflect it. It has 
also experienced 
phenomena. While 
problems in incorporating new 
the existence of the Soviet Union has 
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influenced the way in which international relations have 
developed, it is much less clear that the application of 
Soviet theory has played any part in the developments, 
except in so far as Soviet foreign policy has been based 
on theory. The relationship between theory and practice, 
however, has been far less simple and immediate than 
Soviet theorists suggest. Moreover, concurrent with the 
prodigious claims made for existing Soviet theory, there 
have been continual demands over the years for more and 
better theory (see, for example, Butenko, 1975, pp. 
39-84; Ermolenko, 1977, p. 12; Brezhnev, 1976a, p. 86). 
This suggests that Soviet international relations theory 
is less comprehensive and less useful than has been 
claimed. It can also be argued that Soviet foreign 
policy has been less successful than Soviet theorists 
would have us believe. If it has, indeed, been based on 
theory, then the theory must sometimes have turned out 
to be less than infallible. In examining the kay aspects 
of international relations theory which form the 
contents of the rest of this study, some of the reasons 
why Soviet theory has fallen short of the claims made 
for it will become clear. 
Who formulates Soviet international relations th~Qry? 
To say that Soviet theory has responded slowly to change 
is not to imply that contemporary theory is 
indistinguishable from the original writing of Marx and 
Lenin. Soviet international relations theory has, of 
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course, changed over the years and it is these changes 
that form the subject matter of this study. In some 
respects, 
seems to 
although 
the result has sometimes been a theory which 
have little in common with its origins, 
Soviet writers continue to insist that the 
works of Marx, Engels and Lenin are vital ingredients of 
contemporary theory. Sometimes, previously accepted 
aspects of theory have been discarded or repudiated. 
What makes this confusing for analysts of Soviet theory 
is that rejections have rarely been made explicit 
(except when they have been part of a power struggle in 
which the defeat of the vanquished has included ritual 
public criticism and the insistence on recantation). It 
is rare to find in Soviet literature an explanation that 
a particular aspect of theory turned out to be mistaken 
or an analysis of why it was wrong. Instead, that 
particular aspect will merely be omitted, or a new 
interpretion will be presented as if that has always 
been the way in which it has been interpreted. S On the 
other hand, when changes have occurred and have seemed 
to be dramatically new (the revisions announced by 
Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress are a case in 
point), they can often be seen in retrospect to have 
been incubating for some time before their public 
proclamation. This, too, is confusing, in that it is 
rarely possible to follow the genesis and development of 
new ideas as they occur. A further confusion arises from 
the fact that new aspects of theory have sometimes been 
added which are inconsistent with older theoretical 
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premises. The latter have not, however, been discarded. 
Moreover, explanations have sometimes been transferred 
from one level of analysis to others where, to 
non-Soviet theorists at least, they seem to fit less 
well, if at all. But one looks in vain for critical 
responses from other Soviet scholars. The consequence is 
a virtual absence of theoretical debate in Soviet 
literature. The cause, in part, is the way in which 
Soviet theory is formulated. 
It can be argued that there was very little Soviet 
international relations theory before the Brezhnev era. 
Political science is a young subject in the Soviet 
Union, international relations an even younger branch of 
it. In the 1950s and 19605, while Western scholars were 
polemizing in the traditional-behavioural debate (see, 
for example, Knorr and Rosenau, 1969), their Soviet 
would-be counterparts were arguing over the 
establishment of international relations as an 
independent field of enquiry. The previous official 
position had been that Marxism-Leninism ~ political 
science and provided a ready made theory of 
international relations. If Stalinism imposed an 
official line and made dissent impossible in subjects 
like linguistics and genetics, what need could there be 
for academic research, debate and writing on politics or 
international relations?6 And how could opposing views 
possibly exist? It was only in the Brezhnev era that a 
group of respectable and respected international 
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relations sfJteci.d~Usr.s (called mezhdunarodniki) emerged and 
international relations became a recognized and 
established field of academic study. 7 There had always 
been Soviet books and articles on international 
relations, but they were the works 
exegetists of Marxist-Leninist 
of politicians or 
doctrine (with the 
occasional contribution by historians or international 
lawyers). In the late 1960s and 1970s, the number of 
books and articles on international relations 
multiplied, the range of topics they covered was greatly 
extended and many of them were the work of professional 
mezhdunarodniki. However, although the discipline had 
become an independent field of study, the theory was 
still said to be based on Marxism-Leninism. And since 
some of the most influential professional theorists 
worked in the Central Committee apparatus, international 
relations theory remained primarily the preserve of the 
CPSU. 
These two facts -- that international relations theory 
was once formulated by specialists in Marxist-Leninist 
ideology and that it has remained primarily the preserve 
of the Party have led to the curious way in which 
theory changes in the Soviet Union. Perhaps the most 
descriptive term to use for it is democratic centralism. 
Originally democratic centralism was the organizational 
principle on which Lenin hased his vision of the 
Bolshevik Party. After 1921, when the decree on Party 
Unity effectively made all opposition disloyal (Carr, 
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Vol. 1, 1966, pp. 206-19), it gradually became the way 
in which the whole of Soviet society was organized. As 
an organizational principle it implied strict 
subordination of lower Party organs to higher. It 
permitted free discussion (about policy or theory) until 
a decision had been reached, after which the decision 
would be binding on everyone. Under Stalin the element 
of free discussion eventually disappeared. There 
sometimes ~ discussion, but it tended to be 
orchestrated rather than free (a good example is the 
publication of the 1936 constitution as a draft 
discussion document before it became law). The people 
who had participated in the free discussions of the 
1920s paid a high price in the 19305; those who had 
taken positions opposed to Stalin's became early victims 
of the purges. From then onwards the correct theory or 
opinion was handed down, and it became the only possible 
theory or opinion. After Stalin's death, the penalty for 
holding opinions and theories which diverged from those 
of the leader and therefore from accepted conventional 
wisdom became far less severe. But there ~ penalties 
and, in any case, the habits of controversy and 
non-conformity had been lost. Thus while democratic 
centralism does not operate with the same ferocity as it 
did in Stalin's time, to a considerable (and, to those 
unfamiliar with the Soviet Union, surprising) extent 
this is still the way that Soviet SOCiety works. 8 
As a model of how theory has been and is formulated and 
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changed in ~he Sovie~ Union, democra~ic cen~ralism 
implies ~ha~ i~ is no~ ~ha~ ~heore~ical change does no~ 
occur, bu~ tha~ i~ is cen~rally direc~ed and i~ occurs 
uniformly. In prac~ical ~erms ~his means ~ha~ a close 
reading of ~he work of prominen~ ~heoris~s (par~icularly 
those who hold posi~ions in ~he Central Committee 
appara~us) may give some in~ima~ion tha~ ~heore~ical 
change is likely ~o occur. But it is only af~er a 
particular aspect of ~heory has been given an imprimatur 
by the political leadership ~hat i~ will be ~aken up 
widely. It will ~hen be binding on all ~heoris~s. 
Explaining tha~ par~icular phenomenon or even~ (or 
analogous phenomena and even~s) in any other way will 
not be acceptable (and is unlikely to be prin~ed). One 
Wes~ern scholar describes ~he process in this way: 
"Of course ... even in the Sovie~ Communist 
Party, oplnlons change. What was heresy 
yes~erday is orthodoxy today. But ... the Party 
takes care to make the posi~ion plain ... a~ any 
one moment it teaches the same ~hing 
~hroughout ~he leng~h and bread~h of ~he 
Soviet Union" (Vigor, 1975, p. 4, emphasis in 
~he original). 
This is no~ to sugges~ that the political leadership 
necessarily has either the time or ~he abili~y to 
indulge in theore~ical developmen~, innovp~ion and 
amendmen~. Theory almost certainly origina~es amongst 
theorists. But ~o be successfully accep~ed and widely 
known, it needs to capture the atten~ion of an impor~ant 
political leader (best of all, the General Secretary of 
the CPSU, but ~he "ideological secre~ary" is almost as 
good; Suslov, for example, was extremely influential in 
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formulating the Soviet view of the Sino-Soviet dispute). 
If it does so, it will be publicized in political 
speeches or be embedded in the contents of political 
I programmes and communiques. The publicity will act as a 
signal that a particular concept or interpretation is 
acceptable. It will then be taken up by theorists and 
receive the status of conventional wisdom. The political 
leader or the political document in which it was first 
publicly mentioned will usually be given the credit for 
formulating the theory in the introduction to countless 
articles which develop it.9 New efforts in theory 
building have been initiated in the same way, first 
being mentioned in speeches in which the need for work 
in a particular field is expressed (see, for example, 
Brezhnev's Central Committee report to the 25th Party 
Congress, in Brezhnev, 1976a, pp. 86-7) and then being 
taken up by theorists. 
This description of how theoretical change usually takes 
place in the Soviet Union refer., of course, to 
important concepts which are too close to the essence of 
Marxist-Leninist teaching to be left entirely to 
theorists. More peripheral theoretical concerns can be 
and are left to them. Differences of opinion occur and 
theoretical debates can be found about less important 
aspects of theory. This is not, however, to imply that 
the theories so produced would necessarily not meet with 
the approval of the political leadership. For one thing, 
the parameters of the debate will, of course, be 
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provided by Marxism-Leninism. For another, the 
distinction between the political and academic 
establishments which often seems so total in the West, 
is far less marked in the Soviet Union. Most theorists 
(certainly the more influential amongst them) are 
members of the CPSU; a few are members or candidate 
members of the Central Committee. Whether or not this 
allows them a direct input into foreign policy 
decision-making (and they probably have little to do 
with day-to-day policy), it means that they almost 
certainly share the values and the perceptions of the 
political leadership. As far as more momentous subjects 
are concerned, like the inevitability of war (before 
Stalin/~ death), 
(after Stalin's 
the 
death) 
need 
or 
for 
the 
peaceful coexistence 
definition of what 
characterizes the present historical era, the analyst 
looks in vain for different "schools of thought". 
Thus theory building and elaboration in the Soviet Union 
probably does take place in the specialist international 
relations institutes and in the Central Committee 
apparatus where some prominent theorists work.l0 But the 
theory is communicated upwards, and only if it is 
acceptable there will it be publicized to the academic 
and the wider community. But before that happens, it is 
likely that it will have been taken up by the political 
leadership and it may later seem to have originated at 
the top level of the political hierarchy. This has 
important consequences for the kinds of source. which 
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must be used in studying Soviet international relations 
theory. Something needs to be said, therefore, about the 
sources which have been used in this study. 
The sources used to examine Soviet international 
relations theory 
Since one of the aims of this study has been to examine 
the development of Soviet international relations 
theory, amongst the major sources that have been used in 
preparing it have been those writings of Marx, Engels 
and Lenin which, according to past and contemporary 
theorists, form the basis of contemporary theory. This 
study is not, however, an attempt to extrapolate an 
international relations theory from the entire oeuvre of 
these authors. 11 The subject of this study is Soviet 
international relations theory and Soviet theorists use 
the Marxist-Leninist classics selectively. Attention has 
thus been concentrated on those ideas in the work of the 
classical Marxist-Leninist writers which are said by 
contemporary theorists to be relevant. Occasionally, 
however, it has been necessary to examine the context in 
which the classical theorists have expressed particular 
points of view or to see whether they have expressed 
alternative views at other times. It has also sometimes 
seemed important to check whether and why Soviet 
theorists have selected certain aspects of the theory 
and ignored others, or exalted as theory something which 
was clearly an ad hoc statement.12 This has particularly 
been the case with references to Lenin's writings, where 
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Soviet writers quite often use the term theory to refer 
to post-1917 statements that were patently made in 
response to the pressure of events and have little in 
common with carefully thought out theory. It is 
interesting, in this connection, to compare 
Chicherin said about Lenin and foreign policy: 
"Vladimir Il'ich himself never outlined the 
Soviet republic's foreign policy in its 
entirety and in the form of a systematically 
worked out plan. Its structure and development 
were in his head ... Only some general 
principles, some basic concepts of his foreign 
policy were set out by him in a general form" 
(Chicherin, 1961, p. 276). 
with what modern scholars claim for him: 
"By the time the socialist revolution occurred 
in Russia Lenin had scientifically elaborated 
the main principles and trends of socialism's 
foreign policy. He solved the primary problems 
of the Communist Party's strategy and tactics, 
and expounded his views on the main issues of 
the working class's international policy. 
Consequently, by the time the Russian 
proletariat took power, the Party had already 
been equipped with a Marxist-Leninist doctrine 
of socialist foreign policy" (Sanakoyev, 1972, 
p. 276). 
what 
From what has been said about the way in which theory is 
formulated and changed in the Soviet Union it will be 
clear that it is not just the writings of academic 
theorists which are of interest to the analyst of Soviet 
theory. Political speeches, . / communlques and Party 
reports are equally relevant. Indeed, they are often 
referred to by Soviet authors as the place where 
Marxist-Leninist international relations theory is best 
expressed and most creatively developed. After the 1969 
International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, 
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for example, the editorial board of International 
Affairs held a seminar to discuss the meeting. Most 
speakers commented on the proceedings in words similar 
to these: 
"The material of the Moscow Meeting ... contains 
propositions and conclusions which are a 
further development of Marxist-Leninist theory 
and scientifically elaborate the chief issues 
of our time, in particular the pressing 
problems of present-day international 
relations" ("The Moscow Meeting", 1969, p. 
53). 
Similar claims have been made for other declarations and 
statements issued after international meetings of 
Communist Parties (see, for example, Sovetov, 1964). One 
of the theorists who participated in the International 
Affairs seminar later maintained that the documents of 
Party Congresses and plenary meetings, joint statements 
by government and Party leaders of socialist states, 
documents of the international Communist movement, 
contain "theoretical generalizations" and "a profound 
analysis of the alignment of class and political forces" 
which "contribute to the theoretical elaboration of 
foreign policy" (Sanakoyev, 1975, p. 118). Another 
theorist simila~ly claimed that scientific research into 
the new type of international relations which resulted 
from the formation of a socialist system was based on 
the theory in the classics of Marxism-Leninism and the 
documents of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the 
socialist countries and of the international Communist 
movement (Butenko, 1975, p. 39). Other theorists add to 
the list of Party documents and Congress reports the 
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speeches of Brezhnev, Suslov, Gromyko, Ponomarev and 
other political leaders (Petrenko and Popov, 1981, pp. 
147-53). This may, of course, merely be an elaborate 
form of lip-service, but since such importance is 
attributed to these documents by Soviet theorists, it 
behoves non-Soviet scholars to consult them, and they 
have formed one of the sources which have been used in 
the preparation of this study. 
Most of the sources used in describing contemporary 
theory have, however, been articles and books written by 
Soviet mezhdunarodniki themselves. An attempt has been 
made to use as wide a selection as possible of different 
sources for any particular period of history or anyone 
theme. Sometimes, however, one scholar is so dominant in 
a particular period or in relation to a particular 
aspect of theory that it has been difficult to find 
alternative sources to demonstrate that a point of view 
is generally shared by the Soviet academic community. 
EngliSh versions have usually been cited when they are 
available (and therefore the publication dates which 
appear in the text and bibliography are sometimes a 
couple of years later than the publication dates of the 
original Russian books). 
The structure of the rest of this study 
To apply terms which are commonly used in linguistics, 
this is both a diachronic and a synchronic study. It is 
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diachronic because i~ examines ~he his~orical, or 
classical, wri~ings which, 
Sovie~ ~heoris~s, form ~he 
~heory and looks a~ some 
according ~o con~emporary 
basis of curren~ Sovie~ 
of the changes which have 
occurred in ~he way classical theory is in~erpreted. I~ 
is synchronic in ~ha~ it pays par~icular at~en~ion to 
(and ends wi~h) ~he theory of a par~icular period of 
Sovie~ his~ory, namely ~he period ~ha~ spans ~he ~enure 
as General Secre~ary of ~he Communis~ Par~y of the 
Sovie~ Union (CPSU) firs~ of Nikita Khrushchev and ~hen 
of Leonid Brezhnev. 
The star~ing point of ~he study was dictated by Soviet 
~heorists. Since ~hey claim direc~ descen~ from Marx and 
Engels, this is where ~he analysis begins. The cut off 
point was chosen, initially, simply because the work had 
to end somewhere. I~ has turned out, however, ~o be a 
sensible choice. There are indications that there will 
be theoretical changes under Gorbachev which will seem 
as radical as ~he revisions in Marxism-Leninism 
announced by Khrushchev at the 20th Par~y Congress in 
1956. And just as the genesis of Khrushchev's changes 
were later seen to predate Stalin's demise, in time it 
will probably be clear that the origins of the new 
theory are to be sought before Gorbachev's accession to 
the General Secretaryship. It may thus become apparent 
that a new era in Soviet international relations theory 
began after Brezh~ev's death in November 1982. The 
reason for concentrating on the period during which 
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Khrushchev and Brezhnev were, in turn, General Secretary 
of the CPSU is that it was then that international 
relations became an independent discipline and that 
Soviet scholars began to interest themselves seriously 
in international relations theory. In the chapters that 
follow key aspects of Soviet theory will be examined to 
see what changes have occurred and to consider whether 
the theory can, as Soviet scholars claim, explain the 
past, guide the present and predict the future. 
In choosing which aspects 
intention has been to 
possible of the Soviet 
of theory 
provide as 
view of 
to analyse, the 
full a picture as 
the world. Soviet 
theorists contend that the relations which occur at an 
international level between socialist and capitalist 
states are cardinally different from those which are 
enjoyed among socialist states or between socialist 
states and newly independent less developed countries 
(LDCs). Accordingly, these three kinds of international 
relations are examined separately in the following three 
pairs of chapters. The first chapter of each pair deals 
with pre-1956 theory and the second with the Khrushchev 
and Brezhnev period. 
The question of the order in which to examine the three 
kinds of relations turned out to be awkward. In practioe 
the three kinds of relations have taken place 
simultaneously. Historioally they were all established 
at the same time (although socialist-socialist state 
30 
relations were established last, Party relations 
predated them and influenced in significant ways the 
conception of acceptable socialist inter-state 
relations). Each seemingly logical choice of which 
category should begin the analysis produced illogical 
side-effects because of the inevitable overlap and 
interaction between categories. The order which has 
finally been chosen may seem idiosyncratic in terms of 
the importance of the three types of state to the Soviet 
Union. It has been based on two criteria: first, the 
immediate salience of relations with capitalist states 
after the revolution, and second, the central role of 
China in the development of Soviet theory. Relations 
between socialist and capitalist states are thus dealt 
with first. And since Soviet theory about the Chinese 
revolution prior to 1949 falls into the category of 
relations with LDCs, these relations are examined before 
inter-socialist relations (which include relations with 
China after the revolution). 
Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the development of peaceful 
coexistence. In 1956 Khrushchev proclaimed that peaceful 
coexistence was the basis of Soviet relations with the 
capitalist countries. Moreover, he maintained that the 
Soviet Union had always based its relations on that 
principle. It was defined as the absence of military 
conflict, together with continuing competition in the 
economic and ideological spheres. Peaceful coexistence 
is not, in the Soviet view, inconsistent with Soviet 
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support for the capitalist working class and 
international revolution. The origin of the concept and 
practice of peaceful coexistence is examined in Chapter 
Z, while its development into one of the twin pillars of 
Soviet foreign policy is traced in Chapter 3. 
When decolonization began after the Second World War, 
the Soviet Union was in the throes of post-war 
reconstruction and preoccupied by the deteriorating 
state of relations among the erstwhile allies. To begin 
with, little notice was taken of the cracKs in the 
pre-war empires (except for those countries which had 
immediately begun fighting to become socialist). When 
more serious attention began to be directed towards the 
colonies, Soviet theorists became convinced that Lenin's 
predictions about imperialism being the final stage of a 
moribund capitalism were 
that many of the newly 
proving true. They expected 
independent countries would 
become socialist. By the late 1960s, however, there was 
some disillusion with developments in the Third World 
(indeed, the fact that there ~ a Third World was, in 
itself, disappointing). By the late 1970s it had become 
debatable whether profoundly underdeveloped states could 
or should attempt to embark on a socialist path. This is 
the area of Soviet theory where both theoretical and 
practical problems have been most intractable. Chapter 4 
considers the attitude of Marx and Engels towards the 
colonies and Lenin's expectations of the national 
liberation movement. The theoretical dilemmas after 
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decolonization form the subject matter ~f Chapter 5. 
One of the most frequently encountered assertions in 
Soviet writing is that relations among socialist states 
are' "a new type of international relations", distinct in 
important ways from relations between capitalist states 
or between capitalist and socialist states. The 
theoretical explanation of what characterizes the new 
type of international relations has involved transposing 
the principle of proletarian internationalism (which 
governs relations between socialists and between 
socialist parties) to the inter-state level, where it is 
called socialist internationalism. Yet the history of 
inter-socialist relations and the theoretical debates 
that have arisen from the various crises which have 
occurred in the socialist commonwealth suggest that the 
transposition has not occurred without practical and 
theoretical difficulty. The evolution from proletarian 
to socialist internationalism is examined in Chapters 6 
and 7. Here, too, the first of the two chapters 
considers the theory before 1956, and the second looks 
at the theoretical and practical problems of relations 
within the socialist system after de-Stalinization. 
Chapters 8 and 9 are thematic rather than geographic. 
Both concern the way in which Soviet theory has adapted 
to, incorporated and posited change in the international 
system. According to Soviet policy makers and theorists, 
avoidance of war and preservation of peace have always 
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been the highest priority goals of Soviet foreign 
policy. These aims have co-existed, however, with the 
deep conviction that war is inevitable and the belief 
(seemingly confirmed by the 1917 revolution and the 
changes which occurred after 1945) that war can have the 
effect of speeding up socialist revolution. The 
combination of these two sets of views presented a 
paradox to Soviet theory which was only partially 
resolved by the recognition in 1956 that war could not 
be inevitable in a nuclear age. A further problem has 
been encountered in incorporating the theory and 
practice of neutrality, particularly in its modern 
manifestations of permanent neutrality (or neutralism) 
and non-alignment, in what is essentially a dichotomous 
view of the world. Chapter 8 deals with the changes that 
have occurred in the Soviet theory of war and peace and 
in attitudes towards neutrality. 
The importance accorded to the correlation of forces is 
relatively recent. Soviet theorists and policy makers 
maintain that the correlation has changed since the 
Second World War and that it is continuing to change in 
favour of socialism. They assert that the concept 
differs in significant ways from Western balance of 
power ideas. In Chapter 9 the way in which they 
characterize the differences are examined, as well as 
their reasons for saying that the correlation of forces 
has changed in favour of socialism. Finally, in Chapter 
10 an endeavour is made to evaluate the methodology and 
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content of Soviet theory so as to consider whether it 
can fulfil the role ascribed to it. The study ends with 
some suggestions about why theory is so important in the 
Soviet Union. 
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Not.s 
1. Wetter points out that until Stalin's wor~ on 
dialectical materialism in 1938, Soviet philosophy 
adopted Engels' in~erpretation and ~hree basic laws of 
dialectical materialism: the law of ~he mutual 
interpenetration of opposi~es; the law of the 
transformation of quantity into quality; and the law of 
the negation of the negation (Wetter, 1958, pp. 310-8). 
Stalin (1938, pp. 591-618) laid down four features of 
dialectical materialism: the general connection between 
phenomena in nature and society; the continuous movement 
and development of phenomena in nature and society; 
development as the transition from quantitative to 
qualitative change; development as the struggle between 
opposites. Historical materialism was "the extension of 
the principles of dialectical materialism ... to ~he study 
of society and of its history" (Stalin, 1938, p. 591). 
It was important to use the historical mode in 
investigating social phenomena. The combination of an 
historical approach and the dialectical method enabled 
his~ory to become "as preCise a science as ... biology" 
(Stalin, 1938, p. 601). In this way history made 
scientific prediction of the future possible and could 
be used for practical purposes. In the late 19405 
dialectical materialism was seen as a universal 
methodology without which no science could exist. It was 
"an instrument of scientific investigation, a method, 
penetrating all natural and social sciences" (Zhdanov, 
1947b, p. 10). It is still called "the universal method 
of modern science", but a warning is added that 
"analysis of the facts cannot be replaced by references 
to general propositions of dialectics" (Kharin, 1981, 
pp. 249, 251). 
2. The claim that Soviet foreign policy is scientific 
can be found in most Soviet books on international 
relations, whether they are historical or theoretical. 
See Gromyko ~ al, (Vol. 1, 1960, p. 458), Milestones 
(1967, p. 10) and Sanakoyev and Kapchenko (1973, p. 6) 
for other examples. Petrenko and Popov (1981) called the 
first section of their book "The Scientific and 
Theoretical basis of the International Politics of the 
CPSU and the Soviet State" (pp. 13-202). 
3. This quote comes from the first edition of 
Diplomaticheskii slovar' (Diplomatic Dictionary). The 
fourth edition (Vol. 1, 1984, Vol. 2, 1985, edited by 
A.A. Gromyko, A.G. Kovalev, P.P. Sevost"yanov and S.L. 
Tikhvinskii) does not mention whether or not bourgeois 
diplomacy is scientific. But Soviet diplomacy is still 
said to be built on a scientific basis, i .•• 
"Marxism-Leninism, the principles of dialectical and 
historical materialism" (Vol. 1, 1984, p. 328). 
4. Wetter distinguishes between Engels, who rejected the 
idea that there was an ultimate truth that could be 
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discovered and the Soviet view that absolute truth is 
attainable by dialectical materialism (Wetter, 1958, pp. 
52-3). Absolute truth, once attained, leaves no room for 
theoretical development, however. Since Stalin some 
philosophers have retreated from claiming absolute 
truth. The truth and irrevocability of the fundamental 
propositions of Marxism-Leninism have been proved, but 
this lIin no way signifies that every tenet put forward 
by Marxists is an absolute truth in its final form" 
(Rumyantsev, 1984, p. 129). 
5. There is a similar problem with changes in Soviet 
policy. Changes do, of course, occur, but they are 
infrequently admitted to be changes. It is even rarer to 
find an admission that a previous policy was mistaken. 
The laborious and lengthy process of theoretical change 
is described by Hough (1980), who cogently sums up 
Soviet reluctance to admit that change has taken place: 
"Any change in Soviet policy, when acknowledged at all, 
is described as the natural response of a perfectly 
consistent program to differences in conditions" (p. 
509). 
6. In 1950 Stalin wrote "Marxism and Linguistics" (1950, 
pp. 407-44) to put an end to the dominance of the 
theories of N.Y. Marr (who maintained that language has 
a class structure and therefore was part of the 
superstructure). As far as genetics were concerned, 
Stalin supported T.D. Lysenko (who held that acquired 
characteristics could be inherited) who completely 
controlled Soviet biology, agricultural science and 
genetics until 1965. For an account of the effect of 
Lysenko on Soviet science, see Zhores A. Medvedev (1969) 
and David Joravsky (1970). Barki (1971) offers an 
interesting analysis of why international relations 
presents a particular problem for Marxism. In Vol. 1 of 
the Diplomatic Dictionary published in 1960, the efforts 
of bourgeois scholars to construct a science of 
international relations or international politics were 
derided as "artificial and unfounded ll • An understanding 
of the subject required a combination of history, 
economics, international and domestic law (Gromyko et 
al, Vol. 1, 1960, p. 458). 
7. The need for area specialis~s and international 
relations theorists was recognized while Khrushchev was 
in office. It took time, however, for institutes to be 
established and speCialists to emerge. There are a 
number of interesting Western studies of the development 
of political science and international relations in the 
Soviet Union. S •• , for example, Powell and Shoup (1970), 
Theen (1971), Zimmerman (1971), Goormaghtigh (1974), 
Lynch (1984). 
S. There are signs that Gorbachev intends changing the 
system, having recognized the extent to which it stifles 
initiative and responsibility. His call for glasnost' 
(open-ness) certainly seemed to be a demand that past 
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mistakes be recognized and admitted. Moreover, the kind 
of economic discussions which took place in his first 
year as General Secretary suggested radical changes in 
the status and nature of theory. Whether he will succeed 
in changing something that seems to have become part of 
Soviet political culture remains to be seen. 
9. There are other views about the extent to which 
democratic centralism still reigns in Soviet theory. 
Hough (1980), for example, maintains that published 
views can no longer be assumed to represent official 
doctrine. They may be an attempt to criticize that 
doctrine, or to draw attention to phenomena or 
interpretations that have been neglected. They may also 
represent propagandistic statements to a mass domestic 
or foreign audience. Hough may be correct in some 
instances. Propagandistic aims, however, can quickly be 
detected from the type of journal or the size of the 
edition of the book in which the view appears. If the 
intention is criticism of official doctrine or the 
re-instatement of neglected theory, a refutation will 
almost certainly be published quite quickly unless the 
view has official support. 
10. To mention just three contemporary theorists who 
hold positions in the Central Committee apparatus and 
who will be quoted frequently in this work, Brutents and 
Ul'yanovskii are both deputy heads in the Third World 
section of the Central Committee International 
Department, while Shakhnazarov is deputy head of the 
department responsible for· liaison with foreign 
Communist Parties. 
11. For an interesting synthesis of the international 
relations theory of Marx, Engels and Lenin, see the two 
books by Kubalkova and Cruickshank (1980 and 1985). It 
is ironic (given the usually sensitive Soviet response 
to views that are considered anti-Soviet) that although 
these authors are critical of Soviet theory and policy, 
they have been favourably quoted by Soviet theorists 
because they recognize that there is a Soviet theory. 
See, for example, Petrenko and Popov (1981, pp. 8-9). 
12. The implication, of course, is that selection by 
Soviet theorists has sometimes served the purpose of 
finding evidence to support current theory, while 
ignoring evidence which refutes it. In the course of 
making this study the author has been particularly aware 
of the danger that selection can turn into selectivity 
designed to serve preconceived ideas. Every effort has 
been made to avoid this temptation. But the author 
agrees with .the Soviet view of the inherent partisanship 
of scholarship and therefore understands that the 
endeavour has probably only been partly successful. 
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CHAPTER 2. RELATIONS BETWEEN SOCIALISTS AND CAPITALISTS II 
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE UNDER LENIN AND STALIN. 
The frequent insistence by Soviet political leaders and 
international theorists after 1956 that peaceful 
coexistence was one of the two Leninist principles which 
had always underpinned Soviet foreign policy (the other 
was proletarian internationalism, which will be 
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7) may appear to be no more 
than an example of the constant need to legitimize 
present Soviet policies by finding doctrinal support 
from the Marxist-Leninist classics. The invocation of 
Lenin was certainly intended to reinforce the orthodoxy 
of both the theory and practice of peaceful coexistence, 
but it is a fact that the term was used by Lenin 
(although he preferred the Russian word, sozhitel'stvo, 
cohabitation, to the word currently used for 
coexiste~ce, sosushchestvovanie). It was used as well by 
Trotsky (1917, pp. 163, 165 and 326).1 However, to call 
this early use of the phrase 'theory' is, perhaps, to 
elevate it beyond the context in which Lenin coined the 
expression. In fact, Stalin also often maintained that 
Soviet foreign policy was based on the principle pf 
peaceful coexistence, but once the process of 
de-Stalinization had begun, his use of the term was 
ignored by Soviet writers on soviet international 
theory. In other words, contemporary Soviet theorists 
are factually correct in claiming that Soviet foreign 
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policy has always been baaed on peaceful coexistence, 
but whether that policy has always been based on a 
theory of amity between socialists and capitalists is 
arguable. 
If peaceful coexistence is defined as competition 
between socialist and capitalist states stopping short 
of military confrontation, from October 1917 onwards 
this has 
leaders. 
certainly 
With the 
been the aim of successive Soviet 
exception of the 14-nation 
intervention in the Civil War, the Polish War, the 
Winter War and the terrible experience of the Great 
Patriotic War, Soviet theorists can justly maint~in that 
they have been reasonably successful in implementing the 
principle in their relations with capitalist states. It 
is also the case that peaceful coexistence has been a 
consistent theme in Soviet writing about foreign policy. 
But contemporary Soviet scholars claim more than 
continuity of theory and policy. They imply that the 
content of peaceful coexistence has remained constant 
and that the only change has been in historical 
circumstance, which, in turn, has required different 
ways of implementing the theory. Examining Lenin's brief 
references to the principle and comparing them with 
later versions of the theory suggests, however, that 
both the intent and the content have changed more 
radically than post-Stalin leaders and theorists have 
cared to admit. 
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In terms of the history of Soviet foreign policy 
peaceful coexistence became a necessity as soon as the 
revolution had occurred, although it was not until the 
Civil War was over that the Bolshevik leadership had the 
opportunity to practise it. It entailed business-like 
relations with the capitalist world which would enable 
the Russian economy to be re-built. After Lenin's death 
it was adopted by Stalin and was an essential element in 
his doctrine of socialism in one country. Although it 
retained its business-like connotation, it gradually 
came to be envisaged as a long-term strategy. In the 
1930s, when collective security seemed to be the only 
way that fascism could be halted, peaceful coexistence 
was even more important as a means of convincing the 
capitalist countries that the Soviet Union was a 
worthwhile ally. The attempt to negotiate with Britain 
and France failed, but the theory turned out to be a 
useful way of explaining the pact with Nazi Germany. 
Throughout the Cold War which followed the victory over 
Germany in the Second World War, the Soviet leadership 
continued to claim that their foreign policy was based 
upon peaceful coexistence. 
Thus the concept of peaceful coexistence was. well 
established before Khrushchev promoted it to one of the 
main· principles of Soviet foreign policy. In this 
chapter the origin and development of the term is 
examined by considering, first, Lenin'. use of it and 
then Stalin's. The third part of the chapter deals with 
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the status of peaceful coexistence during the Cold War. 
By the time Stalin died, it was beginning to be clear 
that the concept presented certain theoretical 
difficulties which would need to be resolved if 
capitalists were to believe in its sincerity and 
socialists were to retain faith in Soviet support for 
international revolution. 
1. Peaceful coexistence in Marxism and Leninism 
It is beyond the capabilities of even the most astute 
Soviet specialists to find much doctrinal support for 
the theory or practice of peaceful coexistence in the 
works of Marx and Engels (Trush, 1977, pp. 32-3). The 
best that can be done is to attribute to Marx and Engels 
the prevision that a temporary simultaneous existence of 
states with two opposing social systems would be 
possible (Petrenko and Popov, 1981, pp. 114-5). But 
there is considerable evidence that both Marx and Engels 
thought that the revolution would occur u'all at once" 
and simultaneously" (Marx and Engels, 1965, p.47) and 
therefore the question of peaceful coexistence did not 
arise in their work (see the commentary by Kubalkova and 
Cruickshank, 1985, pp. 36-37). 
It was Leriin who really turned the idea of the 
simultaneous existence of different kinds of stat •• into 
theory in his development of the view that he shared. 
with Trotsky that one of the feature. of monopoly 
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capitalism was its uneven development (Lenin, 1915c, pp. 
339-43 and see Trotsky, 1906 in Trotsky 1962, pp. 
161-254). This meant that a socialist revolution would 
not necessarily be international, but would begin at the 
weakest link of the capitalist chain and only then 
spread to the rest of the capitalist world. It followed 
that until the revolution spread, socialism and 
capitalism would exist simultaneously (Lenin, 1916e, pp. 
77-93). But Lenin did not then lay particular emphasis 
on this intervening stage, since he did not expect it to 
be prolonged. The first revolution would act as the 
spark for the rest and the success of the first would 
depend upon this (see Chapter 6 for a more detailed 
discussion of his argument). It was only after the 
October revolution that he seriously contemplated the 
consequences of the absence of immediate revolution 
elsewhere. Peaceful coexistence became the tactical 
means by which the Soviet state could survive until the 
international revolution occurred. The length of time 
for which it was thought it would endure increased as 
the prospect of other revolutions diminished. 
Since most of Lenin's theoretical work was written 
before the revolution, and 
considered the possibility or 
before he 
necessity 
seriously 
of peaceful 
coexistence, there is very little in his major works 
which can be related to the concept. Later Soviet 
writers are correct in attributing the use of the term 
to him, but their insistence that it was one of his 
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important theories is rather exaggerated. Nor can it be 
considered part of a well thought out and elaborated 
programme of socialist foreign policy. Indeed, Chicherin 
maintained that "before the October revolution no 
attempt was ever made to work out a programme of the 
foreign policy of a socialist state in the midst of 
capitalist states" (Chicherin, 1961, p. 276). He also 
pointed out that Lenin's contribution to Bolshevik 
foreign policy after the revolution was made on an ad 
hoc basis, since the speed and intensity of events made 
the thorough, time-consuming labour of constructing and 
writing theory impossible. Thus, much of the coherence 
that there is in Lenin's theoretical pronouncements 
after the revolution has been imposed by his 
successors. 2 A consummate politician, Lenin was 
unafraid of changing his mind, adapting or even 
reversing theory if it advanced his cause. And his cause 
after the revolution was pre-eminently the survival of 
the Bolshevik state. It was to ensure this survival that 
he advanced the idea of peaceful coexistence. 
Lenin saw 
instrumental 
concessions 
peaceful coexistence essentially in 
terms, first in relation to offering 
to capitalist firms and then to 
re-integratinq Soviet Russia into the international 
economic system. The announcement and practic. of 
peaceful coexistence would reassure the capitali.t world 
that Bolshevik Russia was •••• ntially peaceable. Thus 
war would be prevented and the urgent ~a.k of 
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reconstructing the Russian 
idea was predicated on 
imperialists were, above 
economy could proceed. The 
Lenin's conviction that 
all, businessmen, more 
interested in profit than in ideology. Russi~ required a 
'breathing-space' (the need for a breathing-space or 
peredyshka was a universal theme after the revolution), 
and peaceful coexistence was how it was to be achieved. 
His first mention in 1919 of "the coexistence side by 
side of socialist and capitalist states" was made in 
connection with the need to attract foreign technical 
aid by granting concessions to foreign firms (Lenin, 
191ge, p. 39) This set the context in which he was 
always to use the phrase -- the urgent necessity for 
economic reconstruction. Although peaceful coexistence 
came to mean rather more than this in the post-Stalin 
period, it has always retained this economic aspect. 
Lenin thought that granting concessions to exploit 
Russia's natural wealth would attract foreign 
capitalists to invest in the economic future of 
socialism. Although there were risks involved in using 
foreign capital, the benefits outweighed any danger. It 
was not just that Soviet Russia would gain materially by 
being able to keep a proportion of the production. More 
importantly, there would be an opportunity to le~rn both 
techniques and technology.3 
The idea that coexistence shifts the inevit~ble conflict 
between socialist ~nd capitalist states ~w~y from 
military confrontation to the economic and ideoloqical 
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spheres (a point that is particularly emphasized in 
modern Soviet explanations of peaceful coexistence) has 
always been integral to the Soviet definition of the 
term. Lenin wa. quick to point out that trade relations 
did not mean that "the capitalist wolf would lie down 
with the socialist lamb" (Lenin, 1920f, p. 452). But it 
seemed logical that it would be more difficult for 
capitalist states to go to war with Russia once they had 
taken up concessions. Thus there were both economic and 
political arguments in favour of granting them. For the 
offer to be successful, it had to be preceded by 
peaceful coexistence, but once accepted, concessions 
would themselves serve to consolidate peaceful 
coexistence. Lenin stressed that this did not denote an 
absence of conflict between socialism and capitalism. 
The inevitable conflict would merely be transposed to a 
new sphere, or, in Lenin/s words, "the war of guns and 
tanks yields place to economic warfare" (1920f, p. 459, 
emphasis in original). 
Lenin/s theme was soon taken up by his fellow 
Bolsheviks. The treaty signed with Estonia in 1920 was 
described as: 
..... a dress rehearsal for our agreement with 
the Entente, our first experience in breaking 
the blockade and our first experiment in 
peaceful coexistence with bourgeois states" 
(Chicherin, 1961, p. 135). 
Chicherin seemed to be more realistic about the duration 
of peaceful coexistence than Lenin. Since it was as 
essential to the capitalist world .s it was to Soviet 
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Russia, it would be a prolonged relationship (Chicherin, 
1961, p. 145). Lenin was less sure that the "highly 
unstable equilibrium" could last, but he was certain 
that Soviet Russia had to "make the greatest concessions 
and sacrifices in order to preserve the peace II (Lenin, 
1921a, 148-9). 
By 1921 the Civil War had ended and the economic system 
of War Communism had proved a failure. The Kronstadt 
uprising was the result of this failure. It was put down 
and a recurrence was averted at the price of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP] (see Carr, Vol. 2, 1966 for the 
introduction of NEF). Peaceful coexistence was an 
essential" ingredient of NEF, since economic development 
would depend on foreign capital, or, as Lenin phrased 
it, concessions would be a way of "directing the 
development of capitalism into the channels of state 
capitalism" (Lenin, 1921d, p. 345). But concessions were 
not enough Russia had to be re-integrated into the 
international economic system. This was as important to 
the capitalist world as it was to the Bolshevik 
government. The Soviet delegation arrived at the Genoa 
Conference in 1922 imbued with the confidence instilled 
by Lenin: they were merchants and the result of their 
business-like behaviour would be trade on advantageous 
and politically suitable terms (Lenin, 1922a," pp. 
212-26). Chicherin (leader of the Soviet delegation) 
announced at the first session: 
• ••• the Russian delegation recognize. that in 
the present period of history, which permit. 
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the parallel existence of the old social order 
and of the new ... economic collaboration 
between the states representing these two 
systems of property is imperatively necessary 
for the general economic reconstruction" 
(Chicherin, 1922, in Degras, Vol. 1, 1951, p. 
298) • 
Although Lenin also used the term peaceful coexistence 
to describe ideal political relations (maintaining, for 
example, that the League of Nations was marked by an 
absence of anything like peaceful coexistence and that 
without Russian participation in the settlement of the 
Middle East question there would remain no grounds for 
peaceful coexistence (Lenin, 1922b, pp. 383-9»,it was 
primarily in the economic context that he used the term. 
Moreover, since he never modified his view about the 
inevitability of war, it remained a tactic aimed at 
staving off war. 
Lenin's successo~both broadened the range of relations 
to which peaceful coexistence applied and gradually 
extended it from a tactic to a longer-term strategy and 
then to an abiding principle of Soviet foreign policy. 
However, since an even older principle has always been 
the peaceful nature of socialist foreign policy which 
implies peaceful coexistence on the part of the 
socialist states, the elevation has had more to do with 
the expected response from the capitalist world than 
with any change in Soviet behaviour. In other words, 
Soviet theorists and policy makers maintain that the 
foreign policy of their country has always been ba •• d on 
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peaceful coexistence. What has changed is the reaction 
of capitalist governments to the principle. 
2. Stalin and peaoeful coexistence before the war 
Stalin won the first round in the struggle for the 
leadership after Lenin's illness and death by opposing 
the slogan "socialism in one country" to Trotsky's 
theory of permanent revolution. After the 1905 
revolution, Trotsky had argued that there would be a 
permanent state of revolutionary development between the 
democratic revolution in Russia and the socialist 
reconstruction of society. He also maintained that 
socialist reconstruction required constant internal 
struggle. The domestic revolution would, therefore, be 
permanent. Finally, he believed that the success of the 
Russian revolution depended upon revolution in the 
advanced countries of Europe. The international 
dimension of the revolution would thus also be permanent 
(Trotsky, 1962, pp. 8-9). In 1924 Stalin resurrected 
Trotsky's 1905 theory to attack it in "Foundations of 
Leninism" (Stalin, 1924a, pp. 1-85). According to 
Stalin, Trotsky had not understood the important role of 
the peasantry in the Russian revolution, and he had 
underestimated the strength and capacity of the Russian 
proletariat to lead the peasantry (Stalin, 1924a, pp. 
24-5). Furthermore, the uneven and spasmodic development 
of capitalism meant not only that revolution could occur 
in individual countries, but that the victorious 
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proletariat could and should begin building a socialist 
society (although the complete and final victory of 
socialism would require a victorious revolution in 
several countries). The Russian revolution was to be 
regarded, therefore, "not as a self-sufficient entity 
but as an aid, as a means of hastening the victory of 
the proletariat in other countries" (Stalin, 1924&, p. 
28). 
Skilfully using 
argument, Stalin 
quotes from Lenin to legitimize his 
thus stood the previously expected 
relationship between the Russian and world revolutions 
on its head. Far from the former requiring the latter, 
the former would aid the latter. And it would be able to 
do so more effectively if, instead of being expected to 
"vegetate in its own contradictions and rot away while 
waiting for the world revolution" (Stalin, 1924c, p. 
93), the Russian revolution established and consolidated 
socialism in one country. The building of socialism in 
one country required the survival of that country in a 
world of capitalist states. In other words, it was 
predicated on a period of peaceful coexistence. 
Stalin adopted the instrumental s.nse of Lenin's us. of 
the term peaceful coexistence, often using it in tandem 
with the phrase "business-like relations" (see, for 
example, his political report to the 14th Party 
Congress, 1925a, pp~ 294-5). He also, at least to begin 
with, saw it essentially as a temporary phenomenon, the 
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product of a Iitemporary equilibrium of forces ll , although 
he pointed out that the expected brief peredyshka had 
become lIa whole period of respite ll (Stalin, 1925a, pp. 
267-8) . But each time the international situation 
deteriorated, he depicted peaceful coexistence as a 
fragile state of affairs. In 1927, for example, at the 
height of the war scare,4 Stalin warned that: 
IIWhereas a year or two ago it was possible and 
necessary to speak of a period of a certain 
equilibrium and \peaceful coexistence' between 
the USSR and the capitalist countries, to-day 
we have every reason for asserting that ~ 
period of \peaceful coexistence' is receding 
into the past, giving place to a period of 
imperialist assaults and preparation for 
intervention against the USSR II (Stalin, 1927b, 
p. 295, emphasis in the original). 
Stalin's depiction of peaceful coexistence as a tactic 
comes across very clearly in this _peech. The intention 
was said to be to take account of intra-i~perialist 
contradictions and postpone war by IIbuying off ll the 
capitalists -- the longer war could be warded off, the 
better would be the Soviet position when it finally 
occurred (Stalin, 1927b, p. 296). By 1929 the advantages 
of stretching out the breathing space won at Brest 
included not only the opportunity to build up the Soviet 
economy, but also, according to one Soviet theorist, 
time for Western Communist Parties to bring the working 
class together and for the national revolutionary 
movement in the East to develop (IIVneshnyaya politika 
SSSR bez Lenina ll , 1929). The origins of peaceful 
coexistence were firmly attributed to Lenin, and it was 
said to apply particularly to economic relations. 
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The idea that peaceful coexistence shifts the 
capitalist-socialist conflict to non-military spheres 
was emphasized in the theses adopted at the Sixth 
Congress of the Communist International [CominternJ in 
1928. Great stress was given to the inevitability of 
war, but the Soviet peace policy was said to be 
essential to protect the international revolution and 
allow socialism to be constructed. It did not imply that 
the USSR has become reconciled to capitalism. On the 
contrary, it was another, more favourable form of the 
struggle against capitalism (Eudin and Slusser, Vol. 1, 
1966, pp. 138-9). Both the idea that conflict persists 
despite peaceful coexistence and the depiction of 
peaceful coexistence as a particular form of the class 
struggle were to become important elements of the theory 
under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. But neither element 
suited the kind of peaceful coexistence promoted during 
the Soviet search for collective security in the 1930s. 
Despite the hard line taken by Stalin in 1927 and the 
ultra-r'evolutionary policy adopted by the Comintern in 
1928 at its Sixth Congress, peaceful coexistence soon 
began to be envisaged as a state of affairs that would 
last "until the moment when history carries out its 
task" (Eudin and Slusser, Vol. 2, 1967, p. 437). What ,is 
more, it was accorded central importance in Soviet 
foreign policy. Although the contradictions between the 
Soviet Union and it. capitalist encirclement were said 
to repre.ent the ba.ic antagonism of the world, "the 
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problem of the peaceful coexistence of these two systems 
is the main pivot around which are grouped all the 
cardinal problems of international politics" (Eudin and 
Slusser, Vol. 2, 1967, p. 437). The Rapallo treaty (the 
article which is cited here commemorated the treaty, 
signed between Germany and Russia in 1922) offered a 
model of how relations could be established between 
countries with opposing socio-political systems, but 
with common economic and foreign policy interests. 
Once the dangers of Nazism had become apparent to the 
Soviet leadership, the call for peaceful coexistence 
began to be used in the campaign 
collective security agreement in 
to establish 
Europe. As 
a 
an 
instrument in this campaign it had perforce to apply to 
more than the economic relations between different 
systems of ownership. Thus in his maiden speech at the 
League of Nations in 1934, Litvinov gave the 
relationship between the many nations forming the Soviet 
Union as the best example of peaceful coexistence and 
went on to point out that the invitation to join the 
League represented a victory of the principle at the 
international level. The Soviet Union had always 
believed that some form of association between state. 
with different social and political systems was 
possible, "so long as there is no mutual hostility and 
if it is for the attainment of common aims u (Litvinov, 
1934, p. 92). He defined the political conditions 
necessary for successful peaceful coexistence a. 
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"reciprocal non-interference in the domestic affairs of 
the states ... ; and secondly, the existence of common 
aims" (Litvinov, 1934, pp. 92-3). 
By the mid-thirties the penalties for disagreeing with 
Stalin were already too harsh for any real difference of 
interpretation to be noticeable amongst the leadership. 
Nonetheless, a difference in emphasis can be detected in 
comparing Litvinov's and even Molotov's views on 
peaceful coexistence with those of Stalin. Stalin tended 
to emphasize that Soviet foreign policy aimed at 
preserving peace and strengthening trade relations (see, 
for example, his report to the 17th Congress of the 
CPSU, Stalin, 1934, pp. 224-43). He did not use the term 
peaceful coexistence in his reports to either the 17th 
or 18th Congresses of the CPSU. Instead he laid great 
stress on "business relations" (Stalin, 1934, p. 242, 
and Stalin, 1939, pp. 345-6). Litvinov, on the other 
hand, consistently used the term peaceful coexistence to 
describe Soviet foreign policy: 
"Our collaboration with other countries and 
our partiCipation in the League of Nations are 
based on the principle of the peaceful 
coexistence of two systems -- the socialist 
and the capitalist" (Degras, Vol. 3, 1953, p. 
220). 
In 1935, without making any attempt to explain it, 
Molotov pointed to the apparent contradiction between a 
policy of peaceful coexistence and the inevitable 
conflict between the two systems: 
"In the complex international system there i. 
at one and the same time rivalry and 
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collaboration between two opposite social 
systems. It may be objected that such a 
statement is self-contradictory, but it 
corresponds with the actual state of affairs. 
Rivalry, or, if you wish, a struggle is 
proceeding; but at the same time, and in ever 
newer forms, collaboration is developing 
between the USSR and various capitalist 
countries" (Degras, Vol 3, 1953, p. 107). 
The recognition that there is any contradiction between 
peaceful coexistence and conflict was rare enough to be 
noteworthy. The "ever-newer" forms of collaboration 
mentioned by Molotov included trade relations and 
co-operation to maintain peace. By 1939 the forms of 
collaboration between socialism and capitalism had been 
extended to include the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, 
a pact which, according to Molotov, "since it meets the 
interests of the USSR, ... is in accord with our 
principle of peaceful coexistence" (Degras, Vol. 3, 
1953, p. 368). In contravention of the principle and of 
the Pact, Nazi Germany attacked Soviet Russia in June 
1941. Peaceful coexistence had given way to the 
inevitable war 50 long predicted, yet 50 unexpected when 
it occurred. 
3. Peaceful Coexistence and the Cold War. 
There are two striking features in Soviet writing about 
international relations after the war. The first is the 
extreme sycophancy with which Stalin was treated by 
senior and junior COlleague., as well a. by scholars. 
The second feature is that the Cold War did not s •• m to 
diminish the frequency with which peaceful coexist.nce 
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was proclaimed. Moreover, it acquired a broader, more 
permanent meaning long before Khrushchev gave the term 
prominence, and certainly before the belief in 
inevitable war was jettisoned. Although its meaning 
continued to include the fostering of trade relations, 
it became more closely related to Soviet encouragement 
of the peace movement than to the "business-like 
relations" that Stalin had stressed before the war. 
Sycophancy was not, of course, confined to the field of 
international relations. Nonetheless, when one looks at 
the work of specialists like Korovin, for example, whose 
writings on international law and relations span a long 
period before the Second World War, the Cold War and the 
post-Stalin era, it seems inconceivable that a man of 
his stature would voluntarily (much less seriously) have 
larded his prose with meaningless, redundant phrases of 
which the following (it comes directly after a number of 
pages in which Stalin's every mention of peaceful 
coexistence is recorded in great detail) is only one of 
the innumerable examples: 
"BaSing himself on the teaching of Lenin and 
Stalin about the possibility of peaceful 
coexistence and co-operation of the two 
systems - capitalist and socialist, Comrade 
Molotov has formulated the prinCiples of 
peaceful coexistence at the present stage. 
Guided by the statement of the great leader of 
all progressive mankind, Stalin, w~o confirmed 
that he certainly believed in the possibility 
of friendly and prolonged cooperation betw.en 
the Soviet Union and the We.tern democracies, 
despite the existence of ideological 
disagreements, and also believed in 'friendly 
competition' between the two syste.s, Comrade 
Molotov indicated that 'this must be a type of 
international co-operation which would unite 
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in the interests of peace and security the 
efforts of states having dissimilar social and 
political systems'" (Korovin, 1951, pp. 
572-3). 
As the personality cult became increasingly ubiquitous 
in the period after the war, so more and more credit was 
given to Stalin for various aspects of Marxist-Leninist 
thought. Stalin himself pronounced on a variety of 
subjeots, but he was acclaimed as the intellectual 
expert and co-founder, with Lenin, of every aspect of 
doctrine or poliCY,S including the philosophy and policy 
of peaceful coexistence. One writer, for example, 
maintained that{ 
"As the genius who continued the great ideas 
of Marx and Lenin, Comrade Stalin, to his 
great credit, developed the teaching about the 
possibility of the coexistence of two social 
systems and their co-operation" (Lazarev, 
1949, p. 12) 
Whether Stalin's references to the possibility of 
coexistence constituted a theoretical development is 
debatable. His post-war formulation was not very 
different from what he had said about peaceful 
coexistence in the twenties and thirties. He did point 
out that it took two to coexist peacefully -- the 
possibility of co-operation and the will to co-operate 
were by no means identical. Both existed in the Soviet 
Union, but the desire was often missing in the 
capitalist countries, and this was why peaceful 
coexistence sometimes failed (Stalin, 1947, pp. 75-92). 
In the last couple of years of his life he scarcely 
mentioned peaceful coexistence, 6 emphasizing instead 
the peaceful nature of 
effect of the peace 
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Soviet foreign policy and the 
movement on reducing the 
inevitability of some wars (see, for example, Stalin, 
19SZa and 19SZb). But this is not to imply that Stalin 
ceased to favour or believe in the policy -- if that had 
been the case, it is extremely unlikely that anyone else 
would have dared to continue writing about it with 
enthusiasm. 
Despite the hostile and implacable rhetoric of the early 
Cold War period typified by Zhdanov's speech at the 
founding of the Communist Information Bureau or 
Cominform (Zhdanov, 1947, p. Z), Soviet commitment to 
peaceful coexistence continued to be articulated 
regularly. Parallel to the statements about the division 
of the world into two camps, the increasingly dangerous 
encirclement of the socialist camp and the aggressive 
nature of imperialism, every public speech on Soviet 
foreign policy contained some reference to the fact that 
peaceful coexistence was, and always had been, a 
cardinal principle of socialist foreign policy. 
There was, however, a subtle change in the way the 
preconditions for peaceful coexistence were explained 
after the Second World War. Lenin had believed that the 
economic advantages of coexistence would outweigh any 
ideological objections on the part of the capitalists. 
In other words, the bourgeois states would choo •• 
co.xistence because it was good for bu.in.... The Cold 
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War explanation of its origins concentrated more on the 
way it had been forced upon capitalism by its own 
impotence on the one hand, and by the strengthening of 
socialism on the other. In particular, it was made 
possible by intra-imperialist conflict, the conflict 
between the imperialist states and the colonies, the 
growth of the revolutionary movement within capitalist 
countries with a concomitant rise in popular sympathy 
for the USSR, all of which weakened the capitalist camp. 
This weakness and the strength and might of the Soviet 
proletariat, its success in building socialism and the 
organized force of the Soviet army made it necessary for 
the capitalist camp to accept peaceful coexistence 
(Lazarev, 1949, p. 12). Fear of Soviet power, rather 
than business interests, was now thought to motivate 
peaceful coexistence. This has become an increasingly 
prominent aspect of the theory. 
Another change from the way in which Lenin had envisaged 
the period of co-operation was in' the length of time for 
which it was thought it would last. Lenin had expressed 
doubt on the matter, and while Chicherin had envisaged a 
longer period, it was still essentially considered to be 
a "respite" or "breathing-space" in the inevitable 
conflict between socialism and capitalism. Lenin'. 
doubts were forgotten in the post-war attribution of the 
idea. Malenkov (1947, p. 3) maintained that coexistence 
was "inevitable for a long period of time" and both 
Lenin and Stalin were .aid always to have believed in 
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prolonged co-operation: 
"The great leaders of the Soviet Union, Lenin 
and Stalin, have often firmly asserted that 
the Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that 
the peaceful coexistence of the two systems, 
socialism and capitalism, is inevitable for a 
prolonged period of time" (Korovin, 1951, p. 
566) • 
Particular attention began to be paid to the reciprocal 
aspects of peaceful co-operation. Korovin quoted both 
Zhdanov (1947) and Malenkov (1947), for example, when 
they separately, but using identical words, insisted in 
1947 that coexistence could only be based upon 
observation of the principle of reciprocity and the 
fulfillment of obligations which have been undertaken 
(Korovin, 1951, p. 572). Molotov preferred the word 
co-operation to coexistence. He called for peaceful 
competition which would enable individual states to 
fulfill their inherent potential and enjoy "closer ~nd 
more all-embracing mutual co-operation with one another" 
(Molotov, 1949, p. 263). Co-operation did not require 
identical systems, merely "respect for the system which 
the nation has approved" (Korovin, 1951, p. 25). 
While stressing reciprocity, the idea which had been 
shelved during the search for collective security in the 
19305, namely that conflict shifts to other sphere.s, 
began to be emphasized again. The competitive aspects of 
peaceful coexistence were welcome because they would 
demonstrate the superiority of the socialist economic 
system: 
"We are sure that in conditions of the 
peaceful coexistence of the two systems and in 
conditions of peaceful competition, the 
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socialist economic system must be victorious" 
(Seleznev, 1951, p. 31). 
By the time Malenkov presented the main report at the 
19th Congress of the CPSU in 1952, many of the elements 
of peaceful coexistence later to be stressed by 
Khrushchev were included in his explanation of what it 
implied. Malenkov attributed the policy to Stalin and 
there can be no doubt that Stalin approved of the 
contents of Malenkov's speech. He declared that the 
Soviet Union was desirous of developing international 
co-operation, particularly with the USA, Britain, France 
and the other bourgeois nations. The Soviet commitment 
to peace and security was based on the premise that: 
"The peaceful coexistence of capitalism and 
communism and co-operation are quite possible, 
given a mutual desire to co-operate, readiness 
to carry out commitments undertaken and 
observance of the principle of equality and 
noninterference in the internal affairs of 
other states. The Soviet Union has always 
stood for and now stands for the development 
of trade and co-operation with other 
countries, irrespective of differences in 
social systems. The Party will continue to 
pursue this policy· on the basis of mutual 
advantage" (Malenkov, 19S2, p.l0S). 
Malenkov returned to an economic explanation of why 
peaceful coexistence would be a rational policy for 
bourgeois states to follow. Instead of needing to 
produce more and more arms, capitalist industry would b. 
kept busy by the expansion of trade with the socialist 
countries. The -economy of underdeveloped countries would 
also be assisted by peaceful coexistenoe, he maintained, 
although he did not enlarge on how this would occur. 
Malenkov also saw peaceful coexistence in terms of 
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peaceful economic competition, a competition which would 
prove the superiority of the socialist system. 
Malenkov's exposition disclosed the essential 
contradiction which had always been present in peaceful 
coexistence, both in its Leninist, more limited, 
instrumental variant and, even more so, in the later 
broader interpretation. While it is clearly the case 
that peace provides the most favourable conditions for 
building socialism, it must also delay international 
revolution. If war exposes and aggravates the endemic 
conflict within bourgeois society, speeding up the 
disintegration 
capitalism (see 
which eventually causes the collapse of 
Chapter 8), it is only logical to 
suppose that peace must del.y this process which 
promotes the speedier establishment of socialism. In 
other words, peace not only provides favourable 
conditions for building socialism. It also prolongs the 
conditions under which capitalism can consolidate 
itself. And if Malenkov was right in saying that 
peaceful coexistence is good for the capitalist economy, 
allowing for full employment without the need to expand 
the arms industry, then it must also prevent the 
economic crises which, according to Marxism-Leninism, 
hasten the moment when revolution becomes inevitable. 
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4. Conclusion 
It is clear that peaceful coexistence was a much 
articulated theme of Soviet foreign policy long before 
it received prominence as part of Khrushchev's new 
doctrinal package announced at the 20th Party Congress 
in 1956. Indeed, between 1953 and 1956 it was as much 
the platform of his rivals for leadership as it was his. 
Given the prevalent fear that the imperialist countries 
might take advantage of Stalin's death to launch an 
attack on the Soviet Union, it is perhaps not surprising 
that Malenkov gave the assurance in his oration at 
Stalin's funeral that the Soviet Union's foreign policy 
was "based on the Lenin-Stalin premise of the 
possibility of prolonged coexistence and peaceful 
competition of two different systems" (Malenkov, 1953a, 
p. 249). Later, when that fear (and the fear of Beria) 
must already have been allayed, he repeated the 
assurance, adding that there was no objective reason for 
conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States 
both their national and trade interests, as well as 
international security would be ensured by normal 
relations between them (Malenkov, 1953b, pp. 3-12). 
'Since it has always been an unambiguous tenet ·of 
Marxism-Leninism that there is every objective reason 
for conflict between capitalism and socialism (even if 
it became transposed to the economic sphere under 
peaceful coexistence), it can be argued that his 
analysis was as revisionist as anything produced later 
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by Khrushchev. 
That the new version of peaceful coexistence was 
intended to involve more than just the absence of war 
and expansion of trade relations soon became clear. 
While international economic links were said to be an 
objective economic need of all countries, determined by 
the international division of labour, political and 
cultural co-operation was also envisaged. Successful 
co-operation was said to require strict observation of 
the norms of international law, particularly respect for 
sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs 
of other states (Selektor, 1955, pp. 38-40). This was a 
far more extensive application of peaceful coexistence 
than had occurred previously. And it was to bring to the 
fore some of the theoretical problems inherent in the 
concept. 
In fact, ever since the term had first been used, it had 
contained a potential clash of security and 
revolutionary interests. In the Stalin era little 
attempt was made to explore the relationship between it 
and international revolution, or to explain the 
contradiction between peaceful coexistence and the 
equally firmly held belief in inevitable conflict 
between the two systems. After Stalinls death, however, 
considerable effort. were made to show that peaceful 
coexistence, like the' peaceful nature of Soviet foreign 
polioy, was in the, intere.t. of the international 
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working class. In 1955, for example, one scholar 
explained ~he rela~ionship of peaceful coexis~ence ~o 
revolu~ion in ~he following way: 
" ... i~ is ~heir devotion to proletarian 
interna~ionalism which makes Soviet leaders 
follow a policy of peace. The successful 
building of communism in the Sovie~ Union is 
~he fundamen~al con~ribution made by ~he 
Sovie~ Union to libera~ing other countries 
from ~he yoke of capi~alism. The more 
successful ~he Soviet Union is in building 
communism, ~he more i~ will inspire the 
peoples of the capitalist, colonial and 
dependen~ coun~ries. So, by building communism 
and s~ruggling for peace to do i~ in, ~he CPSU 
and ~he Sovie~ state fulfils its international 
duty to the working class and all workers" 
(Selektor, 1955, p. 38). 
As we shall see in ~he next chapter, the need to 
rationalize the apparen~ contradictions became 
particularly urgent once the Chinese had begun to 
dispute the idea that peaceful coexistence was good for 
revolution. But it is difficult not to conclude with the 
Chinese tha~ al~hough peaceful coexistence may be in the 
security interests of the international working class, 
i~ can hardly be in its revolutionary interests if it 
serves to delay the revolution. In the early years of 
Soviet power it may have seemed rational to make 
international revolution subservient to Soviet state 
security (that is, reasonable to all except the 
left-wing revolutionaries who, in Lenin's term, were 
suffering from an "infantile disorder"), at least until 
the Soviet Union was strong enough to defend itself. 
After the war, and particularly before any Soviet 
leaders admitted that nuclear weapons made the risks of 
war unacceptable and the survival of either revolution 
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or reaction unlikely, the argument that peaceful 
coexistence served the interests of the revolution 
became far weaker. As will become evident when the 
Sino-Soviet dispute is discussed in Chapter 7, once the 
authority of Stalin could no longer be used to affirm 
the correctness of the teaching, the argument that 
international revolution required peaceful coexistence 
did not convince the Chinese, even when the potential 
destructiveness of nuclear weapons was admitted. The 
intellectual effort which Soviet scholars put into 
refuting the idea that there was any contradiction 
between the interests of the Soviet Union and the future 
of international revolution and the theoretical 
development of the concept of peaceful coexistence which 
resulted from it, forms the subject of the next chapter. 
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Note. 
1. Western scholars sometimes seem to imply that it is 
signficant that Lenin used the word sozhitel'stvo and 
not sosushchestvovanie, the word which is now used in 
the term peaceful coexistence (see, for example, 
Kub~lkov~ and Cruickshank, 1980, pp. 106-7). In fact, 
the only significance is probably that the former word 
means cohabitation and is usually used for more intimate 
personal relationships than were ever intended by the 
term peaceful coexistence. Egorov (1971, pp. 119-21) 
denies that there is any difference between the terms. 
He also denies emphatically that Trotsky coined the term 
or the policy. For a discussion of the origins of the 
term, see Griffiths (1964). 
2. This is not, of course, unique to Soviet scholars. A 
not dissimilar process can be observed in Western 
scholars who wish to discredit Soviet theory, 
particularly as it relates to peace and peaceful 
coexistence. They tend to search out contradictions in 
Lenin and to use them to prove that Soviet leaders 
cannot be sincere, or cannot mean what they proclaim. 
Kolakowski, for example, quotes Lenin's view in 1920 
that "while capitalism and socialism live side by side 
they cannot live in peace" to prove that he did not 
really believe in peaceful coexistence (Kolakowski, 
1978, Vol. 2, p. 497). See Egorov (1971) for examples to 
which Soviet scholars particularly object. The 
temptation to select extracts to prove one's thesis is 
almost irresistible, as this author is all too well 
aware (see Chapter 1, footnote 12). 
3. Lenin constantly urged his fellow Bolsheviks to learn 
from the bourgeoisie. Those Soviet mezhdunarodniki who 
have pressed for the adoption of "Western" methodology 
in the study of international relations have quoted him 
on this topic to lend respectability to their plea for a 
more SOCiological approach to the subject. See, fo~ 
example, Ermolenko (1977, p. 62). 
4. It is debatable whether Stalin really expected war in 
1927. But it is certain that he used the war scare as 
one of the reasons for the forced pace of the First Five 
Year Plan which was adopted soon afterwards. But at the 
same time as the warnings about imminent war were being 
voiced, an interesting aspect of economic peaceful 
coexistence emerged in an effort to protect the Soviet· 
economy from the harmful consequence. of any future 
economic sanctions and from the growing protectionism of 
the times. The Soviet Union made the first of a number 
of proposals for an economic non-aggression pact to an 
International Economic Conference in Geneva in 1927 
("Vneshnyaya politika SSSR bez Lenina", 1929, p. 163). 
The call was repeated in 1931 in a draft protocol 
submitted by the Soviet Delegation to the Commis.ion of 
67 
Enquiry on European Union (Degras, Vol. 2, 1952, pp. 
499-500), and again in 1933. An essential element of the 
draft proposal was acceptance of the principle of "the 
peaceful coexistence of all nations irrespective of 
their social, political and economic systemsO (Eudin and 
Slusser, Vol. 2, 1967, p. 533). These calls for economic 
non-aggression bear a close resemblance to Gorbachev's 
proposals in his political report to the 27th Party 
Congress (Gorbachev, 1986). 
5. An active industry of the time consisted of combing 
Stalin's Works as the successive volumes appeared to 
find references to various subjects. Articles would then 
be written on "J.V. Stalin on .••. " whatever subject had 
been researched (see, for example, Lazarev, 1951, who 
wrote on °J.V. Stalin about non-interference in the 
internal affairs of a state and the concept of 
intervention" or Zadorozhny, 1951 on "Questions of 
international law in the thirteenth volume of the Works 
of J.V. Stalin"). Another aspect of this endeavour 
involved interpreting the significance of Stalin's 
pronouncements on a particular subject for other fields 
of study (see Kechek"yan, 1952 and Kozhevnikov, 1951 on 
the significance of the work of J.V. Stalin on Marxism 
and the question of linguistics for the history of 
political studies and international law respectively. 
6. Korovin, for example, listed every mention by Stalin 
of peaceful coexistence. He cited interviews given by 
Stalin in 1946, 1947, 1948 and 1949, and then suddenly 
returned to a 1936 quote. Since he quoted things that 
Zhdanov, Malenkov and Molotov had said on the subject 
after 1949, it was not that his account did not go 
beyond that year (Korovin, 1951, pp. 569-72). 
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CHAPTER 3. RELATIONS BETWEEN SOCIALISTS AND CAPITALISTS III 
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE FROM KHRUSHCHEV TO BREZHNEV. 
Khrushchev's announcement at the 20th Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] in 1956 that 
Soviet foreign policy was based on the principle of 
peaceful coexistence with states of different socialist 
systems had a profound effect on Soviet foreign 
relations, but not at first with the states to which the 
principle pertained. The Chinese leadership interpreted 
it as one of the many examples of the diminution of 
Soviet revolutionary fervour and proof that Khrushchev 
was not a fitting leader of the international Communist 
movement. 
As far as the statesmen to whom it was primarily 
addressed were concerned, peaceful coexistence was 
generally believed to be no more than a new tactic in 
the Soviet plot to mislead and disarm the West. One 
could speculate that a swifter and more positive 
response from the Western leaders to whom the new policy 
was directed might have averted some of the later events 
which were seen as proof positive that nothing had 
changed. But Khrushchev's victory in the post-Stalin 
leadership struggle coincided with Eisenhower's election 
as American president, the implacably anti-Soviet State 
Secretaryship of John Foster Dulles and the replacement 
of the policy of containment by the rhetoric of 
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"roll-back". The prevailing mood amongst Western 
decision-makers was not conducive to d.tente. 
Khrushchev himself was ambivalent about the priorities 
of Soviet policy. He was intent on projecting Soviet 
influence, as well as improving East-West relations. 
Moreover, he ha4 to convince the Chinese that he had not 
lost interest in international revolution. Not 
surprisingly, his foreign policy often seemed erratic. 
Soviet intervention to suppress the Hungarian uprising, 
the Berlin crises of 1958-1961 and the Cuban missile 
crisis all seemed to confirm to Western policy makers 
that peaceful coexistence did not imply anything new in 
Soviet international politics. Nonetheless, Khrushchev 
and his successors continued to insist that Soviet 
foreign policy towards capitalist states was and always 
had been based on peaceful coexistence. 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the claim that Soviet 
policy towards capitalist states had always been based 
on the principle of peaceful coexistence is not as 
far-fetched as it was thought to be when Cold War 
passions were high. No previous leader, however, had 
used the term quite as insistently as Khrushchev did a~d 
it was taken up widely by writers on Soviet foreign 
policy. For that reason peaceful coexistence is 
pre-eminently .ssociated with Soviet foreign policy in 
the period after 19S6. But even when Khrushchev fell 
from power and ~is name di.appeared from Soviet writing 
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on foreign policy, peaceful coexistence retained its 
currency. In fact, although it was Khrushchev who 
promoted the concept to what some theorists called the 
"general line of Soviet foreign policy", his success in 
promoting it was less impressive than that of Brezhnev. 
The high point came in the early 1970s, when a period of 
d'tente in Soviet-European and Soviet-American relations 
was crowned with summit meetings, the SALT accords and 
the Helsinki Agreement on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe. 
By the time the latter was signed, however, detente had 
already begun to decline. The West perceived Soviet arms 
procurements and policy in the Third World to be 
infringements of peaceful coexistence. Soviet policy 
makers, on the other hand, maintained that detente was 
being undermined by a Western (particularly American) 
leadership which could not accept a new, reduced role in 
world affairs. Despite disappointment in the fruits of 
d'tente, Soviet policy towards states with a different 
social structure is still said to be based on the 
principles of peaceful coexistence. 
As far as the development of the concept is concerned, 
peaceful coexistence expanded in meaning after Stalin'. 
death from simple business-like relations to something 
that wa. said to be more than just peace or the absence 
of war. It was no longer a tactic or even a strategy, 
but had become, with proletarian internationalis., the 
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principle on which Soviet foreign policy was based. On 
the one hand it implied co-opera~ion, non-interference 
in domestic affairs and mutual respect for sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and independence. On the other 
hand, while excluding military confrontation, it 
included economic competition and ideological struggle. 
It was said to be a particular manifestation of the 
class struggle and to be consonant wi~h the furthering 
of international revolution. These claims and the 
theoretical problems they have caused form the subject 
of this chapter. 
It will become clear that the concept of peaceful 
coexistence did not trouble Soviet theorists much until 
it was elevated to one of the twin pillars on which 
Soviet foreign policy was based. Once it was expanded 
beyond the simple idea of the absence of war and the 
encouragement of international economic relations, 
however, it became apparent that there were 
contradictions between peaceful ,coex istence (which 
defined state relations) and proletarian 
internationalism (which defined class relations) that 
were extremely difficult to reconcile. There were also 
inconsistencies in the different goals peaceful 
coexistence was intended to pursue and the kind of world 
it was to promote. These contradictions would, perhaps, 
have remained less pronounced, or at least 1 ••• open to 
public scrutiny <although they would Dot have 
di.appeared) if it had not beeD for the Chin ••• 
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objections to the theory. In response to these 
objections, Soviet scholars expended a great deal of 
effort on showing that peaceful coexistence was 
consonant with international revolution and that the 
Soviet Union could be both the standard bearer of peace 
and a force for radical change within other societies. 
Their efforts have not been entirely successful. The 
revolutionary aspects of the theory have remained 
unpersuasive and it is, therefore, difficult not to 
conclude that peaceful coexistence is a coherent theory 
of interstate relations, but an unconvincing one for 
positing the spread of socialism. 
1. Khrushchev'. peaceful coexistence 
(a) The 20th Party Congress 
Khrushchev by no means claimed originality when he 
listed the steadfast pursuit of the Leninist policy of 
peaceful coexistence first amongst the tasks confronting 
Soviet foreign policy in his report to the 20th Party 
Congress (Khrushchev, 1956a, p. 38). On the contrary, he 
too insisted that peaceful coexistence had always been 
the general line of Soviet foreign policy and that it 
was neither a policy of expediency, nor a question of 
tactics, but a fundamental principle. But he explained 
the options in a far mQre stark way than they had ever 
before been described: 
- ••• there are only two ways: either peaceful 
coexistence or the most destructive war in 
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history. There is no third way ... II 
(Khrushchev, 1956a, p. 37). 
For a while after the enunoiation of the Pancha Shila, 1 
many Soviet theoretical exegeses of peaceful coexistence 
concentrated on the five principles, the democratic 
foundations of international relations which, while not 
far-reaching enough to encompass entirely socialist 
international policy, certainly formed part of the 
principles that guided that policy (Korovin, 1956, p. 
51). The principles were: respect for territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, 
non-interference in internal affairs, equality and 
mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence which, it was 
said, both summarized the other four principles and had 
a more active element, entailing all-round co-operation 
to strengthen peace and improve living conditions 
(Korovin, 1956, pp. 47-8).2 Some Soviet theorists were 
particularly eager to demonstrate the international 
legal aspects of the five principles. They were said to 
represent, by their nature, the essence of international 
customary law, the starting point for defining rules of 
a more particular type. This meant that even if they 
were not incorporated into specific treaties, they were 
still valid, since lithe embodiment of a custom in a 
treaty is merely a case of it. formal confi~mation" 
(Durdenevsky, 1956, pp. 616-7).3 
The niceties of showing that the five principles already 
exi.ted in international law and that therefore peaceful 
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coexistence applied to all international relations 
whether or not it was explicitly recognized as valid by 
individual countries soon, however, had to give way to 
more pressing needs. If peaceful coexistence was to 
remain credible, it had to be proved that the 
intervention in Hungary had not contravened its 
principles. Not long afterwar4s it became necessary to 
demonstrate that the pursuit of peaceful coexistence 
with capitalist states did not diminish Soviet 
revolutionary zeal or international responsibility. 
(b) The response to doctrinal objections 
Whereas in 1956 the placing of. bases on foreign 
territory "with or without forced consent" was defined 
as a violation of the principle of respect for 
territorial integrity and sovereignty (Korovin, 1956, p. 
474), a distinction began to be made between actions 
taken "by invitation" and others, at least in relation 
to socialist countries. The problem was that although 
peaceful coexistence referred to socialist-capitalist 
relations rather than to relations among socialist 
countries, socialist internationalism, on which 
socialist-socialist relations- were based, was said ~o 
subsume the "general democratic principles" which 
constituted peaceful coexistence (see Chapter 7). But it 
also included the duty of offering fraternal aid and 
co-operation and these latter element. could (and were) 
used to explain the intervention in Hungary in 19'6 
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(see, for example, Ponomarev, 1960, pp. 650-1). 
Nonetheless, care was taken to explain that Soviet 
actions had not infringed any of the principles of 
peaceful coexistence: 
"It should be emphasized that glvlng help to a 
friendly government who asks for it against an 
attack by armed bands ... is not interference. 
As the recent Hungarian events showed, such 
aid serves the purpose of defending 
international peace and security" (Krylov and 
Durdenevsky, 1957, p. 12). 
The Chinese objections to peaceful coexistence probably 
took a while to surface. But in the aftermath of Hungary 
there was an urgent need to re-establish cohesion within 
the international movement. A meeting of representatives 
of Communist and Workers' Parties was held in 1957, 
where the correctness of the main points of the new 
doctrine announced at the 20th Party Congress was 
confirmed (the other issues discussed at the 1957 
conference will be dealt with in Chapter 7). The main 
content of the epoch was the transition from capitalism 
to socialism. World development was determined by the 
competition between the two systems, a competition in 
which socialism would demonstrate its superiority. 
Renewed faith was expressed in the principles of and 
need for peaceful coexistence. It was a question of "war 
or peaceful coexistence" and all the signatories of the 
1957 Declaration, including the Chinese, regarded the 
struggle for peace as their foremost task. They agreed 
that: 
" ••• the Leninist principle of peaceful 
coexi.tence of the two .yst.m •••• i. the firm 
foundation of the foreign policy of the 
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socialist countries and the reliable 
foundation of peace and friendship among the 
peoples. The five principles advanced jointly 
by the Chinese People's Republic and the 
Republic of India and the program adopted by 
the Bandung conference of African and Asian 
countries correspond to the interests of 
peaceful coexistence" ("Declaration of the 
Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties" 
["Declaration"], 1957, p. ~. 
Although the Chinese signed the 1957 declaration, they 
were not really convinced that peaceful coexistence 
represented anything more than selling out to 
capitalism. A further meeting was held in 1960 and this 
time the object was to reconcile the Chinese leadership. 
It had become necessary, therefore, to be more explicit 
about the advantages of peaceful coexistence for the 
future of socialism. For one thing, socialist foreign 
policy was said to rest on "the firm foundation of the 
Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence and economic 
competition between the socialist and capitalist 
countriesn ("Statement of the Meeting of Representatives 
of the Communist and Workers' Parties" ["Statement"], 
1960, p. 7). For another, it was clearly re-stated that 
the choices were peaceful coexistence or destructive 
war. But it was also affirmed that "peaceful coexistence 
of states does not imply renunciation of the class 
struggle". On the contrary, it provided favourable 
opportunities for the development of the class struggle 
in the capitalist countries and the national liberation 
movement ("Statement", 1960, p. 8). 
This explanation clearly did not r •• olve all the 
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problems caused by peaceful coexistence. Soviet 
theorists spent the next few years arguing against three 
separate kinds of opposition to it or to the Soviet 
interpretation of the term. At one extreme were the 
bourgeois opponents who falsified history to prove that 
Soviet theory had never been, and could not be, basad on 
peaceful coexistence. Equally misguided were the 
revisionists who believed that peaceful coexistence 
applied not only to relations between opposing systems, 
but also to inter-socialist relations. At the other 
extreme, dogmatists denied that there was any need for 
peaceful coexistence and misinterpreted its effects on 
revolution. In reply to 
detailed historical evidence 
the bourgeois 
was produced 
opponents, 
to prove 
Lenin's devotion to peaceful coexistence (see, for 
example, Gromyko, 1962, Chapter VII, Zorin et A~, 1963, 
and Trukhanovsky, 1963). The revisionists were merely 
acting as apologists for (and playing into the hands of) 
the imperialists by not recognizing that socialist 
international relations went beyond peaceful coexistence 
(Gromyko, 1962, p. 71). Dogmatists (it was not 
explicitly stated who they were until after the 
Sino-Soviet dispute became public in 1963) also armed 
the imperialist opponents of peaceful coexistence, since 
they affirmed that peaceful coexistence could never be 
more than a temporary truce (Gromyko, 1962, p. 72). 
Khrushchev himself insisted that peace and peaceful 
coexistence were not one and the .ame thing. Peaceful 
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coexistence was more than the absence of war, or an 
unstable truce between wars. It was based on the mutual 
renunciation of war as a means of settling international 
disputes (Khrushchev, 1961b, p. 49).5 But Soviet 
theorists did not rest with accusing dogmatists of the 
treachery of providing ammunition for the imperialist 
opponents of peaceful coexistence. Instead they began to 
demonstrate the revolutionary nature of peaceful 
coexistence, emphasizing in particular that it did not 
denote the end of class struggle, that it augured well 
for the spread of socialism and that it implied both 
economic competition and ideological vigilance. 
Peaceful coexistence was said to be "a specific form of 
the class struggle between socialism and capitalism" 
(Nikitin, 1959, p. 339) which did not mean that there 
was conciliation between the two systems or that 
antagonisms between them disappeared (Gromyko, 1962, pp. 
102-3). In fact, peaceful coexistence could not and 
would not affect any antagonisms which arose from the 
objective processes of historical development. As far as 
the historically determined conflict between the working 
class and the bourgeoisie in particular countries was 
concerned, it would continue, whether or not there was 
peaceful coexistence. But peaceful coexistence made it 
more likely that the means of waging it, and therefore 
of accomplishing the transition to socialism, would be 
peaceful (Gromyko, 1962, pp. 98-9). Nor did peaceful 
coexistence decre.se intra-imperialist contradictions. 
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On the contrary, it served to aggravate them, since they 
could no longer be temporarily resolved at the expense 
of the socialist countries. So the struggle would be 
turned inwards at the very time that the imperialist 
camp was, in any case, becoming smaller. The Soviet 
Union was not, however, in favour of these 
contradictions being resolved by force, since this would 
draw the working masses into the horror of war. In any 
case, there was a danger that an inter-imperialist war 
would escalate into world nuclear war (Gromyko, 1962, p. 
104). 
The way in which Soviet scholars explained the role of 
peaceful coexistence in the international class struggle 
was particularly convoluted. On the one hand, it was 
said to be a specific form of the class struggle. On the 
other hand, peaceful coexistence was an international 
form of the class struggle which manifested itself 
through inter-state relations, but .which also had 
profoundly beneficial effects on the domestic class 
struggle within capitalist states. It limited and 
paralyzed imperialist aggression, and it aided the 
domestic class struggle in three other ways: firstly, by 
supporting it against imperialist reaction and secondly, 
by allowing the Soviet Union to demonstrate proletarian 
solidarity by putting forward a peaceful foreign policy. 
Finally, by enabling socialism to be constructed 
successfully, it gave the proletariat a powerful weapon 
in the class struggle: the demonstration of the 
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superiority of socialism. fhis was proof that the bases 
of Soviet foreign policy "fully answers the class needs 
of the proletariat, answers to its vital interests and 
to the vital interests of all workers (Gromyko, 1962, p. 
~8). 
As far as the national liberation struggle was 
concerned, proletarian internationalism rather than 
peaceful coexistence operated in the relationship 
between the socialist countries and the colonial 
countries. As a result, the Soviet Union would continue 
to support their struggle for independence. This would 
not contradict the principles of peaceful coexistence. 
Nonetheless, peaceful coexistence would itself have very 
positive effects on the national liberation struggle, 
since it involved supporting disarmament, and without 
arms, the colonizers would not be able to use force to 
suppress the colonial peoples (Gromyko, 1962, pp. 
111-4). 
It was simpler to explain how the peaceful competition 
to which conflict between the social systems had been 
transposed would positively influence the spread of 
socialism. Socialism would win the economic competition 
and this would demonstrate its advanta;es. But the 
purpose of the competition was to benefit humankind: 
liThe proposed competition serves honourable 
aim.: which system guarante.s the best 
conditions for people'. live., who produce. 
more peaceful industrial and agricultural 
goods, builds more hous •• , guarant •• s b.tt.r 
conditions for science and culture, for the 
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flowering of the human personality?" (Korionov 
and Yakovlev, 1961, pp. 110-1). 
Moreover, the competition was not one in which the 
stronger side aimed to crush the weaker or to exploit it 
or extract profits from it. On the contrary, "this 
competition presupposes an expansion of co-operation 
between the two social systems and cultural links 
between them" (Korionov and Yakovlev, 1961, p. 111). 
Contrary to what Malenkov had suggested several years 
previously, expanding economic links would not save 
capitalist countries from economic crises (Gromyko, 
1962, p. 111). The inevitable crises would continue to 
take place and meanwhile, the clear advantages of 
socialism would ensure the victory of the socialist mode 
of production (Ponomarev, 1960, p. 665). Although 
cultural links were envisaged, Soviet theorists 
increasingly emphasized that peaceful coexistence did 
not extend to ideology. On the contrary, a tense 
struggle was developing in the ideological field 
(Ponomarev, 1960, p. 665). Any attempts by bourgeois 
politicians to impose peaceful coexistence in the sphere 
of ideas was described as "direct ideological subversion 
aimed at spiritually and ideologically disarming the 
builders of socialism and communism" (Sovetov, 1964, p. 
8). 
In Suslov's public announcement of the Sino-Soviet 
dispute, it became clear who the dogmatists were in 
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relation to peaceful coexistence. 
Chinese objections to it in his 
Suslov listed the 
exposition of the 
ideological disagreements between the fraternal 
(for their other objections, see Chapter 
parties 
7) . The 
Chinese, Suslov said, did not understand the imperative 
of peaceful coexistence which resulted from the urgent 
need to avoid thermonuclear war. Moreover, they 
discredited the idea of peaceful economic competition 
between the two systems (Suslov, 1963, pp. 7-11). It is 
not inconceivable that the desire to impress upon the 
Chinese that the Soviet Union, too, was unafraid of the 
US "paper tiger" had some influence on the decision to 
place missiles in Cuba in 1962. In the event, the Cuban 
missile crisis failed to convince the Chinese of the 
resoluteness of Soviet policy. It also served to 
discredit Khrushchev's avowal of peaceful coexistence 
(although the aftermath produced measures like the 
institution of the hotline and the signing of a limited 
Test Ban Treaty). Finally, it left K.hrushchev with very 
little time to achieve the improvement in 
capitalist-socialist relations for which he had 
sacrificed the solidarity of the international communist 
movement. 6 
2. P.ac.ful co.xi.t.nc. and det.nt. uAd.r Br.zhnlv 
The hallmark of Br.zhnev's foreign policy, particularly 
in the early year., was caution. There was little 
immediate chanq. in Sovi.t policy toward. the oth.r 
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socialist countries and relations with the capitalist 
West were not immediately affected by Khrushchev's 
dismissal. But to begin with there was a definite change 
in the tone of foreign policy pronouncements. While it 
continued to be maintained that Soviet foreign policy 
towards states with a different social system was based 
on the principles of peaceful coexistence, Brezhnev used 
the term far less abundantly and with considerable less 
enthusiasm than Khrushchev had.7 He was perhaps even 
more verbally belligerent in his criticism of Western, 
particularly American, international politics (see, for 
example, his report to the Z3rd Congress of the CPSU in 
1966, Brezhnev, 1966, pp. 36-67). He also had less 
predilection for theorizing and his speeches tended to 
be concerned with events rather than the developments of 
theory. 
On the other hand, Brezhnev pursued the policy of 
peaceful coexistence with a great deal more success than 
Khrushchev and he enshrined the term in the new 1977 
Soviet constitution (Constitution of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, 1985, p. 23). By the beginning of 
the 19705, once relations with the We.t began to bear 
fruit, .he extolled the advantages of a co-operative 
relationship with the capitalist countrie., particularly 
the USA, a. frequently as Khrushchev had done, 
preferring, however, to use the term d'tente rather than 
peaceful coexistence. Theorist., too, began to write 
about the ·proce •• " of d'tente and the ·principle· of 
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peaceful coexistence (see, for example, Trofimenko, 
1975, p. 3).8 
The 1970s were, both in the real world and in Soviet 
theory, the highpoint of ~ detente. Soviet writing on 
international relatio~ like Brezhnev's speeches, was 
filled with the universal benefits it brought. By the 
end of the decade, however, Brezhnev and his theorists 
were forced to consider why it was failing. The causes 
were seen to be entirely imperialist, since Soviet 
policy was said to be steadfast in upholding the 
principles of peaceful coexistence. Brezhnev's report to 
the 26th Party Congress in 1981 (Brezhnev, 1981, pp. 
27-41) indicated his disappointment. He scarcely 
mentioned peaceful coexistence, concentrating instead on 
a catalogue of American infringements. If it is true, as 
many Western Sovietologists believed, that Brezhnev, 
like Nixon, wanted to be known to posterity as the man 
who had made detente, he must, towards the end of his 
life, have feared failure. 
Although Brezhnev himself did not devote much time to 
international relations theory, the mezhdunarodniki (the 
academic international relations specialists) continu.d 
to analyse various aspects of peaceful coexistence. In 
countle.s article. and books, peaceful coexistence was 
defined, its successes listed (in terms of arms treaties 
like the Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968, mutually 
advantageous economic agreements and Soviet proposals 
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for disarmament, collective security agreements and 
nuclear-free zones) and then it was affirmed that the 
class struggle would not only continue, but would 
benefit from detente (see Zagladin, 1973, pp. 179-83 for 
an authoritative example of an almost universal set of 
themes). Amongst the subjects that were investigated, 
many theorists considered the question of why peaceful 
coexistence had become possible. 
(a) Peaceful coexistence as a consequence of the 
changing correlation of forces 
Soviet and socialist commonwealth statements about 
imperialism had for some time been drawing a distinction 
between reactionary forces and the realistic politicians 
who recognized the need for peaceful coexistence (see, 
for example, "Tasks at the Present Stage of the Struggle 
against Imperialism and United Action of the Communist 
and Workers' Parties and All Anti-Imperialist Forces A , 
1969, p. 29). The successes of detente were thought to 
show that a new realism on the part of Western 
politicians had prevailed (Arbatov, 1973, pp. 264-5). 
The way in which the new realism was explained is an 
interesting illustration of an increasing reliance on 
the concept of power in Soviet international relations 
theory .. 
It will be remembered that Lenin had suggested that 
peaceful coexistence could succeed because it would 
appeal to the d •• ire for profit which motivated the 
capitalist cla ••• It was not that he thought that the 
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bourgeoisie had changed its nature, merely that the 
promise of economic benefits would prevail over 
ideological antipathy. Modern theorists continued to 
believe that there were inherent mutual economic 
advantages in d'tente. But the profit motive was no 
longer used to explain why capitalist-socialist 
relations had improved, despite the implacable hostility 
and ineluctable aggression which was thought to underlie 
the foreign policy of imperialist states. What had made 
detente possible was a combination of factors of which 
the most important was the change in the correlation of 
forces in favour of socialism. Imperialist states had 
been coerced into peaceful coexistence by Soviet power. 
Although power is not entirely synonymous with military 
strength in Soviet theory, 9 even before detente had 
really taken off in the early 1970s, many theorists 
described the reasons for the new possibilities of 
peaceful coexistence primarily in terms of Soviet 
defence potential. It was said, for example, that: 
"Soviet successes in science, technology and 
industry, which resulted in the development of 
the most modern means of defence, restrained 
the imperialist politicians from turning the 
Cold' War into a hot one, and compelled the 
bourgeois world to accept peaceful coexistence 
or at least coexistence with the Soviet Union 
and other socialist countries" (Trukhanovsky, 
1968, p. S9). 
Soviet theorists have frequently used words like 
"compulsion II and II imposi tion" to describe the acceptance 
of peaceful coexistence by the West (s.e, for example, 
Novopashin, 1978, p. 166; Sanakoyav and Kapchenko, 1977, 
p. 113). Some have also recoqnized a subjective chanq. 
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in Western thinking. Shifts within the imperialist camp, 
and particularly the decline in American authority in 
relation to other bourgeois states, have also been said 
to have prompted the acceptance of peaceful coexistence 
(Sanakoyev and Kapchenko, 1973, pp. 78-9). Almost all 
Soviet theorists, however, attributed the change above 
all to the new correlation of forces in the world. The 
following quotation expresses the general Soviet 
scholarly consensus: 
"It was only when they had lost their military 
superiority that the ruling circles of 
capitalist countries began to understand the 
inevitability of peaceful coexistence" 
Shakhnazarov, 1984, p. 22).10 
(b) Peaceful coexistence and the class struggle 
It can be assumed that the successes of detente took 
some of the sting from Chinese accusations that peaceful 
coexistence demonstrated Soviet revisionism. In any 
case, it was clear in the 1970s from Chinese foreign 
policy itself that the Chinese leadership no longer 
considered peaceful coexistence with capitalism 
inconceivable or incompatible with furthering the 
international revolution. 11 The theoretical problems of 
demonstrating that and the international 
revolution were consonant nonetheless continued to 
preoccupy Soviet scholars. However vital peaceful 
coexistence was said to be, it was still considered by 
some theorists to be less significant in foreign policy 
than proletarian internationalism, the other pillar of 
Soviet foreign policy (Trukhanovsky, 1966, p. '9).12 
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It was not that Soviet theorists openly admitted that 
there might be any contradiction between the two 
principles. Indeed, peaceful coexistence was still said 
to facilitate proletarian internationalism precisely 
because it preserved peace and provided the external 
political conditions necessary for building socialism 
and communism (Trukhanovsky, 1968, p. 60). But it must 
have been clear that this simple assertion did not 
really deal with the fundamental problem that had always 
been inherent in peaceful coexistence. Which of the two 
principles, for example, explained Soviet relations with 
the working class in capitalist countries, if 
inter-state relations were based on peaceful 
coexistence? That this presented a conundrum is perhaps 
indicated by the frequency with which recourse was had 
to the linguistic formula that: 
"The principle of peaceful coexistence is 
inapplicable to the relations between 
oppressor and oppressed, between colonizers 
and the victims of the colonial 'yoke" 
(Brezhnev, 1966, p. 63). 
From both a theoretical and a practical point tif view, 
this covered the seeming contradiction between peaceful 
coexistence and the national liberation struggle. 
Peaceful coexistence did not apply to national 
liberation movements. It therefore neither contradicted 
the right of oppressed peoples to fight for liberation 
by whatever means nece •• ary, including arms (UTasks at 
the Present Stage of the Struggle against Imperialism 
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and United Action of the Communist and Workers' Parties 
and All Anti-Imperialist Forces", 1969, p. 35), nor 
interfered with the duty of giving socialist aid to 
nations struggling for national liberation (Sanakoyev 
and Kapchenko, 1973, pp. 87-8). This particular 
interpretation of the limits of peaceful coexistence had 
been upheld consistently ever since it had become a 
prominently acclaimed principle of Soviet foreign policy 
in 1956. The problem was that the Western response to 
such aid was, first "linkage", and then withdrawal from 
detente. 13 But the relationship of the socialist 
countries to the class struggle within capitalist states 
presented a far more complex theoretical problem. 
As we have seen, Soviet theorists and policy makers have 
constantly reiterated that peaceful coexistence is a 
form of class struggle. But one of the cardinal 
principles of peaceful coexistence is non-interference 
in the domestic affairs of other states. It was evident 
that Soviet theorists and political leaders did not only 
intend this to mean military intervention, since they 
frequently used non-military examples to illustrate the 
way in which imperialist states contravened the 
principle. Foreign aid, for example, had long ,been given 
as an example of unacceptable American interference 
(Korovin, 1956, pp. 46-7). In other words, whether 
intervention took a peaceful or a non-peaceful form, it 
was .till interference and it was considered by Soviet 
writers to contravene one of the fundamental principle. 
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of peaceful coexistence. 
the belief On the face of it, 
contravened peaceful coexistence 
that intervention 
was as applicable to 
interference by the international communist movement in 
the domestic class struggle as it was to American 
interference in, say, Soviet emigration policy. But if 
it ~ equally applicable, it was difficult to explain 
how peaceful coexistence could be seen to aid the class 
struggle. One of the forms the aid had been said to take 
was support for local progressive forces against 
imperialist reaction (Gromyko, 1962, p. 98). Another was 
aid to the national liberation movement (Zorin et al, 
1963, p. 32). Within the socialist commonwealth the 
problem of theoretical coherence had been resolved by 
differentiating between Uinvited" and imposed 
interference. This did not necessarily convince the 
opponents of the Soviet Union. It also led to prac~ical 
problems when no credible leader could be found on the 
spot to do the "inviting" (as happened, for example, in 
Afghanistan at the end of 1979 before Babrak Karmal'. 
return). Soviet scholars, however, seemed satisfied with 
their explanation that the principle had not been 
infringed. It did not, however, deal with the problem of 
aiding the class struggle within capitalist state. while 
pursuing peaceful coexistence ·and honouring the 
prinCiple of non-interference. for interference not to 
infringe peaceful coexistence (and international law) 
any "invitation- would have to come from the legitimate 
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qovernmen~. 
While the argumen~ con~inued to be voiced that peaceful 
coexistence included the principle of non-interference, 
it also remained a repeated tenet that peaceful 
coexistence did no~ extend to internal processes of 
class struggle. Relations with bourgeois states were 
based on principles of peaceful coexistence, whereas 
relations with the working class of those states were 
based on proletarian internationalism (Trukhanovsky, 
1968, p. 56). This was one way in which the "dialectical 
relationship" between the ~wo principles,' which was said 
to characterize socialist foreign policy, was expressed 
(Sanakoyev and Kapchenko, 1973, p. 76). But the 
theoretical and prac~ical difficulties of basing 
relations with the governments of capi~alist states on 
one principle, when relations with the majority of i~s 
citizens were based on a diff.ren~ principle were no~ 
really ~ackled by Soviet scholars. Nor was it admi~ted 
(or perhaps even perceived) that aid which was an 
integral par~ of ~he d.fini~ion of prole~ari&n 
internationalism would contravene an equally inherent 
&spec~ of ~he defini~ion of peaceful co.xi.~ence. No 
recourse ~o a real or fictitious invitation (as in the 
case of in~.rven~ion in socialist countries) could 
obviate this particular contradiction. As a result, it 
was never really clear what was entailed in proletarian 
internationalism when it was applied to the workinq 
class of capitalist stat ••• 
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In fact, Soviet theorists have either been vague about 
the relationship of socialism to the domestic class 
struggle in the countries with which the Soviet Union 
enjoys co-operative relations, or they have referred to 
the dialectic of peaceful coexistence, without being 
specific about what this means. The principles of 
peaceful coexistence and proletarian internationalism 
have been said, for example, each to be relatively 
independent and to have their own sphere of application. 
At the same time the two are in a relationship of 
dialectical interdependence (Butenko, 1975, p. 311). But 
what the nature of the dialectical relationship was in 
this case was not made explicit. To obscure the meaning 
even more, peaceful coexistence was itself said to be 
dialectical. Many authors have used the term to describe 
the simultaneous workings of co-operation and struggle 
(Trukhanovsky, 1968, p. 60, for example), or the 
two-fold nature of peaceful coexistence: aa definite 
system of international relations" and, at the same 
time, "a special form of class struggle in the 
international arena", 
b~e~e 
the two making a unity ~"both 
struggle and co-operation proceed in peaceful forms and 
are conducted by peaceful means" (Menshinzky, 1969, p. 
45). A slightly different explanation denied that there 
was a combination of peaceful co.xi.t.nce and struggle 
because that would imply that the struggle was 
.upplementary. In fact, "struggle expr ••••• the •••• nc. 
of r.lations of p.ac.ful coexistenceN(But.nko, 197', p. 
·306 fn). A third variation of the term, "complicat.d 
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dialectics", was used to describe the fact that: 
"In their efforts to avert a nuclear war and 
to develop economic, scientific and technical 
ties, countries with different social systems 
are, at the same time, pursuing for (sic] 
different class goals in their foreign policy" 
(Kortunov, 1979, p. 85). 
In the case of the socialist countries, the class goals 
were the creation of favourable conditions for communist 
construction and the development of the world 
revolutionary process. The capitalist states, on the 
other hand, hoped to protect bourgeois society, retard 
social progress and further their own class interests 
(Kortunov, 1979, pp. 85-6). All these explanations still 
concentrated on inter-state relations, however, without 
explaining how the dialectic affected the relationship 
between the socialist states and the inevitable class 
struggle within capitalist society. 
Soviet scholars seemed not to have advanced much on this 
subject from the thinking of the early sixties. 
Imperialist governments were warned, for example, that 
they could not expect any guarantee of "class peace" in 
return for recognizing the principle of peaceful 
coexistence. It was not that the Soviet Union would 
interfere in their domestic affairs, but just that the 
class struggle was an ineluctable and objective law 
governing the development of society and nothing could 
abolish it (Trukhanovsky, 1966, p. 57). In the 1970. it 
became fashionable to us. the term "social and political 
status quo" to explain what it was that would inevitably 
94 
change despite the excellent inter-governmental 
relations between socialist and capitalist states: 
"(D'tente and peaceful coexistence] in no way 
mean the maintenance of the political and 
social status quo in the various countries, 
but on the contrary create the optimum 
conditions for the development of the struggle 
of the working class and all democratic 
forces" ("Statement of Conference of the 
Communist and Workers ' Parties of Europe", 
1976, p. 25). 
When it came to explaining how the optimum conditions 
for the class struggle were to be brought about, the 
explanations were not very different from those that had 
been given in the pre-detente days. One influential 
theorist predicted that the class struggle and the 
struggle to avert war would merge. Moreover, the world 
revolutionary process would gain in strength and unity 
from the struggle for peace, since the masses would gain 
political consciousness from it and lead the struggle 
for democratic and social rights within the capitalist 
countries (Zagladin, 1973, pp. 184-7). Another scholar 
pointed out that the contradictions between the two 
social systems would not cause a revolutionary situation 
within the capitalist system directly, since this was 
only one of the many conditions required for a 
successful struggle of the proletariat against the 
bourgeoisie. Whether the class conflict. within 
capitalist state. which peaceful coexistence were said 
to would be resolved by peaceful or 
non-peaceful means was left open. What wa. certain was 
that "revolutionary cla •• force" would be required, but 
this could either be peaceful or non-peaceful, depending 
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on the amount of resistance offered by the ruling class 
(Butenko, 1975, p. 306). But all theorists continued to 
insist that revolution could and would not be exported 
(see, for example, Kortunov, 1979, p. 87). 
The only course of action which the socialist states 
seemed determined to undertake in support of the 
international class struggle and international 
revolution was to continue the war of ideas, but even 
here they were not very explicit about the form this 
would take. 
(c) Peaceful coexistence and the ideological struggle 
Although it had always been said that peaceful 
coexistence did not affect the war of ideas, there 
seemed to be a new urgency in the Soviet insistence in 
the 1970s that the ideological struggle would continue 
despite detente. On the one hand it was a reaction to 
the schools of thought fashion.able amongst We.tern 
sociologists and political scientists that ideology 
would cease to be important in post-industrial society 
or that a convergence was taking place between socialism 
and capitalism. These ideas were anathema to Soviet 
political scientists and a great deal of energy was 
expended in refuting them. 14 On the other hand, it was 
also partly a respons. both to suggestions that d'tente 
is incompatible with ideological struggle and to those 
parts of the Final Act of the European Conference OD 
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Security and Co-operation which promised greater 
exchange of information and cultural interchange. 
Western hopes that this would bring about a relaxation 
in censorship in Eastern Europe, and ideological change 
there, were quite open. Soviet determination that 
ideological contamination would not be permitted was 
equally overt. 
This does not imply that the firmly stated views that 
lion ideological questions there can be no compromises" 
(Trukhanovsky, 1968, p. 60) were merely reactive and 
defensive responses. The Soviet belief in the efficacy 
and necessity of propaganda is even older than the 
October revolution and, as we have seen, peaceful 
coexistence had never been intended to embrace ideas. On 
the contrary, the better detente worked, the more 
important the ideological struggle was believed to be. 
Arbatov, for example, maintained that the very existence 
of two systems made it inevitable that the ideological 
struggle would continue until the progressive system was 
victorious (Arbatov, 1973, pp. 274-6). He pointed out 
that the demand that Communist and socialist partie. 
abandon the ideological struggle was it.elf the 
expression of an ideology, or of "ideological 
subversion" (Arbatov, 1973, p. 279). This was the 
generally accepted view. A call to halt the ideological 
struggle was, at be.t, an attempt at peaceful 
penetration of the socialist c·ountrie. (Sanakoyev and 
Kapchenko, 1973, pp 89-90). At worst it reflected ·a 
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desire to achieve unilateral ideological disarmament of 
the socialist countries (Kortunov, 1979, pp. 89-91). In 
either case, "Marxist-Leninists resolutely act against 
the idea of the possibility of a peaceful coexistence of 
the bourgeois and socialist ideologies and against 
compromise in the ideological field" (Milovidov, 1977, 
p. 217). 
It also became generally accepted terminology to talk of 
the war of ideas or the ideological struggle when it was 
being conducted by socialists and of psychological 
warfare when it was being waged by capitalist (see, for 
example, Mshvenieradze, 1982, Chapter 3). This 
terminological distinction was itself, perhaps, part of 
the war of ideas. However, Soviet theorists have been 
far less explicit about the intentions and effects of 
the socialist campaign in the war of ideas than they 
have been about Western intentions. They have also not 
been very specific about the forms the socialist side of 
the struggle takes. There have been regular calls for 
ideological vigilance, but they are hardly new (in fact, 
the jamming of foreign radio stations broadcasting to 
the Soviet Union decreased briefly after the Helsinki 
Final Act was signed). The Soviet Union spends a great 
deal of money and effort on publishing and broadcasting 
information for foreign dis •• miilat,ion, but this too is 
part of a long-standing programme. In short, it is not 
at all clear that the lncreased' anxiety about the 
ideological struggle has produced any innovatory 
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techniques or means of using the war of ideas to serve 
the class struggle or international revolution. 
(d) The decline of d'tente 
Brezhnev's preference from the mid-seventies onwards for 
the term detente rather than peaceful coexistence 
neither meant that the two were entirely synonymous, nor 
that the latter term fell out of favour. Peaceful 
coexistence retained its meaning of one of the 
principles of Soviet foreign policy, while detente was 
used to denote both a process and an existing or desired 
situation of reduced tension, in particular military 
tension. To begin with the term detente was usually used 
in combination with peaceful coexistence (but far less 
frequently). Brezhnev seemed to avoid both, speaking 
instead of the struggle for peace, and the peace-loving 
policy of the Soviet Union (Brezhnev, 1966, pp. 36-130). 
It was only at the 25th Party Congress in 1976, when he 
seemed to be most optimistic about the international 
situation (although the strains in detente must already 
then have been felt), that he began to use detente more 
frequently and often without the accompanying peaceful 
coexistence. 15 The term then began to be used by other 
speakers in preference to peaceful coexistence in public 
speeches and announcements about foreign policy (.ee, 
for example, ·Statement of Conference of the Communist 
and Horkers' PArtie. of Europe", 1976). It WAS then) to~ 
that theorists began to favour the term. 16 
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Ironically, this coincided with Brezhnev's publicly 
expressed doubts about the commitment of the West to 
~ detente in his speech to the conference of European 
Communist and Workers' Parties in 1976 (Brezhnev, 
1976b). Although it had always been conventional wisdom 
to express reservations about capitalist intentions, and 
warnings about the inescapable aggression of 
imperialism, from 1970 onwards the underlying tone had 
been optimistic. After 1976 the prevailing mood became 
increasingly gloomy and pessimistic and this gradually 
began to be reflected in theoretical works. In 1975, for 
example, the failure to achieve most-favoured nation 
status in the USA (except at the price of concessions on 
emigration which the Soviet leadership was not willing 
to pay) was explained as the unfortunate effect of 
"influential forces in the USA" who were trying to 
"hinder the onward march of the process of d~tenteU 
(Trofimenko, 1975, p. 11). By 1980 it was not only 
influential forces that were blamed, but the general 
characteristic of the American leadership, which wished 
"to use detente to strengthen the world position of 
imperialism, particularly American imperialism". The 
American ruling elite had intentionally aggravated the 
international situation at the beginning of the 1980s 
(Usachev, 1980, pp. 208-9). 
Any serious attempt by Soviet scholars to analy.e the 
reasons for the increasingly tense international 
atmosphere was rendered impo •• ible, however, by the 
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imperative of ascribing all blame for the deterioration 
in detente to the capitalist states. The point is not 
whether this was necessarily incorrect. But the ~ priori 
assumption that the capitalist states were solely to 
blame and the inability to consider the possibility, 
say, that Soviet actions might have prompted Western 
perceptions that were deleterious to detente precluded 
serious analysis. This problem is not unique to the 
theory of peaceful coexistence and detente. It points to 
one of the weakest aspects of Soviet international 
relations theory in general, and one of the major 
reasons why it is difficult to agree with Soviet writers 
and policy makers who claim scientific st~tus for their 
policy. 
3. Conclusion 
To summarize the evolution of the concept of peaceful 
coeXistence, it was implied by Lenin's theory of the 
uneven development of capitalism, but it is debatable 
whether the sense in which Lenin used the term after the 
revolution can be called theory. The survival and 
economic recovery of the Bolshevik state required & 
breathinq space which would be achieved by peaceful 
coexistence. But Lenin saw it es.entially .s & 
short-term tactic, predicated on the belief that the 
capitalists' profit motive would be strong enough to 
overcome their ideological antipathy. Stalin adopted the 
term and extended the period for which it would be 
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operative: socialism in one country required a lengthy 
period of peaceful coexistence. In the context of the 
need for collective security to contain fascism in the 
1930s, peaceful coexistence was a useful way of 
indicating the reliability of the Soviet Union as an 
ally. Moreover, it was sufficiently flexible both to 
explain the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 when negotiations 
with Britain and France broke down, and co-operation 
with those countries and the United States after the 
attack by Germany on the Soviet Union in 1941. 
Peaceful coexistence remained an active ingredient of 
Soviet international relations theory during the Cold 
War. It was no longer said to be motivated by the search 
for profit on the part of the capitalists, however, but 
to be due to the power of the socialist system. Most of 
the elements of the theory which are usually attributed 
to Khrushchev can, in fact, be traced to the period 
before Stalin's death. It acquired particular 
prominence, however, when Khrushchev revised the theory 
of Soviet foreign policy at the 20th Party Congre.. of 
the CPSU in 1956. The Chinese rejected peaceful 
coexistence as reviSionist, a sign that the Soviet Union 
was no longer committed to international revolution. 
Soviet theorists began exploring the relationship of 
peaceful coexistence to proletarian internationalism, 
the class and ideological struggle. They did not, 
however, succeed in resolving the theoretical 
difficulties which had ari.en. 
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Brezhnev was less enthusiastic about the term than 
Khrushchev, but his policy of peaceful coexistence was 
very successful at first. The problems faced by Soviet 
scholars were very similar, however, to those which had 
always arisen from the theory of peaceful coexistence. 
It was easy to explain why peaceful coexistence was good 
for the socialist states which already existed. It was 
far more difficult to prove that it would promote other 
socialist revolutions. 
By the beginning of the 1980s a vast number of books and 
articles had been written about the theory of peaceful 
coexistence. Many prominent and competent international 
relations theorists had turned their minds to explaining 
its aetiology and history, the reasons for its successes 
and failures, its effects on other aspects of Soviet 
theory and policy, its likely duration and its probable 
outcomes. And yet) in a very real sense, the theory was 
not much better developed than it had been when it was 
first used to mean something more extensive and more 
permanent than good international economic relations.· To 
some extent the limitations which prevent Soviet 
theorists from questioning . Soviet foreign policy 
behaviour are responsible for retarding the development 
of theory. But the paradoxical nature of the concept of 
peaceful coexistence and the extent to which it i. 
inherently incompatible with other a.pects of Soviet 
theory are even more to blame. 
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At one level the theory of peaceful coexistence can be 
seen as a mirror image of containment theory. Its 
successes are attributed to the firm rebuff and 
resistance which has been offered to imperialist 
aggression. In other words, it is claimed to contain 
imperialism) rather like containment was intended to 
prevent the advance of communism. It presupposes similar 
psychological sources of imperialist conduct to those 
identified by Kennan in Soviet behaviour in the article 
which heralded containment (Kennan, 1947). Like 
containment, it does not suggest exporting its own 
system beyond its borders. Nonetheless, and again like 
containment, there is an underlying hope and expectation 
that change will take place. In the case of containment 
it was to be democratic change, whereas with peaceful 
coexistence it is to be progressive change (which is 
also called democratic by Soviet theorists). In both 
cases the emphasis is on firmness of intent and the 
known 
force. 
ability 
The 
to respond, rather than the overt use of 
theoretical difficulties for Soviet 
mezhdunarodniki came from the requirement that peaceful 
coexistence should both contain imperialism and promote 
a more active advance of socialism than can be attained 
by the waiting-And-hoping implied by containment. The 
practical difficulty for Soviet policy makers was that 
many of their Western count_rparts perceived peaceful 
coexistence as a holding operation in Europe while 
revolution and the d.struction of imperia11sm proceeded 
el.ewhere. 
The problem has 
knowledge 
predictions 
that, 
from 
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been exacerbated by the unavoidable 
contrary to all the optimistic 
1917 onwards, the socialist world has 
not taken the lead in the sphere of material production, 
"the determining sphere of social activity" (Butenko, 
1975, p. 308). In other words, the spread of socialism 
by force of example is less likely because the example 
has become less successful. Vet all Soviet theorists 
insist that peaceful coexistence does not mean the 
maintenance of the political and social status quo. 
Peaceful coexistence is thus expected to produce two 
seemingly mutually exclusive conditions: it must both 
provide the necessary peaceful environment for building 
socialism and communism in the existing socialist 
countries, and it must promote the circumstances which 
encourage a change in the political and social status 
quo. No theorist has managed to find a synthesis for the 
apparently inescapable contradictions of these two 
demands. 
In Soviet theory in general there has been a turn from 
the voluntarism of pre-revolutionary Leni.nism to a more 
Marxist determinism and this is clearly reflected in the 
theory of peaceful coexistence. The insistence that 
revolution cannot be exported and that history it.elf 
will bring about change is evidence of thi •• 
Nonethele •• , Soviet .cholars often maintain (and it i. 
difficult to argue with them) that capitalists are 
unlikely to give up their privilege. voluntarily_ 
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Moreover, whether or not social change takes place 
peacefully depends not on those who want change, but on 
those who have to give up their class privileges. They 
will resist forcibly, according to Soviet theory, unless 
the forces against them are so obviously overwhelming 
that struggle is hopeless. But one of the advantages of 
peaceful coexistence is said to be its ability to create 
the kind of atmosphere in which "democratic and social 
rights" can be attained (Zagladin, 1973, pp. 184-7). If 
this is the case, it is difficult to see how it can also 
produce the kind of polarization and tension that is 
likely to precede the profound change in the political 
and social status quo envisaged by Soviet theorists. 
Similarly, if trade and economic co-operation are 
mutually advantageous, they must preclude, or at least 
postpone, the economic crises which are endemic to 
capitalism and which aggravate class conflict, thus 
hastening the socialist revolution. For these reasons, 
peaceful coexistence seems unlikely to have the effects 
claimed for it by Soviet mezhdunarodniki. 
There is another .triking paradox in the Soviet theory 
of peaceful coexistence. It is said to benefit the 
international class struggle and to promote progre.sive 
change. But Soviet theorists are equally adamant that 
imperialist governments are imp~ac&bly hostile to this 
kind of change. Moreover, their foreign policy, like all 
foreign· policy, i. designed to defend their clas. 
inter.st.. This rai... the question of why capitalist 
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governments should consent at all to a form of 
international relations which is destined to undermine 
and then finally destroy their power. The explanation 
usually offered, as we have seen, is that they are 
reluctant partners ~n a relationship of peaceful 
coexistence which has been imposed upon them by the 
superior moral and military force of socialism. Yet 
peaceful coexistence, according to Khrushchev and all 
his successors without exception, is more than just the 
absence of war. It includes mutual understanding, trust 
and active co-operation. In other words, what is 
required from capitalist governments is the voluntary 
surrender of the class interests their foreign and 
domestic policies are designed to defend. If class 
struggle is sincerely believed to be "the essence" of 
peaceful coexistence (Butenko, 1975, p. 306 fn.), Soviet 
theorists should wonder less that detente has powerful 
opponents in the West. In fact, the class struggle 
aspect of peaceful coexistence is so unconvincing that 
the insistence that peaceful coexistence promotes the 
spread of socialism seems merely to be an act of 
theoretical cap-doffing to an outdated tenet which 
cannot explicitly be abandoned. 
The Soviet desire for relations between different 50cial 
and economic systems- based on the principles of peaceful 
coexistence is long-standing. There is every reason to 
suppose that it is sincere. The intention of this 
argument is not- to impugn the Soviet de.ire for p.ace, 
107 
but to cast doubt on the logic of aspects of the theory. 
Not even the most dialectical of reasoning seems able to 
reconcile the various elements of the theory to make it 
internally consistent. 
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Notes 
1. In June 1954 five principles (pancha shila) of 
relations were accepted by India and China (Daniels, 
Vol. 2, 1984, pp. 217-8). This formulation of peaceful 
coexis~~~ce was greeted with much enthusiasm in the 
Soviet Union (see Pravda, 29 June and 1 July 1954). It 
was supported by a declaration of the Supreme Soviet in 
February 1955 and it immediately became the basis for 
much of the Soviet writing on peaceful coexistence. It 
was also adopted by the Bandung Conference as the basis 
of Afro-Asian international relations. For the Soviet 
response to Panch a Shila, see Krylov and Durdenevsky 
(1957, p. 5). For a Western view that despite the use of 
the term by Soviet theorists and policy makers before 
1956, it was Khrushchev who was the founder and creator 
of the current Soviet concept, see Marantz (1982). 
2. Later it was denied that the socialist meaning of the 
term peaceful coexistence was identical to the five 
principles. The content of these five traditional 
democratic principles had been enriched by socialist 
ideas. Through socialist pressure, for example, 
non-aggression had acquired international recognition. 
In a rather radical assertion, one author claimed that 
the principle of non-aggression now applied not only to 
interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign 
states, but also to the affairs of peoples and nations 
struggling for the right to self-determination (Butenko, 
1975, pp. 309-10). But non-interference and 
non-intervention have had a chequered career in Soviet 
legal thinking. Korovin (1926) distinguished between 
"reactionary" and "progressive" intervention. Korovin 
(1951), after quoting Stalin at length on the subject, 
criticized his own previous "unscientific" distinction, 
and insisted that interference is always an infringement 
of sovereignty and never progressive. Soviet declaratory 
practice has retained the later definition, while Soviet 
policy clearly continues to make the distinction. 
3. For other examples of discussions of the 
international legal aspects of peaceful coexistence, see 
Tunkin (1956), Krylov and Durdenevsky (1957) and Gromyko 
(1962, Chapter VI). 
4. In this particular article Korovin seemed to violate 
the spirit, if not the letter, of the very peaceful 
coexistence with the USA which he, Khrushchev, and every 
other spokesman on Soviet foreign policy were promoting. 
His example. to illustrate infringements of the 
principles were based on US transgressions: US bases on 
foreign territory "with or without forced consent" 
violated the principle of respect for "territorial 
integrity and sovereignty; the Anglo-American practice 
of "fostering restrictive aggressive military blocs" and 
dictating policy "from positions of strength" viola~ed 
non-aggression; Marshall Aid and other kinds of US aid 
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violated the principle of non-interference; while the 
"open-door ll and II equal opportunities ll policies so 
favoured by American diplomacy violated the principle of 
equality and mutual benefit, since they were based on 
deep-seated inequality (Korovin, 1956, pp. 46-7). The 
point is not whether Korovin's diagnosis was correct or 
not, but that his tone and examples were hardly 
consonant with a desire for relations based on 
co-operation with his chief villain. 
5. Kubalkova and Cruickshank maintain that Khrushchev 
stressed the peaceful content of peaceful coexistence to 
make it sound like a policy which aimed at preserving 
the status quo, instead of what it really was, a 
II strategy for world revolution ll (1980, p. 166). As we 
shall see, Khrushchev and the theorists who wrote about 
peaceful coexistence stressed that it corresponded to 
the norms of international law. But they also placed far 
more emphasis on ideological and economic competition 
than had previously been customary. It is difficult to 
agree, therefore, that the peaceful content was stressed 
more than under Stalin. Indeed, given that Khrushchev 
frequently adopted an abrasive tone and that his foreign 
policy decisions were erratic, peaceful coexistence 
often seemed a more belligerent policy between 1956 and 
1964 than it did before or after. 
6. Although it is generally accepted that the Cuban 
Missile fiasco played no small part in Khrushchev's 
dismissal two years later, Soviet theorists never 
reproach him in print for the crisis or see it as a 
contravention of peaceful coexistence on the part of the 
Soviet Union. The Cuban Missile crisis has always been 
interpreted as the fault of US imperialism and the 
standard phrase for describing Khrushchev's response to 
Kennedy's demand is that it IIcombined principled 
firmness with tactical flexibilityh, although Khrushchev 
is not mentioned by name. See,"for example, Lebedev 
(1982, p. 133), Stepanova (1982, p. 85). For a detailed 
Soviet account of the crisis (in which Khrushchev's name 
is never mentioned), see the chapter by Anatoly A. 
Gromyko in Zhurkin and Primakov (1972, pp. 70-95). 
7. This does not imply that Brezhnev did not insist that 
Soviet foreign policy was peaceable. He merely used the 
term peaceful coexistence sparingly, in the early year. 
often preferring IIpeaceful co-operation". In his Central 
Committee report to the 23rd Congress, for example., he 
mentioned the term four times. At the 1969 Conference of 
European Communist and Workers' Parties and in hi. 50th 
anniversary speech in 1967, he used it one. only in each 
(Brezhnev, 1973, pp. 36-130). But the new doctrine 
announced at the 20th Party Congress (and, as Soviet 
writers put it, reaffirmed at the 21st and 2Znd Party 
Congresses as well as in the international statements of 
1957 and 1960) was by no means repudiated. 'ulsome 
tribute continued to be paid to it, although it was no 
longer credited to Khrushchev. S •• Egorov (1971, pa •• im) 
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and, for a more recen~ ~ribu~e, Pe~renko and Popov 
(1981, p. 155). One Wes~ern scholar, Maran~z (1982, p. 
234) believes ~ha~ i~ was precisely because Khrushchev/s 
colleagues believed ~ha~ he had over-emphasized ~he ~erm 
~ha~ i~ was downgraded af~er his dismissal. 
8. I~ was no~ a ques~ion of linguis~ic convenience. The 
~erm de~en~e is no less cumbersome in Russian ~han 
peaceful coexis~ence. The Russian ~erm for peaceful 
coexistence is mirnoe sosushchestvovanie, whereas 
detente is razryadka napryazhennosti, relaxa~ion of 
~ension (some~imes shor~ened ~o razryadka). 
9. The change in the correlation of forces in favour of 
socialism is considered ~o be due par~ly to ~he increase 
in ~he number of socialis~ s~a~es, par~ly ~o the grow~h 
of peace-loving and progressive forces in ~he capi~alis~ 
world, and par~ly ~o ~he economic and mili~ary power of 
~he Soviet Union and ~he socialist world. See Chapter 9 
for a de~ailed discussion of Soviet definitions of power 
and the correla~ion of forces. 
10. For o~her examples of theorists attributing ~he 
success of peaceful coexis~ence to Soviet power, see 
Lebedev (1976, p. 41), Mshvenieradze (1981, p. 109), 
Pe~renko and Popov (1981, p. 167). 
11. This is no~ ~o imply tha~ ~he ~haw in Sino-Wes~ern 
rela~ions pleased ~he Soviet Union. Indeed, few 
international changes have caused them more anxiety. 
There is, moreover, reason to identify the improvement 
in Sino-American relations as an important motive for 
Soviet-American detente. Nor did the change in Chinese 
policy ~owards the West moderate Soviet objections ~o 
the earlier opposi~ion to peaceful coexistence. Two 
prominent theori5ts explained the sequence of events as 
follows: until the early 1960s the Chinese had approved 
of peaceful coexistence. They than began to attack i~ as 
a betrayal of the revolution, demanding confrontation 
with the capitalist states. Their plans failed and after 
the Cultural Revolution, they suddenly changed foreign 
policy tactics and began to use peaceful coexistence in 
their own interests. Although the sincerity of the new 
tactics were considered doubtful, these theorists 
welcomed ~he change (Sanakoyev and Kapchenko, 1973, pp. 
91-2). After the thaw in Sino-American relations) Soviet 
spokesmen (Arbatov, 1973, p. 256, for example), went 'on 
claiming that the attitude towards relations between 
capitalist and socialist state. was II one of the 
principal issues between Leninism and opportunism". The 
Chinese leadership, together with Trotskyi.ts and the 
extreme left, repre.ented the opportunist. who 
propounded revolutionary war, contradicting the ba.ic 
tenet of Marxism-Leninism that socialist revolution 
could not be imposed on people by force (Arbatov, 1973, 
pp. 257-9). 
12. Egorov criticized a thesis which he maintained had 
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been current at one stage (and which he attributed in 
particular to Soviet international lawyers like Tunkin 
and Federov, although he implied that there were other 
offenders) that peaceful coexistence was the general 
line of Soviet foreign policy. He called this d a 
voluntaristic interpretation of the basic principles of 
the foreign policy of the USSR" (Egorov, 1971, p. 
160). It contradicted the theoretical basis and practice 
of Soviet foreign policy. Peaceful coexistence was only 
one line of Soviet foreign policy and concerned only 
relations with states with different social systems. In 
distinguishing between these two kinds of relationship, 
Egorov did not deviate from the accepted categories. But 
he seemed rather innovative in describing relations with 
newly independent countries as "relations based on the 
principle of peaceful coexistence which may develop into 
relations based on the principles of proletarian 
internationalism" (Egorov, 1971, p. 161). Other scholars 
have always implied or stated that the relations between 
socialist states and the ex-colonies are based on 
proletarian internationalism. See, for example, Butenko 
(1975, p. 311). 
13. Western and Soviet differences of opinion about the 
relationship of Soviet aid to the national liberation 
movement and peaceful coexistence was a major reason for 
the breakdown in detente from the middle of the 1970s. 
The Western interpretation of peaceful .coexistence has 
never included the Soviet right to extend military aid 
to the Third World. When the initial Western response of 
"linkage" was ineffective and Soviet aid began to 
include Cuban troops and Soviet logistic support, 
detente quickly began to crumble. 
14. See, for example, the first chapter in Egorov (1971) 
or Shakhnazarov (1984, passim). A number of books have 
been written on the ideological struggle and detente, 
for example, Arbatov (1973), Lebedev, Dracheva and 
Knyazhinsky (1981), Gantman (1981), Sanakoyev and 
Kapchenko (1981). It is interesting that the Soviet 
response to Reagan's ideological rhetoric has been a 
warning that the ideological struggle can get out hand. 
After Reagan's devil empire" speech, for example, a 
Soviet theorist, Zamoshkin, spoke at Chatham House 
calling for a decrease in the ideological struggle. This 
call has been repeated by Gorbachev. See Light 
(forthcoming, 1987) for the decline in ideology in 
Gorbachev's foreign policy statements. 
15. Although Brezhnev .eemed to avoid the term peaceful 
coexistence, at this stage his verbal preference. were 
not yet immediately reflected in the terms chosen by 
mezhdunarodniki or other political leaders (the speed 
and frequency with which the top leader'. words are 
exactly echoed may well be a way of measuring the extent 
of the personality cult!), In his report to the 24th 
Party Congress in 1971, when detente was already well 
established, he only used the term three tim ••• His 
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optimistic report to the 25th Congress in 1976 contained 
thirteen references to detente and only six to peaceful 
coexistence. One of the latter references was an offer 
to normalize relations with China Itin accordance with 
the principles of peaceful coexistence (CPSU, 1976, p. 
14). This signified a major theoretical departure. 
Until then it had been firmly maintained that peaceful 
coexistence only applied to relations between states 
with different social systems. Inter-socialist relations 
were founded on proletarian and socialist 
internationalism. No theoretical justification was given 
for the suggestion that two different types of relations 
could be operative within one group of states (or for 
the other possible implication -- that the Soviet model 
was changing from a triangular to a quadrilateral model 
of the world). In fact, the offer had been made as early 
as 1972 (Brezhnev, 1973, p. 434) and had been quoted by 
some international theorists (see, for example, 
Sanakoyev and Kapchenko, 1973, p. 92). Kubalkova and 
Cruickshank (1978, pp. 191-8) maintain that the 1972 
offer was low-key and that it only became significant in 
1976. 
16. For a sample of the many books and articles with 
detente in the title rather than peaceful coexistence, 
see Usachev (1980), Gantman (1981), Mshvenieradze 
(1981), Deborin et al (1982). 
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CHAPTER 4. INCORPORATING THE THIRD WORLD II 
SOCIALISM AND COLONIALISM. 
As with all foreign policy, Soviet relations with less 
developed countries [LDCs] and with the national 
liberation movement are justified by reference to 
Marxist-Leninist theory. When relations with the Third 
World were revived after the Second World War, Lenin's 
theory seemed uncannily accurate. The disintegration of 
the colonial system after the Second World War was 
thought to prove the accuracy of his predictions about 
the fate of imperialism (Gromyko and Ponomarev, Vol. Z, 
1981, pp. 17-8). Similarly, the establishment of 
socialist and socialist-oriented states in Asia, and 
later in Africa and Latin America seemed to prove the 
contention of both Marx and Lenin that in certain 
circumstances the capitalist phase of development can be 
avoided. There seemed to be no reason why other aspects 
of Marxist-Leninist theory would not prove equally 
useful. In fact, it can be argued that decolonization 
disproved as much of Lenin's theory of imperialism as it 
proved. In the vast majority of cases independenoe was 
granted rather than won throuqh force of arms. Their 
colonies had become so expensive, that far from 
weakening the metropolitan countries, they were 
strengthened by losing them. With regard to sooialism in 
the colonies and ex-colonie., too, the theory has not 
been entirely reliable. The capitalist phase may have 
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been skipped by some countries, but this has by no means 
proved invariable. Nor has the establishment of 
socialism proved quite as simple as Lenin seemed to 
suggest. In other words, although none of the original 
theories have been repudiated explicitly, it has become 
necessary to develop others to explain why outcomes 
other than those predicted by Marx and, more 
particularly, by Lenin have occurred. That body of 
theory forms the subject of the next chapter. But an 
appreciation of how the theory has developed requires an 
outline of what the original theory was and how it was 
interpreted in the early days of decolonization. This 
chapter aims to provide that outline. 
It begins with a brief examination o.f what Marx and 
Engels wrote about the colonies. There is a very direct 
link between their views and those of Lenin, although 
Soviet theorists pay more attention to what Lenin wrote. 
The colonies figured more in their journalism than in 
their political theory, but they drew attention to the 
potential advantages to socialism of colonial 
revolution. Whether they continued believing in a unique 
"Asian" mode of production has become .. contentious 
subject amongst stUdents of and believers in Marxism. It 
is a term that was used by the Third. Communist 
International [Comintern], although modern Soviet 
theorists believe that Marx had discarded the concept by 
the 1870s. It is uncontentious, however, that Marx and 
Engels prefigured Lenin's view that under certain 
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conditions some underdeveloped countries would be able 
to proceed to socialism wi~hou~ going through the 
capitalist stage of development. 
The second part of the chapter examines Lenin's view of 
the colonies and semi-colonies in two sections: his 
pre-revolutionary views and his attitudes after the 
revolution, particularly his contribution to the debates 
in and the policy adopted by the Comintern. This is 
followed by a consideration of Stalin's contribution to 
Soviet theory. Since the main thrust of the policy of 
both the Soviet state and the Comintern in the colonies 
and semi-colonies was directed towards China in the 
1920s, and it was Stalin who personally controlled 
Soviet and Comintern Chinese policy, the first part of 
this section contains an account of Stalin's China 
theory and the policy which it 
section describes the changes 
produced. The second 
in Soviet attitudes 
towards the colonies and the first ex-colonies in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. It will be seen that 
although Soviet theory became very radical, a more 
moderate view began to prevail before Stalin'. death. In 
other words, the origins of the theory and th. policy 
launched by Khrushchev can be traced back to the period 
before Stalin's death. 
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1. Marx, Engels and the Colonies 
Soviet theorists pay relatively little attention to what 
Marx and Engels wrote about the colonies. There are two 
related reasons for this. First, although Marx and 
Engels were acutely aware and highly critical of the 
evil effects of colonialism, in their writing about the 
colonies they often displayed the patronizing values of 
Victorian Europeans. This attitude, as Avineri points 
out (1969, p. 13) is a source of embarrassment to 
orthodox communists. Second, their theory of the Asiatic 
mode of development forms part of that writing and this 
particular concept has been rejected by Soviet 
theorists. 1 It is, however, relatively easy to trace the 
connections between their views and Lenin/s on 
colonialism and the effects of colonial revolutions on 
metropolitan countries. Moreover, the idea of an 
alliance between the peasantry and the proletariat, 
pre-eminently credited to Lenin, is prefigured by Marx 
and so is the possibility of skipping the capitalist 
stage of development. In other words, both Lenin/s 
theories about the East and his views on the 
prerequisites of revolution in Russia can be traced back 
to Marx. 
Much of what Marx and Engels wrote about colonialism 
took the form of newspaper articles analysing current 
events. Their criticism of its deleterious effects s •• ms 
remarkably modern and acut.. They understood, for 
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example, ~hat ~raditional ways of life were undermined 
by colonialism. They deeply disapproved of ~he opium 
~rade and they defended ~he "une~hical" means used by 
~he Chinese in figh~ing ~he Opium Wars (Marx, 1951b 2). 
But at the same time they were unambiguous in ~heir 
belief that colonialism was a posi~ive and necessary 
phenomenon. I~ was a progressive force and the ex~ernal 
agent without which the colonial peoples would no~ be 
able to advance from ~heir traditional, stagnan~ way of 
life. No matter how mercenary their mo~ives, the 
colonizers imparted civiliza~ion to the backward peoples 
of Asia and Africa who lived in a s~ate of "Asiatic 
barbari~y". There seems little doubt tha~ bo~h Marx and 
Engels believed tha~ Western civilization was superior 
to "the jealousy, the intrigues, ~he ignorance, the 
cupidity and corruption of the Orien~als", or ~he 
"rotting semi-civilization" represented by China 
(Engels, in Marx, 1951b, p. 45). Despite the nas~iness 
and Slavonic filth of Russian rule, i~ was a civilizing 
force for the Bashkirs and Tartars of the Black and 
Caspian Seas and Central Asia (Engels to Marx, in Marx, 
1969, p. 447). Marx called the conquest of Algeria "an 
important and for~unate fact for the progress of 
civilization" (Marx, 1969, p. 47). As far as India was 
concerned, Britain had given it political unity, a 
native army, a free press, private land ownership and 
had encouraged the emergence of an educated class 
capable of qoverninq (Marx, 19~1a, pp. 67-8). More 
important than the motives behind colonialism was the 
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question: 
"[could] mankind fulfil its destiny without a 
fundamental revolution in the social state of 
Asia? If not, whatever may have been the 
crimes of England, she was the unconscious 
tool of history in bringing about that 
revolution" (Marx, 1951a, p. 29). 
The low esteem in which Marx and Engels held the 
colonial peoples was, perhaps, typical for Europeans of 
the 19th century. But it fitted with their poor opinion 
·of the peasantry, since the Asian society they described 
contained only despots and peasants. Marx felt what one 
modern Western scholar has called "the conventional 
disgust of an urban intellectual for the backward and 
stagnant provinces" (Mann, 1983, pp. 16-7). 
But whatever contempt Marx and Engels may have felt for 
peasants, they did not rule out temporary alliances 
between them and the urban proletariat under the 
leadership of the proletariat (Marx and Engels, 1850a, 
pp. 106-17). In fact, they understood that peasant 
participation was essential to the proletarian 
revolution in peasant countries. It would provide "that 
chorus without which [the proletarian revolution's] solo 
song becomes a swan song in all peasant countries" 
(Marx, 1851, p. 340, fn.). This legitimized Lenin's 
later arguments for a worker-peasant alliance in RUssia. 
But as far as the colonies were concerned, there was no 
proletariat with which the peasants could ally 
themselves. Indeed, there were no recognizable class 
divisions. 
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Oriental Society and the Asiatic Mode of Production 
It was the absence of recognizable class divisions which 
made Marx and Engels call the oriental way of life 
stagnant. Social classes, and the antagonism which 
developed between them, were the prerequisites for the 
historical pattern of change which they had discerned in 
Europe (progressing from primitive communism to slave 
owning, feudal and capitalist society). They could not 
detect any internal mechanism for change in oriental 
society. This was why colonialism, for all its evils, 
was beneficial. Without the impact of an external force 
like colonialism, there was no prospect of change and 
development. At times Marx seemed to depict the mode of 
production in India as first ina developing sequence 
and therefore part of a universal historical 
development: 
"In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal 
and modern bourgeois methods of production can 
be designated as progressive epochs in the 
economic formation of society" (Marx, 1859, p. 
363). 
Later, however, both Marx and Engels wrote about the 
Asiatic form of production as something static and 
unchanging and therefore substantially different from 
European modes of production with their inherent 
imperative for change. What distinguished Asian .ociety 
was the absence of private property, ~aused mainly by 
"the climate, taken in connection with the nature of the 
soil, especially with the great stretches of de •• rt" 
(Engels to Marx, in Marx, 1969, p. 452). In such 
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climatic conditions, agriculture was impossible without 
irrigation on a scale which could not be undertaken 
privately. It had to be provided by a central 
government. A supplementary feature of Asian life which 
contributed to its stagnation was the extent to which 
society was atomized: 
" .•. the whole empire, not counting the few 
larger towns, was divided into villages, each 
of which possessed a completely separate 
organisation and formed a little world in 
itself- (Marx, 1969, p. 455, emphasis in 
original). 
Because these self-sufficient villages were cut off from 
one another, they remained traditional and conservative. 
There was very little commerce between them and, 
consequently, no development of a bourgeoisie. As a 
result of this atomization and th~ central economic role 
of the state, it tended to be despotic. 
Since to Marx, history meant change and he could detect 
no motor for change in Asiatic society, he maintained 
that it had no history, or "at least no known history" 
(Marx, 1951a, p. 67). A consequence of this description 
of the Asiatic mode of production as something which 
stood outside of history was that Marx's claim to have 
discovered universal laws of history was undermined. If 
much of the world outside Europe lived under this 
particular mode of production, then the historical 
progress from feudalism to capitalism and then socialism 
wa. inevitable only in Europe (unl ••• , of cours., 
colonialism transferred capitalism to the coloni •• ; but 
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even ~hen ~he agen~ of change would no~ be ~he 
inevi~able in~ernal dialectic of the conflict be~ween 
ma~erial produc~ive forces and exis~ing rela~ions of 
produc~ion, bu~ an ou~side force). Marx himself la~er 
claimed only to have written an "historical sketch of 
the genesis of capi~alism in Western Europe •.. [not] "an 
his~orico-philosophic ~heory of ~he general path of 
development prescribed by fate to all na~ions, whatever 
the his~orical circumstances in which ~hey find 
~hemselvesH (Marx, 1877, p. 293). His modern Soviet 
successors have preferred to ignore the Asiatic mode of 
production and retain the claim that Marxism is a 
universal theory. 3 
The possibility of omitting a stage of development 
Neither Marx nor Engels seemed to envisage that 
developmen~ would be po.sible 
Asiatic mode of production 
for coun~ries wi~h an 
wi~hou~ going ~hrough the 
capitalist stage. If progress was to occur a~ all, it 
would be via the transfer of capitalism. But they did 
not consider what would happen after capitalism had been 
introduced from without. 4 However, whereas there was no 
suggestion that capitalism was a stage that could be 
skipped by the colonial countries, a number of year. 
later they implied that Russia could skip the capitalist 
stage. Marx decried developments in Rus.ia after the 
emancipation of the serfs. Rus.ia would "lo• e the fin •• t 
chance ever offered by history to a people and undergo 
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all the fatal vicissitudes of the capitalist regime", 
instead of proceeding from village communities "by 
developing the historical conditions specifically her 
own" (Marx, 1877, p. 292). The Russian peasant community 
could be the mainspring of Russia's social regeneration 
if hostile influences were eliminated and spontaneous 
development occurred (Marx, 1881, pp. 319-20). While 
Engels ridiculed the idea that Russian peasants were 
socialist by instinct or that Russia had the material 
foundations for socialism, he, too, thought that Russia 
could avoid capitalism if a proletarian socialist 
revolution took place in the West (Engels, cited in 
Mann, 1983, p. 29). It is possible, of course, that he 
would by then have come to the same conclusion about the 
colonial countries of Asia or Africa, but they had 
ceased to be a focus of his attention. In any case his 
views about Russia, reiterated later by Lenin, served as 
a useful basis for later theories of post-independence 
colonial development.S 
The relationship between colonial and 
revolutions 
metropolitan 
One of the results of colonialism was the rise of 
nationalism in the colonial countries. As we .hall see 
in Chapter 4, Marx and Engels only supported nationalism 
in Europe when they considered that it would further the 
aims of revolution.' But even in those case., they saw 
it essentially as an auxiliary force in bringing about .. 
democratic or socialist revolution in the metropolis. 
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Similarly, the nationalism engendered by colonialism 
should be supported not for its own sake, but because it 
would bring about colonial revolutions which, in turn, 
would bring about revolution in the metropolitan 
countries. It was particularly in connection with 
Ireland that the power of colonial revolution to bring 
about revolution in England seemed obvious. Indeed, Marx 
believed that "the decisive blow against the English 
ruling classes ..• cannot be delivered in England but 
only in Ireland" (Marx, 1870, p. 221, emphasis in 
original). It was, therefore, particularly important to 
"make the English workers realize that for them the 
national emancipation of Ireland is ••• the first 
condition of their own social emancipation" (Marx, 1870, 
p. 223, emphasis in original). The duty of socialists to 
support colonial liberation movements became an 
important part of Lenin's theory of the East. 
Marx and Engels were ambivalent, however, about the 
relationship between the colonial and metropolitan 
revolutions. At first Marx thought that revolution 
abroad would provoke revolution in Europe, but would not 
itself be successful until after the metropolitan 
revolution. He said about the Chinese struggle, for 
example: 
" ••• it may safely be augured that the Chines. 
revolution will throw the spark in to the 
overloaded mine of the present industrial 
system and cause the explosion of the 
long-prepared general crisis, which, apreading 
abroad, will be closely followed by political 
revolutions on the Continent" (Marx, 1951b, p. 
7) • 
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At other times, he seemed to imply that the success of a 
colonial revolution, at least in terms of improving 
local conditions, did not necessarily depend upon 
revolution in the metropolis. With regard to India he 
seemed to think that either variant was possible: 
"The Indians will not reap the fruits of the 
new elements of society scattered among 
them ... till in Great Brit.in itself the now 
ruling classes shall have been supplanted by 
the industrial proletariat, or till the Hindus 
themselves shall have grown strong enough to 
throw off the English yoke altogether" (Marx, 
1951a, p. 71. 
What remained unclear was the form these "fruits" would 
take. Indeed, however necessary they believed capitalism 
was to colonial development, their analyses of its 
effects in Europe were filled with descriptions of the 
awful social conditions it caused. If the history of 
European industrialization was to be repeated in the 
colonies, there was little ground for optimism. Marx's 
fear that Russia would fall victim to the "fatal 
vicissitudes" of capitalism indicates that whatever the 
final benefits in terms of becoming ripe for a sociali~t 
revolution, he thought that capitalism itself had little 
to recommend it. But neither he nor Engels dwelt on 
colonial or post-colonial developments. Engels 
maintained that only idle hypotheses could b. advanced 
about the various social and political phases through 
which the colonies would pass before arriving at 
socialist organization (Marx and Engels, 1975, p. 331).7 
What Marx and Engels wrote about the colonies did not, 
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in any sense, form a complete theory. Moreover, their 
interest was less in the colonies per se than in the 
potential effect of events in the colonies on the 
metropolitan countries. As a result they paid little 
attention to developments within colonial societies. 
Nonetheless, a number of their views were reflected in 
the writings of subsequent Marxists, most particularly 
(in terms of the subject matter of this thesis at least) 
in Lenin's theory. 
2. Lenin And the Revolution in the East 
Lenin's best known writing on colonialism was contained 
in his pre-revolutionary IIImperialism: The Highest Stage 
of Capitalism" (1916d, pp. 185-304) and in his 
post-revolutionary draft theses for the Second Congress 
of the Third Communist International (1920c, pp. 252-9). 
But the complex Bolshevik teaching on nationalism and 
self-determination referred as much to the colonies as 
to the Russian empire. Moreover, both the theory of 
uneven development and the analysis of why revolution 
would begin in Russia could equally apply to the 
colonies. S These theories were and are often referred to 
by later theorists in their discussion of independence 
movements and post-colonial developments (see, for 
example, Butenko, 1975, p. 370; Trush, 1977, pp. 164-5). 
In fact, Lenin's writings turned out to be inadequate 
for explaining developments in the colonial and 
post-colonial world when decolonization began after the 
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Second Wor~d War for much ~he same reason ~ha~ ~hose of 
his predecessors fell short. Like Marx and Engels, Lenin 
was primari~y in~erested in the effects of co~onia~ 
revo~u~ion on ~he metropolitan countries. As a result, 
he paid little atten~ion to the situa~ion within the 
co~onies, the means by which independence could be 
has~ened or ~ike~y developments af~er independence. 
Although colonia~ism was the subject matter of 
"Imperialism" and was not irrelevant ~o other 
pre-revolu~ionary ~heoretical issues, the East really 
only became a live political issue after the Oc~ober 
revolution. By then the Bolshevik attitude to the 
colonies was an issue in their relations with o~her 
coun~ries too. The British government, for example, was 
very anxious about the influence of Bolshevism on the 
British colonies, particularly India. The price of a 
commercial agreemen~ with Britain in 1921 was the 
promise not to proselytize in 
Lenin did not change his ideas 
the British colonies. 
about the East very 
radically af~er the revolution, but i~ is convenien~ ~o 
begin by looking a~ his pre-revolu~ionary wri~ings, 
before turning to the situation after 1917, particularly 
in the Comin~ern. 
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(a) Pre-revolutionary theory 
The class structure of the colonies 
Despite Lenin's rather poor opinion of the peasantry as 
a class, he astutely developed an agrarian policy for 
Russia that would ensure peasant support for the 
Bolshevik Party. Unlike Engels, he did not believe that 
the Russian peasant commune could serve to prevent 
Russia from going through a capitalist stage of 
development. He argued that the Russian system of 
farming sustained feudal relationships in the 
countryside (Lenin, 1914a, pp. 375-7). But he understood 
that although socialism would require a more advanced 
method of farming, in a country like Russia, where the 
peasantry formed 80% of the population, neither the 
bourgeois democratic nor the socialist revolutions could 
succeed without peasant support. The only way to get 
that support was to offer the peasants the land that 
they wanted. In 1905 he supported the seizure of the 
land by the peasants and in 1917 he used their demand 
for (and spontaneous confiscation of) land to enlist 
their support for the Bolsheviks by adding land to the 
Bolshevik call for °bread, 
Nonetheless, he believed that the 
peace and freedomo. 
peasants were petty 
bourgeois by nature and his opinion of them was not much 
better than that of Marx and Engels.' 
Curiously, although Lenin must have understood that the 
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proportion of peasants in the colonial population was 
even higher than in Russia, he sometimes seemed to 
misunderstand the nature of the colonial class 
structure. He implied that colonialism was creating a 
vast proletariat in the colonies. In 1908, for example, 
he maintained that: 
" ... the age-old plunder of India by the 
British and the contemporary struggle of all 
these 'advanced' Europeans against Persian and 
Indian democracy, will steel millions, tens of 
millions of proletarians in Asia to wage a 
struggle against their oppressors ... The 
class-conscious European worker now has 
comrades in Asia, and their number will grow 
by leaps and· bounds" (Lenin, 1908, p. 22, 
emphasis in original). 
Colonialism not only turned the colonial peasantry into 
a proletariat very quickly, but also spoilt the European 
proletariat, infecting it with "colonial chauvinism" 
(Lenin, 1907, p. 18). The reason for this was that it 
was no longer the labour of the European proletariat 
which maintained society, but the labour of "the 
practically enslaved natives in the colonies". The upper 
strata of the metropolitan working class had thus been 
corrupted. Privileged sections had been created which 
were detached from the broad masses of the proletariat 
and prone to opportunism (Lenin, 1916d, p. 281). What 
Lenin meant by opportunism was that the European 
proletariat was often in favour of colonialism and 
therefore did not support colonial independence 
movements. 
There was also a difference between the colonial 
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bourgeoisie and the metropolitan middle class. When 
Europe was feudal, the bourgeoisie had been a 
progressive class. Now, however, it was "decayed". The 
colonial bourgeoisie, on the other hand, was still 
revolutionary, "capable of championing sincere, 
militant, consistent democracy ... still capable of 
supporting an historically progressive cause- (Lenin, 
1912, p. 47). The principal social support of the Asian 
bourgeoisie in its democratic struggle was the peasant. 
No matter how progressive the colonial bourgeoisie, 
however, Lenin recognized (in contrast to his optimism 
regarding the growing size of the colonial proletariat) 
that it was still small. In 1916 he maintained that 
bourgeois-democratic movements had hardly begun or still 
had a long way to go in the East (Lenin, 1916g, p. 151). 
European socialists should demand the immediate 
liberation of the colonies and: 
"render determined support to the more 
revolutionary elements in the 
bourgeois-democratic movements for national 
liberation in these countries and assist their 
uprising -- or revolutionary war, in the event 
of one -- against the imperialist powers that 
oppress them" (Lenin, 1916g, p. 151-2, 
emphasis in original). 
In his writing before the Russian revolution, Lenin 
explicitly denied that capitalism could be prevented or 
avoided, describing the Chine.e view that this was 
possible as reactionary (Lenin, 1912, pp. 47-9). In any 
cas., capitalis. had already begun in the colonies. The 
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main difference between capitalism and monopoly 
capitalism was that the former exported goods, whereas 
monopoly capitalism exported capital. And the result of 
exporting capital was to "greatly accelerate the 
development of capitalism in those countries to which it 
was exported" (Lenin, 1916d, p. 243). Thus the East had 
already embarked on the capitalist path, on the 
"struggle for the ideals which the West has already 
worked out for itself" (Lenin, 1912, p. 47). Lenin 
clearly agreed with Marx ~hat capitalism was 
progressive, at least in relation to the system of 
economic relations it replaced in the colonies. Later, 
as we shall see, he changed his mind about whether 
capitalism was an essential phase of development. 
Apart from viewing the construction of capitalism within 
the colonies as an inevitable consequence of 
colonialism, Lenin paid little attention to economic, 
social or political developments within the colonies. 
"Imperialism" , for example, contained a description of 
how imperialism had occurred: first, production became 
concentrated in monopolies; second, bank capital and 
industrial capital merged to form a financial oligarchy; 
third, capital was exported; fourth, international 
monopolist combines were formedj and fifth, the whole 
world was divided up territorially amongst the largest 
capitalist· powers (Lenin, 1916d, pp; 266-7). It also 
contained a polemical argument against Kautsky, whose 
definition in 1914 and 1915 (Kautsky, 1970) of a phase 
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of "ultra-imperialism" (in which the partition of the 
world would be stabilized and the risk of war 
eliminated) Lenin was intent on refuting, and an 
explana~ion of why imperialism necessarily en~ailed war. 
But it did not contain an analysis of the social and 
economic s~ructure of the colonies, of the consequences 
for them of ~he development of capi~alism or of ~he 
results of ~he inevitable struggle for na~ional 
emancipation which accompanied imperialism. He implied 
that ~he collapse of imperialism would precede colonial 
independence. Colonial liberation could occur under 
capitalism, but "only by way of exception or at ~he cost 
of a series of revolts and revolutions both in the 
colonies and the metropolitan countries" (Lenin, 1916c, 
p. 338). He did not consider what would happen if the 
exceptions proved more numerous than the rule (as they 
did after the Second World War) or how further 
development within the colonies would occur after 
liberation. He realized, however, that there would be a 
problem, since the colonies could not be extricated from 
dependence on European finance capital: 
liThe coloni •• have no capital of their own, or 
none to speak of, and under finance capital no 
colony can obtain any except on terms of 
political submission" (Lenin, 1916c, p. 338). 
The absence of capital and, therefore, the difficulty in 
following traditional Marxist stages of development may 
have been why Lenin later postulated that capitalism 
could, under certain conditions, be skipped. 
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The relationship between colonial and 
revolutions 
metropolitan 
As we have seen, Marx had argued that colonial 
revolution would provoke European revolution (although 
he did not think that the colonial revolution would 
necessarily be successful without a European 
revolution). Lenin, on the other hand, sometimes seemed 
to visualize simultaneous revolutions. The revolution in 
Europe would occur in "an epoch in which are combined 
civil war by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. in 
the advanced countries and a whole series of democratic 
and revolutionary movements ... in the underdeveloped, 
backward and oppressed nations" (Lenin, 1916a, p. 60). 
To imagine that social revolution was "conceivable 
without revolts by small nations in the colonies and in 
Europe" was to "repudiate social revolution" (Lenin, 
1916c, p. 355, emphasis in original). At the same time, 
no matter how essential colonial revolutions were, Lenin 
was adamant (he was arguing against the Polish 
social-democrats at the time) that uprisings by small 
European nations were infinitely more valuable to the 
success of socialist revolution than any number of more 
intense rebellions in remote colonies (Lenin, 1916c, p. 
357). It is clear that it was socialist revolution 
rather than colonial liberation that was his prime 
concern. European socialist revolutions became even more 
important to him after the October revolution. 
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(b) Post-revolutionary theory 
Lenin's belief in the right of the nations belonging to 
the Tsarist empire to secession was eroded by the Civil 
War (see Chapter 6).10 However, the right of the 
colonies to self-determination continued to be upheld. 
But the imminent expectation of revolution in Europe 
meant that the Bolsheviks' main attention was directed 
towards Europe, not the East. 11 Nonetheless, the 
relationship between revolution in the East and European 
revolution remained a subject of debate. Trotsky and 
Zinoviev both maintained that national liberation in the 
East was contingent upon successful European socialist 
revolution while others, sometimes including Lenin 
and, as we shall see, most particularly Stalin, claimed 
that European socialist revolution could not succeed 
without the aid of colonial revolution. 12 
Self-determination for the colonies became a more 
important issue as European revolution became less 
credible. The "East" acquired a new importance in 
Bolshevik theory and practice, most particularly at the 
Second Congress of the Third Communist International in 
1920, but it was an importance that waxed and waned, 
depending on how imminent European revolution seemed. 13 
Which force. should be .upported. Lenin v •• Roy. 
The Second Congress 
the Com intern on the 
set out to formulate a policy for 
national and colonial question. 
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There were four key issues: how important the East was; 
why it was important; which groups of people should be 
supported; the need for European parties to pay more 
attention to the colonial question. The only issue on 
which there was complete agreement was the last 
(although little substantive was done to translate words 
into deeds). A commission was established to discuss two 
Dets of theses, one drafted by N.M. Roy, the Indian 
delegate, who expressed the "Eastern" opinion, the other 
by Lenin, embodying a more "Western" view. 
On the first issue, Roy was certain that the Comintern 
should devote its major attention to the East. Lenin 
agreed that the East had been neglected, but he did not 
think that the Comintern effort in Europe should be 
diverted. On the question of why the East was important, 
Roy asserted that the European revolution waD dependent 
upon the Asian, while Lenin merely maintained that 
revolution in the colonies would facilitate revolution 
in Europe and help to save Soviet Russia. The argument 
about which forces should be supported in the colonies 
was the most important, since it was to have long-term 
consequences for colonial socialists. Roy argued that 
the transfer of capitalism to the colonies would soon 
produce an alignment of forc.s that resembled that of 
the West. The national bourgeoisie would become richer, 
coalesce with the feudal classes and compromise with 
Western imperialism against the proletariat and the 
peasantry. The anti-imperialist struggle, therefore, 
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would be led not by the bourgeoisie but by the 
proletariat and peasantry. The Comintern ought urgently 
to create communist organizations of workers and 
peasants rather than support the unreliable national 
bourgeoisie (Eudin & North, 1957, pp. 65-7). This view 
contrasted with Lenin's belief that the revolution in 
the East should be based on the bourgeois nationalism 
which had been awakened in the colonies as a result of 
the war (Lenin, 1919a, pp. 230-41). In his draft theses 
Lenin argued that bourgeois-democratic and peasant 
movements should be assisted in more backward states and 
nations. Socialists should form alliances with them, 
while preserving their independence by refusing to fuse 
completely (Lenin, 19200, pp. 252-9). The debate which 
ensued, the subsequent 
interpreted were to have 
vote and the way 
a profound effect 
it was 
on both 
Comintern and Soviet policy (insofar as the two were 
separable) towards the national liberation movement for 
many years. 14 
Both sets of theses appear to have enjoyed considerable 
support. As a result, they were amended slightly 
(Lenin's so that the term bourgeois-democratic wa. 
replaced wi t.h "national revolut.ionary'· which excluded 
reformist movement.s likely to collaborat.e wit.h 
imperialists against. revolutionary movement.s) and both 
were adopted, ev.n though Lenin's thes •• called for 
support of the struggle of all Eastern natiops against. 
West.ern imperialism, while Roy's insisted upon the 
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hopelessness of such a policy and the need to support 
socialists. In the year& after the Congress, Roy's 
theses fell into abeyance and Lenin's view prevailed, 
although it reflected, in the words of one Western 
historian: 
"[A] child-like conviction that your adversary 
will not understand your intentions, though 
you express them quite openly, that he will 
continue to co-operate with you as long as you 
want it and allow himself to be overthrown 
when it suits you" (Borkenau, 1962, pp. 292-3, 
emphasis in original).15 
There were three reasons why Lenin's view prevailed: 
first, it was very similar to the Bolshevik policy which 
had worked so well in achieving a successful revolution 
in Russia. Both Bolsheviks and other Comintern members 
were inclined to believe that it would work equally well 
elsewhere. Second, Bolshevik and Comintern policy 
rapidly grew less radical after the Second Comintern 
Congress. Lenin's theses, rather than Roy's, 
corresponded to the new line of compromise which seemed 
essential and which Lenin described in "Left-Wing 
Communism: An Infantile Disorder" (1920a, pp. 17-118). l' 
Third, although the revolution in the East was said to 
be vital, Soviet and the Comintern's interest remained 
focussed on Europe. Successful colonial independence 
movements would, it was thought, weaken the European 
countries and make the socialist revolution more likely. 
And independence movements were far more likely to be 
successful if they were led by the national bourgeoi.ie 
(or the national revolutionarie., which amounted to the 
same thing) and not by nascent or weak communist 
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organizations. 
The possibility of omitting a stage of development 
It was at the Second Comintern Congress that Lenin 
changed his mind about the necessity for colonies to go 
through a capitalist phase of economic development. He 
now argued, as Marx had argued about Russia, that: 
"If the victorious revolutionary proletariat 
conducts systematic propaganda among [the 
backward nations] and the Soviet governments 
come to their aid with all the means at their 
disposal -- in that event it will be mistaken 
to assume that the backward peoples must 
inevitably go through the capitalist stage of 
development" (Lenin, 1920d, p. 270). 
In the years that followed the Second Comintern Congress 
the growing interest in the East was reflected in a 
number of developments. Two congresses were specifically 
devoted to the East: in September 1920 a Congress of 
Toilers of the East took place in Baku, and in January 
1922 a Congress of Toilers of the Far East took place in 
Moscow and Leningrad. In addition, the Red International 
of Labour Unions (Prof intern) and the Peasant 
International (Krestintern) were formed in 1921 and 1923 
respectively. A Communist University of Toilers of the 
East was set up and Comintern agents made contact with 
Asian revolutionary movements. 17 This activity, however, 
had very little impact on the course of revolution in 
the East, except in Outer Mongolia where a Mongolian 
People's Government was set up in 1921 with Soviet aid. 
The Soviet Union agreed to keep troops in the country 
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for as long as required (Degras, Vol. 1. 1951, pp. 
252-3). Mongolia was organized as a Sovie~ bu~ no~ a 
socialist republic. It was never incorporated in~o the 
Sovie~ Union, but i~ relied heavily on Soviet aid (see 
Carr, Vol. 3, 1972, pp. 833-902 for an account of the 
early pos~-revolu~ionary developmen~5 in Mongolia). 
There was very little discussion about colonial affairs 
a~ ~he Third Comintern Congress in 1921. By 1922, 
however, and the Fourth Comintern Congress, reviving 
conservatism in the West made the Eastern na~ional 
revolution an increasingly desirable goal. Lenin took 
little part in the discussion, except to urge 
moderation. Once again a compromise resolution was 
adopted: collaboration wi~h the bourgeoisie would 
continue for as long as it supported social and agrarian 
reform. Refusal ~o enter into alliance with n&~ional 
revolutionary movements <called opportunism) and 
remaining aloof from class struggle in the name of 
national unity were equally criticized. However, within 
the alliance socialists should con~inue preserving an 
independent identity. Their tasks were dual: to fight 
for radical solutions of the problems of th~ bourgeois 
democratic revolution and to organize the workers and 
peasants for class struggle (Degras, Vol. 1, 1960, pp. 
383-93). 
In Lenin'. last published article he expressed & renewed 
faith in the East. Since Russia, India, China, etc. 
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constituted a gigantic majority of the world's 
population, and since this majority had rapidly been 
drawn into the struggle for emancipation in the past few 
years, there could not be lithe slightest doubt what the 
final outcome will be the complete victory of 
socialism is fully and absolutely assured" (Lenin, 
1923a, p. 318). Once again, however, it was 
disappointment in the absence of revolution in Europe 
rather than a belief in the intrinsic importance of the 
colonial world which prompted this turn to the East. 
Considering Lenin's work as a whole, and the very small 
amount of it that was devoted to colonialism, it is 
clear that modern Soviet theorists exaggerate his part 
in shaping Soviet theory and policy towards the Third 
World. As McLane· points out (1966, pp. 75-6) the only 
systematic consideration he gave to the subject was in 
1920, and even then his formulation was vague, often 
irrelevant and frequently a source of misunderstanding 
and confusion. His real contribution lay in directing 
the Comintern's attention to the world beyond Europe. 
Nonetheless, modern theoristS quote him constantly, 
particularly in relation to the need to support 
bourgeois independence movements and the possibility of 
skipping the capitalist phase of development. But after 
his death both Bolshevik and the Comintern Eastern 
policy and theory more and more reflected Stalin'. 
views. In fact, a. Commissar for Nationalitie. from 
October 1917 onward~Stalin's views had carried weight 
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even before Lenin's illness and death. But it was 
particularly in relation to China that he had the 
opportunity to demonstrate his theory and his policy. 
3. Stalin and the Colonial Qu.stion 
.Although Stalin's views on the national question had 
long been considered authoritative, he did not hold any 
important positions in the Comintern. 18 Since two of his 
rivals for power, Trotsky and Zinoviev, were prominent 
in the Comintern and could count on considerable 
support, he tended, until his position had been secured, 
to bypass it. He had, however, linked the national 
question to developments in the colonies even before the 
revolution, pointing out that the Bolshevik policy 
towards 
combined 
the national 
with support 
minorities in Russia should be 
for revolutionary movements 
against im~erialism. This would create "a rear for the 
vanguard of the socialist revolution [sic]" and build a 
bridge between West and East (Stalin, 1917, p. 67). 
The images of the October revolution as a "bridge" and 
the colonial revolution as the "rear" remained amongst 
Stalin's favourite themes after the revolution. H. 
warned, for example, against forgetting the East because 
it represented the "'inexhaustible' re.erve and "most 
reliable' rear of world imperialism- (Stalin, 1918&, p. 
359). He maintained that the October revolution had 
transposed the national question into the more general 
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question of colonial emancipation, thus erecting "a 
bridge between the socialist West and the enslaved East" 
(Stalin, 1918b, p. 76). He also insisted that the 
successful resolution of the Russian national problem 
(by which he meant overcoming the two deviations of 
Great Russian chauvinism and local nationalism and 
successfully and materially aiding the backward border 
peoples of Russia to develop a socialist economy without 
passing through the stage of industrial capitalism) was 
vital for the domestic well-being of the October 
Revolution. It would also be of international 
significance, providing an example that would stir up 
and revolutionize "the far imperialist rear the 
colonial and semicolonial countries of the East and 
thereby hasten the fall of capitalism" (Stalin, 1923, p. 
148). Although, to use Boersner's categories (see 
footnote 6), Stalin was rather more "Eastern" in his 
view of the importance of colonial revolution, in the 
long run he saw no prospect for either successful 
emancipation without the overthrow of capitalism, or for 
lasting proletarian victory without colonial 
emancipation. In other words, he had a far more 
interdependent view of the relationship between the two 
revolutions than either Roy or Lenin: 
n ••• the victory of the world proletarian 
revolution may be regarded as assured only if 
the proletariat is able to combine its own 
r.volutionary struggle with the movement for 
the emancip.tion of the toiling m..... of the 
non-sovereign nations and the coloni.. against 
the power of the imperialists, and for a 
dictatorship of the proletariat- (Stalin, 
1921, p. 11~). 
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Stalin's interest in the East became more pronounced as 
the climate in Europe became less revolutionary. Once 
the Bolsheviks had failed at Warsaw in 1921 and in 
Hungary and Germany, they realized that the European 
revolutionary movement was slowing down (Stalin, 1923, 
pp. 147-8). But the revolutionary possibilities in the 
colonial liberation movement were not yet exhausted and 
they could be "utilized for the purpose of overthrowing 
imperialism" (Stalin, 1924a, p. 52). China became the 
focus of attention because it was there that both 
nationalist (Kuomintang) and communist parties (CCP, 
established in 1921) existed and had been persuaded to 
form an alliance. Moreover, the Soviet government had 
signed an agreement to aid the Kuomintang. 19 It was for 
these reasons firstly, that Soviet gov.ernment policy 
towards China was more important than the Comintern 
policy (until the two became indistinguishable after 
Stalin had attained supreme power) and secondly, that 
Soviet policy was pre-eminently Stalin's policy and thus 
served as one of the issues in the Stalin-Trotsky 
dispute. 20 
(a) Stalin and the Comintern 
Which forc ••• hould b •• upp~rt.d? 
Although Stalin did not work through it At first, the 
Comintern did not entirely ignore the national and 
colonial qu •• tion. The 5th Congr... in 1924 wa. 
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preoccupied with the failure of the uprising in Germany 
in 1923 and the "Russian question" (i.e. the opposition 
within the Russian Communist Party), but there was a 
debate between Roy and Manuilsky on colonial affairs. 
Roy urged prudence in the matter of alliance with the 
national bourgeoisie, pointing to Lenin's agreement at 
the Second Congress that support should be given to 
revolutionary and not to reformist parties. Building up 
reliable local communist parties should be the most 
important task. In dismissing Roy's objection, Manuilsky 
gave an intimation of future trends, in particular the 
way in which Stalin would become co-legitimator of all 
policy and the Com intern would express the interests of 
the Soviet state rather than those of the international 
revolution. Firstly, he linked Stalin's name with 
Lenin's as the source of revolutionary theory and 
co-architect of the theses adopted by the Second 
Congress. Secondly, he implied that Asian nationalism 
was more useful to Soviet foreign policy than 
proletarian or peasant movements (because it harrassed 
Russia's European enemies). Asian communists should 
therefore collaborate with, or even, if necessary, 
organize petty-bourgeois parties (for a discussion of 
the debate, see Carr, Vol. 3, 1972, pp. 89-91, 632-5). A 
few years later Stalin was to explain that the Comintern 
support for the Kuomintanq in 1926 and 1927 had been 
correct because it enfeebled and undermined imperialism, 
"thus facilitating the development of the hearth ~nd 
home of the world revolution, the USSR- (Stalin, 1927d, 
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p. 237). 
The debate between Roy and Manuilsky, like the previous 
debate between Roy and Lenin, was an argument between 
Eastern and Western viewpoints. Roy, while 
overestimating the size of the colonial proletariat, was 
promoting the socialist future of the colonies, whereas 
Manuilsky was primarily interested in encouraging those 
colonial developments that would weaken capitalism in 
the metropolitan countries, and thus encourage 
revolution in Europe. The extent to which Manuilsky 
reflected Stalin's view may be seen by Stalin's 
evaluation of the national movements in Afghanistan and 
Egypt: 
"The struggle which the Emir of Afghanistan is 
waging for the independence of his country is 
objectively a revolutionary struggle, despite 
the monarchist views of the Emir and his 
entourage, for it weakens, disintegrates and 
undermines imperialism ... For the same reason, 
the struggle which the Egyptian merchants and 
bourgeois intellectuals are waging for the 
independence of their country is objectively 
revolutionary despite the bourgeois origin and 
bourgeois calling of the leaders of the 
Egyptian national movement and despite the 
fact that they are opposed to socialism •.• the 
national movement of the oppressed countries 
should be judged ••. from the point of view of 
the actual results in the sum total of the 
struggle against imperialism" (Stalin, 1924b, 
p. 194). 
Stalin, however, was eclectic about which national 
movements should be supported and when. Where they came 
into conflict with the inter.sts of the development of 
the proletarian movement, support was uentirely out of 
the qu.~tion·· (Stalin, 1924b, p. 52). He distinguished 
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between three kinds of colonies. In those in which there 
was no proletariat the task of Communists was to create 
a united national front against imperialism. In 
countries like Egypt or Chin~ in which there was a small 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie had already split into 
revolutionary and compromising parties, Communists 
should form a revolutionary bloc of workers and petty 
bourgeoisie (he gave the Kuomintang as an example of 
this kind of bloc), while retaining leadership of the 
revolutionary party and freedom of agitation and 
propaganda. Finally, in countries like India, where the 
compromising section of the bourgeoisie had already come 
to an agreement with imperialism, the proletariat should 
systematically be made ready to become hegemonic in the 
liberation movement (Stalin, 1925b, pp. 216-8). The 
situation in China gave him the opportunity to tryout 
his theories. 
Stalin and the Chine •• Revolution, 1924-27 
There is general agreement amongst Western scholars that 
Stalin's China policy was spectacularly unsuccessful. 
McLane (1966, p. 483), for example, maintains that: 
"Stalin's single full-fledged venture in Asia, 
marred by misjudgments and a Byzantine 
devotion to intrigue, was a disaster from 
whioh recovery was possible only in the 
avoidance of similar ventures in the future". 
It is oertainly true that the Chine.e Communist Party 
paid h.avily for followinq his advice. Moreover, it wa. 
in relation to China that the Comintern most obviously 
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became first a forum for his struggle against Trotsky 
and then his mouthpiece. International revolution was 
replaced by defence of socialism in one country (in 
other words, the security of the Soviet state) as the 
first ~riority. Whether colonial revolution was ever 
really of primary importance to either Stalin or the 
Comintern is debatable. From its inception colonial 
representatives often complained that insufficient 
attention was paid to revolution in the East. But it was 
only in 1935 that it became apparent that there could be 
serious conflict between Soviet security and colonial 
revolution. 
Stalin's "venture" in China can 
phases: from 1924 to April 1927 he 
be divided into 3 
insisted that the 
Chinese revolution was a "bourgeois revolution of an 
anti-imperialist type" and that therefore an alliance 
between the Kuomintang and the CCP was required (Stalin, 
1927e, p. 196), even after Chiang Kai-shek (who had 
succeeded Sun Vat-sen as leader of the Kuomintang) began 
restricting the CCP. The climax of this phase was Chiang 
Kai-shek's attack on the communists of Shanghai who, on 
orders from Moscow, had hidden their arms. Stalin 
maintained that his and the Comintern's position had 
been Nabsolutely correct" (Stalin, 1927e, p. 196) and 
that the CCP was at fault. The national bourgeoisie, 
Stalin admitted, had deserted the Chinese revolution, 
but the compensation was that the revolution had entered 
a higher phase of development. 
147 
The second phase in 1927 was, according to Stalin, "a 
gigantic agrarian revolution" (Stalin, 1927e, p. 198). 
The correct policy for the Chinese Communists was to 
continue their alliance with the left wing of the 
Kuomintang, impelling it leftwards to "transform it into 
the core of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of 
the proletariat and peasantryU (Stalin, 1927e, p. 203). 
Stalin would not at this stage consider the 
establishment of Soviets in China because that would 
have meant rushing ahead and becoming divorced from the 
masses (Stalin, 1927a, p. 245). He maintained that the 
Chinese revolution had suffered a temporary defeat and 
only when a new upsurge had become a fact would it be 
appropriate to set up Soviets (Stalin, 1927e, p. 217). 
But he agreed that the CCP should sponsor agrarian 
reform. The second phase ended in July when the left 
Kuomintang expelled the communists, arresting some and 
killing others. Once again the CCP was blamed and told 
to change its leadership. 
During both first and second phases of the Chinese 
revolution Stalin was, in fact, applying the principles 
Lenin had set out at the Second Comintern Congress. But 
he went on insisting on alliance with the Kuomintang, 
even when it became obvious that collaboration was 
little more than a" fiction and immensely dangerous to 
the Chinese communist •• The problem may have been that 
he was a oaptive of his own theory (that is, that the 
oorrect tactics for the bourgeois-demooratic stage of 
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the revolution was alliance with nationalist forces). 
But a more important reason may have been his domestic 
power struggle against Trotsky and the left opposition, 
who were proposing a more radical (and probably more 
suitable) policy. Admitting that he was wrong and 
changing tactics to adopt their policy would have 
resulted in loss of prestige, perhaps even enabling 
Trotsky to gain ascendancy. It was probably only at the 
end of 1927, when he had defeated the left and was about 
to turn against his own right wing, that he could afford 
to change policy. Unfortunately, it was too late and the 
victims once again were the Chinese communists. 
In the third phase of Stalin's venture in China, from 
August to December 1927, he ordered the new CCP 
leadership to "make use of the experience of the Russian 
October Revolution" and organize armed defence against 
the counter-revolutionary forces of the bourgeoisie 
(Degras, Vol. 2, 1960, P 410). Soviets should now be 
established. The CCP duly undertook a series of armed 
uprisings, all of which failed. In December 1927 a 
commune was set up in Canton. It lasted a brief few 
days, before being defeated in a devastating battle in 
which thousands of communists were killed. As a result 
the CCP lost what little remaining influence it had in 
the cities, becoming what one Western historian ha. 
called -an organization of intellectuals leading 
peasants" (Borkenau, 1962, p. 323). 
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This time too Stalin insisted that the fault lay with 
shortcomings in the CCP, including "insufficient 
preparatory work", "inadequate knowledge of what was 
happening in Canton" and "weakness of the political 
mobilization of the masses" (Degras, Vol. 2, 1960, pp. 
437-40, quotes on p. 439). But he minimized the 
significance of the failure. At the Fifteenth Congress 
of the CPSU(b} he enunciated his new theory of colonial 
revolution which was to form the basis of Soviet 
analysis of the East for the next few years: 
"Great popular revolutions never achieve final 
victory in the first round of their battles. 
They grow and gain strength in the course of 
flows and ebbs. That has been so everywhere, 
including Russia. So it will be in China" 
(Stalin, 19Z7g, p. 290). 
And so it ~ in China, but whether the strength of the 
CCP and its eventual victory owed anything to Stalin is 
debatable. The dismal failure in 1927, however, led to a 
reappraisal of the general Comintern line, in the 
colonies as well as in Europe. 
A new radical programme was adopted by the Sixth 
Comintern Congress in September 1928, based on the new 
revolutionary crisis of imperialism detected by Stalin. 
Part of the programme analyzed the situation in the 
colonies. The immediate problems for colonial and 
.emi-colonial countries with rudimentary industry and a 
predominant Asiatic mode of production (the term wa. 
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still in use) were to struggle against feudalism and 
pre-capitalist forms of exploitation, to bring about 
agrarian revolution and to struggle against imperialism 
and for national independence. The transition to 
proletarian dictatorship would require a series of 
preparatory phases and the transformation of the 
bourgeois-democratic into a socialist revolution. 
Successful socialist construction would only be possible 
with the help of countries where the proletarian 
dictatorship had already been established. In even more 
backward countries which did not have a bourgeoisie, 
national liberation was the central task. Victorious 
national uprisings could lead the way to socialism, 
by-passing the capitalist stage if sufficient aid was 
given by the countries with a proletarian dictatorship 
(i.e. the USSR) and by the international proletarian 
movement generally. 
The rather contradictory implication to be drawn from 
this analysis was that more developed colonial and 
semi-colonial countries would take longer to travel 
through the intermediate preparatory phases to socialism 
than the entirely undeveloped countries (Degra., Vol. 2, 
1960, pp. 506-7). Certain minimum prerequisites had to 
exist in more developed countries: "a certain level of 
industrial development, of trade union organization and 
a strong communist party" (Degras, Vol. 2, 1960, p. 
537), while the undeveloped countries would be able to 
omit an entire stage of economic development. ·Aid from 
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the victorious proletarian dictatorship would thus, on 
the one hand, enable backward colonies to embark on a 
"non-capitalist path of development II immediately and, on 
the other, transform the bourgeois-democratic revolution 
in more advanced countries rather more gradually into 
proletarian socialist revolution (Degras, Vol. 2, 1960, 
p. 533 and see McKenzie, 1964, p. 83). 
The programme listed eight special tasks for the 
communist parties of colonial countries: the overthrow 
of foreign 
bureaucracYi 
imperialism, feudalism 
the establishment of 
and landlord 
a democratic 
dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry on the 
basis of Soviets; national independence and political 
unification; cancellation of state debts; 
nationalization of large foreign imperialist 
enterprises; expropriation of large landowners, church 
and monastery estates and the nationalization of land; 
introduction of an eight-hour day; establishment of a 
revolutionary workers' and peasants' army (Degras, Vol. 
2, 1960, pp. 505-8).~ New theses on the revolutionary 
movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries 
were adopted, spelling out in greater detail the 
strategy and tactics that should be adopted by 
communists. The lessons learnt in China were, reflected 
in the warning to communists that Man incorrect 
appraisal of the national-reformist tendency of the 
bourgeoisi •••• may give rise to serious errors in the 
strategy and tactics- (Degras, Vol. Z, 1960, pp. 5Z6-48, 
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quote on p. 538). Moreover, although the theses began by 
stating that Lenin's 1920 theses were still valid, the 
1928 version vindicated Roy to some extent (Roy, 
however, was expelled from the Comintern in 1929) by 
insisting that building up and developing communist 
parties had become an urgent task (Degras, Vol. 2, 1960, 
p. 542). In China the immediate practical task was to 
prepare for and carry through armed insurrection to 
complete the bourgeois-democratic revolution by 
destroying the power of the Kuomintang and the 
militarists and to establish a Soviet regime (Degras, 
Vol. 2, 1960, pp. 543-4). Within a few years, however, 
alliance with the Kuomintang once again became the order 
of the day. 
Decreasing interest in the East 
From 1928 onwards the Communist International 
increasingly reflected Soviet state policy and 
decreasingly concerned itself with colonial revolution. 
The fact that there were conflicts between Soviet 
interests and the interests of international 
state 
and 
colonial revolution was perhaps indicated by the absence 
of a Comintern Congress between 1928 and 1935. It also 
demonstrated the decline in the importance of the 
Comintern. The official line remained that the colonial 
East was entering a new stage of revolutionary upsurge 
(Safarov, 1930, p. 69), but there was little Soviet or 
Comintern engagement in colonial affairs. Although 
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Chinese rural Soviets began to be identified as a symbol 
of the revolutionary movement there, the transition of 
the Chinese revolution to a socialist phase was 
increasingly postponed to the distant future. ~ In his 
report to the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU (b) 
(Stalin, 1934, pp. 470-538), Stalin did not mention the 
colonies. The Seventh (and last) Comintern Congress was 
held in 1935. The purpose was to create a platform for 
announcing the new Soviet and Comintern line -- popular 
fronts against fascism. In the colonies the popular 
front was to take the form of an anti-imperialist united 
front. But it was here that the seriousness of the 
contradiction between So~iet state interests and the 
interest. of colonial revolution was demonstrated in 
stark reality. It was one thing to call for an 
anti-imperialist united front in China, where the 
imperialist enemy, Japan, was also the enemy of the 
Soviet Union. But the imperialist enemies against whom 
the national revolutionaries in other colonies were to 
unite were the very Western powers with which Stalin 
sought to join forces against Germany. 23 Despite the 
apparently revolutionary formula "anti-imperialist 
united front .. , a choice had to be made by the Soviet 
leadership. In the East it was made against colonial 
movements. 
After 1935 Soviet diplomatic efforts were taken up with 
the Spanish Civil War and, increasingly urgently, with 
attempts to construct a 'collective security agreement 
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against Nazi Germany. It was only after fascism had been 
defeated that the Soviet Union turned back to the East. 
But the Comintern had been disbanded in 1943 and Soviet 
leaders and scholars took some 
significance 
movements. 
of post-war 
(b) Colonialism and the Cold War 
policy, 
time to recognize the 
colonial independence 
suspended when the The popular 
Stalin-Hitler 
front 
Pact was signed in 1939, was resumed as 
soon as the German attack on the Soviet Union took place 
in June 1941. It applied as much to the colonies and 
semi-colonies as to Europe. Chiang Kai-shek, for 
example, was called the leader of the Chinese people and 
a symbol of Chinese unity, while the demand for Indian 
independence was said to be untimely (Lemin, 1942, pp. 
76-84). Soviet interest in the colonies only revived 
after the Yalta conference in February 1945. But even 
then it took eighteen months for a policy towards China 
to be formulated and even longer towards other colonies. 
In the immediate aftermath of the war Soviet leaders 
were preoccupied with dealing with the economic 
consequences of the war, with post-war Europe and the 
almost immediate outbreak of the Cold War. Stalin seemed 
to expect to continue the popular front policy. He 
advised against proceeding with the civil war in China 
and suqgested a continuation of the alliance between the 
CCP and the Kuomintang. The Soviet government had signed 
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a Pact of Friendship and Alliance with China in August 
1945 and although the Red Army allowed the CCP to 
liberate some areas after the Japanese surrender, very 
little public attention was paid to the CCP until the 
middle of 1946.~ 
When the change occurred, Soviet leaders and theorists 
became far more radical in their approach to 
international relations in general and far more aware of. 
the revolutionary potential of colonial uprisings and 
unrest. But once again it was not really independence 
per se that was valued. The colonies and ex-colonies 
were seen as instruments in the Cold War struggle. One 
Western study of the Soviet Union and South East Asia 
found, for example, that: 
liThe Soviet attitude toward national 
liberation in any given instance 
was ..• determined not by Communist strength in 
the movement seeking it or by the imminence of 
independence but by the irritation the 
national liberation movement, Communist or 
non-Communist, was capable of producing in the 
metropolitan" (McLane, 1966, pp. 346-7). 
It is usually implied in Western literature that Soviet 
policy remained radical until Khrushchev came to power. 
It would be a mistake, however, to credit Khrushchev 
with being the sole instigator of a more moderate 
attitude towards the colonial world. While it is true 
that Soviet theory became far more radical in 1947, a 
careful reading of what Soviet l •• ders were saying and 
Soviet theorists were writing.t the beginning of the 
1950s make. it clear th.t Stalin was planning • change 
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in policy before he died. 
When the 
revolution 
change in attitude towards the Chinese 
became public in 1946, it began to be 
reflected in commentaries on other colonial matters. But 
theory and policy really only emerged in the reaction to 
Varga's theory about the stabilization of capitalism. In 
the first version of his book (1946), Varga suggested 
that the relationship had changed between many colonies 
and metropolitan countries. The colonies were no longer 
necessarily in debt to the metropoles. This would change 
their political relations. The obvious upsurge in 
anti-imperialist movements had been caused by a 
strengthening of the native bourgeoisie and proletariat, 
the military training received during the war and the 
consequent availability of colonial troops to 
participate in the independence struggle. Varga seemed 
to think that it was possible that the colonies could 
evolve towards independence (Varga, 1946, pp. 219-26). 
In refuting these evolutionary ideas, Soviet theory 
suddenly became far more radical, resembling the 1928 
Comintern programme and theses, and moving away from 
moderate popular front class alliances. 25 
Colonialis. in the two camp world 
Most We.tern scholars see 
Cominform founding meeting 
Zhdanov'. 
as the 
speech 
first 
at the 
public 
indication of a new hard line in Soviet theory and 
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policy. Zhdanov divided the world into two camps, the 
imperialist, anti-democratic camp and the anti-fascist 
camp. The latter consisted of the USSR, the new 
democracies of Eastern Europe, and countries like 
Romania, Hungary and Finland, which had broken with 
imperialism. Indonesia and Vietnam were associated with 
it and Egypt and Syria were sympathetic to it. It was 
also backed by labour and democratic movements, by 
communist parties and by the fighters for national 
liberation in the colonies and dependencies (Zhdanov, 
1947, p. 2).26 The anti-fascist camp was thus both 
geographic or (to use the terminology adopted in 
Kubalkova and Cruickshank, 1980) "horizontal", in that 
it included groups of states, and class-based or 
"vertical", including some groups which, in a purely 
horizontal division, would perforce have belonged to the 
opposing camp. One interesting aspect of Zhdanov's 
speech in light of subsequent Soviet interpretations of 
the causes of successful national liberation movements 
was that- he did not give any particular credit to the 
Soviet Union except insofar as it had been responsible 
for the defeat of fascism. The war had resulted in a 
change in the correlation of forces, but it was the war 
rather than the correlation of forces which had led to 
changes in the colonial system: 
"World War II aggravated the crisis of the 
colonial system, as expressed in the rise of a 
powerful movement for national liberation in 
the colonies and dependencies. This has placed 
the rear of the capitali.t system in jeopardy. 
The people. of the colonies no longer wish to 
live in the old way. The ruling cla •••• ~f the 
metropolitan countries can no longer govern on 
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the old lines. Attempts to crush the national 
liberation movements by military force now 
increasingly encounter armed resistance on the 
part of the oolonial peoples and lead to 
protracted colonial wars" (Zhdanov, 1947, p. 
2 ) . 
It was oommonly aocepted then that the increased 
activity of the colonial anti-imperialist movements was 
a natural phenomenon and not due to the "hands of 
Moscow". Nonetheless, the Bolshevik Revolution, in 
particular the way it had dealt with the development of 
the baokward peoples of the Tsarist empire and aided 
Mongolia to complete its bourgeois demooratic revolution 
and acquire "the necessary prerequisites for further 
progressive development .. , was often offered as a model 
to the colonies (see, for example, Zhukov, 1946, p. 43). 
This was not a new suggestion; Stalin had been making 
the same analogy sinoe 1918. 
Varga's view of the colonies had already begun to be 
refuted by the time that Zhdanov made his speech. The 
possibility of a peaceful transition to independence was 
precluded, since the economic prerequisites were laoking 
(Vasil'eva, 1947, p. 64). Moreover, oo-operation with 
the national bourgeoisie was no longer considered 
aoceptable. To begin with, no attempt was made to 
distinguish between various kinds of bourgeoisie 
since it was willing to oompromise with imperialists it 
was, as a whole, anti-national (Zhukov, 1947a, p. 6). A 
little later, however, alliance with the petty 
bourgeoisie and middle seotors was authorized, although 
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communists were to constitute the main force of the 
anti-imperialist struggle (Zhukov, 1947c, p. 55). 
Whether or not that struggle needed to be an armed 
struggle was unclear, but there was no ambiguity about 
neutralism. The theory of a "third force" between 
communism and imperialism was "an imperialist device to 
slander the USSR by placing it on the same level with 
American imperialism" (Zhukov, 1947c, p. 63 and see 
Chapter 8). 
By 1949 three changes were evident in the Soviet 
interpretation of the situation in the colonial world. 
Firstly, the successes of the national liberation 
movement were now said to be due to the change in the 
correlation of class forces, which in turn was the 
result of an increase in the power of the USSR (Zhukov, 
1949, p. 56). Secondly, the condemnation of the 
nationalist bourgeoisie for being reformist became even 
stronger (Maslennikov, 1949, pp. 62-75). Nehru, who 
until 1947 had been considered sympathetic to the 
democratic camp, was now called an "imperialist lackey" 
(Zhukov, 1949, p. 59). At the same time, the political 
weight and power of the colonial proletariat tended to 
be over-rated: 
" •• the working class is the admitted hegemon 
in the colonial revolution and the· communist 
party, directly or through wider maa. 
organizations, leads the national liberation 
movement" (Zhukov, 1949, p. 55, emphasis in 
original). 
The third change marked an attempt to explain how the 
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transition to socialism would take place in the 
ex-colonies. It was envisaged that the transition would 
be similar to that taking place in the People's 
Democracies of Eastern Europe (and the ex-colonies were 
called "the new People's Democracies of the East"), but 
that "the transition to the solution of socialist tasks 
may prove more protracted" than 
democracies which had not been colonies 
in the people's 
(Zhukov,· 1949, 
p. 60). The first of these changes (attributing colonial 
revolution to Soviet power), was to remain standard 
practice in future Soviet theory. The latter two 
changes, however, (the explanation of the class 
structure in the colonies and ex-colonies and of the way 
in which the transition to socialism would take place) 
signalled theoretical problems which, together with the 
question of the economic structure of the underdeveloped 
countries, would continue to preoccupy Soviet theorists 
in the post-Stalin era. 
Despite the evident radicalization of Soviet attitudes 
towards the colonies, theorists had already begun to 
search for alternative ways of advancing Soviet 
influence. There was some delay before the search was 
reflected in Soviet theory and practice, however, partly 
because of the impetus provided by the success of the 
Chinese revolution in 1949 and, more particularly, 
because of the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. For a 
while the Chine.. model was extolled for all colonial 
revolutions. Colonialism could only b. overcome by 
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proletarian revolution and the overthrow of imperialism. 
Although a broad revolutionary movement was required, it 
should be led by the working class and its vanguard, the 
Communist Party (Potekhin, 1950, pp. 24- 7). But it soon 
became clear that not all Soviet theorists believed that 
China could serve as a universal model. 
Theoretical diversification. 
At a conference held at the Oriental Studies Institute 
in November 1951 on "the character and attributes of the 
system of people's democracies in the Orient" (the 
countries so termed were China, Mongolia, Vietnam and 
Korea), a 
Zhukov, 
scholars, 
number of 
the most 
maintained 
opposing views were expressed. 
prominent of the participating 
that although the Chinese 
revolution was extremely significant, it should not be 
regarded as a "stereotype", since many countries did not 
possess revolutionary armies ("Discussion of the 
Character and Effect of People's Democracy in the 
Orient", 1952, p. 3). Two of the discussants disagreed: 
similar conditions applied in other countries of the 
Orient, including India and the events in Burma, 
Vietnam, Korea, Malaya and the Philippines were examples 
of the role of revolutionary armies ("Discussion of the 
Character and Effect of People's Democracy in the 
Orient-, 1952, p. 6). They did not, however, succeed in 
changing Zhukov'. mind, from which it can be a •• umed 
that this particular theoretical proposition had b.an 
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settled: China was no longer to be considered a 
universal model and armed revolution was not everywhere 
applicable. 
The relevance of the Chinese experience was not the only 
controversial subject discussed at this conference, 
however, and the other subjects were less easy to 
settle. In essence an agenda was set of theoretical 
issues which were to remain problematical for many.years 
to come. The participants considered which features the 
people's democracies in the Orient shared with the 
European people's democracies and which were specific. 
They also discussed the thorny problem of creating a 
people's democratic system in countries which lacked a 
proletariat (for example, Mongolia), whether India and 
China had or could embark on a path of noncapitalist 
development, the definition of the noncapitalist path, 
and how the transition of the people's democratic 
revolution to the socialist revolution would take place 
("Discussion of the Character and Effect of People's 
Democracy in the Orient", 1952, pp. 4-7). In summing up 
the discussion Zhukov insisted that China had already 
embarked upon the path of noncapitalist development. 
Given the low level of industrialization, it was, 
however, too soon to speak 
Mongolia. He pointed out 
proletariat nor a national 
of building socialism in 
that Mongolia had neither a 
bourqeoisie, but that 
nonetheless, its people's democratic 
differ qualitatively from those of other 
regime did not 
countries of 
Asia: 
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"In regard ~o Mongolia ... the constan~, 
disin~eres~ed assis~ance and the 
ideological-poli~ical suppor~ of the USSR 
ensured ~he necessary proletarian leadership 
for ~he Mongolian people's regime ... By virtue 
of ~his ... the people's revolutionary 
regime ... performed the functions of a 
revolu~ionary democra~ic dicta~orship of the 
proletaria~ and peasan~ry" ("Discussion of ~he 
Charac~er and Effect of People's Democracy in 
the Orient", 1952, p. 7). 
He was nei~her specific about the kind or amount of 
assistance, nor did he explain how assis~ance and 
ideological-political support could ensure proletarian 
leadership in ~he absence of a prole~ariat. The 
published repor~ ended by indicating ~he need for "a 
scientific elaboration" of ~he problems ("Discussion of 
the Character and Effect of People's Democracy in the 
Orien~" , 1952, p'. 43). And the problems which required 
scientific elaboration were basically those noted above 
as future perennial conundrums for Soviet theorists: the 
social class structure of developing countries, the 
transition to socialism and the economic structure of 
developing countries. 
4. Conclusion 
It is clear that while only a small proportion of Marx's 
writing related to the colonies, a considerable amount 
of Lenin's work both before and after the revolution was 
relevant to the subject. The colonies also formed an 
important but controversial part of Stalin'. theory and 
revolutionary activity in the 1920 •• It is also evident 
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~ha~ ~he ini~ial dicho~omous and polarized view of ~he 
world presen~ed by Sovie~ ~heoris~s in ~he early years 
of ~he Cold War had already been modified before 
S~alin's dea~h. Dis~inc~ions were drawn be~ween various 
colonies and ex-colonies and a ~heore~ical agenda was 
se~. In re~rospec~, some of Khrushchev's innova~ions in 
1956 seem less original when ~he discussions abou~ ~he 
colonies before S~alin's dea~h are considered. 
I~ would be incorrec~ ~o suppose ~ha~ ~he colonial world 
grea~ly preoccupied Sovie~ ~heoris~s and policy makers 
a~ ~ha~ time, however. Malenkov's Central Commit~ee 
report to the 19th Congress of the CPSU in 1952 
indicated tha~ the LDCs constituted a rather unimportant 
part of the Soviet world view (Malenkov, 1952, pp. 
99-124). He spoke of the upsurge in the colonial 
independence movements after the war (mentioning, in 
par~icular, Vietnam, Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, India, Iran and Egypt) and the decline in the 
economies of the colonial and dependent countries as a 
result of prolonged oppression. He also gave a fairly 
detailed and optimistic report on the economic 
developmen~ of China, Korea and Mongolia. But in listing 
the Party's tasks in the sphere of foreign policy, he 
included China, Mongolia and Korea with the People's 
Democracies with whom relations of inviolable friendship 
were to be strengthened, but made no reference to 
national liberation movements (Malenkov, 1952, p. ·10·6). 
Thus while the change in Soviet attitude. toward. the 
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newly independent countries cannot be attributed 
entirely to Khrushchev, it is certainly true that he 
moved them to a more central position in Soviet foreign 
policy. Moreover, it was Khrushchev who turned the study 
of the theoretical problems into a safe occupation. 
Resolving the problems proved to 
however, and some of the attempts to 
subject of the next chapter. 
be more difficult, 
do so form the 
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Notes. 
1. Avineri main~ains ~hat the Asiatic mode of 
development led Marx inexorably to the position of 
"having to endorse European colonial expansion as a 
brutal but necessary step toward the victory of 
socialism" (1969, p. 13). Orthodox communists reject 
this view (see, for example, Nikiforov, 1975, for a 
refutation of the Asiatic mode of production and, in 
particular, of the theories of Karl Wittfogel (1957) and 
his application of the concept to the Soviet Union. 
Nikiforov's criticism of Wittfogel is analysed in 
Gellner, 1978). For a modern analysis of imperialism 
that is close to Marx's interpretation, see Warren 
(1990). Avineri also points out that Marx disapproved of 
imperialism and distinguished between the motives behind 
colonialism and its historical significance. His 
analysis of colonialism was far more sophisticated than 
Lenin's. He understood, for example, something that 
Lenin did not: that the costs of colonialism far 
outweighed the financial benefit obtained and that, as a 
result, the metropolitan working class was the net loser 
(Avineri, 1969, pp. 18-22). 
2. Although the collection Marx on 
Marx's name, one of the articles, 
written by Engels. 
China bears only 
"Persia-China", was 
3. Kolakowski (Vol. 1, 1978, pp. 349-51) believes that 
the Asiatic mode was excluded from the Soviet view of 
history because, apart from denying the thesis that 
productive forces have the primary role in history, it 
contradicted the view of the uniformity of human 
evolution and thus detracted from the universality of 
Marxism. For an analysis of the disappearance of the 
concept and its partial re-emergence, see Hough (1986, 
pp. 38-54). Nikiforov (1975) has argued forcefully that 
Marx himself rejected the Asiatic mode of production in 
1877. It is interesting that Petrenko and Petrov (1981), 
for example, devote a chapter to the international 
relations theory of Marx and Engels but do not refer to 
any of the writings on the colonies. 
4. Avineri (1969, pp. 22-4) puts this down to Marx's 
reluctance to predict when there were several 
intervening stages between the present stage and the 
universal trend towards a new form of society. But it is 
probably also a reflection of his preoccupation with 
Europe and the fact that his interest in the colonies 
primarily concerned its affects on Europe. 
5. More importantly, they legitimized a revolution in 
Russia as long .s a socialist revolution was imminent 
elsewhere in Europe. 
6. Boeranar (1982, pp. 1-58) calls their attitude to 
nationalism -relativist and dialectical U (by which he 
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means that they supported nationalism only where they 
saw it as an objective carrier of historical progress) 
and distinguishes between a Western (Proudhon and Marx 
before 1867) and ~n Eastern view of nationalism (Marx 
after 1867 and Lenin) in Marxism. The former was 
impatient of nationalism and wanted to press on with 
realizing socialism. The latter was conscious of the 
national problem and believed that national demands had 
to be satisfied before socialism could come about. 
7. Engels maintained that colonies with European 
populations could become independent immediately after 
the socialist revolution, while those inhabited by a 
native population would need to be taken over by the 
proletariat and led towards independence (Marx and 
Engels, 1975, p. 331). 
8. For further discussion of these theories, see Chapter 
6. In one sense they applied even better to the colonies 
than to Russia: the necessary but uncertain condition 
guaranteeing the success of the Russian revolution was 
revolution in the rest of Europe. The colonies, on the 
other hand, did not have the uncertainty. They would be 
able to rely for aid on the socialist state already in 
existence. It was this aid, for example, which was said 
to have allowed the Mongolian People's Republic to 
embark upon a non-capitalist path of development (Trush, 
1977, p. 177). 
9. For a detailed analysis of his attitude to the 
peasantry and its role in the revolution, see Mann 
(1983). 
10. Stalin <writing in Pravda in November 1918) claimed 
that the bourgeois democratic movements amongst the 
oppressed nationalities in Russia had proved themselves 
incapable of meeting the demands of the toiling masses. 
After the October revolution they had become reactionary 
and counter-revolutionary. Stalin meant that they 
continued to opt for secession, whereas the workers 
would choose, if they could, to remain linked to the 
Soviet state. (Stalin, 1918b, pp. 68-77). 
11. It should be noted, however, that an appeal was 
issued to "All Muslim Toilers of Russia and the East" 
soon after the revolution. Russian Moslems were assured 
that their beliefs and usages, their national and 
cultural institutions were henceforth free and 
inviolable, while those of the East were urged to 
overthrow the imperialist robbers and enslavers of their 
countries (Degras, Vol. 1, 1951, p. 16). 
12. For a discussion of the various ~iewpointa~ aee 
McLane (1966, pp. 8-12). 
13. The Comintern had been eatablished the previous 
year, in 1919. Little attention was paid to the East at 
its first congress and very few Eastern delegate. 
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attended it. Its manifesto (written by Trotsky) 
maintained that liberation in the colonies was 
unthinkable without the liberation of the working class 
in the metropolitan countries. It included an appeal to 
"Colonial slaves of Africa and Asia! The hour of 
proletarian dictatorship in Europe will also be the hour 
of your liberation" (Degras, Vol. 1, 1956, pp. 38-47, 
quote on page 43). Boersner (1982, p. 66) points out 
that this was a Western-orientated view of the colonial 
question. (See footnote 6 above for the distinction 
between Western and Eastern views of the national and 
colonial question). 
14. The debate and its effects are discussed in McLane 
(1966, pp. 12-24) and in Boersner (1982, pp. 80-93. See 
also E. H. Carr (Vol. 3, 1966, Chapter 26). 
15. Borkenau (1962, pp. 293-4) vividly conveys just how 
incompatible the two sets of theses were. The Turkish 
delegates to the Congress (and to the Congress of the 
Toilers of the East in Baku) did not enjoy popular 
support in Turkey. They were stoned as they passed 
through Turkish villages on their return. They were 
finally arrested, tortured and thrown out to sea. The 
Comintern had to choose between supporting them or 
enjoying relations with the government of Kemal. It 
chose Kemal (in other words, Lenin's theses, rather than 
Roy's) and never again gave serious support to the 
Turkish Communist Party. 
16. In discussing the reasons why Lenin's theses 
prevailed, E.H. Carr (Vol. 3, 1966, pp. 258-61) points 
out that co-operation with bourgeois movements was 
thought to be a short-term expedient, since it was still 
hoped that proletarian revolution would occur shortly in 
Europe. Moreover, existing national movements were 
thought to be almost entirely dependent upon Moscow, 
which meant that Moscow could decide the terms on which 
support should be given. It was only when the theses 
were applied over a long period and national governments 
were sufficiently strong to lay down their own 
conditions for alliance that difficulties emerged. 
Borkenau, on the other hand, indicates that problems 
arose immediately (see footnote 15 above). 
17. The proceedings of the two conferences were recorded 
in Pervyi s"ezd narodov Vostoka; stenograficheskii 
otchet (Moscow, 1921) and Pervyi s"ezd revolyutsionnykh 
organizatsii Dal'nego Vostoka, sbornik (Petrograd, 
1922). Both congresses were dominated by Comintern 
spokesmen and although the atmosphere is said to have 
been very revolutionary, neither congress achieved very 
much and neither was followed by further meetings (see 
Boersner, 1982, pp. 98-9 and McLane, 1966, pp. 25-6). 
The Communist UniverSity of the Toiler. of the East drew 
students not only from the East beyond Russia. In 1925 
Stalin said that there were repre.entative. from fifty 
nationalities and ethnic groups, one group of which came 
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from the Soviet East and the other from colonial and 
dependent countries. The former were trained to become 
competent cadres to minister to the needs of the Soviet 
Eastern republics, while the latter were to minister to 
the revolutionary needs of the colonies (Stalin, 1925b, 
pp. 205-6). 
18. Stalin's only theoretical work before the revolution 
was "Marxism and the National Question", written in 
Vienna under Lenin's tutelage at the end of 1912 and 
published in 1913 (Stalin, 1913, pp. 3-61). In it he set 
out the Bolshevik support for national 
self-determination as well as the arguments against the 
Austrian Social-Democratic programme for national 
autonomy and the Jewish Bund's proposal for a federal 
party (see Chapter 6 for further discussion of Stalin's 
attitudes towards nationalism). 
19. The Kuomintang-CCP alliance was urged upon the CCP 
by Maring, acting on behalf of the Comintern, in 1922. 
But in January 1923 an agreement was made between Sun 
Vat-sen, leader of the Kuomintang, and Joffe, 
representing the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs 
(Narkomindel) on Soviet-Kuomintang collaboration 
(Rubinstein, 1966, pp. 100-1). In the autumn of 1923 
Borodin was sent to Canton as Sun Vat-sen's adviser. But 
he represented the Russian Communist Party, not the 
Comintern or Narkomindel. Thus Narkomindel, the CPSU(b) 
and the Comintern were all involved in China. 
Ironically, of the three, the Comintern was most 
peripherally involved (see North, 1953). 
20. The issu~over which Stalin and Trotsky fell out can 
be summarized as: permanent revolution and socialism in 
one country (see Chapter 2); NEP and the need for 
industrialization; Party democracy and the growth of the 
bureaucracy; and Comintern policy (in respect 
particularly of Germany and China). For a succinct 
summary, see Fitzpatrick (1982, Chapter 4). Borkenau 
(1962) argues that Stalin firmly followed Lenin's 
precepts. Moreover, Tr~sky agreed initially with the 
policy followed in Cnina and changed his mind only in 
1926, at the height of his dispute with Stalin. Thus, 
"Trotsky, in shouting about .treason, simply accuses the 
unsatisfatory reality of the system which he has himself 
helped to create" (Borkenau, 1962, pp. 306, 316-8, quote 
on p. 318). Soviet theorists, even at the height of 
de-Stalinization, have never criticized Stalin's Chinese 
policy. The authoritative Istoriya vneshnei politiki 
SSSR (edited by Gromyko and Ponomarev in numerous 
editions) omits Soviet-CCP relations and all the events 
of the late 19205, mentioning only the establishment of 
relations with Sun Vat-sen in 1923. For an account of 
the early years of the Chinese revolution and the Soviet 
role,s •• Brandt (19~8). 
21. The programme went on to u.e the terms which have 
become associated with Mao Tse-tung rather than with the 
170 
Comintern (or with Bukharin who, ironically considering 
that it was a radical programme which contained an 
attack on the right, drafted the programme). Colonial 
and national liberation revolutions were important 
aspects of the conquest of power by the working class. 
In the transition period colonies were important 
"because they represent the village on a world scale 
vis-a-vis the industrial countries, which represent the 
town in the context of the world economy" (Degras, Vol. 
2, 1960, p. 508). 
22. McLane (1958) believes that the last identifiable 
instance of Soviet intervention in the affairs of the 
CC? was in January 1931. In part this was due to the 
reduced role the Comintern played after 1930 as an 
instrument of Soviet foreign policy and to the physical 
inaccessibility of the scattered Soviet districts in 
China. But most importantly it was due to the threat 
from Japan, which caused the Soviet government to 
curtail support for revolutionary movements and to 
re-establish relations (broken off at the end of 1927) 
with the Kuomintang in 1932. 
23. The dilemma was apparent even when the imperialist 
enemy was not one of the countries with which the Soviet 
Union hoped to negotiate a collective security 
agreement. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia, for 
example, was clearly identified by Molotov in 1936 as an 
imperialist war to extend Italy's colonial possessions 
(Degras, Vol. 3, 1953, p. 156). Litvinov reacted sharply 
against it in the League of Nations (Degras, Vol. 3, 
1953, p. 139-41). But he also reassured the Italian 
ambassador in Moscow that the Soviet Union was "inspired 
by an unchanging desire to maintain and develop the best 
relations" with Italy (Degras, Vol. 3, 1953, p. 149). 
24. Djilas (1969, p. 141) claims that Stalin admitted 
that he had been wrong to urge the Chinese communists to 
reach a modus vivendi with Chiang Kai-shek. McLane 
(1966, pp. 254-60) suggests that the reason Stalin 
changed his mind about supporting the CC? in the Chinese 
Civil War was probably that there were signs that the 
USA was considering giving greater aid to the 
Nationalists. Roy Medvedev, by contrast, maintains that 
the reason why Stalin urged the CCP to compromise with 
the Kuomintang was fear that American intervention would 
lead to defeat of the CCP and the occupation of China by 
the USA (198~JPp. 18-20). Medvedev and Djilas also both 
believe that even then Stalin felt disquiet about a new 
Communist great power. 
25. Varqa was publicly criticized for his views about 
the effect of the Second World War on the capitalist 
economies, in particular, his contention that th •• e 
economies were increaSingly able to withstand crises. 
See "0 nedostatkakh i zadachakh 
nauchno-is.ledovatel'skoi raboty v oblasti ekonomike-
(1948) for the speech.s at the meeting' at which he and 
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his colleagues were cri~icized. He was forced ~o change 
his book bu~ his ~roubles persis~ed. He was dismissed 
from his posi~ions and his ins~i~u~e and journal were 
closed down. He was rehabili~ated after Stalin/s death. 
His institute was re-opened and he re-published his 
views on the capitalist economies in 1964. One of his 
colleagues, Trainin, died soon af~er the furore and 
although he was given a long and respec~ful obi~uary, 
his "mistakes" were listed in detail ("Pamyati 
Akademikia Bol'shevika, 1949, pp. 1-6). For accounts of 
~he Varga dispu~e and the doc~rinal changes in 
1948-1949, see Skilling (1951a, pp. 16-33, 1951b, pp. 
131-49), Lynch (1984, pp. 32-44) and Hough (1986, pp. 
106-14). 
26. In fact, the ~wo camp metaphor used by Zhdanov had 
been used by Lenin (1923a, p. 317) and by Stalin. In 
pressing f6r the formation of th. USSR in 1922, for 
example, Stalin had said that "~he states of the world 
have split into two camps: the camp of socialism and ~he 
camp of capitalism. (Stalin, 1922, p. 127). A little 
later he used the same image to distinguish between the 
camp of colonizing nations and the camp of oppressed and 
exploited colonial peoples (Stalin, 1924a, p. 54). 
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CHAPTER 5. INCORPORATING THE THIRD WORLD II: 
RELATIONS WITH NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 
AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. 
No single aspect of Soviet policy, not even arms 
acquisitions and dispositions, contributed more to the 
decline of detente in the 1970s than its activity in the 
Third World. It,was believed by some in the West that 
under cover of detente the Soviet leadership had adopted 
an unprecedented, forward policy and was making 
incursions into areas traditionally considered at least 
neutral, if not firmly within the Western sphere of 
influence. It was not, of course, that Soviet diplomatic 
relations with the less developed countries [LDCsJ were 
unprecedented. Nor did Soviet arms sales to LDCs 
represent a departure. What was thought to herald a new, 
dangerous Soviet activism was the role played by Cuban 
troops (with Soviet logistic support) in Angola in 1975 
and in Ethiopia in 1977. The climax was the direct 
intervention of Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 1979. 
This was variously interpreted as an extension of the 
Brezhnev doctrine outside Europe, a push towards the 
oil-rioh countries of the Persian Gulf, the building of 
a cordon sanitaire against infection by Muslim 
fundamentalism, or even another step towards the 
realization 
revolution. 
of the ultimate Soviet dream: world 
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In fact, Soviet Third World policy has arguably been 
rather less successful than these interpretations have 
suggested. To mention just a few examples, since active 
relations with the ex-colonies were launched in the 
mid-19S0s the Soviet leadership has lost as an ally the 
strongest LDC (China); it has also lost prestige in the 
international communist movement by continuing relations 
with regimes 
Parties (the 
that have suppressed local Communist 
best and most dramatic example is Egypt); 
it has been the victim of post-independence coups and 
regime changes (for example, in Ghana and Mali); it has 
backed two historical rivals· (Somalia and Ethiopia) and 
been forced to abandon one (Somalia), thereby losing 
valuable naval bases; it has supported the loser in an 
independence movement coalition (in Zimbabwe) and 
thereafter experienced difficulty in establishing 
relations with the winner; and it has favoured cruel, 
crude and unreliable leaders, (for example, the Amins of 
both Uganda and Afghanistan, Gadafy) and it has felt 
forced to intervene in Afghanistan in an attempt to 
establish a more acceptable and malleable leader. 
On the positive side of the balance, the Soviet Union 
enjoys diplomatic and economic relations with a large 
number of Third World countries (between 90 and 100 
depending on the definition of a Third World country, 
see Gromyko, at al, 1984, pp. 314-24), it can frequently 
rely on their support in the United Nations) and the 
number of states which are considered socialist oriented 
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has grown to about fifteen. 
But the political, economic and social development of 
the LDCs has not entirely conformed to the expectations 
of earlier Soviet theorists and policy makers. This 
chapter consider~ some of the attempts that have been 
made to understand why and to explain the structure of 
society in the LDCs. The background to the discussion is 
the doctrine enunciated by Khrushchev at the 20th Party 
Congress in 1956. 
In his report to the Congress Khrushchev declared that 
wars between socialism and capitalism were no longer 
inevitable and that relations between states with 
different social structures should be based on peaceful 
coexistence. But he also abandoned Stalin's dichotomous 
division of the world, and introduced a third zone of 
peace, neither socialist nor capitalist, which could 
draw on the achievements of the socialist bloc and 
receive aid "free of any political or military 
obligations" (Khrushchev, 1956a, pp. 29-38, quote on p. 
34). It has been suggested that Khrushchev's other 
famous revision, the possibility ofa peaceful 
transition to socialism, commonly thought to have been 
intended to woo Yugoslavia back into the Soviet bloc, 
may also have been directed towards allaying the fears 
of the governments of the former colonies that local 
communist parti •• were potential sources of civil war 
(D. Dallin, 1962, p. 325). Khrushchev wa. firm, however, 
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that no matter what form the transition to socialism 
took, "an absolute and decisive requirement is political 
leadership of the working class, headed by its vanguard" 
(Khrushchev, 1956a, p. 38). Like Ma1enkov in 1952, he 
made no mention of the national liberation movement in 
listing the foreign policy tasks of the CPSU (it 
appeared regularly from the Z2nd Party Congress Report 
onwards), but he did list India, Burma, Afghanistan, 
Egypt, Syria and other countries standing for peace 
amongst those with which bonds of friendship and 
co-operation were to be strengthened. 
In fact, policy had predated theory. In 1955 Khrushchev 
and Bu1ganin had made a much publicized tour of India, 
Burma and Afghanistan and in July 1955 an arms deal had 
been concluded between Egypt and Czechoslovakia. The 
Soviet leaders were less interested in encouraging 
national liberation in the colonies which had not yet 
reached indep~ndence than in establishing good relations 
with those that had. And since the governments in power 
were usually nationalist and were often unwilling to 
co-operate with (or sometimes even tolerate) local 
communist parties, this created certain theoretical and 
practical.difficu1ties. One Western theorist has pointed 
out that: 
"The Soviet leaders •• ~expected that new 
chances for the Communist. of the new .tat •• 
would be gradually created by their diplomacy; 
as a long-term by-product of growing Soviet 
and Soviet bloc influence" (Lowenthal, 1977, 
p. 187). 
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But Khrushchev's problem in launching a successful and 
more outgoing state policy which, at the same time, did 
not contradict the revolutionary imperative of aiding 
the national liberation movement lay partly in the 
dearth of specialized knowledge in the Soviet Union 
about foreign countries or about international 
relations. This affected both theory and practice. Many 
speakers at the 20th Party Congress decried the state of 
the social sciences in the Soviet Union, urging, amongst 
other things, research 
relations. The outcome 
in 
of 
the 
the 
area of international 
criticism was 
re-opening of the Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations (closed as a result of the Varga 
controversy, see Chapter 4, footnote 25), Varga's 
rehabilitation, a change in the editorial board of the 
journal Sovetskoe vostokovedenie (Soviet Eastern 
Studies) , the establishment of a number of new 
institutes, and the gradual emergence 
generation· of mezhdunarodniki.l 
of a new 
Of course, the Soviet study of international relations 
remained firmly within the framework of 
Marxism-Leninism, but it became a more flexible system 
of ideas, particularly in relation to the LDCs. There 
has been no lack of Soviet theory about the Third Wor~d 
since 1956 and, apart from a few eternal verities which 
have b~en generally accepted by all scholar., a n~mber 
of issues have failed to produce a consensus. When 
Khrushchev fell from power, his Third World policy wa. 
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high on the list of mistakes for which he was blamed. 
But although his policies were repudiated, the doctrine 
he had enunciated at the 20th Party Congress was 
retained more or less intact and it has continued to 
form the parameters within which discussion takes place. 
Even after Khrushchev's name had been expunged from the 
literature, credit continued to be given to the 
correctness of his reports to the 20th, 21st and 22nd 
Congresses of the CPSU and to the development of theory 
in the declarations published after the 1957 and 1960 
international meetings of Communist Parties, as well as 
to the subsequent statements by Brezhnev (see, for 
example, Brutents, Part I, 1977, p. 106). 
Although the range of topics concerning LDCs which have 
been considered legitimate spheres of enquiry by 
mezhdunarodniki has increased, amongst the theoretical 
problems which have preoccupied them have been those 
which were noted above in Chapter 4 which they had 
inherited unresolved from the 
have continued trying to 
past. 
find 
Soviet theorists 
an appropriate 
categorization of the social classes in underdeveloped 
and developing countries. They have searched for an 
adequate explanation of how the transition to socialism 
takes place in non-industrialized countries and they 
have tried to analyse the economic structure of the LDes 
and how non-capitalist economic systems can be 
.stablished. 
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These three theoretical problems are, of course, very 
closely inter-related: as we have 
chapters, the bourgeois-democratic 
seen in previous 
revolution which 
would introduce bourgeois reforms 
Marxist-Leninist theory, either 
could, 
be 
according to 
led by the 
proletariat or by the bourgeoisie. But the socialist 
revolution would certainly be carried out by the 
proletariat and its vanguard party. Having taken over 
the bourgeois state and the means of production, the 
proletariat, under the guidance of its vanguard party, 
would introduce a dictatorship of the proletariat (or of 
the proletariat and the peasantry) and proceed to 
socialize the economy. It was envisaged that the 
socialist revolution should ideally take place in 
countries with industrialized economies, but Lenin had 
pOSited that it was possible for certain underdeveloped 
countries to proceed to socialism without ever going 
through a capitalist phase of development. The condition 
which was thought to make this possible was aid from 
those countries which were already socialist (and 
industrialized). The early Soviet model of 
de-colonization (that is, the development of the 
peripheral areas of the tsarist empire) had involved 
industrializing those regions. But it had also required 
a transfer of resources from the already socialist 
centre to create the necessary facilities to educate and 
train local people to enable them to partiCipate in 
modernization. 
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This model presented several complex problems when 
applied to the LDCs. First, a working class had to be 
identified, 
group or 
and if there was no working class, another 
class which could carry out the 
bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolutions. Second, 
the interim period between independence and socialism 
had to be described. What was the nature of the 
noncapitalist path of development and what distinguished 
it from capitalist development? How would the transition 
to socialism take place? In the absence of a proletariat 
and a vanguard party, could a socialist consciousness be 
inculcated in the indigenous masses? And what kind of 
aid was required from the existing socialist states? 
What if they proved unable to provide the kind of aid 
that had made it possible for the Russian underdeveloped 
areas to skip the capitalist stage of development? 
Finally, although it was agreed that noncapitalist 
development was the prelude to the socialist stage of 
development, was it certain that it ensured economic 
development and industrialization and that it invariably 
led to socialism? These were not, of course, the only 
problems that were studied by Soviet theorists, but it 
could be argued that they proved to be the most 
intractable. Th-e rest of this chapter will examine the 
attempts to answer them. 
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1. Classes in the LDCs: the evolution of the Soviet 
view, 1956-1982 
It has always been difficult to apply Marxist-Leninist 
class categories, developed essentially on the basis of 
European empirical data of the 19th century, to the 
Third World, where tribe, caste, race and religion have 
often been far more prominent than class. The difficulty 
has been compounded, first, by the desire to identify a 
proletariat which could take the lead in the transition 
to socialism, and second, by the fact that many Third 
World countries are governed by military regimes, which 
mayor may not be progressive, but which do not fit well 
into a Marxist-Leninist class analysis. The recognition 
of the revolutionary propensities of the national 
bourgeoisie before and the petty bourgeoisie after 
independence has not really resolved the difficulty, 
since LDCs often lack not only a proletariat, but also a 
bourgeoisie. Because of these difficulties, a working 
class, a peasantry and a bourgeoisie have continued to 
be identified in the LDes, but at the same time Soviet 
scholars have recognized that these divisions are 
insufficient to describe societies often vastly 
. di.ff erent from European .ocietia .• and from one another. 
The result has bee·n the identification of a number of 
sub-groups, part of which form the "revolutionary 
democrats", who undertake many of the tasks 
traditionally carried out by the proletariat. 
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Th. working cla •• 
Despite the recognition that "in the vast majority of 
developing countries there is no large and influential 
proletariat" (Deborin and Manusevich, 1965, p. 37) and 
that often "the population is still divided into tribes 
and the process of forming a nation has not been 
completed" (Ponomarev, 1961, pp. 41-2~ the tendency to 
overestimate the role and political power of the working 
class has been difficult to eliminate from Soviet theory 
about the Third World. The 1961 Party Programme 
maintained that an alliance between the working class 
and peasantry was the fundamental condition of a 
successful struggle to achieve democratic change and 
achieve economic and social progress ("Programme of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union ll , 1961, p. 11). It 
was difficult, therefore, to envisage democratic change 
and progress without a working class. As a result 
theorists recognized that the working class was small, 
but still expected it to be a strong revolutionary 
vanguard. One prominent scholar, for example, described 
its small size (Brutents, 1965b, pp. 35-6), but 
nonetheless claimed that it could achieve considerable 
influence or even lead the national liberation 
revolution, (Brutents, 1965a, p. 18). A second, equally 
prominent, scholar recognized that: 
11 •• in conditions where nationalist, religious 
and other traditional forms of ideology are 
wid.ly diss.minated or even predominate, wh.re 
tribal, patriarchal and cast. v •• tig.. .x.rt 
great influenc •••• Marxist-L.ninist teaching 
cannot b. compl.t.ly acc.~ted. by the broad 
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masses in a short historical time" 
(Ul'yanovsky, 1972, p. 421). 
But he claimed that the working class was growing in an 
unprecedented way in terms of numbers, organization and 
political organization and that it was the most active 
champion of national and social liberation (Ul'yanovsky, 
1972, pp. 417-8). 
When it became obvious that the working class in most 
Third World countries was neither developing rapidly, 
nor necessarily becoming revolutionary, this optimism 
gradually dwindled. It was explained that the emerging 
working class had not lost its bonds with the 
countryside, and this: 
" ... quite naturally tended to slow down the 
development qf class consciousness, and made 
the proletariat susceptible to the 
petty-bourgeois ideology, hampering their 
escape from the grip of nationalistic 
attitudes, and caste, religious and -- in many 
African and some Asian countries -- tribal 
survivals" (Brutents, Part 1, 1977, p. 80). 
Other scholars began to believe that the small numerical 
size of the working class and its low level of culture 
made it difficult for it to become the leading force in 
the anti-imperialist struggle (Zagladin, 1973, pp. 
294-7). This was why the social content of the national 
liberation revolution had not become socialist (Butenko, 
1975, p. 396). But the absence of a large working cl •• s 
was not thought to prevent development along the 
were noneapitalist path. Other classe. and groups 
identified to lead the newly liberated countries in 
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their development. 
It was quite clear that the largest and most exploited 
class in the LDCs was the peasantry (Grigoryan, 1966, p. 
52) and Soviet theorists were optimistic that 
exploitation had turned it into a revolutionary class. 
The landless peasants and agricultural workers, in 
particular, were thought to play an active role in the 
national liberation movement (Tyagunenko, 1967, p. 10). 
Moreover, independence was all too often followed by 
deteriorating social and economic conditions, and this 
served to activate the peasant movement, turning it into 
a powerful (though vacillating and rather unreliable) 
political force (Ul'yanovsky, 1972, p. 418). Soviet 
theorists were unclear whether the peasantry formed part 
of the petty bourgeoisie. One theorist declared that: 
"The 'Third World', not excluding the most 
developed of the economically underdeveloped 
countries (e.g. India) ... is, in an economic, 
political, social and moral sense, an ocean of 
petty bourgeois-dom" (Ul'yanovsky, 1972, p. 
546), 
He estimated that this "ocean" constituted 80-90% of the 
population and he must therefore have included the 
peasantry in his calculation. Other theorists have been 
quite explicit that the peasantry are the most numerous 
and the most important part of the petty bourqoeisie 
(Levkovsky, 1970, p. 111). 
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As in Russia after the October revolution, the peasantry 
was seen to be the natural ally of the working class in 
the anti-imperialist struggle. Indeed, it was recognized 
that where the national liberation movement was large, 
this was almost always because of the participation of 
the peasantry; that where it used armed struggle to 
achieve independence, the violence often took the form 
of "a peculiar kind of 'peasant war'lI. The peas,antry, in 
fact, "provided the backbone" of the national liberation 
movement (Brutents, Part I, 1977, p. 91). But Soviet 
theorists envisaged an even more revolutionary role for 
the peasantry in the LDCs than had eventually been 
considered possible in Russia (where the alliance 
between the working class and the peasantry was broken 
violently and permanently during the enforced 
collectivization of agriculture). In the developing 
countries peasants could become lithe nub of the 
revolutionary process" (Zagladin, 1973, p. 107), but 
they had to understand that "in practical terms their 
aims can only be achieved in alliance with the working 
class and under its direction" (Zagladin, 1973, p. 303). 
The reason for this was that although the peasantry 
provided lithe social basis and the mass army cZ the 
national liberation movement", it did not act within it 
Pas an independent class force" (Brutents, Part I, 1977, 
pp. 91-2). Thus the working class had to be the senior 
partner in the alliance. This did not, of course, deal 
with the problem of who would direct the alliance in the 
absence of a working class. 
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The bourgeoisie 
Neither the working class nor the peasantry have given 
as much theoretical trouble to Soviet theorists as the 
colonial and ex-colonial bourgeoisie. It was the first 
class to receive serious analysis after Khrushchev's 
encouragement of the social sciences. A seminar, in 
which some Third World Marxists participated, was held 
in 1959 on the role of the bourgeoisie and this marked 
the end of the condemnation of bourgeois reformism which 
had been common since the end of the 1940s ("The 
National Bourgeoisie and the Liberation Movement", 1959a 
and b). In 1959 it was decided that on the whole the 
bourgeoisie remained a positive force in the national 
liberation struggle. But no matter how revolutionary it 
was at the time of independence, the working class had 
to be promoted to a leading position if political and 
economic independence were to be retained ("The National 
Bourgeoisie", 1959b, p. 79). After independence the 
national bourgeoisie would reveal its conventional 
bourgeois traits: 
"The policy of the national bourgeoisie is 
contradictory. It participates in the struggle 
against colonialism and tries to weaken the 
control of foreign monopolies over the 
national economy but at the same time it 
supports relations with the imperialist powers 
and makes possible the further inflow of its 
capital. While trying to restrain and weaken 
feudalism, [it] ••. makes concessions to the 
landowners, supporting an alliance with them 
against the democratic forces. It finds the 
development of a national industry and the 
nationalization of foreign . capital 
adv.utageou •••• supports indu.trialization and 
is prepared for the state sector to be 
expanded. But [its) leadership ••• intends 
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conducting this whole policy on the basis of 
capitalist methods •.. Exhorting the people to 
co-operate in fulfilling the tasks of ~conomic 
development, at the same time it strengthens 
the bureaucratic apparatus, refuses to extend 
democracy or to take measures to improve the 
condition of the people" (Ponomarev, 1961, p. 
42). 
The question about whether the bourgeoisie was hesitant 
and indecisive)or revolutionary and inclined to support 
profound social change and progressive development 
(Grigoryan, 1966, pp. 23-4, 38~ was thus resolved by 
deciding that it changed from being anti-imperialist and 
anti-feudalist before independence to being a 
"vacillating and double-minded force" afterwards 
(Zagladin, 1973, p. 314). 
But over the years some Soviet theorists had begun to 
realize that it was not just the working class which was 
lacking in many LDCs. It was often difficult to identify 
a group which could really be called a bourgeois class 
(see, for example, Avakov & Stepanov, 1963, pp. 46-54, 
Kiva, 1975, pp. 113-4; Tarabrin, 1975, pp. 58). The 
reason for its absence was simple: capitalist production 
had been imported into the colonies and very often 
foreign bourgeois groups had settled there as well. As a 
result a local national bourgeoisie had often been 
economically unnecessary. This also explained why, 
insofar as it existed, it tended to be poorly organized, 
have little political experience, lack iniative and be 
rather inert (Brutents, Part I, 1977, pp. 93-8). These 
negative features did not prevent it from ·participating 
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in the national liberation movement, but meant that it 
rarely acted as the leading force. To explain why this 
was not invariably the case and why therefore it was 
difficult to define the nature of the national 
bourgeoisie, a "dialectical assesment" 
there was a fundamental contradiction 
was required: 
betwen the 
national bourgeoisie and imperialism, but how this 
contradiction expressed itself depended, firstly, upon 
how acute the antagonism was between the bourgeoisie and 
the local working class; secondly, upon the particular 
stage of the national liberation struggle; thirdly, upon 
international factorsjand fourthly, upon the presence 
within the bourgeoisie of sections with different 
economic interests (Brutents, Vol. I, 1977, p. 106). 
Since the national bourgeoisie was unreliable, Soviet 
theorists began to look to the petty bourgeoisie and the 
nonproletarian and semi-proletarian middle sections for 
the revolutionary motive force in Third World society. 
The intermediate .trata and the revolutionary democrat. 
It was evident that with or without a . sizeable working 
class or a revolutionary bourgeoisie, many countries had 
changed, and some had expressed an intention to develop 
along the noncapitalist path. The class to which Soviet 
scholars turned for an explanation was the petty 
bourgeoisie, "the 
extent, the most 
most numerous and, to a certain 
important class at given stag.s of 
188 
evolution of the majority of states in the Third World" 
(Levkovsky, 1970, p. 106). Nowhere else had the petty 
bourgeoisie been considered progressive. In the Third 
World, however, it had developed in a unique way, quite 
unlike its development in European industrialized 
countries. Moreover, it did not act on its own, but 
formed an alliance with other strata in society. 
The term that was commonly used to denote the groups 
which governed those liberated colonies that had chosen 
the noncapitalist path of development (for example, 
Algeria, Burma, Tanzania, etc.) was "revolutionary 
democrats", necessarily an alliance of various groups, 
since: 
It 
"The unique feature of the social conditions 
in most liberated countries is the fact that 
none of the social classes is sufficiently 
developed to govern the social, economic and 
political processes without a reliable 
alliance with all the anti-imperialist forces. 
The attempt by one class, social stratum or 
group to gain the monopoly of political power 
usually destroys political stability" 
(Ul'yanovsky, 1972, pp. 423-4). 
was relatively easy to explain the political 
predispositions of the revolutionary democrats. They 
were opponents of capitalism, suppor~ers of socialism 
and patriots who identified with the working class and 
with scientific socialism (Grigoryan, 1966, pp. 45-6). 
Their policies closely resembled socialist policies and 
they relied upon the support of the world socialist 
system and the international commupist and workers' 
movement (Tyagunenko, 1967, p. 13). Marxist-Leninist 
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parties were encouraged to form alliances with the 
revolutionary democratic parties, since this would speed 
up the world revolutionary process (Ul'yanovsky, 1972, 
pp. 433-4). 
The class composition of the revolutionary democrats was 
more difficult to explain, however, and a variety of 
definitions have been offered. The problem arose partly 
because of the enormous differences between the 
revolutionary democrats of various countries which made 
it difficult to generalize (Brutents, Part II, 1977, p. 
14). The generic term that gained acceptance to 
encompass this conglomerate of elements was the 
"intermediate" or "transitional" "section" or "stratum" 
(promezhutochny or sredny sloi). 
combination of petty bourgeois, 
semi-proletarian elements, together 
Defined as a 
nonproletarian and 
with the civilian 
and military intelligentsia, civil servants, small 
traders, artisans and handicraftsmen, the most radic~l 
section of this large group formed the revolutionary 
democrats (Mirsky, 1976, p. 42). Some theorists used the 
term with a certain diffidence, recognizing that it was 
"vulnerable, especially in the strict economic sense", 
given its "ad hoc nature" (Brutents, Part I, 1977, p. 
107). But it was not so much the name, or the A4 hoc 
nature of the group that was interesting, as the 
explanation of how it had formed and why it did not 
behave like an ordinary petty bourgeoisie. 
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The in~ermedia~e s~ra~um was said by 50vie~ ~heoris~s ~o 
arise because normal or classical capi~alism had never 
become consolida~ed in ~he underdeveloped coun~ries: 
before independence capitalism was imported, and 
af~erwards the ex~ent of underdevelopmen~ mean~ ~ha~ 
economic needs were ~oo grea~ ~o be sa~isfied by private 
capital. As a result ~he s~a~e played a uniquely 
impor~an~ role in pos~-independence socie~y. Only ~he 
s~a~e could mobilize the resources necessary for 
crea~ing a s~rong economy with its own national indus~ry 
(Mirsky, 1976, p. 42). The consequence was ~hat ~he 
pet~y bourgeoisie, led by ~he intelligentsia, developed 
no~ under ~he influence of the big bourgeoisie, but 
under the aegis of the state. I~ ~hus became a far more 
independen~ class ~han i~s European counterpar~ and i~ 
was this independence which enabled i~ to choose a 
noncapi~alis~ pa~h of development (Mirsky, 1979, pp . 
. 
139-40). In mos~ colonial and semi-colonial coun~ries, 
the intermediate sections had led the na~ional 
liberation movement. Brutents (Part I, 1977, p. 123) 
calculated that this had been the case in 40 out of 70 
countries. However, choosing the noncapitalis~ pa~h was 
not thought to be inevitable or irreversible. It was not 
excluded that the transitional stratum could develop 
pro-bourgeois tendencies and opt instead for capitalist 
development (Brutents, Part I, 1977, p. 115). Nor was it 
excluded that countries could chanqe course, a. had 
happened in Ghana, Egypt, Mali and Somalia (Vl'yanovaky, 
1979, p.116). Perhaps the most novel aspect of the way 
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in which the intermediate stratum was described was the 
implication that it could develop a class consciousness 
independent of its class origins. The international 
proletariat was thought to provide the necessary 
consciousness and this explained how the transition to 
socialism could take place in the absence of a working 
class. 
The concept of the intermediate stratum enabled Soviet 
theorists to incorporate military regimes in their class 
analysis. There has always been a fear in the Soviet 
Union that if the military have too much power or 
popularity, "Bonapartism" will follow.2 But just as the 
Third World petty bourgeoisie have been consid~red 
progressive, 50 there has been considerable tolerance 
towards Third World military regimes (for example, in 
Iraq, Congo, Benin, Ethiopia and Peru). The 
intelligentsia in general, including the military 
intelligentsia, has been thought to be the leading 
element of the intermediate stratum and consequently 
active in the revolutionary democratic party. The army, 
or that part of it that formed the military 
intelligentsia, could, therefore, "become an important 
progressive factor in the political struggle for further 
development of the national-democratic revolution" 
(Solodovnikov, 1973, p. 47). Perhaps more importantly, 
it was recognized that the army was often the strongest 
national institution, with concomitant opportuniti.. to 
influence local developments I since the political 
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structures of developing states were often embryonic, 
political parties were non-existent or amorphous and 
there was a low level of political consciousness, the 
army has often been the only authoritative institution 
(Brutents, Part I, 1977, p. 246-8). If it was led by a 
progressive military intelligentsia it could be the 
source of progressive change. 
Despite this theoretical tolerance, the assessment of 
the role of the military in the s~ruggle for 
independence and the way in which post-independence 
military regimes have been regarded have largely 
depended upon the political stance adopted by 
post-independence military governments and the attitude 
of particular regimes towards the Soviet Union. But even 
when relations have been good and military regimes have 
enjoyed Soviet support, there has been considerable 
pressure on them to form vanguard parties and include 
civilians in the government. It has been suggested, for 
example, that: 
"In some countries ••. the army is regarded as 
the best organised social force. And sometimes 
this is offered as a reason for the 
establishment of military governments. In 
actual fact a revolutionary-democratic 
party ••• is not only the advanced, but also the 
best organised detachment of the alliance of 
all progressive forces· (Chirkin and Yudin, 
1978, p. 79).3 
This brief discussion indicates some of the confusions 
and difficulties encountered by Soviet scholars in 
trying to interpret Third World society in 
Marxist-Leninist terms. As early .s 1963, 'Mirsky 
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entitled an article on the LDCs "Creative Marxism and 
the problems of national-liberation revolutions" 
(Mirsky, 1963, pp. 63-8). The creativity that has been 
required to apply Marxist class categories to a variety 
of societies, many of which are actually pre-class, has 
led to lively discussion and sometimes to disagreement 
in print (see, for example, Butenko, 1975, footnote on 
pp. 370-1), a relatively rare phenomenon in Soviet 
theoretical literature. In the last few years there has 
been general agreement about one thing: there is still 
considerable empirical and theoretical work to be done 
on post-independence Third World societies, whether the 
path followed by the regime is capitalist or 
non-capitalist (see, for example, Gudymenko and 
Starostin, 1981). 
2. The transition to socialism 
Defining which classes or strata were revolutionary in 
the LDCs was part of the larger problem of explaining 
how the transition to socialism could take place in 
conditions 50 different from those envisaged by Marx or 
Lenin and what was required in the transitional peri~d. 
At first Soviet theorists found it relatively easy to 
define the necessary form of government for managing the 
transition from independence to socialism. The emergence 
of a proletariat and its vanguard party was, it was 
thought, essential if the transition was to take place. 
It •• emed equally clear that aid from the socialist 
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system was indispensible to the transition. But 
certitude gradually gave way to doubt with the 
realization that the transition was far less simple than 
envisaged at first and with the increasing reluctance of 
the Soviet leadership to accept the economic commitment 
of promoting the transition. 
The government of the newly-independent countries 
The belief that the ex-colonies would follow a similar, 
but rather slower, path to the one on which the European 
People's Democracies had embarked after the Second World 
War (Zhukov, 1949, p. 60) was modified at the end of the 
19505. The term People's Democracy of the East was 
replaced by National Democracy, defined at the 1960 
Moscow Conference of Eighty-One Communist and Workers' 
Parties as: 
"a state which consistently upholds it 
political and economic independence, fights 
against imperialism and its military blocs, 
against military bases on its territory; •.• 
fights against the new forms of colonialism 
and the penetration of imperialist capital; 
..• rejects dictatorial and despotic methods 
of government; .•• in which the peole are 
ensured broad democratic rights and freedoms 
(freedom of speech, press, assembly, 
demonstrations, establishment of political 
parties and social organizations), the 
opportunity to work for the enactment of an 
agrarian reform and other domestic and social 
changes and for participation in shaping 
government policy" ("Statement of the Meeting 
of Representatives of the Communist and 
Worker's Parties", 1960, p. 11). 
Political power in the national democracies was thought 
to be held by a combination of progre •• ive patriotiC 
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forces. Bu~ i~ was expec~ed ~ha~ as ~he masses became 
increasing1y disenchan~ed wi~h ~heir bourgeois leaders, 
~he influence of ~he prole~aria~ would grow (Arzumanyan, 
1961, p. 12). This was considered essen~ia1 "~o c1ear 
~he way for ~he ul~ima~e advance ~owards socialism" 
(Khrushchev, 1961a, p. 20). Communis~s had been amongs~ 
~he mos~ ac~ive of ~he forces s~ruggling for 
independence and ~he fac~ ~ha~ communis~ par~ies were 
s~ill forced ~o remain underground in 
coun~ries was decried (Ponomarev, 
many 
1961, 
libera~ed 
p. 45).4 
Al~hough i~ was accep~ed ~ha~ some ex-co1onies wou1d 
deve10p a10ng capi~alist lines, it was ~hought probable 
~ha~ once the ~asks of national 1iberation had been 
completed, a class s~ruggle would develop be~ween ~he 
working class and the national bourgeoisie for 
leadership of the uni~ed fron~ (Kim, 1962, p. 5). 
The immediately importan~ ~asks of ~he na~ional 
democra~ic state were land reform, ~he res~ric~ion of 
foreign monopolies and ~he e1imination of imperia1ist 
domination, par~icularly if ~he intention was ~o follow 
a noncapita1ist path of deve1opmen~. Economic 
independence would be achieved by creating a state 
sec~or which would "concentrate efforts on developing 
~he mos~ impor~ant branches of the economy, increase ~he 
speed of development and •••. prepare the material basis 
for ~he gradual ~ransition to a noncapitalist path of 
development" (Ponomarev, 1961, p. 44 and se. Clarkson, 
1978, for a detailed analysis of the political economy 
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of the state sector). National democracy was not 
socialism, it was emphasized, but "a transitional stage 
on the path to socialism" (Arzumanyan, 1961, p. 12). 
There was general agreement with Lenin's thesis, 
however, that with the help of the working class of the 
advanced countries, the LDCs could reach socialism 
without going through a capitalist phase. Ponomarev, for 
example, pointed to the example of the peoples of the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, who had "arrived at socialism 
from feudalism and tribal relationships", as well as to 
Mongolia and Vietnam which had developed along the 
noncapitalist path (Ponomarev, 1961, p. 48). It was even 
suggested that pre-feudal societies would be able to 
skip both feudalism and capitalism (Brutents, 1965b, pp. 
27-28). Marxist-Leninist ideas were thought to be 
increasingly popular. The proof was the growing number 
of leaders who had announced that they had chosen a 
socialist path of development. Although their version of 
socialism had little in common with scientific 
socialism, the historical significance of using 
socialist slogans was enormous (Brutents, 1965a, pp. 
19-20). Another feature which was thought to make it 
likely that the ex-colonies would choose socialism was 
said to be attractiveness of the model of rapid 
development offered by the Soviet Union and the other 
socialist states (Brutents, 1965b, p. 28). 
When the term national 
seemed that Soviet 
democracy was first u.ed, it 
theorist. envisaged a rather short 
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passage from national democracy to noncapitalist road of 
development and then a transition to socialism. However, 
it soon became clear that the tasks were so complex that 
there would have to be a lengthy transition period. 
Attaining political independence was only the beginning 
of the struggle. Far more difficult and far more 
important was achieving economic liberation (Dvorzhak, 
1965, p. 5). Apart from removing foreign and large 
national monopolies and introducing agrarian reform, all 
feudal and pre-feudal relations had to be removed from 
economic, social and cultural life. Education had to be 
extended, the standard of living improved, and society 
had to be democratized (Brutents, 1965a, p. 23). 
Moreover, foreign aid could only be a supplementary 
means of achieving these goals. It was more important to 
mobilize internal resources (Dvorzhak, 1965, pp. 19-20). 
While the state sector continued to be thought 
essential, some Soviet theorists began to advise against 
hasty nationalization, suggesting that a balance had to 
be found between public and private sectors (Zagladin, 
1973, pp. 287-8). The distinctions between capitalist 
and noncapitalist developing states (previously defined 
as the creation of a strong industrial state sector, a 
decrease in the private capitalist sector and the 
introduction of planning) became far less obvious. More 
importantly, the early certainty that: 
"there are no countries which, owing to their 
economic backwardness or any other internal 
reason, cannot take the path of socialist 
revolution. With the aid of socialist states, 
these countries too have the opportunity of 
beginning their movement towards socialism u 
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(Kuusinen, 1961, p. 605) 
was replaced by the belief that extreme social and 
eco~omic backwardness could be a serious obstacle to 
noncapitalist development (Brutents, 1972b, pp. 115-6). 
It explained why the progress was frequently so slow. 
The term noncapitalist development had consistently been 
used to describe those states in which the revolutionary 
democrats were instituting progressive policies. In the 
late sixties the term socialist-oriented state began to 
be used as a synonym (see, for example, Brezhnev, 1969, 
p. 162) and it soon gained predominance. 5 
Socialist-oriented states were defined as countries 
which, though not yet socialist, had rejected capitalism 
and were led by revolutionary national-democratic 
parties which were introducing radical social changes 
which would hasten their transition to socialism 
(Ul'yanovsky, 1979, p. 115).6 Good relations and 
organic links (Primakov, 1981, p. 7) were enjoyed with 
the socialist system, but socialist-oriented countries 
had not been able to end their dependence on world 
capitalism (Ul'yanovsky, 1979, p. 117). Although the 
difficulties facing them were by no means underestimated 
(for example the need to destroy archaic political 
institutions inherited from the past, the difficulty of 
nation-building, Mel'nikov, 1981,· pp. 123), Soviet 
theorists began occasionally to be rather critical of 
the way in which they were tackled. 
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The criticism took the form, first, of a disapproval of 
locally grown socialism which had nothing in common with 
real socialism (Sanakoyev and Kapchenko, 1977, p. 194). 
Secondly, undemocratic practices like excessive 
presidential power, the retention of a one-party system 
(which, unless it ~ a Marxist-Leninist party, or at 
least a vanguard party, by definition precluded the 
formation of Marxist-Leninist parties), a weak mass 
political party and the tendency towards 
bureaucratization and corruption were criticized 
(Brutents, 1972b, pp. 121-6) . Thirdly, some 
socialist-oriented states were said to have "got stuck" 
at the stage of state capitalism. As a result, 
capitalist 
particularly 
productive relations 
in agriculture, trade 
were 
and 
developing, 
the service 
industries. Progress towards socialism required a class 
mobility which was absent (except in Cuba, Vietnam, 
Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique where the beginnings of 
socialist development could be detecte~ (Maidanik and 
Mirsky, 1981, pp. 25-6). Although there were ~angible 
shortcomings which caused this criticism, there were two 
other underlying reasons: the chronic economic 
backwardness of the LDCs seemed to be increasing rather 
than becoming less prominent, and there was a growing 
belief that without a vanguard party, progress towards 
socialism would be impossible. 
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Th. n •• d for • vangu.rd p.rty 
As we have seen, Sovie~ ~heoris~s have main~ained ~ha~ 
~he revolu~ionary democra~s had predomina~ed in ~he 
na~ional libera~ion movemen~. Their success in ~he 
independence s~ruggle had depended on forming popular, 
mass par~ies. Only in ~his way had ~hey been able ~o 
unify ~he various tribal, religious, cas~e and national 
elemen~s wi~hin ~he LDCs (Tyagunenko, 1967, p. 17). The 
ques~ion arose whether, since ~he working class was 
developing only slowly and did no~ have i~s own, 
vanguard par~y, the revolutionary democra~ic parties 
would be able to launch ~heir coun~ries on~o ~he pa~h of 
noncapitalist development or even the socialist path. To 
use a favouri~e Sovie~ phrase, "life itself" had posed 
the ques~ion. Many one-par~y nationalist regimes which 
had banned ~heir communis~ parties were, none~heless, 
considered progressive. The only way ~o explain ~heir 
progressiveness seemed ~o be ~o deny the need for 
prole~arian vanguard par~ies. Moreover, ~he expected 
rapid enlargemen~ of ~he proletariat had not been 
realized. One ~heorist captured ~he essence of the 
conundrum: 
"If the working people of an economically 
underdeveloped coun~ry ••• had to wait for the 
possibility of forming a national prole~ari.n 
dictatorship to begin the transition to 
soci.lis~ development, it would m •• n th.t 
capitalism would have to be developed r.pidly, 
so ~hat • working class might b. creat.d •••• nd 
subsequently, a Marxist-Leninist party might 
be formed on this b.sis· (Ul'y.novsky, 1966, 
p. 114). 
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Some ~heoris~s adopted a rather ~raditional view: large, 
mass parties could cer~ainly lead the· struggle for 
independence and promote national uni~y, but social and 
political ~ransformation required vanguard parties 
governed by ~he ~heory of scien~ific socialism 
(Tyagunenko, 1967, p. 17). Other theoris~s became rather 
more innovative. The reason for the transition to a 
noncapitalist path of development was 
conflic~ ~ha~ was normally expected to 
socialist revolu~ion, but the example 
not the class 
presage a 
of existing 
socialism. The ~ransition would occur before the social 
differentiation and class polarization which accompanied 
the developmen~ of capitalism. It would also occur 
before the proletaria~ developed into a class for itself 
and organized a leading, Marxis~-Leninist party. But 
this need not delay the ~ransition to a non-capitalis~ 
path of development (Grigoryan, 1966, p 45). The 
revolutionary democrats, toge~her with the world 
socialist sys~em, could fulfill ~he necessary func~ions 
(Brutents, 1965b, p. 29). 
To begin with ~here was little ~o distinguish 
revolutionary democrats from Marxist-Leninis~s in Sovie~ 
descrip~ions. Likecommunis~s, they repudia~ed 
capi~alism, nationalized foreign and large domestic 
capitalist enterprises, introduced agrarian reforms and 
sided with the socialist s~ates on important 
international issues (Ul'yanovsky, 1966, p. 112). They 
identified with the working class and were attracted by 
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the principles and concepts of scientific socalism. The 
only discernible difference between revolutionary 
democrats and Marxist-Leninists seemed to be in class 
origin. Indigenous communists had been instructed to 
form united fronts with them (Grigoryan, 1966, pp. 
45-6), and to act as the friends and assistants of 
national leaders (Ul'yanovsky, 1966, p. 113). On the 
face of it there seemed no reason why they should not 
establish non-capitalist development and even proceed to 
lay the foundations for socialism the boundary 
between the two was, in any case, extremely vague. Lenin 
was invoked to explain why communist parties did not 
need to be formed in countries where there was no 
proletariat and why mass national revolutionary parties 
were more suitable. It was only when the building of 
socialism became the immediate aim that the mass party 
needed to evolve into a communist party (Primakov, 1981, 
p. 5). But the disillusion described above both with the 
performance of the revolutionary democrats and with the 
dismal economic situation of the Third World, as well as 
the recognition of the danger of relying on the policy 
of a single charismatic revolutionary democrat led other 
theorists to reaffirm the need for a vanguard party. The 
revolutionary democrats, because of their heterogeneity 
and petty bourgeois character, could not but be 
inconsistent and contradictory (Brutents, Part II, 1977, 
pp. 24-5). 
The most acute problem .eemed to be assuring that 
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revolu~ionary democra~ic par~ies did no~ rever~ ~o 
pro-capi~alis~ policies, as had happened in Ghana, Mali, 
Egyp~ and Somalia. I~ was one ~hing ~o in~roduce 
noncapi~alis~ socio-economic policies, bu~ ano~her ~o 
re~ain ~hem. Wha~ was required for progressive 
socio-poli~ical developmen~ was ~he es~ablishmen~ of 
s~rong, democra~ic governmen~ organs, ~he proper 
~raining of cadres, a s~rong army, close ~ies between 
party, sta~e and ~he masses, an economic programme ~o 
improve domes~ic condi~ions, close links wi~h ~he 
socialis~ countries and, above all, the crea~ion of a 
vanguard par~y (Ponomarev, 1980, p. 42). The key 
variable in making noncapi~alis~ developmen~ 
irreversible was to strengthen ~he socialist na~ure of 
~he superstruc~ure, and ~he precondi~ion for achieving 
~ha~ was s~reng~hening ~he leading force of the regime 
~he vanguard party (Maidanik and Mirsky, 1981, p. 
26). But one of the reasons why the creation of a 
vanguard party seemed so pressing may have been that the 
role of the socialist system in the development of the 
LDGs was being re-assessed. 
The role of the USSR and the international socialist 
system 
The success of the national liberation movement had, 
since the end of the 1940s, been attributed to the 
October revolution,the victory of the Soviet Union in 
the Second World War and the subsequent change in the 
correlation of force., which protected the LDes from 
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imperialist aggression. But the role that was first 
intended for the socialist system, in particular the 
USSR, went much further than this. Lenin's theory that 
the capitalist stage of development could be avoided was 
predicated on a world in which socialism already existed 
in some countries. There was no question of skipping the 
capitalist stage without aid. The model for jumping a 
stage which was constantly evoked, that of the Russian 
border lands and of Mongolia, involved substantial aid 
from Moscow. The implication in offering it as a model 
was that similar aid would be given to the LDCs. Since 
Soviet relations with the peoples of the Third World 
were said to be based on proletarian internationalism 
(Sanakoyev and Kapchenko, 1977, p. 118), and a key 
element of this principle was fraternal co-operation and 
mutual aid (see Chapter 7), there was all the more 
reason for the LDCs to expect that they could rely on 
socialist aid for their economic development. 
But it was not just a question of financial aid. There 
were other functions which, according to Soviet 
scholars, could be fulfilled by the socialist system. It 
was thought, in particular, that it could replace the 
proletariat in the LDCs, acting as: 
" .•. a powerful 
ally of the 
masses as well 
strata in 
semi-colonies" 
proletarian vanguard and as any 
peasant and semi-proletarian 
as of all the transitional 
the former colonies and 
(Grigoryan, 1966, p. 36). 
It was clear what this meant in terms of foreign policy: 
helping the revolutionary democrats in the struggle 
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against any attempt to export counter-revo~ution, giving 
them diplomatic and, if necessary, military support 
against imperialist attacks and against any attempt to 
reverse the social transformations which had taken place 
(Brutents, 1965b, p. 29). It also meant serving as an 
example and a model (Ul'yanovsky, 1966, pp. 111-2). 
Noncapitalist development was said to be a new 
historical phenomenon precisely because of its ability 
to re~y on socia~ism. It was: 
" .•. a special form for a number of countries 
to progress towards socialism without direct 
guidance from the working class but with 
re~iance on the socialist countries and in 
alliance with the international workers' and 
communist movement" (Zag~adin, 1973, p. 287). 
In fact, what was implied was not just financial, 
dip~omatic and military aid. Th~ socia~ist syste~ would 
provide the proletarian consciousness which would make 
possible the ~ransition to socialism. As one theorist 
expressed it, the socialist system was not just an 
external prerequisite or secondary factor, "it 
influences significant aspects of the national· 
democratic revolution, the forms and prospects of its 
development" (Butenko, 1975, p. 377). But how this 
transfer of consciousness would take place remained a 
mystery. 
As far as financial aid was concerned, there was a 
change from the ostentatious, prestige aid projects 
initiated by Khrushchev to the more cautious approach of 
his successor~who dispensed aid rather l •• s liberally 
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and with an eye to economic returns for the Soviet 
Union.7 Although Khrushchev's aid policies had been 
unpopular, some theorists thought them correct. Two 
scholars, for example, pleaded that economic, technical 
and cultural aid would be more useful to the liberated 
states than mere military, political and diplomatic 
support, pointing out that "you cannot go far on 
revolutionary phrases and anti-imperialist slogans 
alone" (Etinger & Melikyan, 1964, pp. 26-7). 
Soviet theorists have reacted 
accusations that Soviet aid has been 
rather 
meagre 
angrily 
and 
to 
have 
made considerable efforts to prove it superior to 
capitalist aid. What made it superior, they said, was 
that it was directed towards local development, not 
given in the interests of the donor. It was granted to 
LDCs irrespective of the kind of regime and always on 
the basis of "equality and mutual advantage, respect for 
national integrity and sovereignty" (Dvorzhak, 1965, p. 
50). However, socialist-oriented states were offered 
more aid and better terms. S Socialist aid was also said 
to have important indirect effects. For one thing, the 
mere existence of the socialist bloc had changed the 
correlation of forces and therefore made it safe for 
underdeveloped countries to accept capitalist aid 
without risking neo-colonial exploitation (Tyagunenko, 
1967, p. 16). For another, imperialist states were 
forced to offer better aid and trade terms to LDCs, 
since they were competing with socialist stat •• 
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(Butenko, 1975, pp. 381-93). What upset Soviet theorists 
even more than aspersions about socialist aid, however, 
were attempts to include them in the effort to close the 
North-South gap. 
It was not that Soviet leaders and scholars did not 
support the New International Economic Order [NIEO]. 
They had long been pressing for the establishment of 
just and equal international economic relations. But 
they objected strenuously to attempts by First or Third 
World leaders to lay the same responsibility on 
socialist states to compensate for economic backwardness 
as that which rightly should be born by the capitalist 
states. In response to the demands made in 1976 at the 
UNCTAD and Colombo conferences to the socialist 
countries to improve their terms of trade, strong 
exception was taken to this attempt to: 
" .•. involve the socialist world in a scheme to 
divide countries into rich and poor and, in 
this way, to put socialist countries on a par 
with imperialist countries as far as the 
historical responsibility for the economic 
backwardness of the developing ocuntries is 
concerned and for the consequences of the 
colonial yoke and the neocolonial exploitation 
of these countries" (Pravda, 5/10/1976, quoted 
in Sanakoyev & Kapchenko, 1977, p. 170).9 
Apart from resenting the financial implications of what 
was termed .. the so-called principle of automatically 
transferring a fixed proportion of national income" 
(Ul'rikh, 1981, p. 58), the idea of a North-South divide 
was anathema to Soviet theorists, who took it for 
granted that class divisions mattered more than 
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geography. The issue, ~hey insis~ed, could no~ be 
reduced "simply ~o distinctions between 'rich North' and 
'poor South"· (Brezhnev, 1981, p. 21, and afterwards 
almos~ invariably quo~ed by ~heorists). From the Soviet 
point of view, the monopoly capitalist countries were 
historically responsible for underdevelopment and 
therefore it was up to them to provide the cure. They 
could not therefore understand on what grounds the Third 
World based its expectations (Chekhutov, 1981, p. 55). 
The call for a NIEO coincided with two things which 
probably in part accounted for the response (although 
the Soviet Union had long· been accused of generally 
being "first to criticize, last to pay" (quoted by Gati, 
1980, p. 242) when it came to multilateral aid). On the 
one hand, the growth rate of the Soviet economy was 
declining. This meant that even if the political will 
had been there to co-operate in the NIEO and to provide 
sufficient aid to ensure the rapid development of the 
socialist oriented states and the transition to 
socialism, the economic means were unavailable. On the 
other hand, Soviet theorists had, in any case, begun to 
understand the enormous and intractable difficulties of 
profound underdevelopment. It is to the way in which the 
underdeveloped economies were analyzed that we now 
briefly turn. 
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3. The economy of underdevelopment 
Sovie~ ~heoris~s had at firs~ been op~imis~ic abou~ ~he 
prospec~s for Third World developmen~, particularly in 
the noncapi~alist coun~ries. They had also proposed a 
model of developmen~ which roughly mirrored Sovie~ 
moderniza~ion in ~he ~wen~ies: expropriation of foreign 
and large local capi~alis~ en~erprises, nationaliza~ion 
of ~he commanding heigh~s of the economy, the 
development of the sta~e sector, rapid 
industrialization, particularly of heavy industry, the 
encouragement of voluntary agricul~ural co-operatives 
and educa~ion and ~raining to produce qualified cadres. 
As we have seen, ~o begin with it was assumed tha~ this 
programme would be attainable by any ex-colony, no 
ma~~er how poor. Two modifica~ions ~o the original model 
gradually became apparent: firs~ly, i~ was recognized 
that a certain minimum level of economic development was 
required for noncapitalist development (Brutents, 1972b, 
pp. 115-6) and, secondly, it was accep~ed that whether 
capitalist or noncapitalist, LDCs were and would remain 
in the world capitalist economic system (Primakov, 1981, 
p. 7). The monoculture of their economies, their low 
levels of productivity and the positions still occupied 
by foreign monopolies contributed to 
dependent on developed capitalist states. 
them the problem of economic growth 
keeping them 
For all of 
was the most 
important political and social task (Butenko, 1975, p. 
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388). It was also recognized that the economic situation 
of many LDCs had deteriorated after the attainment of 
political independence and that the gap between the 
economic levels of the developed and developing world 
had increased. Even in countries where there was rapid 
economic growth, the growth would need to double if the 
gap was to begin to decrease (Shakhnazarov, 1981, p. 
200). 
Some theorists began to try to find the causes of this 
dismal state of affairs, turning, in particular, to 
Leninist theory for explanations. Amongst the approaches 
that emerged, two were particularly interesting. The 
first was based on a little quoted phenomenon noted by 
Lenin in pre- and immediately post-revolutionary Russia: 
the multidimensional nature of social and economic 
structures (see, for example, Lenin, 1921b, pp. 329-65 
and the discussion in Hough, 1986). This concept offered 
a means of explaining the socio-economic situation in 
the developing countries. 
Within most of the newly independent countries there 
existed . not just one, but a number of different 
socio-economic structures, that is "vastly different 
social types of economic management" (Levkovsky, 1970, 
p.. 9). The result was mnogoukladnost', 
multidimensionality, an interlacing of old and new forms 
of production and management and a unique 
multistructured economic system, quite different from 
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the preindustrial systems of Europe and North America 
(Medovoi and Yashkin, 1975, p. 106).W Capitalist 
economic forms had been imported during the colonial 
period and had been grafted onto some old forms of 
production, while replacing others. This explained the 
complex class structure of the ex-colonies which 
deviated from orthodox Marxist models, the transitional 
nature of the SOCiety and the difficulty these countries 
had in "taking off" into economic development. It also 
explained why the state played such a vital role in the 
LDCs. Its function was not only to lead the country out 
of dependence, but also to regulate between forms or 
layers, mediating contradictions within and between them 
(Medovoi and Yashkin, 1975, pp. 107-11). In the Soviet 
Union: 
"Victory of socialism in the USSR signified 
the elimination of mnogoukladnost', the 
establishment of total supremacy of social 
ownership in state and co-operative collective 
farms and the creation of a unified, planned 
socialist economic system" (Blishchenko, 1970, 
p. 66). 
Development in the LDCs thus required overcoming the 
phenomenon of multidimensionality and evening out the 
various structures. 
The second application of Leninist theory to 
underdevelopment concerned a rather better known but not 
unrelated concept --the theory of uneven development. It 
had frequently been used to explain why revolutions 
could take place in non-industrial countrie., but it wa. 
now applied to Third World economic development, both 
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before and af~er ~he achievemen~ of independence. On ~he 
one hand, i~ explained ~he enormous dispari~iesbe~ween 
Third World coun~ries (par~icularly eviden~ since ~he 
oil crisis in ~he mid-1970s) and the increasing gap 
between developed and underdeveloped coun~ries. On ~he 
o~her hand, i~ could also be reflected wi~hin coun~ries, 
where uneven developmen~ mean~ ~hat in some respects 
they were more ready for revolution ~han in others. The 
fact ~hat ~he ma~erial prerequisi~es for ~he new socie~y 
had not been created in the course of prerevolu~ionary 
development, for example, indicated uneven development 
of the economic and social aspects. This could gave rise 
to serious contradictions in the countries of socialist 
orientation. The contradictions, in turn, explained why 
progressive social transforma~ions were of~en delayed or 
even reversed: the necessary material base was lacking. 
Sometimes the transformations were introduced despite 
the absence of the necessary base. This damaged or 
undermined the economy. Uneven development could also 
manifest itself in a weak ruling party which failed to 
activate the masses to defend the progressive 
socio-economic transformations which had already taken 
place (Primakov, 1980b, pp. 28-47). 
While neither of these application. of Leninist theory 
offered a cure for underdevelopment (or a complete 
explanation of why it persisted), they were inter.sting 
exampl •• of new attempts to'mak. better u •• of empirical 
data, to stre •• specific feature. of diver.e region. or 
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countries and to move away from vague genera~ization and 
dogmatic formu~ation (for other aspects of Soviet 
development theory, see C~arkson, 1978 and Valkenier, 
1983, pp. 73-108). Insofar as the proponents of either 
approach suggested the means of overcoming 
underdevelopment, they stressed the importance of 
internal economic efforts and the need for time. On the 
one hand, political solutions were no longer considered 
a means of overcoming backwardness. Moreover, Third 
World leaders were advised to adopt less, rather than 
more, radical economic po~icies and to recognize that 
their economies were firmly tied into the world 
capitalist market. On the other hand, the idea that 
socialist aid would be used to enable developing 
countries to skip the capitalist phase of development 
and progress to socialism ~ad been abandoned. It had 
explicitly become accepted that the transition to 
socialism would be prolonged. Implicitly this also meant 
that it would be a far more complex process than had 
been envisaged by Lenin. 
4. Conclusion 
Although the final sections of this chapter have touched 
only briefly on some of the investigations done by 
Soviet theorists in relation to the LDCs, it is evident 
that this is one of the richest fields of the Soviet 
study of international relations. It i. diverse, it 
contains more overt debate and argument than other 
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fields of international relations theory, there is more 
use of empirical data and theorists have been unusually 
innovative. Many of the more contentious theoretical 
issues have yet to be resolved, and it is a field of 
study that is still evolving. While it is often the case 
in other branches of theory that there are outstanding 
issues that have not yet been settled, it is rare to 
find the admission that this is so. In the study of the 
Third World, on the other hand, one frequently finds the 
implicit recognition that experience has not always 
confirmed theory and that the course of history has 
differed from that envisaged by Marx, Engels and Lenin 
and from the early optimistic expectations of theorists, 
first after the October revolution and then after the 
Second World War. The consequence is, perhaps, that 
Soviet Third World theory is less consistent and less 
coherent than other branches of international relations 
theory. It is certainly far less easy to encapsulate in 
a brief description. But it is also more interesting. 
The admission that history has not always followed the 
expected course has not, however, been accompanied by a 
refutation or even a critique of those aspects of 
Marxist-Leninist theory which have been proved 
inaccurate or wrong. As with all foreign policy, Soviet 
leaders and scholars maintain that Soviet relations with 
the LDCs are ba.ed on Marxist-Leninist theory. Lenin'. 
theory seemed uncannily accurate when Soviet relations 
with the Third World were revived after the Second World 
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War. The disintegration of the colonial system after the 
Second World War was thought to prove the accuracy of 
his predictions about the peoples of the East. 
Similarly, the establishment of socialist and socialist 
oriented states in Asia, and later in Latin America and 
Africa seemed to prove the contention of both Marx and 
Lenin that in certain circumstances the capitalist phase 
of development can be avoided. There seemed to be no 
reason why other 
would not prove 
could be argued 
aspects of Marxist-Leninist theory 
equally useful. In fact, however, it 
that neither of those theories was 
accurate, and that adhering to Lenin's Second Comintern 
Congress theses, rather than to Roy's, has sometimes had 
negative consequences for the spread of socialism. 
As far as the theory of imperialism was concerned, it is 
true that Lenin predicted decolonization. But he 
expected it to take place as the result of a series of 
inter-imperialist and national liberation wars which 
would weaken the imperialist powers. In fact, negotiated 
decolonization was more frequent than 
resulting from a liberation war. The Second 
independence 
World War 
had weakened the colonial powers, but it can be argued 
that they were strengthened by granting independence to 
colonies that had become too expensive to maintain. 
Moreover, by the time that decolonization took place, 
the arch-capitalist power was the United State. (in 
fact, Lenin realized as early .s 1919 that this had 
become the ca.e, see, for example, Lenin, 1919a, p. 23~ 
216 
and Soviet theorists have called it that ever since 
then). Far from being weakened by decolonization, the 
USA, it could be argued, gained enormously in political 
and economic influence. Just as Lenin wrote 
"Imperialism" to update Marx by taking account of new 
developments, it has been necessary to update Lenin. But 
this has proved to be a more delicate task than that 
faced by Lenin in 1916. As we have seen, the one 
theorist who tried to do so, Varga, found himself 
without an institute and forced to recant. And although 
both he and his work were rehabilitated after Stalin's 
death, the result has been the co-existence of two 
theories (not 
strengthening 
theory. 
or 
always 
the 
peaceful), 
replacement of 
rather 
the 
than the 
classical 
The thesis that underdeveloped countries would be able 
to skip the capitalist phase of development has proved 
true for some underdeveloped countries, but it is no 
longer considered invariable. The resulting system (in 
Cuba, Vietnam, Laos or Korea, for example, which are 
said to have already reached socialism) is clearly not 
always what was envisaged in terms of industrialization 
and prosperity. To some extent, therefore, the original 
theory has been adapted. The limiting circumstance to 
avoiding capitalism is now said to be a certain minimum 
level of development. But there seems to be no precise 
definition of what that level is and no self-evident 
reason why it should not be defined. Economic typologies 
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of developing countries have been constructed (see, for 
example, Tipologiya nesotsialisticheskikh stran, 1976). 
If some Third World states are recognized to be 
non-capitalist, others are socialist-oriented and still 
others have already reached the stage of socialist 
development, it should be possible to say what the 
economic criteria are for passing from each of these 
stages to the next, and what the minimum take-off 
criteria are for becoming non-capitalist. Furthermore, 
the fate of countries below the minimum level is not 
specified: will they remain stagnant, will they have to 
pass through capitalism, or if sufficient aid was to be 
made available, could they embark upon noncapitalist 
development? Or could it be that the criteria are not 
just economic? 
This last question ties up with the old problem of which 
forces to support in the drive for national liberation. 
Lenin's theses at the Second Comintern Congress have 
always been considered valid and bourgeois democratic 
movements have continued to enjoy Soviet support. The 
result has sometimes been embarrassment for the Soviet 
leadership when the 
repressed indigenous 
concomitant lack of 
movements have come to power and 
communist parties. But the 
support for local socialists and 
communists may also have served to keep them weak, 
thereby making it even more difficult for a vanguard 
party to be formed before or ·after independence to 
ensure the transition, first to nonc.pit.list 
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development and then to socialism. Whether this is one 
of the reasons why the transition has often proved 
difficult to effect is a question that has not been 
tackled by Soviet theorists, perhaps because if it is 
the reason, Roy may well have turned out to be correct 
rather than Lenin. And yet in terms of providing a guide 
to Soviet policy and ensuring its success, the need for 
theoretical clarity on this issue is vital. 
There are other reasons, however, why adapting classical 
theory has been difficult. For one thing, the classical 
theory does not really address the intractable problems 
of underdevelopment or the rapid regime change which has 
been a feature of post-independence government. Noy. can 
it easily be adapted to explain phenomena like the 
Iranian revolution, which caused considerable conceptual 
confusion, some theorists interpreting it optimistically 
in terms of progressive social development (for example, 
Kim, 1980), others recognizing that it contained an 
equal potential for retrogressive change (for example, 
Primakov, 1980a). (In fact, Iran is recognized as being 
anti-imperialist, but Soviet-Iranian relations have been 
worse since the revolution than before 11). It does not 
allow for the possibility of war between two socialist 
oriented states (for example, Vietnam and Kampuchea) or 
between two underdeveloped states (for example, Iran and 
Iraq). For another, Soviet-Third World relations are 
said to be an example of a new type of international 
relations, combining the principles of peaceful 
219 
coexistence with the principles of proletarian 
internationalism (Butenko, 1975, pp. 403-13). In other 
words, they are a combination of state relations and 
class relations, or of "horizontal" and "vertical" 
relations. Insofar as they are class relations they are 
based "on the Leninist teaching that the national 
liberation movement is an integral part of the world 
revolutionary process" (Novopashin, 1978, p 134). And 
insofar as they are state relations, they are based on 
the principles of international law which include the 
principles of peaceful coexistence. The problem arises 
when these two aspects contradict one another (there is 
a similar problem in relations with capitalist states, 
as we have seen, and an identical one in relations with 
socialist states, which will be discussed in Chapter 7). 
In other words, when good state relations require the 
neglect of a movement that would, if it attained power, 
probably be more sympathetic to socialism, or 
conversely, when proletarian international support for 
national liberation movements results in poor 
inter-governmental relations or adversely affects 
East-West detente there is a dilemma. Soviet theory does 
not deal with it, although it had become evident very 
early in Soviet history. Soviet practice has often 
resolved it in favour of good state relations and at the 
expense of the national liberation movement, or at least 
of the local socialists. 
In those aspects of Soviet theory which are 1 ••• 
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directly based on the classical writing, there seem to 
be surprising gaps. Concern that the effect of aid might 
be to increase the relative advantages of the already 
advantaged, doubts about the efficacy of industrial 
models as a solution to Third World underdevelopment, 
worry about the effects of the disintegration of 
traditional societies, the rising birth rate, the 
depletion of natural resources and the effects of 
pollution are common in a variety of Western and Third 
World theories. These concerns are rarely voiced in 
Soviet theory or are treated with optimism. Western 
demographers who calculate that the world will run out 
of food resources are accused of being Malthusians 
(Shakhnazarov, 1984, p. 123). The gap between rich and 
poor, Soviet theorists maintain, will remain until a new 
social order reigns throughout the world, but mankind's 
technical expertise and the scientific and technical 
revolution are sufficient to resolve resource scarcity 
in the short term (Shakhnazarov, 1984, pp. 135-8). Works 
like The Limits to Growth (Meadows, 1972) and the Brandt 
report (The Brandt Commission, 1980) are either 
"somewhat sensational II (Shakhnazarov, 1984, p. 124) or 
harmful because they promote an atmosphere of panic and 
the expectation of imminent disaster (Khvoinik, 1980, p. 
49). Despite the doubts expressed by recent theorists, 
the Soviet remedy for underdevelopment remains effective 
industrialization and the gradual introduction of 
socialism. What Soviet theorists fail to explain, 
however, is how these remedi •• will solve endemic Third 
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World problems which, they increasingly admit, are far 
from being identical to those faced by the Soviet Union 
in the 1920s. The problems of modernization are simply 
not perceived as acutely in the Soviet Union as they are 
in the West and, more importantly, in the South. In 
other words, there seems to be no coherent theory of 
socialist development which sets out how the problems 
which accompany any development will be avoided. Second 
World theorists are no closer than First or Third World 
theorists in solving the problems of underdevelopment. 
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Not.s 
1. The East had not suffered the same neglect as other 
area studies and social sciences under Stalin (although 
categorizing all the colonies as "the east" denoted a 
certain lack of geographic discrimination). To some 
extent this proved to be a disadvantage afterwards, 
since Orientalists continued criticizing the "bourgeois 
regimes" of newly independent countries even after 
Khrushchev had launched his new, active policy. As a 
result a number of people were dismissed. When the first 
edition of Sovetskoe vostokovedenie under its new 
editorial board appeared in 1956 (4 months late), 
various people in Eastern studies were accused of 
sectarianism and dogmatism ("XX s"ezd kommunisticheskoi 
partii Sovetskogo Soyuza i zadachi izucheniya 
sovremennogo Vostoka", 1956, pp. 3-12). Zimmerman (1971, 
p. 36) tied the personnel changes to the struggle within 
the CPSU between Molotov and Khrushchev. The 20th Party 
Congress speeches urging research (those by Mikoyan, 
Suslov and Shepilov are particularly relevant) are 
translated in Gruliow (1957). Rozman (1985) has argued 
that some of the recent, interesting work done by 
Orientalists, particularly on China, is intended as a 
surrogate for the study of Soviet history and Stalinism. 
There are a number of interesting studies on the 
international relations and area studies institutions 
and their effect on Soviet policy. See, for example, 
Remnek (1975), Eran (1979), Saivetz (1982) and Malcolm 
(1984) and see also the authors cited in Chapter 1, 
footnote 7, above. 
2. Throughout Soviet history generals and military 
leaders have been removed as soon as they became too 
popular or too powerful. The first position that Trotsky 
lost during his dispute with Stalin, for example, was 
that of Commissar for War. Zhukov was demoted first by 
Stalin and then by Khrushchev. 
3. Military regimes in capitalist developing states have 
been particularly ferociously criticised. One theorist, 
for example, explained that the moving force in the 
capitalist developing world was the "surrogate" of the 
national bourgeosie "in the form of the 'bureaucratic', 
parasitic, neocomprador bourgeoisie or militarist 
neo-bonapartist dictatorships" (Maidanik and Mirsky, 
1981, pp. 24-5). The considerable differences in the 
views held by the Soviet military and by civilians on 
the role of the military in the Third World have been 
documented by Katz (1982). See also Saivetz (in Duncan, 
1980, pp. 135-51) and Hosmer and Ho1fe (1983). The' 
absence of a mass party in Ethiopia was the cause of 
considerable criticism of Menghistu (see, for example, 
Primakov's remarks about the weakness of the rulin; 
party in some countries and the need to involve the 
masse., 1980b, pp. 42-43). Men;histu finally formed the 
Workers' Party of Ethopia, which held it. first con;re •• 
in September 1984 (Staar, 1985, pp. 92, 97). 
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4. In 1959 at the 21st Extraordinary Congress of the 
CPSU Khrushchev spoke out against anti-communist 
campaigns, mentioning the United Arab Republic by name 
(Khrushchev, 1959b). At the 22nd Congress in 1961 he 
again objected to the anti-communist policy of some 
national democracies (Khrushchev, 1961b. p. 47) but 
Soviet state policy did not change as a result of the 
repressions. Egypt remained the recipient of the largest 
amount of military and economic aid until 1965 (when it 
fell to second place) even though Nasser would not 
legalize the Egyptian Communist Party. See Heldman 
(1981, pp. 48-9) and Saivetz (1982, pp. 126-33). 
5. One Western theorist calls the concept of 
noncapitalist development "a teleological model, a 
programmatic statement of how to get from a traditional 
to a SOViet-type society" (Saivetz, 1982, p. 15). The 
introduction of the term socialist-orientation was a way 
of getting round the gap between the proclaimed goals of 
many LDCs and the reality of their successes and 
failures (Saivetz, 1982i pp. 296-197). It also 
represented a shift from prescription to a more 
analytical theory (Saivetz, 1982, pp. 287-90). According 
to another Western theorist, changes in the late 
Brezhnev period reflected both a greater sophistication 
in scholarly and policy-oriented discourse and a general 
lowering of expectation regarding Soviet influence in 
the Third World and the revolutionary potential of Third 
World countries (Bialer, 1980, p. 271). For an analysis 
of the further lowering of expectations, see Valkenier 
(1986) . 
6. In 1979 non-capitalist LDCs were classified as 
follows: 
Long established socialist oriented states: Algeria, 
Burma, Guinea, the People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen, the Congo, Syria and Tanzania. 
Recently established socialist oriented states: 
Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique, Ethiopia "and others". 
Afghanistan was then said to have just joined this 
group. 
States which had avoided capitalism and already 
reached socialism: Vietnam, Korea, Laos, and Cuba. 
The last group had been led by people's democratic 
governments, while the government of the LDC 
socialist-oriented states were revolutionary national 
democratic, undergoing a similar development to 
Mongolia. Ghana, Mali and Egypt were classified as 
having reverted to capitalism, as had Somalia 
(Ul'yanovsky, 1979, pp. 116-7). According to the papers 
captured in Grenada, the New Jewel Movement found its 
acceptance as a fraternal Marxist-Leninist party 
"maddeningly slow n • Its representative in Moscow 
explained that this was because the Soviet authorities 
had burnt their fingers giving support to the wrong 
groups, for example, in Egypt, Somalia, Ghana and Peru 
(USA Department of State and Department of Defence, 
1984, 26/3). Grenada was accepted as being "at the 
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national democratic anti-imperialist stage of socialist 
orientation" ( USA Department of State and Department of 
Defence, 1984, 26/2). Jacobs, the New Jewel 
representative, added ruefully: "they regard Grenada as 
a small distant country and they are only prepared to 
make commitments to the extent of their ability to 
fulfill, and if necessary, defend their commitment" (USA 
Department of State and Department of Defence, 1984, 
26/2). In'fact, the New Jewel Movement was considered a 
petty-bourgeois vanguard party, inferior to a 
Marxist-Leninist party (Irkhin, 1982, p. 58). 
7. See Heldman (1981) for an analysis of Khrushchev's 
aid policies and Valkenier (1983, pp. 1-36) for the 
changes which have occurred in aid policies from 1955 to 
the end of 1982. 
8. Chekhutov (1981) maintained that more credits are 
offered to states with socialist orientation. But 
according to his figures, 40% of credits granted in the 
mid-seventies went to the contiguous states of India, 
Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, none of which are conside~ed 
socialist oriented (p. 54). He criticized Western 
assertions that the volume of socialist aid is inferior 
to that from capitalists on the grounds that Western 
ecnomists do not correlate volume of aid with the export 
of goods or with the per capita income of donor country. 
If the volume is so correlated, the socialist 
commonwealth will be seen to donate double the volume of 
capitalist aid (1981, pp. 58-9). In fact, most Western 
scholars maintain that the Soviet global aid effort is 
insignificant compared to Western aid (see Donaldson, 
1981, for example). 
9. For an account of the Soviet contribution to the NIEO 
debate, see Donaldson (1981, pp. 358-83), Gati (1980, 
pp. 241-70) and Valkenier (1983, pp. 109-46). 
10. As Valkenier (1983, p. 105, footnote 24) explains, 
the word uklad in the term mnogoukladnost' almost defies 
translation. It means the various types of productive 
relations which make up the economy. The types usually 
coalesce into feudal, capitalist or socialist 
formations. In undeveloped economies coalescence has not 
yet taken place because a number of types of productive 
relations exist. Hough (1986, p. 55) translates the word 
uklad into "substructure". He describes the emergence of 
the concept and the controversy it produced, 
particularly as used by Levkovskii, who "explicitly 
emphasized ••• that a SOCiety without a dominant class 
could not have a government that was subordinated to a 
dominant class" (Hough, 1986, p. 59). 
11. Following Brezhnev's formulation at the 26th Party 
Congress (1981, p. 17), the revolution in Iran wa. 
defined as ·social and national in content", with both 
anti-imperialist and conservative feature.. The 
situation in Iran confirmed that that Islam can both be 
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the cause of liberation struggle (as in Iran) and be 
used by reactionary forces in the service of 
counter-revolution (as in Afghanistan). In Iran, 
however, "the Islamic ideology is used by one and the 
same social and political forces as the basis of both 
anti-imperialist and anti-democratic slogans and 
actions, to confirm the false thesis of \a special 
Islamic way' opposed to both West and East, that is 
opposed to both capitalism and socialism" (Maidanik and 
Mirsky, 1981, pp. 18-9, quote on p. 19). 
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CHAPTER 6. RELATIONS AMONG SOCIALISTS I: 
NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM. 
The principle which has always been said to underpin the 
relations between members of the international workers' 
movement is proletarian internationalism. It is still 
ranked as one of the two pillars on which Soviet foreign 
policy is based (the other, as we have seen, is peaceful 
coexistence). After the Second World War, when socialism 
moved beyond the borders of one country to become the 
dominant system in a region, proletarian 
internationalism became the basis of inter-state 
relations. In its inter-state form, it began to be 
called socialist internationalism. 
The modern concept of socialist 
proletarian internationalism, 
work of Marx, Engels and Lenin 
socialists. This presents 
internationalism, like 
is said to stem from the 
on relations between 
a 
however, in that neither Marx nor 
theoretical problem, 
Engels conceived of 
relations between socialist states. Their use of the 
term internationalism referred essentially to relations 
within a class. On the one hand, the socialist 
revolution would be international and it would lead to 
the disappearance of national differences. There would, 
therefore, be no need for foreign policy. And on the 
other hand, the state would wither away after the 
revolution and there could, therefore, be no inter-state 
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relations. Lenin, however, believed that national 
differences would remain for some time. Moreover, he 
insisted that socialists should support the right of 
nations to self-determination. He also extended the 
period during which a state would be necessary and 
therefore 
relations. 
available to 
But Lenin, 
engage 
too, 
in 
used 
international 
proletarian 
internationalism primarily to refer to relations within 
the working class or between socialist parties. 
Stalin further postponed the disappearance of both 
national differences and the state. He also postulated 
that socialism could be built in one or several 
countries. Once it was postulated that socialism could 
occur in one or more country and that the state would be 
retained in each, theoretically there could be 
inter-state relations between them. After the Second 
World War the theoretical possibility became a reality. 
It became necessary both to relate the internal changes 
in the countries of "Eastern Europe (and countries like 
North Korea, North Vietnam and China) to the Soviet 
model and to explain the form relations between them 
should take. In the case of their domestic developments 
it proved relatively easy to adapt aspects of Leninist 
theory. It was far more difficult, however, to conceive 
of foreign relations which both enco~pa.sed the normal 
features of inter-state relations, and also included the 
principle of proletarian internationalism, which by then 
had come to mean putting Soviet state interests first. 
228 
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the development 
of Soviet theory from the belief that the state would 
wither away to the beginning of a theory of relations 
between socialist states. It begins with a brief look at 
the concepts of nationalism and internationalism in the 
writings of Marx and Engels before turning to three 
aspects of Lenin/s theory which are considered relevant 
to relations between socialists. In the third section of 
the chapter, Stalin/s 
considered. Finally, 
theory of 
the gradual 
nationalism 
extension 
is 
of 
proletarian internationalism to relations between states 
is traced by examining the establi~hment of the 
socialist camp after the war and the depiction under 
Stalin of developments within and relations between what 
became known as the People/s Democracies. This sets the 
scene for Chapter 7, in which the development of a 
theory about a new type of international relations will 
be examined. 
1. Nationalism and internationalism in Marx and Ingels 
Since Marx and Engels expected an international 
revolution, they paid little attention to the external 
relations of the future socialist world. Although later 
Soviet scholars (for example, Lebedev, 1982, p. 23) have 
mocked Trotsky's much quoted dictum when he became 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs in 1917 that he would 
publish the .ecret Tsarist treaties and then "shut up 
shop", Trotsky was being true to the same Marxist theory 
which is now invoked by Soviet scholars And policy 
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makers in support of greater integration within the 
Soviet bloc (see Chapter 7). Marx believed that class 
similarities were more important than national 
differences. He observed that capitalism was creating 
interdependence and that national antagonisms were 
disappearing. This process would, he thought, be speeded 
up by the victory of the proletariat. In the "Communist 
Manifesto" he claimed that: 
"In proportion as the exploitation of one 
individual by another is put an end to, the 
exploitation of one nation by another will 
also be put an end to. In proportion as the 
antagonism between classes within the nation 
vanishes, the hostility of one nation to 
another will come to an end" (Marx and Engels, 
1848, p. 51). 
It was the duty of communists "to point out and bring to 
the front the common interests of the entire 
proletariat, independently of all nationality" (Marx and 
Engels, 1848, p. 46). Workers of all countries' were 
exhorted to unite in a common struggle, a struggle which 
Marx believed would lead to a revolution throughout the 
"civilized world". 
If Marx and Engels had thought about a socialis~ foreign 
policy, they would not have expected it to be the 
function of traditional state institutions. They 
believed that the state was ~he instrument through which 
the ruling class protected its interests and that 
"political power.o.is merely the organized power of one 
class for oppre.sing another" (Marx and Engels, 1848, p. 
S4).· Once the proletariat had seized power, it would 
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establish its own dictatorship for the transition period 
from socialism to communism (Marx, 1875, pp. 32-3). When 
classes and class antagonisms finally disappeared, there 
would be no further need for a state. Engels later 
elaborated this idea: 
"As soon as there is no longer any social 
class to be held in subjection ... a special 
repressive force, or state, is no longer 
necessary. The first act by virtue of which 
the state really constitutes itself the 
representative of the whole of society--
taking possession of the means of production 
in the name of society -- this is, at the same 
time, its last independent act ... the 
government of persons is replaced by the 
administration of things, and by the conduct 
of processes of production. The state is not 
'abolished', it dies out" (Engels, 1877, pp. 
150-1, emphasis in original). 
However, neither Marx nor Engels underestimated the 
force of nationalism. They believed that claims to 
self-determination should be suppo~ted if they furthered 
the aims of socialist revolution, or resulted in the 
formation of large and powerful units. But the claims of 
"petty states" deserved no encouragement (Engels in Marx 
and Engels, 1980, p. 170). Thus Polish independence was 
considered both viable and a blow against the Tsarist 
autocracy, whereas the nationalist aspirations of other 
Slav nations were no more than a manifestation of a 
Pan-Slavism that would serve the Russian Tsar (Engels in 
Marx and Engels, 1980, p. 140 and see the discussion in 
Herod, .1976, pp. 6-38). Maix and Engels saw the 
establishment of the nation as a bourgaois phenomenon 
(Marx and Engels, 1848, p. 38) and their support of 
nationalism was thus conditional on its usefulness to 
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socialism. 
2. Lenin. nationalism and the state 
Three aspects 
relevant to 
of Leninist theory are particularly 
relations within the socialist system and 
will be examined in this section. The first, Lenin's 
theory of uneven development, explained how a socialist 
revolution could occur in countries which had not yet 
reached the stage of advanced capitalism and why, 
therefore, national differences would be retained even 
after the revolution. The second aspect, Lenin's 
complicated theory of national self-determination and 
its relationship to the internationalism in which he, 
like Marx and Engels, very firmly believed, is pertinent 
to the complex balance between national and 
international interests within the socialist system. The 
way in which Lenin's original ideas were applied during 
the Civil War demonstrated the vulne~ability of this 
theory in the face of a threat to the survival of the 
state. 
The third relevant aspect of Lenin's theory explains why 
inter-state relations are required at all within the 
socialist world, given the Marxist belief that "the 
working men have no country", that national differences 
would diminish, and that the nation-state would 
disappear when the state withered away. In writing about 
the development of society after the revolution, Lenin 
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prolonged the dictatorship of the proletariat and 
postponed the withering away of the state, thereby 
postponing almost indefinitely other features which 
Marx, Engels and he himself had predicted would be 
characteristic of socialism and communism. 
Even more useful to subsequent theorists in justifying 
policies which, to the outside observer, seem more 
concerned with Soviet state interests than with the 
ideals of internationalism are the many, often 
contradictory, statements Lenin made on these issues 
after the October revolution, when he was preoccupied 
with the future survival of the Soviet republic rather 
than with international theory. 
(a) Uneven development and the revolution 
As early as 1897 (Lenin, 1897), but more particularly 
after the 1905 Russian Revolution (Lenin, 1905), Lenin 
was concerned to explain how a socialist revolution 
could take place in a country as poorly developed as 
Russia, where neither advanced capitalism nor bourgeois 
democracy existed. The experience of 1905 made it 
obvious that the Russian bourgeoisie was unlikely to 
take power and even less likely to keep it.l The 
bourgeois democratic revolution would therefore have to 
be made by the Russian proletariat, in alliance with the 
peasantry in a "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship" 
of the prol.taria~ and the peasantry (Lenin, 1905, p. 
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56) .2 
There was no ques~ion, a~ ~his s~age of Lenin's 
~hinking, of by-passing ~he capi~alis~ s~age of 
developmen~. Once bourgeois democracy had been 
ins~i~u~ed and capi~alis~ developmen~ had accelera~ed, 
~he prole~aria~ would need ~o abandon ~he peasan~ry. The 
socialist revolution would be accomplished by an 
alliance of ~he prole~aria~ and "~he mass of ~he 
semi-prole~arian elemen~s of ~he popula~ion" (Lenin, 
1905, p. 100). That there would be a gap between ~he ~wo 
revolutions was clear, bu~ Lenin was ambiguous abou~ i~s 
length. Although he argued aqains~ Tro~sky's ~heory of 
permanent revolu~ion (see Chap~er 2), ~heir ideas were 
very similar and by April 1917 he was advoca~ing ~ha~ 
the Bolsheviks should proceed direc~ly to ~he socialist 
revolution (Lenin, 1917h, pp. 55-92). In la~er years, 
Lenin's ~heory of a single, ~wo-phase revolution was 
used to explain how socialism had been established in 
some of the People's Democracies (see, for example, 
Sobolev, 1951; Fiqurnov, 1954). It was also used, as we 
have seen in Chapters 4 and 5, to explain colonial 
revolu~ion. 
In 1917 Lenin was ~onvinced that the success of a 
socialist revolution depended both upon the co-operation 
of the Russian peasantry and upon the support of a 
European socialist revolution (see, for example, 1917c). 
It was not until 1921 that he gave up immediate hope for 
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a European revolution and tried to ensure the 
co-operation of the Russian peasantry by introducing the 
New Economic Policy. By the time the countries of 
Central and South-East Europe became socialist after the 
Second World War, the relationship that Lenin had 
initially envisaged between the European revolution and 
the Russian revolution had been stood on its head: the 
Russian revolution had made the European revolution 
possible and fidelity to the Soviet Union was required 
to ensure the survival of both. 
Lenin observed that capitalism had developed unevenly 
throughout the world (Lenin, 1916a, p. 60). This was 
natural since· "there never has been and never could be 
harmonious or proportionate development in the world of 
capitalism" (Lenin, 1919d, p. 308). It was, therefore, 
unlikely that social revolution would be the result of 
the united action of the proletarians of all countries 
simultaneously (Lenin, 1916a, pp. 58-9). A more probable 
scenario was that revolution would occur first in a less 
developed country on the periphery, where the weakest 
link of capitalism was to be found, for example, in 
Russia. 
But Lenin stressed that it was easier for the Russians 
"to begin the 
continue it and 
1919d, p. 310). 
great proletarian revolution" than "to 
carry it to final victory· (Lenin, 
The final succe.sful establishment of 
socialism would require that the revolution spread from 
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Russia to the more advanced capitalist countries. Since 
this meant that revolution would take place in countries 
at varying stages of development, the forms it would 
take, and the subsequent changes brought about by the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, were bound to differ. 
In writing about the socialist commonwealth since the 
war and the national differences which have occurred in 
the establishment of socialism, most Soviet theorists 
cite Lenin's view that: 
"All nations will arrive at socialism -- this 
is inevitable, but all will do so in not 
exactly the same way, each will· contribute 
something of its own to some form of 
democracy, to some variety of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, to the varying rate of 
socialist transformations in the different 
aspects of social life" (Lenin, 1916a, p. 
69-70). 
Nonetheless, Lenin believed that certain aspects of the 
Russian revolution were universally applicable. For one 
thing he was convinced that successful revolutionary 
parties had to be modelled on the Bolshevik party. For 
another, he saw the dictatorship of the proletariat as 
an essential element in establishing socialism: 
"the transition from capitalism to communism 
is certainly bound to yield a tremendous 
abundance and variety of political forms ..• 
but the essence will inevitably be the same: 
the dictatorship of the proletariat" (Lenin, 
1917g, p. 413, emphasis in the original). 
In' 1948 the People's Democracies were proclaimed to be 
new types of the dictatorship of the proletariat which 
conformed to Lenin's theory. 
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(b) Proletarian internationalism and national 
self-determination 
On the question of national self-determination, Lenin 
developed a complex view which he reiterated constantly 
in debate with those Marxists who eschewed nationalism 
as a bourgeois and therefore retrograde phenomenon. It 
was precisely because it was a bourgeois phenomeno~ that 
nationalism should be supported. Supporting the right of 
nations to self-determination would give socialists "the 
strength to accomplish the socialist revolution and 
overthrow the bourgeoisie" (Lenin, 1916c, p. 336). But 
although it was the duty of socialists in oppressor 
states to struggle against the enforced retention of 
oppressed nations within the boundaries of other states, 
socialists in the oppressed nations should, with equal 
force, insist on their right to unite with the workers 
of .the oppressor nation (Lenin, 1916g, pp. 147-8). To 
support the freedom to secede was not to encourage 
separatism, Lenin insisted, and to confuse the two was 
as foolish lias accusing those who advocate freedom of 
divorce of encouraging the destruction of family ties" 
(Lenin, 1914b, p. 422). 
Lenin believed that a transitional period of complete 
emancipation would eliminate national friction and 
mistrust (Lenin, 1916q, p. 147). Once hostility between 
nations had disappeared, the process of -drawing 
together" (sblizhenie) and "fusion" (sliyanie) could 
begin, a process -that will be completed when the state 
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withers away" (Lenin, 1916c, p. 325, emphasis in the 
original) . The length of time f4ShO ll\ would take thus 
depended upon how long ft would take for the state 
to wither away. The end point that Lenin evisaged in his 
theory of national self-determination was "complete 
equality, the closest association and the eventual 
amalgamation of all nations" (Lenin, 1916c, p. 346, 
emphasis in the original). No coercion was to be 
involved in the fusion, however, and none would be 
required: 
gravitate 
it was expected that the workers would 
irresistibly towards union. But by 1920 Lenin 
was already admitting that amalgamation would take a 
little longer than previously envisaged, since national 
and state distinctions would "continue to exist for a 
very long time to come, even after the dictatorship of 
the proletariat has been established on a world-wide 
scale" (Lenin, 1920a, p. 92). 
Whatever the rights of nations, individual socialists 
were certainly expected to be above bourgeois 
nationalism and to oppose it. Lenin claimed that 
bourgeois nationalism and. proletarian internationalism 
were "two irreconcilably hostile slogans" (Lenin, 1913, 
p. 26).' For individual socialists the claims to 
self-determination could never supersede the claims of 
internationalism. To be an internationalist meant 
placing the interests of all nations above those of 
one's own nation (Lenin, 1916c, p. 347). In the First 
World War this implied following a policy of national 
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defeatism. In the .aftermath of that war and the 
establishment of the Third Communist International on 
strict democratic centralist principles, it meant 
subordinating national revolutionary interests to the 
line laid down by the Executive Committee of the 
Communist International. Thus, as Carr points out (Carr, 
Vol. 1, 1966, p. 430), Lenin, like Marx and Engels, 
never gave absolute validity to the right 
self-determination: 
"While recognizing equality and equal rights 
to a national state [the proletariat] values 
above all ... the alliance of the proletarians 
of all nations, and assesses any national 
demand, any national separation, from the 
angle of the workers' class struggle" (Lenin, 
1914b, pp. 411, emphasis in the original). 
to 
By 1918 the Civil War had begun and the incompatibility 
of national self-determination and "the workers' class 
struggle" was strikingly obvious. Immediately after the 
Revolution, the Bolsheviks had proclaimed the right of 
nations within the Tsarist empire to self-determination 
up to and including secession. The independence of 
Poland, Finland and the Baltic states was accepted (in 
the case of the latter two, not particularly gladly), 
but Ukrainian self-determination threatened the 
existence of the new Soviet state, firstly, because of 
the Ukraine's economic importance to Russia and 
secondly, because this was where the Civil War began~3 
In 1919 Lenin insisted that an international workers' 
brotherhood was required to vanquish international 
capital. Ha still preferred a voluntary union, but if 
the Ukrainian workers and peasants cho.e independence, 
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the question to be decided was not secession, but the 
-kind of federal ties necessary to bind the Ukraine to 
Russia (Lenin, 1919b, pp. 291-7). 
By the time the imme-diate danger of the Civil War was 
over, it seemed to be accepted that the secession of the 
borderlands would threaten the economic viability and 
security of Soviet Russia. Although Lenin strongly 
objected to the manner in which Stalin and Orzhonikidze 
foisted Bolshevism and a Transcaucasian Republic on 
Georgia, he understood that a solution was required 
which endorsed the right to self-determination without 
threatening the security of Soviet Russia. 
The compromise was embodied in the first constitution of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adopted in 1924,-
which was federal in form, but centralist in content (to 
paraphrase Stalin's explanation of national culture 
under the dictatorship of the proletariat -- "a 'culture 
socialist in content and national in form", Stalin, 
1930, p. 260). The constituent republics were granted 
the theoretical right to secede, but the institutions of 
government were hierarchical and highly centralized and 
very few (primarily cultural and educational) functions 
were relegated to the republican level (th. text of the 
constitution is given in Unger, 1981, pp. 58-76). The 
theory of national self-determination and voluntary 
union had fallen victim to Soviet state interests. When 
voluntary union failed to materialize, constitutional 
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lip service was paid to national self-determination and 
unity was imposed in the name of the interests of the 
revolution. The precedent was set for the future fate of 
national self-determination. Where secession from the 
socialist system was seen to threaten the security of 
that system, the right to secession would be considered 
invalid. 
(c) The Proletarian State 
A strict interpretation of Marx's and Engels' theory led 
some Bolsheviks to expect the state to be abolished. But 
the adoption of a new constitution in 192~ suggested 
that there was very little sign of the state withering 
away. Lenin had indicated even before the October 
revolution that the transitional period of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat would last long~r than 
Marx and Engels had seemed to imply. The immediate task 
of the proletariat after the revolution was to destroy 
the bourgeois state. But this did not mean that 
post-revolutionary society would be able to do without 
any form of state: 
"During the transition from capitalism to 
communism, suppression is still necessary; but 
in this case it is the suppression of the 
minority of exploiters by the majority of 
exploiters. A special instrument ••• is 
necessary, but this is now· a transitional 
State" (Lenin, 1917g, p. 463). 
Lenin believed that the bourgeois state would be 
destroyed, but that when they used the phra.e ·wither 
away., Marx and Ingels were referring to the gradual, 
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elemental disappearance of the proletarian state which 
is "so constituted that it begins to wither away 
immediately, and cannot but wither away" (Lenin, 1917g, 
p. 402). This would come about by replacing the 
operations of the bourgeois state bureaucracy with the 
functions of "foremen and accountants" who would be 
revocable and modestly paid. The result would be the 
gradual decay of all bureaucracy (Lenin, 1917g, p. 426). 
But the final stage of the process could and would not 
be reached before communism had been attained: 
"The state will be able to wither away 
completely when society adopts the rule: 'From 
each according to his ability; to each 
according to his needs'; that is, when 
people ... will voluntarily work according to 
their abilities" (Lenin, 1917g, p. 469, 
emphasis in the original). 
Lenin's optimism that the withering away of the 
proletarian state would begin immediately did not 
survive the chaos of the early post-revolutionary 
period. By 1918 he maintained that "at present we 
certainly uphold the state" (Lenin, 1918b, p. 147) and 
from then until the end of the Civil War he was 
concerned with strengthening the state. Although by the 
end of his life he was worried about the excessive 
bureaucracy in both Party and state institutions, he 
understood that he had miscalculated the speed with 
which transform~tion would come about. He also 
recognized that a state was essential to the dealin;s of 
Soviet Russia with other countries. 
Since Lenin continued to believe that it was merely a 
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matter of time before the European revolution took 
place, the question· of whether it would be sufficient 
for communism to arrive in Russian society for the state 
to disappear, or whether international communism was 
required, did not really arise until Stalin posited the 
possibility of building socialism in one country. And by 
that time it was obvious that "the economic foundation 
of the withering away of the state" (as one of the 
chapters of Lenin's "State and Revolution" was called) 
was far from being attained. As the dictatorship of the 
proletariat increasingly became the dictatorship of the 
Party and then of Stalin, the state certainly "withered 
away", but the process and the end product bore little 
resemblance to what Marx, Engels or Lenin had envisaged. 
3. Stalinism and internationalism 
In a damning dismissal of Stalin's theoretical 
pretensions, the Polish expatriate philosopher, 
Kolakowski, maintains that Marxism-Leninism under Stalin 
consisted only of Stalin's own doctrine of the day, plus 
the quotations he selected from the works of Marx, Lenin 
and Engels. The twists and turns in the policies of the 
Comintern, for example, had nothing to do with ideology 
and doctrine and "any ideological grounds adduced to 
defend them were invented for the purpose and have no 
bearing on the history of ideologyN (Kolakowski, Vol. 3, 
1978, pp. 3-9, quote on p. 8). Lowenthal (1964, pp. 
39-45), on the other hand, believ •• that Stalin 
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reconciled three inherent contradictions in Leninism: 
the fiction of democracy and the fact of the 
dictatorship; the palpable continued existence of the 
state; and the probable conflict between Soviet state 
interests and the interests of world revolution. These 
views, on the surface irreconcilable, are actually two 
sides of the same coin. What Stalin did was to adapt 
Leninism first to the needs of a Soviet state ideology, 
and then to his own requirements. He could, perhaps, be 
accused of being a revisionist, but in that respect he 
was following an example already set by Lenin. 
(a) Stalin and nationalism before the Second World 
War 
Stalin's theoretical career had begun under Lenin's 
tutelage: the Bolshevik theory of self-determination 
before the war was based on the work he wrote in Vienna 
in 1913 (Stalin, 1913). It can be argued, moreover, that 
there was little that he added to the theory of 
proletarian internationalism that would have seemed 
alien to Lenin. Lenin did, however, object to the way 
Stalin put his theory into practice. 
Although Lenin realized soon after the October 
Revolution that unity (even if it could not be obtained 
voluntarily) was a higher priority than the fulfilment 
of the national a.pirations of the peoples living in the 
borderlands of the old Tsarist empire, he resented the 
tactics and manner Stalin used to impos. unity and 
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Bolshevism on Georgia. Nonetheless, Stalin can hardly be 
accused of deviating from Bolshevik Party policy in 
respect ·of national self-determination at this stage. 
The Party as a whole seemed to be agreed that survival 
required a unitary state. Stalin invoked Marx's 
disapproval of southern Slav nationalism in support of 
his contention that not every national movement was 
deserving of the proletariat's support. Where the 
national movements came into conflict with the interests 
of the development of a proletarian movement (and by 
implication this was the case in the Russian 
borderlands), support was, according to Stalin, "out of 
the question" (Stalin, 1924b, p. 193). 
But the formation of a unitary Soviet state did not 
necessarily imply the extinction of the nations that 
were subsumed within that state. Indeed, the view that 
national differences would disappear rapidly became 
categorized as a "creeping" Great-Russian chauvinist 
deviation (Stalin, 1930, p. 256). In defence of a 
variety of national cultures and languages within the 
USSR, Stalin quoted Lenin's view that national and state 
differences would continue for a long time even after 
the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
on a world scale (Stalin, 1930, p. 257). Although 
Stalin's actual treatment of the national minorities 
bore little resemblance to his theoretical claims, the 
Soviet theoretical model of dealing with the national 
question was consistently proposed to the new regimes of 
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the multinational states of Eastern Europe after the 
Second World War.4 What was to become more 
problematical was whether it should also be the model 
for relations between East European states and the 
Soviet Union. 
As far as relations between Communist Parties were 
concerned, it was Lenin who imposed the 21 conditions on 
the constituent Parties of the Third Communist 
International [Comintern] which internationalized 
democratic centralism and effectively turned proletarian 
internationalism into loyal adherence to the policies 
decided by the Russian-dominated Comintern Executive 
Committee [ECCI] (the conditions can be found in Degras, 
Vol .. 1, 1956, pp. 166-72). But there is general 
agreement that Lenin sincerely believed that the Russian 
model of Party organization was an assured way to 
international revolution and that he did not intend the 
Comintern to become an institution for promoting Soviet 
state policy (see, for example, Borkenau, 1971, p. 191 
and Kolakowski, Vol. 3, 1978, pp. 105-9). Stalin, 
however, turned the Comintern first into an instrument 
in the factional fighting in the Russian Communist Party 
and then, once he was the undisputed victor of the power 
struggle, an auxiliary of Soviet raison d'etat. 
Stalin's interpretation of the meaning of the term 
proletarian internationalism was unambiguous: 
"An internationalist is one who is ready to 
defend the USSR without re.ervation, without 
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wavering, unconditionally; for the USSR is the 
base of the world revolutionary movement, and 
this revolutionary movement cannot be defended 
and promoted unless the USSR is defended" 
(Stalin, 1927d, pp. 53-4). 
Thus Soviet state interests were declared to be the 
supreme interests of international communism and of the 
world proletarians who should "pledge their lives to the 
defence of the Soviet Union" (Degras, Vol. 2, 1960, p. 
409). According to the 1928 Programme of the Comintern, 
when socialism existed in only one country, that country 
was "fatherland" of the proletariat (Degras, Vol. 2, 
1960, p. 512). As Seton-Watson points out (1961, p. 
403), logically this meant that all workers owed their 
allegiance to the USSR and acting against it was 
tantamount to treason. It also meant that the member 
Parties of the Comintern followed Stalin's line, whether 
or not it was in the interests of their own 
revolutionary struggle. And, as we have seen in Chapter 
4 in connection with China, when-the policy failed, 
blame invariably fell not on Stalin or on the line, but 
on the individual Party which would then be forced to 
purge its membership. 
One of the inherent contradictions of Leninism the 
dilemma of possible conflict between Soviet state 
interests and the interests of world revolution was 
thus resolved by Stalin in favour of the Soviet state. 
In later years, after socialism had spread to other 
countries and.there was more than one -fatherland-, the 
que.tion of whether the interest. of the new socialist 
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states should continue to be subordinated to the needs 
of the Soviet Union became an insoluble theoretical and 
practical problem. 
During the purges Stalin resolved another inherent 
contradiction in Leninism: the fact that far from 
withering away, the state, or at least that part of it 
that dealt with state security, was ever more 
ubiquitous. He declared that the class struggle 
intensifies as socialism advances, thus explaining why 
there was a continued need for an ever stronger state 
(Stalin, 1937, p. 213). In 1939 he answered his own 
rhetorical question: Will the state remain in the period 
of communism? 
"Yes, it will, unless the 
encirclement is liquidated, and 
danger of foreign military attack 
eliminated U (Stalin, 1939, p. 387). 
capitalist 
unless the 
has been 
Stalin had thus shifted from the position he had held in 
his argument against Trotsky in 1924, when he had 
maintained that the building of socialism could begin 
but not be completed in one country (see Chapter 2). He 
now envisaged communism in one country, but it was to be 
a communism in which the state remained intact. This 
raised two theoretical questions: firstly, if other 
countries embarked on the road to socialism, would they 
also retain the state? And secondly, what form would 
relations taka betwe.n socialist states? After 1945 both 
questions required urgent answers. 
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(b) The People's Democracies 
The development of a theory about the countries of 
Eastern Europe liberated by the Red Army was closely 
related to the establishment and consolidation of Soviet 
influence in that area. Although Stalin seems to have 
been sure at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences that 
Eastern Europe would remain under Soviet domination, he 
does not seem to have had a clear blueprint about what 
this implied for the political systems of those 
countries. In practice, it was only in 1948 that a 
political and e~onomic pattern emerged which strongly 
resembled the Soviet political and economic model. It 
was then, too, that theoretical conformity and 
consistency were required from Soviet theorists and the 
East European regimes. 
Until 1948 Soviet theorists seemed to be searching for a 
definition to explain the political and economic 
structures of the countries of Eastern Europe and their 
relations to one anotner and to the Soviet Union. Some, 
like Varga, called Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Albania (it took longer for Hungary 
and East Germany to be described in this way) 
"democracies of a new type". 5 Varga explained that the 
ruling classes in these countries had been discredited 
during the war because they had co-operated with the 
Nazis. As a result, the remnants of feudalism had b.en 
eliminated and land had been distributed to landle •• and 
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poor peasants (Varga, 1947, pp.3-6). This had ensured an 
alliance between town and country and support for the 
new regimes from the peasantry. 6 Although private 
property still existed, foreign capital had been 
eliminated and the commanding heights of industry had 
been nationalized. Moreover, economic planning had been 
introduced and the socialist sector dominated the 
economy (Moshetov and Lesakov, 1947, pp. 41-50). But the 
democracies of a new type were neither socialist nor 
capitalist: they were transitional states with a mixed 
economy, in which socialist economic changes had yet to 
be reflected in the superstructure. 7 Thus various forms 
of government existed, ranging from coalition 
parliamentary democracies (a form considered compatible 
with the political rule of the workers), to Soviet-type 
regimes (Varga, 1947, p. 13). In all cases the state and 
coercive apparatus served the interests of urban and 
rural workers rather than those of the monopoly 
bourgeoisie (Varga, 1947, pp. 3-6). In these unique 
transitional systems the contradictions between the 
material productive forces of society (i.e. the type of 
machinery and labour) and productive relations (i.e. who 
owned the means of production) would diminish as the 
socialist sector was extended, but fierce class 
struggles were to be expected. 
Other term "democracies of • 
special 
1936-1938 
theorists preferred the 
type". Trainin, for 
•• the precursor 
example, saw Spain in 
of the stat.s of Eastern 
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Europe. The Spanish Communist Party had participated in 
a coalition Republican government which had introduced 
agrarian reforms and nationalized industry, transport 
and the banks. Trainin believed that the urgent tasks 
confronting the East European regimes consisted of 
combatting fascism and struggling against imperialism, 
rather than moving further towards socialism (Trainin, 
1947a, pp. 1-13). 
By 1948 a third term, "people's democracy", was becoming 
standardized, although it had not yet acquired 
authoritative definition. Greater emphasis was placed on 
the leading role of the Communist Parties. The 
unification of Communist and Socialist Parties into 
United Workers' Parties was lauded, particularly if the 
socialists agreed to "break completely with their 
opportunist past and •.• there is full recognition and 
undeviating fulfilment of all programmatic, tactical and 
organizational proposals of Marxism-Leninism" 
(Burdzhalov, 1948, p. 44). The idea that national 
peculiarities could imply various routes to socialism 
was emphatically denied: 
·Of course, one must take the unique into account 
in the transition of a country to socialism .•. But 
this does not cancel the general laws of 
development. The assertion that every country goes 
towards socialism in its own original way, that as 
many countries as there are, so many paths are 
there to socialism cannot be accepted as 
corr.ct •••• Th. gen.ral laws of the transition from 
capitalism to socialism revealed by Marx and 
Eng.ls, proven and made concrete and develop.d by 
Lenin and Stalin on the basis of the experience of 
the Bolshevik party and the Soviet state are 
obligatory for all countries" (Burdzhalov, 1948, p. 
51). 
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There were two separate issues at stake. The first was 
whether the countries of Eastern Europe would proceed 
towards socialism at all. The danger that they might 
revert to capitalism became apparent in the amount of 
interest they showed in the Marshall Plan. The second 
issue was whether, if they did become socialist, they 
would adopt the Soviet model or whether various forms of 
national communism would develop. The danger that 
diverse forms of national communism might form arose 
firstly, from the absence of a unifying international 
organization to impose a line (the Comintern had been 
disbanded in 19438 ). A second reason for diversity was 
the latitude allowed to the Eastern European states 
before 1948 and the fact that many East European 
leaders had spent the war years cut off from Moscow, 
acquiring independent views and popular support in the 
process. The extent of the latter danger became manifest 
as the quarrel between Stalin and Tito developed, but 
their dispute merely highlighted divergencies which 
already existed. 
The possibility of defection from the Soviet zone of 
influence was averted by the imposition of Communist 
Party rule throughout Eastern Europe in 1948. The danger 
of uncontrollable forms of national communism (and 
possible riVAls to Stalin as the leader of the world 
communist movement) caused the establishment of the 
Communist InformAtion Agency [Cominform] And the 
expulsion of Yugoslavia from the bloc. The Cominform WAS 
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intended as a forum for exchanging information and an 
agent for spreading a uniform policy and theory, via its 
journal For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy. 
Although it had been correct to disband the Comintern 
because mass parties could not be directed from a single 
centre, there was now said to be a new need for Umutual 
consultation and voluntary co-ordination of action U 
(Zhdanov, 1947, p. 4). In fact, both the organization 
and its journal soon became devoted almost entirely to 
criticizing Tito and the various deposed leaders accused 
of Titoism.9 But by then there was little danger of 
unacceptable theoretical innovations gaining currency. 
The expansion of socialism in one country into socialism 
in one bloc had been accompanied by the extension of 
Stalinism into Eastern Europe. 
Soon after the publication of Burdzhalov's article, 
Trainin and Varga were taken to task for their "vulgar 
distortion of Marxist-Leninist teaching about the 
leading role of the working class" (Farberov, 1949, p. 
5). 10 They had failed to show that the People'. 
Democracies were in a transition period from capitalism 
to socialism and had ignored one of the salient features 
of the proletarian revolution, viz: 
11 ••• that socialism gains victory first in the 
political realm, and only then, on this basis, 
in the economic and cultural realms· 
(Farberov, 1949, p. 5).11 
The difference between what Varga and Trainin had 
written and the new theory concerned emphasiS and timing 
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rather than substance. The People's Democratic regimes 
were now called a particular form of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat made possible by the leading role of the 
Communist Parties within those political systems and the 
existence of Soviet power (Farberov, 1949, p. 30).12 The 
reorganization of coalition governments to establish 
Communist Party hegemony had enabled the development and 
consolidation of this kind of dictatorship of the 
proletariat (Farberov, 1949, p. 26). Although the class 
struggle would intensify as socialism approached, the 
disenfranchisement of the old exploiting classes was not 
required. This was an obvious departure from the Soviet 
model, where a one-party state had been instituted in 
1918 and the former bourgeoisie had remained 
disenfranchised until 1936. It was asserted that: 
"Experience has proved that people's 
democratic reqimes may fulfil the functions of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat even if 
there are several parties, but on the definite 
condition that the leading and directing force 
of the state is the vanguard of the working 
class -- the communist party" (Sobolev, 1951, 
p. 30) 
But this was not in itself sufficient to explain why the 
People's Democracies could depart from the Soviet model 
in this respect, particularly since the universality of 
the Soviet experience was constantly stressed and the 
Soviet model of collectivization and industrialization 
was considered the essential route from merely embarking 
on the path to .ocialism to becominq countries which had 
constructed socialism (Korovin, 1951, p. 392). Clearly 
what was more to the point was the extent to which the 
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People's Democratic regimes owed their existence to the 
Soviet Union: it was the Soviet army which had liberated 
them and which, Soviet theorists maintained, prevented 
Anglo-American intervention in their affairs. The Soviet 
Union also gave them moral and political support, 
economic aid and the rich experience of its own social 
transformation (Sobolev, 1951, p. 27). 
Although 
revolution 
the implication might 
had been exported 
seem to be that 
to Eastern Europe, this 
suggestion was emphatically denied. The Eastern European 
revolution had neither been artificially propagated nor 
was it the result of coercive intervention. It had been 
a revolution based on a broad front under the leadership 
of the working class, at the head of which stood the 
Communist Party and this was why it had not been violent 
in spite of the acute class struggle (Figurnov, 1954, p. 
133). 
There was a slight disagreement about the nature of the 
Eastern European revolution. One theorist believed that 
single phase "revolutions of a socialist type" had taken 
place (Mankovsky, 1949a, p. 7). Others offered a more 
Leninist interpretation, detecting two phases: the 
first, agrarian, anti-feudal and anti-imperialist stage 
had fulfilled the tasks of the bourgeois democratic 
revolution under the leadership of a dictatorship of the 
working class and the peasantry. The second phase had 
laid the foundations of socialism under the dictatorship 
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of the working class alone (Sobolev, 1951, pp. 26-30). 
The second formulation, which remained the accepted 
explanation even after Stalin's death (see, for example, 
Figurnov, 1954, pp. 125-6), was virtually 
indistinguishable from Varga's interpretation of the 
historical development of Eastern Europe. The point at 
which the first phase passed over to the second was 
marked by the institution of a one-party system, 
something which was said to have been necessitated by 
the clearly counter-revolutionary intentions of the 
bourgeois parties (Figurnov, 1954, p. 127-8).13 
Although all the theorists who wrote about the People's 
Democracies before and after 1948 until Stalin's death 
stressed that co-operation and friendship with the USSR 
was the sine qua ~ of their present well-being and 
future success, they were essentially discussing 
traditional inter-state relations. 14 The relations 
between the USSR and the People's Democracies were 
already claimed to be of a new type (Generalov, 1950, p. 
17), on the grounds that their political and economic 
relations were based on full equality, mutual advantage 
and respect for sovereignty (Malenkov, 1952, p. 106). 
But these features were not really different from those 
on which relations of peaceful coexistence wi~h 
capitalist states were based. What was said to make 
inter-socialist relations different was the similarity 
between the •• countries: 
-Th. treati •• of the USSR and the countries of 
the People's Democraci.. are a new type of 
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in~erna~ional co-opera~ion based on ~he common 
charac~er of ~he political and socio-economic 
s~ruc~ures of ~hese coun~ries" (Korovin, 1951, 
p. 145). 
Moreover, while bourgeois s~ates ~ended to ignore ~he 
norms of in~ernational law when it suited them, they 
were always observed in the relations between the USSR 
and the People's Democracies. Stalin also claimed that 
no capitalist country could have given such effective, 
cheap and technically competent economic assistance to 
the People's Democracies, directed towards promoting 
economic progress (Stalin, 195Za, p. 468). 
The term proletarian internationalism was used in 
discussing the People's Democracies, but at this stage 
the concept was not considered relevant to rela~ions 
between states. Instead it was used to illustrate how 
national discrepancies and potential conflicts had been 
overcome within the Soviet Union. It was recommended as 
a model for dealing with ethnic problems within the 
People's Democracies (Farberov, 1949, Chapter 1). 
Dimitrov had insisted that the workers needed to be 
educated to understand proletarian internationalism, so 
that they would become aware of the importance of a 
firm, united front of the People's Democracies and the 
Soviet Union and of the leading role of the Bolshevik 
Party (Dimitrov, 1949, p. 3). But before S~alin's death 
Soviet theorists rarely mentioned proletarian 
internationalism .& the organizing principle in the 
relations between the People'. Democracie. or between 
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them and the Soviet' Union .15 
5. Conclusion 
Thus by the time Stalin died, a theoretical explanation 
of the economic and political structures of the East 
European countries had been formulated. The theoretical 
arguments about whether the new socialist states of 
Eastern Europe and Asia were "democracies of a new type" 
or "people's democracies" were, in essence, arguments 
about the distribution of political power. Varga's term, 
"democracy of a new type", had implied power-sharing 
through coalition government until the economic bases of 
these societies had become socialist (Varga, 1947, pp. 
3-14). Only then would the political superstructure 
become socialist. But once the countries were declared 
people's democracies, and once people's democracies were 
defined as a particular form of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat (Farberov, 1949, p. 30), it was clear that 
in theory as well as in practice the Communist Parties 
were no longer to share political power. Socialism was 
to begin in the superstructure and spread from there to 
the economic bAse and this could only be achiev~d 
through the establishment of the hegemony of the 
Communist Parties (Farberov, 1949", pp. 2, 26). 
Th. question of who the actors were in int.r-socialist 
relAtions hAd Also b •• n resolved. In fAct, by then the 
withering AWAY of the state had c •••• d to b. an i •• u. in 
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Soviet theory. As long as capitalist states existed, 
socialist countries would require states and those 
states would engage in relations both with capitalist 
countries and with one another. But it was already clear 
that if relations among socialist states were depicted 
as identical to those between capitalist states, the 
claim that they were a new type of relations would seem 
rather flimsy. As long as Stalin was alive, however, 
there was little need (and little scope) for theoretical 
development. It was only when de-Stalinization was in 
the process of taking place and when dissent within the 
bloc became a serious problem that Soviet theorists 
began to consider the need for a theory of relations 
among socialist states. The evolution of that theory 
forms the subject of the next chapter. 
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Hote. 
1. The 1905 revolu~ion was en~irely spon~aneous. Urban 
discon~en~ and rural rebellion combined ~o force ~he 
Tsar to insti~u~e some democra~ic reforms. The 
bourgeoisie played li~tle part in the revolution and in 
subsequent years, as the Tsar gradually whittled away 
the reforms, they showed no "indlination to oppose him. 
2. E.H. Carr poin~ed out that this particular dilemma 
was not unique to Russia: "Once bourgeois democracy was 
recognized as a stepping stone to socialism, it could be 
brought about only by those who believed also in 
socialism .... The ~rouble was not that condi~ions in 
Russia were no~ ye~ ripe for the western revolutionary 
drama; it was ~hat ~he drama had been played ou~ in the 
west, and could no longer be re-acted elsewhere" (Carr, 
Vol. 1, 1966, p. 54). Since Western his~ory and 
experience is accessible to the East, there is no reason 
for his insight to be restric~ed to Europe. This was not 
something which the Bolsheviks understood very well, or 
else Lenin's view would not have prevailed over N.M. 
Roy's regarding the proper policy for the Comintern in 
the colonies. It is even clearer that Stalin did not 
understand it. As we have seen, he expected Chang Kai 
Shek to allow himself to be used and discarded. See 
Chap~er 4 for Stalin's policy in China and Chapter 5 for 
the ~heory and practice of Third World policy. 
3. Ironically, the Bolshevik regime was actually saved 
by Ukrainian nationalism. For one thing the White Armies 
were intent on restoring both the monarchy and the 
emplre and ~hus found little support amongst the 
Ukrainian nationalists. For another, when the Polish 
armies invaded the Ukraine in 1920, the nationalists 
remembered that they disliked the Poles even more than 
the Russians. The Bolsheviks were less fortunate with 
Polish nationalism. They expected Polish workers to 
practise proletarian internationalism when the Red Army 
extended the war into Poland and were dismayed to find 
that the, Polish workers defended Poland rather than 
fighting for the international revolution. 
4. Carr (Vol. 1, 1966, pp. 395-400) gives a brief 
account of the incorporation of Georgia into a 
Transcaucasian Republic and its bolshevization. Stalin's 
treatment of the national minorities in the USSR, both 
in terms of Russification ~nd, more particularly, duri~g 
and after the Second World War, was an example of the 
very Great Russian chauvinism he deplored and bore 
little relation to the Marxist or Marxist-Leninist 
theory of national .elf-determination. 
5. See Skilling (1951a and 1951b) and Brzezinski (1967, 
Part 1) who pOints out, that local East, European 
communists provided t,he impetus for the" conceptual 
development, which took place at this time. It, was Tito 
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who coined the ter~ "people's democracy" and it was 
Dimitrov who first gave it public definition in a widely 
quo~ed speech (Dimi~rov, 1949, pp. 3-4). 
6. Varga also said that the mis~ake of ~urning the 
expropriated land into s~a~e farms had been avoided. 
This probably con~ributed ~o ~he wra~h he aroused in 
S~alin. Al~hough Ti~o was criticized before 1948 for 
collec~ivizing too fast, after 1948 ~he "socialist 
~ransformation of the countryside" was insisted upon in 
all the People's Democracies. 
7. Varga used the term mnogoukladnyi for mixed economy, 
a ~erm which, as we have seen in Chapter 5, was used 
la~er to explain the social and economic s~ructure of 
the Third World. 
8. One Sovie~ theorist main~ained that the Comintern had 
been disbanded to pu~ an end to German propaganda abou~ 
Sovie~ interference in the domestic affairs of other 
states (Lazarev, 1949, p. 5). 
9. The Cominform was se~ up in September 1947. Its 
headquarters were scheduled ~o be in Belgrade, but were 
shifted ~o Bucharest when Yugoslavia was expelled from 
the organization. The members consisted of the ruling 
Communis~ Parties (with the excep~ion of Albania) and 
~he French and I~alian Communist Parties. S~alin and 
Tito fell out over a number of issues, but the 
underlying cause was whether Sovie~ in~erests still had 
precedence now ~ha~ there was more than one socialist 
s~a~e. For a detailed account of the Cominform's 
activities in the Stalin-Tito dispute, see Ulam ( 1952). 
Seton-Watson (1961, pp. 313-4) argues that the Cominform 
was intended to counterac~ the Marshall Plan. 
10. As we have seen Varga was already under a~tack for 
the views he had expressed in his book on the effec~ of 
the Second World War on the capitalist economies (Varga, 
1946 and see Chapter 3, footnote 25). The doctrinal 
changes in 1948-1949 are analysed by Skilling (1951a, 
pp. 16-33 and 1951b, pp. 131-49). 
11. The effect of the superstructure on the base was 
given even more authoritative expression by Stalin: "N6 
sooner does it arise than it becomes an exceedingly 
active force, actively assisting the base to take shape 
and consolidate itself, and doing everything it can to 
help the new system finish off and eliminate the old 
base and the old classes" (Stalin, 1950, p. 408). 
12. In 1949 Farberov applied the term to the countries 
of Central and South East Europe, as well as to Mongolia 
and North Korea. By 1951 some theorists were also 
including China in the category. 
13. Farberov was rather 
described the formation of 
disingenuous in the way he 
one-party stat... MIn the 
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struggle for the development of popular democracy, the 
unity of the working class became stronger. The joining 
of the Communist and Social-Democratic parties in a 
single party was an expression of the strong political, 
ideological and organizational unity of the working 
class. A pre-condition for their unification was the 
expelling of the right-wing reactionary elements from 
the Social-Democratic parties" (Farberov, 1948, p. 33). 
14. One theorist, countering Yugoslavia's claim to 
non-alignment, maintained that any slackening in the 
friendship between the USSR and the People's Democracies 
would threaten the very basis of their existence. And an 
attempt to leave the socialist camp to become a "third 
force" or "bridge" between the two blocs was merely a 
cover for entering the other bloc (Galkin, 1953, p. 17). 
15. See, for example, Farberov's discussion of the 
foreign policy of the People's Democracies (1949, pp. 
89-97). Brzezinski (1967, p. 158) pointed out how seldom 
Stalin spoke about the People's Democracies. In liThe 
Economic Problems of Socialism" (1952a, pp. 445-81), for 
example, he mentioned them only in connection with the 
deepening crisis of capitalism. 
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CHAPTER 7. RELATIONS AMONG 
FROM PROLETARIAN TO SOCIALIST 
SOCIALISTS II: 
INTERNATIONALISM. 
'Under Stalin unity was imposed on the People's 
Democracies. It had been feasible for Tito to leave the 
bloc because he enjoyed enormous popular support and 
there was no Soviet Army in Yugoslavia to enforce Soviet 
leadership. But Soviet Army divisions were present in 
the other People's Democracies (with the exception of 
Czechoslovakia) and in any case, once the "Titoists" had 
been eradicated, it was unlikely that the leaders who 
replaced them would either want to, or be able to, rely 
on popular support to develop their own brands of 
national communism. But Khrushchev was determined to 
disassociate himself from Stalinism and once 
de-Stalinization was set in train~ a new means of 
cohesion had to be found for the bloc. Khrushchev hoped 
that coerced unity could be replaced by unity based on 
voluntary 
used to 
international 
denote that 
internationalism. 
solidarity. 
solidarity 
The term that was 
was proletarian 
The nature of the relations within the socialist 
regional system have changed over the years. Moreover, 
it is not just the' states of central and south-east 
Europe which proclaim themselves socialist. There are 
outposts of the socialist system in the Caribbean and 
South East Asia. There are a number of intermediate, 
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"socialist-oriented" states around the world. And there 
are also outcasts from the system, which either do not 
have any relations at all, or which have (or have had) 
predominantly hostile contact with the Soviet Union. The 
disputes with states which have, either temporarily or 
permanently, become pariahs have, to a considerable 
extent, been conducted through the medium of doctrine. 
In the process, the theory on which proletarian 
internationalism is said to be based has been made more 
explicit and the term has been adapted to include 
principles normally associated with ordinary inter-state 
relations. In its new form proletarian internationalism 
is called socialist internationalism. Soviet theorists 
maintain that because the relations between members. of 
the world socialist system are based on socialist 
internationalism, they are qualitatively different from 
those which pertain within the capitalist system or 
between socialist and capitalist states. They are 
international relations of a new type. This chapter 
investigates that claim. 
It begins by examining the tension between proletarian 
internationalism and the separate national interests 
within the socialist system. The first climax of that 
tension was the intervention by Soviet troops in Hungary 
in 1956. The Soviet attempt to impose unity and to deal 
with the phenomena of revisionism (in other words, 
Yugoslavia) and dogmatism (or China) i. analysed in the 
second part of the chapter. Efforts to promote cohesion 
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through integration accompanied the arguments about 
revisionism and dogmatism. They were not wholly 
successful, since they prompted the Romanian leadership 
to take an unexpectedly independent stand. The third 
section of the chapter considers, first, ,some of the 
theoretical arguments offered by Soviet theorists in 
favour of an international socialist division of labour, 
and second, the theoretical implications of the Brezhnev 
doctrine and the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in 
Poland in 1980. The chapter concludes by pointing out 
some of the theoretical difficulties of the concept of 
socialist internationalism and the claim that it 
represents a new type of international relations. 
1. Proletarian internationalism 
The elevation of proletarian internationalism to a 
fundamentally new type of international relations and 
the organiZing principle for relations between socialist 
states began with Khrushchev's attempts to woo 
Yugoslavia back into ,the bloc and, paradoxically, 
reached new heights when his efforts failed and the 
dangers of revisionism (in other words, divisive forms 
of national communism which threatened the leading role 
of the Soviet Union) threatened the cohesion of the 
bloc. 1 Thus when the term first began to be wid'ely used 
after Stalin's death, it implied more room to manouevre 
and a greater equality within the bloc. After 1957 it 
reverted back to meaning recognition of Soviet 
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leadership. 
Khrushchev used ~he concep~ of prole~arian 
in~erna~ionalism ~o prove ~o Ti~o ~ha~ i~ would be safe 
for Yugoslavia ~o re~urn ~o ~he .ocialis~ camp. Wha~ he 
offered in re~urn was a partial admission ~ha~ Ti~o had 
been wronged in 1948 (Beria was blamed, bu~ Ti~o was 
expec~ed ~o ~ake par~ of ~he responsibili~y) and ~he 
recogni~ion ~ha~ ~here was more ~han one possible road 
~o socialism. Al~hough ~his was pa~en~ly ~rue, by 
admi~~ing ~he fact Khrushchev legi~imized bo~h ~he 
Yugoslav and ~he Chinese revolutions. As a resul~, ~he 
Sovie~ Union los~ ~he monopoly of being ~he fir5~ and 
uniquely valid Marxis~-Leninis~ revolu~ion. The 
implica~ions of ~he loss did no~, however, become 
apparent immediately. But it was soon evident that the 
offer did no~ have ~he in~ended effec~. Ti~o was happy 
to reins~ate good diplomatic and economic relations, but 
he rejected the over~ures to en~.r into close Party 
associa~ion even after ~he Cominform, the symbol and 
ins~rumen~ of Yugoslavia's excommunication, was 
disbanded in April 1956. Moreover, as Lowenthal 
demonstrates (1964, Chapter 4), it gradually became 
obvious that Tito had ambitions to end the sa~ellite 
status of ~he other People's Democracies. 
The term proletarian interna~ionali&m began to be used 
to define relations between all socialist. immediately 
after Stalin's death, but support for the Soviet Union 
266 
was still considered a measure of reliability: 
"The attitude towards the Soviet Union of the 
workers of other countries is a 'touchstone of 
their loyalty to the interests of their own 
nations and their ability to combine national 
and international tasks" (Azizyan, 1953, p. 
7 ) • 
There was some recognition, however, that national needs 
and interests were important: 
"To realize consist.ntly a policy of 
proletarian, socialist internationalism, 
correct account must be taken of the unique 
national features in any given country ... A 
correct understanding of the particular 
national features and a creative application 
of Marxist-Leninist national policy in 
accordance with these features makes it 
possible for communists to unite all 
toilers ... "(Azizyan, 1953, p. 6) 
But a clash .between national and international interests 
was unthinkable. Proletarian internationalism and 
socialist patriotism were two sides of the same coin 
(HSvyaz' teorii s praktikoi i partiinaya propaganda", 
1955, p. 7). Moreover, as Khrushchev proceeded with his 
plans to change the basis of intra-bloc relations, 
international interests began to be construed in terms 
of support for the socialist bloc as a whole rather than 
for the Soviet Union alone: 
"One cannot be a genuine internationalist 
without being a.defender and supporter of the 
socialist camp, since it is on the existence 
of that camp, on its power, that the success 
of all toiling .mankind depends" (Titarenko, 
1955, p. 103). 
The world socialist system, it was said, had reached a 
new stage of relations. This new stage included 
fraternal friendship and trust b ••• d on proletarian 
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internationalism on the one hand, and genuine equality, 
respect for national independence, co-operation and 
mutual aid on the other. The two together were the 
essence of socialist internationalism ("Velikaya sila 
Leninskikh idei internatsionalizma", 1955, pp. 7-8). 
Thus socialist internationalism subsumed both Party 
relations based on proletarian internationalism and 
state relations based on the norms of international law. 
It was the former aspect which proved unpalatable to 
Tito. 
The first obvious changes in relations within the 
socialist camp' after Stalin's death were economic. The 
economic ties between the Soviet Union and the People's 
Democracies began to be remodelled in the wake of riots 
in East Germany in 1953. The joint stock companies which 
had enabled the USSR to cream profits from Eastern 
Europe were abolished. A certain degree of economic 
liberalization was encouraged within each country at the 
same time. The way in which these changes were depicted 
in Soviet writing was particularly interesting. 
Economic relations between members of the world 
socialist system were said to reflect both friendship 
and mutual aid. But the joint companies were not 
denigrated: they were said to have been a useful means 
of transferring technical documentation and training 
specialists. That aim having been fulfilled, they would 
now revert entirely to the People'. Democracies. As far 
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as agricul~ure was concerned, i~ con~inued ~o be 
main~ained ~ha~ ~he socialis~ ~ransforma~ion of ~he 
peasan~ economy was essen~ial if agricul~ure was ~o keep 
pace wi~h rapid indus~rial developmen~. Bu~ there was 
now said ~o be no need to na~ionalize land. The 
co-opera~ive movemen~ would grow despi~e ~he priva~e 
ownership of land (Chis~yakov, 1954, pp.135-7). This 
method of changing tack not only without 
pas~ policy, but while insisting that 
repudiating 
it had been 
correct at the time is perhaps the most typical feature 
of change in both Soviet doctrine and policy. 2 
The departure from the Soviet economic model was 
reinforced by a call ~o abandon autarky: national 
economic plans should henceforth be co-ordinated with a 
view to establishing a socialist division of labour 
which would enable specialization and economic 
development based on national resources and domestic 
demand as well as the needs. of the whole socialist 
market (Chistyakov, 1954, pp. 47-50). This was the first 
of the calls for greater economic integration which was 
to become one of the means by which successive Soviet 
political leaders and theorists would try to promote 
intra-bloc cohesion. As we shall see, the pressure to 
integrate Soon became a divisive issue, regarded with 
suspicion particularly by the less industrialized East 
European states. 
The new basis of relations between socialist stat.s was 
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given authoritative public confirmation at the 20th 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
[CPSU] in February 1956. In his report on domestic and 
foreign affairs, Khrushchev quoted Lenin in support of 
his view that: 
"It is quite probable that the forms of 
transition to socialism will become more and 
more varied; moreover, achieving these forms 
need not be associated with civil war under 
all circumstances .... in the European people's 
democracies .•. things went without civil war ... 
In all forms of transition to socialism, an 
absolute and decisive requirement is political 
leadership of the working class, headed by its 
vanguard" (Khrushchev, 1956a, p. 38). 
But Khrushchev also made a secret speech at the Congress 
on the cult of Stalin (Khrushchev, 1956b, pp. 172-88). 
Whatever his motives were in revealing some of Stalin's 
crimes, he cannot have intended the effect his 
revelations produced. There was a profound loss of faith 
in Marxism-Leninism and in the CPSU as the accomplice 
(and victim) of Stalinism which reverberated throughout 
the international communist movement. In making the 
secret speech, Khrushchev thus lost for himself and for 
the CPSU much of the moral authority which had 
previously been accorded unquestioningly to the Soviet 
Party and its leader. The loss of moral authority was 
exacerbated by Khrushchev's recognition in his public 
speech (Khrushchev, 1956a, pp. 37-8) that there were a 
variety of ways of reaching socialism. By·legitimizing 
the Yugoslav and Chines.e roads to socialism (as well as 
allowing for the possibility of parliamentary paths), he 
lost for the CPSU its previous authority of possessing 
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the first, and the uniquely valid,_ historical 
experience. Once the Soviet road to socialism was no 
longer the only route, there was no reason for the CPSU 
to be the unquestioned and unquestionable leading Party. 
Khrushchev's hopes of replacing despotic authority with 
legitimacy were dashed. Overt force was used to reimpose 
unity in 1956 and the efforts after 1956 to promote 
cohesion without resorting to coercion have suffered 
repeated setbacks. Moreover, Khrushchev's ambition to 
reintegrate Yugoslavia in the bloc failed and his 
attempts to do so initiated the dispute which finally 
led to China leaving it. 
The repression of the Hungarian revolution later in 1956 
by Soviet troops made it clear that there were limits to 
the separate roads which would be permitted and that the 
boundaries did not extend to a multi-party system with a 
proclaimed neutral foreign policy. But there was at 
first an unprecedented public admission that the 
socialist states had legitimate grounds for grievance. 3 
An apology for the blood shed in repressing the uprising 
was published in Pravda on October 31, 1956. The article 
recognized that there had been mistakes in Soviet 
relations with the East European socialist countries. 
Soviet economic advisers would be withdrawn And the 
stationing of Soviet troops under the terms of the 
Warsaw Pact would be discussed with member government •• 
According to the article Hungarian demands had been 
legitimate to begin with, but reactionary forces had 
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gained control in Hungary and this was why intervention 
had been necessary (Gruliow, 1957, pp. 230-1). 
Within a very few days the line had changed and the role 
of the Soviet army had been reinterpreted: the new 
Hungarian government had invited Soviet aid to suppress 
a counter-revolutionary uprising instigated by 
anti-socialist reactionary forces abetted by the 
imperialist powers (Farberov, 1957). In a keynote speech 
on the anniversary of the October Revolution Suslov 
stressed the immutable laws and common features of 
socialist revolution. 4 Although he recognized certain 
national differences (the forms, methods and rate of 
reaching socialism would differ; each country would make 
a contribution to the theory and practice of socialism 
by analyzing national conditions and working out the 
best forms and methods of struggle), the overwhelming 
message was the need for unity in a hostile external 
environment (Suslov, 1956). 
In the following years practical politics and scholarly 
activity were concerned with finding the optimal mix of 
the seemingly mutually exclusive elements which were 
said to characterize relations within the socialist 
system national diversity and international unity. 
Although Yugoslavia's revisionism seemed to provoke the 
theoretical debate, with hindsight it became clear that 
what was at issue was whether China or the Soviet Union 
would predominate in the socialist system, 
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2. Unity restored and lost 
From November 1956 to November 1957 great efforts were 
made to reunite the bloc by repairing the damage which 
had resulted from the intervention in Hungary and by 
persuading Tito to modify his revisionist stand. The 
Chinese played a major role in these efforts, which 
culminated in a meeting of representatives of the 
Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist 
Countries in Moscow after the fortieth anniversary 
celebrations of the October Revolution. 5 
Khrushchev intended that the meeting should produce the 
nucleus of a new international organization and 
recognition of the leading role of the Soviet Union. In 
fact, it resulted in compromise: a modified formula was 
adopted to describe Soviet status, both national 
differences and universal general laws were recognized, 
no permanent organization was formed, although it was 
agreed to publish a journal, Problems of Peace and 
Socialism (later called World Marxist Review in the 
English language version). The meeting condemned 
revisionism and, as a result, the Yugoslav 
representative (Tito did not attend the meeting) refused 
to sign the declaration issued by the meeting. Thus the 
November meeting marked the rejection of the Yugoslav 
road to socialism and an attempt to define the 
parameters of diversity. 6 The II Declaration of the 
Conference of Representatives ofCommunlst and Workers' 
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Parties of Socialist Countries ["Declaration"] " (1957) 
served as an authoritative statement on the state of the 
world, the laws of socialist development and the 
principles of relations between socialist states for the 
next decade. 
According to the declaration, the general laws of 
socialist development included the leadership of the 
working class (itself led by a Marxist-Leninist party) 
in bringing about the revolution and establishing some 
form of dictatorship of the proletariat; the necessity 
of an alliance with the peasantry and other strata of 
society; the establishment of public ownership of 
property and the gradual socialist reorganization of 
agriculture; economic planning aimed at building 
socialism and communism and raising the standard of 
living; a cultural and ideological revolution and the 
establishment of a socialist intelligentsia; the 
elimination of national oppression and the institution 
of equal national rights; the defence of socialism and 
solidarity with the working class of other countries. 
But these laws were said to be manifested everywhere 
alongside a great variety of historically formed 
national features and traditions to which due regard 
should be given ("Declaration", 1957, p. 5).7 Relations 
between socialist states and between Communist Parties 
were said to rest on the principles of Marxism-Leninism 
and proletarian internationalism: 
"The socialist countries base their 
on the principles of complete 
relations 
equality, 
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respect for territorial integrity and state 
independence and sovereignty, and 
non-interference in one another's 
affairs ..• Fraternal mutual aid is an integral 
part of these relations. The principle of 
socialist internationalism finds effective 
expression in this aid" ("Declaration", 1957, 
p. 4). 
But it was incumbent upon socialist states (and 
compatible with their vital interests) to support the 
Soviet Union, "the first and mightiest socialist power" 
(-Declaration", 1957, p. 4). 
The declaration listed two deviations which threatened 
socialism: revisionism and dogmatism. The former 
represented the main danger, though each Party should 
decide for itself which was the greater danger at any 
given moment .. This was the declaration of a new 
ideological war against Tito in which the Chinese played 
a rather more vociferous role than the Russians. Until 
the Sino-Soviet dispute became irreparable, the 
watchword for the bloc was unity and its main enemy was 
said to be revisionism. 8 
(a) Revisionism 
Revisionism, of course, meant revising the teachings of 
Marx and Lenin. But since Marx had revised himself, 
Lenin had revised Marx and both Stalin 'and Khrushchev 
had called for creative Marxism-Leninism, not every 
revision was castigated aa revisionism. In the 19~7 
declaration revisionists were accused of declaring 
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Marxism outmoded, killing its revolutionary spirit, 
denying the historical necessity for proletarian 
revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
repudiating the leading 
the Parties, rejecting 
internationalism and 
role of Marxist-Leninist 
principles of proletarian 
democratic centralism and turning 
the Party from a militant revolutionary organization 
into a debating society ("Declaration", 1957, pp. 5-6 
and quoted in numerous articles and books thereafter). 
Revisionists were also accused of promoting the idea of 
national communism, an invention of imperial reaction 
which encroached' upon the unity of the world socialist 
system (Kuusinen, 1961, pp. 773-4). 
Although Yugoslavia was the obvious and usually explicit 
target of these criticisms, they had two other, more 
covert purposes: first, to convince the Chinese of the 
renewed revolutionary militancy of the CPSU, and second, 
"to discourage the revisionist tendencies which had 
become manifest in the course of 1956-1957 within the 
rest of Eastern Europe, particularly Poland. One of the 
ways in which Soviet theorists expressed revolutionary 
militancy was by modifying Khrushchev's formulation of 
non-violent revolution. The necessity for violence in 
certain circumstances was recognized, particularly if 
the ruling clas5es offered resistance (aDeclaration A , 
1957, p. 6). The warning to potential revisionists in 
Eastern Europe took 
universality of the 
the form of an emphasiS on the 
Soviet experience. As far as 
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Yugoslavia was concerned, by refusing to sign the 1957 
declaration Tito had, it was said, ignored the goodwill 
of the CPSU and other Marxist parties who were trying to 
normalize relations on the basis of Marxist-Leninist 
principles. The Yugoslav "apostasy" was confirmed by the 
programme adopted by the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia in 1958, which "all the Communist and 
Workers' Parties of the world qualified as 
revisionist- (Ponomarev, 1960, pp. 700-1). The programme 
proclaimed~ amongst other unacceptable formulations, 
that proletarian internationalism could no longer be 
defined in terms of attitude to the Soviet Union. It 
should signify mutual respect and 
amongst all socialist forces.9 
non-interference 
In fact, mutual respect and non-interference were 
amongst the principles that Soviet theorists and policy 
makers claimed to follow in their relations with other 
socialist states. As we have seen in Chapter 3, it was 
explicitly denied that the activities of the Soviet 
troops in 1956 constituted interference in Hungary's 
domestic affairs. The fraternal aid had been "a worthy 
example of fulfilment of international duty and of 
proletarian solidarity·' (Kuusinen, 1961, pp. 773). The 
other principles which governed relations between 
socialist states continued to be defined as fraternal 
friendship, mutual aid under conditions of full 
equaiity, re.pect for territorial integrity, .tate 
independence and sovereignty (Deborin, 19~8, p. 16). It 
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was recognized ~ha~ ~he call for uni~y migh~ seem ~o 
contradict these principles, but most ~h.oris~s insis~ed 
that unity, in fact, g~aranteed both independence and 
sovereign~y (Korovin, 1958b, pp. 24-9). 
There was a related discussion in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s about the relationship of national in~erest5 
to bloc interests. Most writers denied tha~ any clash 
between the ~w~ ~ou1d occur. ~he struggle for national 
in~erests, freedom and independence could only take 
place on ~he basis of fra~erna1 co-opera.~ion wi ~h o~her 
socialist states and solidaritY'with the in~ernationa1 
workers' movement (Ponomarev, 1958, p. 212). As long as 
. na~ional interests were "correctly unders~ood", it was 
said, there would be harmony between na~iona1 and bloc 
in~erests (Vinogradov, 1959, p. 85). One writer was 
adaman~ that: 
" ... Given correct policies by the Communist 
Parties, which presuppose the combination of 
the principles of socialist internationalism 
and national in~eres~s, there can be no 
conf1ic~s or aggravation of the mutual 
relations between socialist states" (To1kunov, 
1961, p. 24) 
Bu~ a ra~her more rea1is~ic warning was given: ~he call 
for unity and ~he establishment of socialism would not 
make national differences disappear automatically. 
Conflict between socialist countries was, ther'efore, 
quite possible. But it would be non-antagonistic 
conflict, temporary and untypical,and therefore easy to 
de.l with (Mitin, 1961, pp. 20-1). 
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Despite the status of the USSR as "the first and 
mightiest socialist power" ("Declaration", 1957, p. 4), 
Soviet theorists insisted that the members of the 
socialist camp were equal. The CPSU merely set an 
example, it did not claim a special leading role and 
there were "no hegemons, no satellites, no superior and 
subordinate parties" in the socialist camp (Kuusinen, 
1961, pp. 775-6). Nonetheless, it was increasingly 
emphasized that the Soviet experience in building 
socialism was 
had therefore 
of international importance and that it 
been natural that proletarian 
internationalism had been expressed as support for the 
Soviet state after the October revolution. From the 
Soviet side, proletarian internationalism was said to be 
reflected in support for the international workers' 
movement (Ponomarev, 1958, p. 212). The Soviet Union was 
already implementing the -developed building of 
communist society~. The other countries of the socialist 
camp were only "laying the foundations of socialism", 
although a few had already reached the stage of building 
"a developed socialist society" (Tolkunov, 1961, p. 15). 
As if to stress the equality of bloc members it was said 
that the different stages of development would not 
affect the transition from socialism to communism -- all 
socialist states would enter communist society at more 
or less the same time (Kuusinen, 1961, pp. 850-2).10 
Although a dictionary of political terms published in 
1958 (Ponomarev, 1958) did not even list "socialist 
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internationalism", the term began to be used widely to 
express the special nature of relations in the 
"socialist commonwealth", another term which rapidly 
gained currency to emphasize equality within the bloc. 
Previously socialist internationalism had been used as a 
synonym for proletarian internationalism. Now a 
distinction began to be made. Proletarian 
internationalism was defined as: 
" ... in the first place, the scientifically 
confirmed ideology of the community of 
interests of the working classes of all 
countries and nations. Secondly, it is the 
feeling of solidarity of the working people of 
all countries, of the brotherhood of the 
working people. Thirdly, it is a definite form 
taken by the relations between the national 
detachments of the working class. These 
relations are based on unity and concerted 
action, mutual aid and support. The special 
characteristic of these relations is that they 
are built on a voluntary basis, on the 
realisation that such relations correspond to 
the fundamental interests of the workers of 
all countries" (Kuusinen, 1961, p. 375, 
emphasis in the original). 
Socialist internationalism signified rather more than 
proletarian internationalism: it involved not only 
general principles like equality and respect for 
sovereignty, but also "a voluntary union of efforts in 
the struggle for the victory of socialism, fraternal 
mutual aid and support" (Tolkunov, 1961, p. 20, my 
emphasis). In other words, it subsumed the international 
legal principles which governed the relations between 
all states, irrespective of their social structure, and 
"fraternal co-operation, mutual aid and sincere mutual 
support ••• on the b •• is of proletarian fnternationalism" 
(Ponomarev, 1960, p.6S7, my _mphasi.). The probl.m, of 
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course, was that the first part of the equation, that is 
respect for sovereignty and equality, could only be 
claimed as long as the mutuality and voluntary nature of 
the second half were genuinely sincere. 
In general, while equality, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, were extolled, emphasis continued to be 
placed on the need for unity (reflecting the growing 
dispute with China rather than the struggle against 
revisionism, although this was not yet clear). Unity was 
said to be required for similar reasons to those that 
had prompted the formation of the USSR: the need for the 
combined defence of socialist achievements and the 
struggle against imperialism (Tolkunov, 1961, p. 20). In 
what now seems remarkably like a forerunner both of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine and the explanation of why 
intervention in Afghanistan had been necessary, the 
warning was issued that: 
"Every Marxist party, every socialist state is 
responsible not only for the fate of socialism 
in its country, not only for its fate within 
the commonwealth, but also for the fate of 
socialism throughout the world" (Tolkunov, 
1961, p~ 25). 
What made the unity of the socialist commonwealth 
different from imperialist unity (which was based on 
exploitation and coercion) was, firstly, its voluntary 
nature, and secondly, the fact that the drawing together 
of equal peoples was an objective tendency of 
development (Kuusinen, 1961, p. 766). It was said to be 
reflected in bilateral friendship treaties as well .s in 
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the multilateral Council for Mutual Economic Aid [CMEA] 
and the Warsaw Treaty Organization [WTO]. But more 
importantly, there was held to be a fundamental 
perception of a common identity which did not require 
permanent institutional embodiment. While not implying 
uniformity and allowing for diversity in details, local 
peculiarities and methods of approach, this led to a 
situation in which: 
"While remalnlng politically and 
organisationally independent, the Communist 
Parties voluntarily,. by mutual agreement, 
proceeding from the unity of their views on 
the international problems of the working 
class, unite their action, jointly elaborate, 
if necessary, a unified line of conduct, and 
act as a unified international force" 
(Kuusinen, 1961, pp. 437-8, emphasis in the 
original) . 
In fact, by the time these words were published in 1961, 
the socialist commonwealth had ceased to talk or act 
with one voice and dogmatism had replaced revisionism as 
the main doctrinal heresy. 
(b) Dogmati5m 
A meeting of Communist Parties was held after the 
November anniversary celebrations in 1960 to try to 
conciliate the increasingly divergent Soviet and Chinese 
world views. 11 Although unanimity was eventually 
achieved in the declaration issued after the meeting 
("Statement of the Meeting of Representatives of the 
Communist and Workers' Parties ["Statemen.t"]II, 1960), 
the price wa. a compromise formulation which broke down 
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almost immediately, first in the respective public 
stands taken in the Soviet-Albanian quarrel and later in 
the increasingly bitter polemical exchange between the 
CPSU and the Chinese Communist Party [CCP), which 
finally caused a schism in the world communist movement. 
The first sign of estrangement had occurred more than 
two years previously, when Mao launched China's Great 
Leap Forward and announced that the People's Communes 
were the first step on what he initially envisaged as a 
short journey to communism. 12 This implied that China 
would reach communism before the Soviet Union. It might 
al~o offer a more relevant and attractive model to 
underdeveloped countries. Thus the leadership position 
of the Soviet Union, based both on possessing a 
universal model of development and on alone having 
completed the construction of socialism and embarked on 
building communism, was twice threatened. The Soviet 
response was to announce its own programme for the 
transition to communism (Khrushchev, 19S9b, pp. 41-72). 
Although Mao had backed down by that time (as much 
because the "leap" proved impossible as to conciliate 
Khrushchev), Soviet writers continued proclaiming that: 
"The transition to communism is inconceivable 
without an abundance of the material and 
spiritual good things of life •.. What is 
involved is in fact a new gigantic advance in 
the development of the productive forces" 
(Kuu5inen, 1961, pp. 795-6). 
The next contentious issue between Mao and Khrushchev 
arose out of Khrushchev'S pursuit of peaceful 
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coexistence with the United States in 1959. In practical 
terms, a rapprochement between the USSR and the USA 
would isolate China. Moreover, the withdrawal of the 
offer of nuclear aid, together with Khrushchev's 
-promotion of a test ban treaty, exacerbated Mao's sense 
of isolation. In doctrinal terms, this particular issue 
was reflected in Chinese criticism of Khrushchev's 
reformulation of the theory of the inevitability of war. 
In 1956 Khrushchev had announced that war was no longer 
inevitable (Khrushchev, 1956a, p. 37 and see Chapter 8). 
Probably to placate Mao, he soon modified his view to 
stress that even if world war could be averted, the 
danger of war would continue, since the nature of 
imperialism had not changed. Moreover, just wars of 
national liberation remained inevitable. The Chinese 
also wanted Khrushchev to modify his view that peaceful 
roads to socialism were more likely than revolutionary 
violence. By adopting an increasingly militant tone in 
relation both to the possibility of violent revolution 
and to the continuing danger of war, Soviet theorists 
demonstrated a willingness to compromise for the sake of 
unity. The debate died down as preparations began for 
the 1960 Moscow conference. 13 
At first the Moscow declaration seemed a victory for the 
Soviet view. But in fact it embodied the compromises 
which Soviet theorists had already made, and it combined 
Soviet and Chinese views in a rather incoherent way. It 
would clearly not b. able to serve as a universal 
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programm~ for very long. According to the statement, the 
growth in power and influence of the world socialist 
system, the disintegration of the colonial system and 
the intensification of class struggle and decline in the 
capitalist system were the most important features of 
the present epoch. A new stage had been reached in the 
development of the world socialist system. 14 Since the 
USSR was the first country in history to be constructing 
communism, it served as "the most striking example and 
the most powerful bulwark for the peoples of the world" 
("Statement", 1960, p. 4). The people's revolution in 
China had contributed to the change in the balance of 
world forces and it exerted enormous influence, 
particularly on the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. 
The 1957 formulation of the correct mix of specifically 
national and universal features was repeated. Progress 
in the socialist countries was the result of "a proper 
application of the general 
socialist construction, with 
historical peculiarities of 
objective laws governing 
due regard to the 
each country and to the 
interests of the entire socialist system" ("Statement", 
1960, p. 5). On the other hand, undue emphasis should 
not be placed on the role of national peculiarities. 
What was required was a proper combination of the 
principles of socialist internationalism and socialist 
patriotism. The warning against nationalism was rather 
more pointed than in the 1957 declaration. The socialist 
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camp was & social, economic and political community of 
free and sovereign peoples with equal rights. National 
antagonisms were diminishing within the camp since there 
were no objective reasons for contradictions and 
conflicts: the interests of the socialist system as a 
whole and national interests were harmoniously combined. 
But manifestations of nationalism and national 
narrow-mindedness did not disappear automatically. The 
inculcation of a spirit of internationalism was 
required. 
The 1960 statement was adamant that war was no longer 
fatally inevitable and insistent on the need for 
peaceful coexistence. War could and should be prevented 
and this made negotiation and disarmament extremely 
important. Peaceful coexistence and economic competition 
would reveal the advantages of socialism and enable the 
spread of socialism. But while the only correct and 
reasonable principle of international relations was 
peaceful coexistence, vigilance was required: the danger 
of war still persisted arid would persist as long as 
imperialism existed. Moreover, colonial peoples might 
still require armed struggle to win independence. 
Revolution could not be exported, but the export of 
counter-revolution would be resisted. Marxist-Leninist 
Parties wouldsaek to achieve socialism by peaceful 
means, but "the possibility of non-peaceful transition 
should be borne in mind" because experience had shown 
that the ruling classes never relinquish power 
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voluntarily ("Statement", 1960, p. 14). 
The declaration proclaimed the need to continue the 
struggle against revisionism, but gave a more specific 
warning than the 1957 declaration of the dangers of 
dogmatism and sectarianism: 
"Dogmatism and sectarianism ... rob 
revolutionary parties of the ability to 
develop Marxism-Leninism through scientific 
analysis and apply it creatively according to 
the specific conditions. They isolate 
Communists ... doom them to the p'assi ve 
expectation of Leftists, adventurist actions 
in the revolutionary struggle" ("Statement", 
1960, p. 15). 
As in 1957, the international situation was said to 
require consolidation of the world Communist movement. 
Communist and Workers' Parties were independent and 
equal, but they were responsible not only to the working 
people of their own country, but also to the 
international working class and Communist movement. The 
meeting was reported to have agreed unanimously that the 
CPSU remained the universally recognized vanguard of the 
world Communist movement and that its experience in 
building socialism was of fundamental significance for 
the whole movement. 
Throughout the previous year the Chinese had been 
lobbying for support within the international movement 
(laying themselves open later to the charge of 
fractionalism, an activity which had been outlawed since 
the 10th Congre •• of the Ru •• ian Communist Party adopted 
a decree on unity in 1921). Their one unflinching ally 
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was Albania and the Albanians began to attack 
revisionism loudly and often.lS Soviet writers, in turn, 
sharpened their definition of dogmatism 
sectarianism: 
"Sectarianism is based on a dogmatic attitude 
to various theoretical propositions and 
formulas, a. though they offered a solution 
for all possible problems of political life. 
Instead of studying actual life, dogmatists 
proceed from a scheme, and if the facts do not 
fit into the scheme, they ignore the facts. 
Dogmatism means losing touch with reality, 
and, if the Party does not fight dogmatism, it 
becomes a sect out of touch with life .•. The 
essence of sectarianism consists in isolation 
from the masses, the failure to take 
advantages of the available opportunities for 
revolutionary work and an effort to evade the 
vital issues raised by life itself" (Kuusinen, 
1961, pp. 433-4). 
and 
It became vital to demonstrate the cost of siding with 
China, so that other East European Parties would not 
follow suit. In 1960 a pro-Khrushchev faction was 
eliminated in Tirana and the Albanians continued to 
attack revisionism, restating Chinese positions in the 
process. When Soviet warnings had no effect, Khrushchev 
first suspended economic aid and withdrew Soviet 
personnel from Albania and then launched an unexpected 
public attack on Hoxha at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. 
The Albanian leaders, Khrushchev said, had begun to 
depart from the commonly agreed line and in the 
interests of their people and the cause of building 
socialism in Albania: 
"they should renounce their mistaken views and 
return to the path of unity and close 
cooperation .•• with the whole international 
Co~munist movemantO (Khrushchev, 1961b, p. 
70). 
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The Chinese withdrew from the Congress in protest. 
Shortly afterwards the Soviet Union broke off diploma~ic 
relations with Albania. Subsequently an attack by the 
Albanians on Khrushchev was reprinted in China. A verbal 
war of attrition ensued in which the Chinese attacked 
Yugoslav revisionism, while the Soviet leaders attacked 
Albanian sectarianism. The Sino-Soviet dispute continued 
by proxy in this way until all pretence at unity was 
abandoned in March 1963 and letters from each Central 
Committee to the other were published admitting that 
there were serious difficulties. 16 
After the Sino-Soviet dispute had finally become public, 
Suslov summarized the ideological differences between 
the two Parties in a long article in Pravda in April 
1963. Firstly, he accused the Chinese of discrediting 
the idea of peaceful coexistence and economic 
competition, a competition that would be won by the 
socialist world, making socialism more attractive to the 
rest of the world. Secondly, the CCP had attempted to 
shake the foundations of the socialist commonwealth, 
curtailing ties and discrediting CMEA. The CPSU, on the 
other hand, believed that it was vital to develop 
political and economic ties and to consolidate cultural, 
scientific and technical co-operation. Thirdly, it was 
clear that thermonuclear war had to be prevented and war 
averted and that disarmament was an important step in 
this direction. But the Chinese undere.timated the 
danger of nuclear war. They called the nuclear bomb a 
289 
"paper tiger" and believed that those who fought for 
peace hindered revolution. Fourthly, the Chinese 
misunderstood the present epoch. The rise of the world 
system of socialism had brought about profound changes. 
The most important characteristic of the current epoch 
wa. not, as the Chinese maintained, the national 
liberation struggle, but the struggle between socialism 
and capitalism. That struggle required peaceful 
coexistence and economic competition. Fifthly, the 
Chinese believed that revolution could be exported and 
that it necessarily needed to be violent. The CPSU, on 
the other hand, maintained that revolution could not be 
exported and that the transition to socialism could be 
peaceful or non-peaceful, depending on the concrete 
historical situation. In either case it was essential 
that it should be followed by the establishment of a 
dictatorship of the proletariat. Finally, armed 
uprisings would be supported by the CPSU, but they were 
not always timely. The CCP failed to recognize this and 
recommended armed struggle at all times. It seemed clear 
that the CCP was trying to split the international 
communist movement (Suslov, 1963, pp. 5-16) •. 
Western analysts of the Sino-Soviet dispute have found 
more doctrinal differences than those listed by Suslov 
and it 
hardened 
policies., 
is, of course, natural that as the dispute 
and .s each state followed independent 
so the theoretical differences multiplied and 
broadened.17 But it was also the ca •• that once the rift 
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had occurred, the two sides became increasingly 
polarized, each perceiving the other's ~heore~ical 
statements and behaviour as inimical to the true faith 
in a process not unlike the deeds and beliefs attribu~ed 
by conformists to heretics and witches in medieval 
~imes. There were also s~rong non-ideological aspects to 
the quarrel, which arose in part from historical 
differences relating both to Tsarist and Soviet times, 
and in part from the very different positions each state 
occupied in the world. Soon the conflicts of interest 
became paramount and the "non-antagonistic" conflict 
be~ween socialist states turned into a bitter border 
war. 
Although Khrushchev's revisionism (as the Chinese and 
Albanians now openly called it) had turned Soviet theory 
into a more flexible instrument for describing the real 
world, it turned out to be insufficiently pliable to 
deal with a dispute between two socialist powers. 
According to the theory, it was non-antagonistic, but it 
was extremely acrimonious. The Soviet leadership began 
by taking refuge in the assertion that the Chinese 
leadership had fallen victim to pe~ty-bourgeois 
nationalism. Later, particularly after the armed 
conflict in 1969 and the very real panic caused by the 
Sino-Western rapprochemen'ti., Ch"ina ceased to 
considered socialistl 
"Peking'. foreign policy 
anti-Sovietism, hostility to 
commonweAlth and alliAnce 
reactionary, ilDperialist stAt •• 
is based on 
the socialist 
with the 
and thus has 
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nothing in common with a class approach or 
with internationalism, in other words, it is 
not a socialist foreign policy" (Petrenko and 
Popov, 1981, p. 11).18 
Whatever functions were served by recourse to doctrine 
in the mutual name-calling that characterized the 
Sino-Soviet dispute in the middle and late sixties, the 
serious and scholarly development of Marxist-Leninist 
theory of international relations was not amongst them. 
But by this time doctrine had ceased to play an 
important role in the dispute. For the future role of 
the Soviet Union in the socialist commonwealth perhaps 
more ominous than the lack of theoretical development 
was the fact that Khrushchev's attempt to use 
'conciliar' (the term is Lowenthal's) methods to retain 
unity had failed spectacularly. It proved impossible to 
rally sufficient support to excommunicate the Chinese in 
the ritualistic way that the Cominform had denounced 
Tito. The CPSU had the support of most of the East 
European countries, but it no longer had the authority 
to insist that the whole internation.l movement publicly 
follow the Soviet line. Democratic centralism had ceased 
to operate effectively in the communist movement. 
Consequently it became increasingly difficult to 
formulate and impose a general line, as the Romanian 
leadership was soon to prove. But any hope that this 
made unrestricted pluralism possible in the theory and 
practice of socialism within the bloc was destroyed by 
the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
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3. Cohesion through inteqration 
Even' after Khrushchev fell from power and his name 
became taboo, Soviet theorists continued to quote with 
approval the 1957 and 1960 declarations and the reports 
to the 20th, 21st and 22nd Congress (although without 
reference to the date at which communism would be 
attained) and their contribution to Soviet international 
relations theory. The new collective leadership soon 
clamped down domestically on the cultural thaw which had 
been condoned intermittently ~ince the mid-fifties, but 
there was little change in policy towards the other 
socialist countries. Economic reform was permitted and 
Khrushchev's promotion of economic integration was 
continued. The attempt to extend integration within the 
CMEA produced the next public demonstration of 
dissension within the socialist commonwealth. It also 
provoked theoretical work on the international socialist 
division of labour. 
(a) The international socialist division of labour 
Despite its name, the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, 
established in 1949, had little to do with mutual aid 
and less with the promotion of integration within the 
socialist system in the first decade of its existence. 
Each East European regime strove to develop a h.avy 
industry, to bring about a ·socialist transformation of 
agriculture" (in other words, collectivized agriculture) 
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and to achieve economic autarky. In economic terms the 
result was a failure to develop a raw material and power 
base consonant with the developing industry, so that 
there were tremendous disproportions in economic 
development and increasing dependence on the Soviet 
Union for industrial raw materials. Economic planning 
became chaotic as the disparity between planned 
production targets and volume of available raw materials 
increased (for the early history of CMEA, see Kaser, 
1965). In social terms the result was a decline in the 
value of real wages, a fall in the standard of living 
and increasing popular discontent, as Brown (1966, pp. 
75-9) points out. The first signs of dissension after 
Stalin's death were riots in East Germany caused by 
economic discontent. The Soviet leadership responded by 
turning the joint companies over to the national 
governments, withdrawing economic advisers, offering 
loans and credits and encouraging more realistic 
planning. Khrushchev, however, quite soon began to think 
of more radical economic reform and, in particular, 
integration. But economic nationalism proved to be even 
more difficult than political nationalism to eradicate, 
particularly amongst the less industrialized countries 
of Eastern Europe. 
Economic nationalism was not the only factor inhibiting 
integration, however. Neither the political, nor the 
economic structures of CMEA members were conducive to 
integration. Pricing poliCies, for examp~., tended to be 
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arbitrary and would need to be standardized. The 
economic systems would need to become more flexible and 
responsive. The free movement of labour across CMEA 
borders would be required. The extent and depth of the 
problems and the fierceness of the opposition gradually 
became apparent. But meanwhile Soviet theorists had 
begun to promote the advantages of integration. 
Early supporters of the socialist international division 
of labour maintained that it would lead to faster 
growth. They explained that each country could 
concentrate on those branches of industry for which it 
was best suited and less developed countries would be 
able to catch up with the rest, so that all could arrive 
at communism at more or less the same time (Fedoseyev 
and Pomelov, 1959).19 The model that was suggested was 
that of Soviet economic development in the period of the 
first five year plans: the economic integration of the 
various constituent republics then had encouraged the 
economic development of all the republics and 
underdeveloped areas had caught up with the more 
advanced (Sergeev, 1964). The influential History of the 
CPSU maintained that the "gradually shaping" 
international division of labour amongst the socialist 
countries was part and parcel of the socialist world 
economy: it involved co-ordination of economic plans and 
specialization and co-ordination of production, based on 
comradely co-operation and mutual assistance (Ponamarev, 
1960, p. 640). An equally authoritative textbook 
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contended that there was no need for autarky in the 
world socialist economy because the international 
division of labour avoided parallelism and waste of 
resources. It was inexpedient to build up a full range 
of industries in each socialist country. International 
specialization and co-operation in production should 
instead be extended (Kuusinen, 1961, pp. 776-81). The 
kind of warped one-sided growth which was a feature of 
capitalist integration would not occur. As a result of 
planned, proportional development and the ideology of 
Marxism-Leninism: 
"No country in the socialist camp, however 
small, is threatened with the danger of being 
turned into an agrarian raw-material appendage 
of a stronger and economically more developed 
state" (Kuusinen, 1961, p. 781). 
In the early sixties almost every article about 
intra-bloc relations called for co-ordination of 
national economic plans, the socialist international 
division of labour, co-ordination and specialization of 
production. Until then Soviet theorists had insisted 
that a socialist division of labour would not infringe 
sovereignty. CMEA was an international agency which 
would aid the sovereign socialist states "jointly and on 
a voluntary basis" and prepare proposals for the 
socialist international division of labour. But it was 
"by no means ••• a supra-state agency with authority to 
intervene in the affairs of sovereign states" " (Kuusinen, 
1961, p. 780). When supranational planning began to be 
proposed, opposition within some socialist countries 
became public. 
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In 1962 an agreement "On the basic principles of the 
socialist division of labour" was adopted by a meeting 
of representatives of CMEA members and incorporated into 
the CMEA Charter.~ A Soviet theorist, perhaps 
unwittingly, made it clear how difficult it was proving 
to institute co-ordination when he praised the agreement 
not only for its political significance, but for its 
international legal significance: member countries would 
henceforth be obliged to be guided by the agreement in 
their economic relations (Morozov, 1963, pp. 79-80). In 
fact, the first round had already been lost. In June 
1962 Khrushchev proposed the establishment of a 
supranational planning authority and an investment plan 
for the exploitation of raw materials. The economically 
developed socialist states which had supported the 
initial scheme balked at the possible loss of national 
sovereignty. The less developed countries which had 
opposed integration from the start felt extremely 
threatened that they would remain "raw-material 
appendages". The Romanian leadership which had just 
embarked on a very ambitious five-year plan felt 
particularly vulnerable. In March 1963 the Romanian 
Central Committee denounced the idea of the 
international socialist division of labour and invoked 
the principles that had so often been vaunted by Soviet 
theorists and political leaders: Romania would base its 
co-operation with the other socialist countries on the 
principles of national sovereignty and independence, 
equality of rights, fraternal aid and mutual interest 
297 
(for an account of the stand taken by Romania, see 
Fejt~, 1974, pp. 157-64). 
In the face of the Romanian veto, the scheme was shelved 
but not abandoned. However, it was partly to prevent the 
kind of cohesion that would make it possible for the 
scheme to be imposed on socialist states that Romania 
began playing a neutral role in the Sino-Soviet dispute. 
Soon Romania had achieved a unique position in the 
socialist commonwealth, daring an independence no other 
country could risk, playing political loyalty off 
against economic concessions and vice versa and ensuring 
that full economic integration would remain a goal of 
the international socialist economic system rather than 
an achievement.~ 
After Khrushchev fell from power plans for the 
international socialist division of labour were revived 
quite strenuously, but with little more success. Soviet 
economists interpreted the general international 
division of labour as an objective historical process. 
The socialist division of labour, a new form, was also a 
manifestation of historical processes. It was: 
I' ••• an objective, historical natural law of 
the economic development of the world 
socialist system, based on the commonality of 
new, socialist productive relations and 
ar1s1ng on the basis of objective economic 
laws" (Sergeev, 1964, p. 85). 
Unlike the integration of capi -t;alist economi.e., -t;he 
socialist divi.ion of labour would eliminate inequality 
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and allow underdeveloped coun~ries to catch up with ~he 
more advanced. Disappointment in ~he rate of progress 
was, however, reflected in the complain~ that: 
"For all the undoubted achievements in this 
sphere, ~he curren~ level of specializa~ion of 
production .... does not answer the demands of 
the growing scientific and technical 
revolution and the greatest possible increase 
in labour produc~ivity" (Bogomolov, 1967, p. 
17). 
Agreement was finally reached in 1971 on a new 
Comprehensive Programme for the Further Deepening and 
Perfecting of Co-operation and Development of Socialist 
Economic Integration of Member Countries of CMEA 
(Coun~il for Mutual Economic Aid, 1971). While 
undoubtedly extending the process of integration and 
promoting the co-ordination of economic plans, the 
Programme also insisted on the voluntary nature of 
participation and the absence of any supra-national 
bodies.~ 
Summing up the detailed theore~ical work on socialist 
integration which accompanied the two-year process of 
drafting an acceptable programme, one Sovie~ theoris~ 
drew attention to the fact that socialist countries were 
involved in the international socialist division of 
labour to varying degrees (Dudinsky, 1976, p. 259). 
Soviet economists, he said, had concluded that socialist 
and capitalist integration differed fundamentally in 
substance, method of implementation and in the 
socio-economic consequences of the process. Integration 
was clearly a vital factor for the f~ture development of 
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the world socialist system, but the concept of 
supranationalism had been rejected because it was based 
on coercion. The most important characteristic of 
socialist economic integration was its harmonious 
combination of the national interests of member 
countries with the common interests of the commonwealth 
as a whole (Dudinsky, 1976, pp. 262-3). This combination 
helped to encourage: 
"the optimal inclusion of national industries 
in the international socialist division of 
labour and create the prerequisites for an 
ever deeper and more stable specialization of 
production" (Dudinsky, 1976, p. 263). 
Economic integration was said to be vital for the 
efficient functioning of the socialist military 
alliance. The WTO was held to be an extraordinary 
alliance which did not represent "a mechanical sum of 
national defence measures", but nthe qualitatively 
higher degree of relations which is inherent in the 
system of socialist states" (Milovidov, 1977, p. 144). 
But this "higher degree" required the kind of economic 
integration which would allow for co-operative 
manufacture and specialization. 
The objections to integration in 1976 were clearly 
little different from those that had been expressed in 
1962, and they reflected a general tension within the 
socialist commonwealth. Although there has been progress 
since then in some fields of specialization and joint 
projects have been launched, Romania has continued to b. 
the stumbling bloc. C.ausescu has successfully withstood 
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intermittent but strong pressure to conform to plans for 
specialization and co-ordination and, from early on, 
increased Romania's economic ties with the West. Soviet 
theorists have recognized the problems. Dudinsky, for 
example, concluded, more in sorrow than with impatience: 
..... Inherent in the process of integration is 
a particularly characteristic contradiction --
that is the contradiction between the need for 
the uninterrupted deepening of the 
international division of labour and 
specialization of production and co-operation 
on an international basis and the complex 
economic, social and political-economic 
factors which ... restrict the participation of 
one or another country in the international 
process and place certain limits on such 
participation. Overcoming this contradiction 
is an extraordinary complex matter ... " 
(Dudinsky, 1976, p. 270). 
Rakowska-Harmstone (1976) has pointed to the central 
paradox in the policy of East European economic 
integration -- it has become economically burdensome but 
politically desirable to the Soviet leadership. For the 
East Europeans, on the other hand, it has become 
economically desirable, but it represents a political 
burden and dependence that most East European leaders 
would prefer to avoid. 
(b1 The Brezhnev Doctrine and after 
Ceausescu's independent stand and the economic reforms 
which transformed Hungary were, it seemed, symptoms of a 
new liberalization signalling c,rte blanch. for the 
development of national communism. But there were limits 
to the diversity which could be tolerated and ·socialism 
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with a human in Czechoslovakia evidently 
transgressed the bounds. Revisionism once again became 
the main danger. The combined forces of the WTO (minus 
Romania) intervened to impose conformity on 
Czechoslovakia on the night of August 21, 1968.23 In the 
aftermath an explicit (but by no means new and not very 
well-defined) announcement was made of what the bounds 
were. 
Western observers called the new announcement the 
Brezhnev Doctrine. In an article published in Pravda a 
month after the intervention the international interests 
of the socialist commonwealth were proclaimed to take 
precedence over the individual national interests of the 
constituent states. It was not only the right, but the 
duty of socialist states to come to the defence of 
socialism whenever it was threatened (Kovalev, 1968, in 
Remington, 1969, pp. 412-6). In effect, national 
self-determination had again been declared invalid for 
socialist states. In fact, Brezhnev had been unambiguous 
about the Soviet position before the intervention took 
place, maintaining that "we cannot and never will be 
indifferent to the fate of socialist construction in 
other countries" (Brezhnev, Pravda, July 4, 1968). But a 
year later, he ~enied that sovereignty was limited 
within the socialist commonwealth: 
"Bourgeois propaganda goes out of its way to 
malign the principle. of the independence, 
sovereignty and equality of the national 
contingents of the working cla.. and the 
communist movement. That is the purpose for 
which imperialist propagandists have 
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fabricated and put into circulation the 
notorious theory of 'limited sovereignty'" 
(Brezhnev, 1969, p. 175). 
There are strong grounds for doubting the sincerity of 
Brezhnev's protest, but the fact that he felt called 
upon to make it in that particular forum indicates the 
unease with which the international movement had reacted 
to the intervention. 
In retrospect it was not really surprising that the 
Soviet leadership had been worried by the events in 
Czechoslovakia. It was not only concern for the security 
of the bloc which had been aroused (and there is no 
reason ~o doubt that the concern was genuine and that it 
was considered necessary to station Soviet troops in 
Czechoslovakia, even though there had been no overt 
threat to leave the WTO). The demands voiced in 
Czechoslovakia for the abolition of censorship could 
spread and several countries within the socialist 
commonwealth were already experiencing difficulties with 
recalcitrant dissidents. Moreover, it was not at all 
clear that the Czech Party retained its leading role --
from the outside it looked remarkably as if the Party 
was being led. The publication of the draft Party 
statutes on August 10, 1968 served to aggravate this 
fear since the new rules explicitly abolished the 
principle of democratic centralism (see Press Group of 
Soviet Journalists, 1968, p. 39 for Soviet condemnation 
of this attempt to "legalize factionalism D ). 
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One .Western analyst calls the reason for the 
intervention (and the third limitation to be placed on 
diversity within the bloc after loyalty to the alliance 
and single-party rule) "loss of control" (Lowenthal, 
1982, p. 277). What was perhaps surprising was that the 
decision to intervene seemed to be taken with great 
difficulty, as Dawisha (1980) demonstrates; that it was 
not only (and perhaps not unanimously) the decision of 
the Soviet Politburo~and that Ceausescu disassociated 
Romania from the decision and publicly criticized the 
intervention with impunity, though not without 
considerable risk. The Czech events seemed to signal a 
new state of affalrs in the socialist commonwealth, and 
the Brezhnev doctrine was only one of the symptoms. 
The assumption is often made in the West that the 
Brezhnev doctrine implied a new hard line policy on the 
part of the Soviet leadership. In fact, Soviet domestic 
policy had become less liberal as soon as Khrushchev 
fell from power. Moreover, it had been implicit from the 
end of the war onwards that the loss of one of the 
states forming a buffer between the Soviet Union and 
Europe would not be tolerated. The invasion of Hungary 
in 1956 had confirmed that this was the case. A~d in 
terms of articulated theory, both after 1956 and in the 
1960 declaration, there were, as w. have s.en, explicit 
statements about the responsibility of socialist stat •• 
not only for the fate of socialism in their own country, 
but also tarthe movement as a whole, or for socialism 
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internationa11y. What the Brezhnev Doctrine did was to 
reiterate the warning forcefully, in an attempt to 
exp1ain the intervention ~ post facto. It also made it 
c1ear that there wer. still limits beyond which 
socialist states cou1d not go. But what it did not do 
was to define those 1imits. The other justifications for 
the intervention offered by Soviet writers at the time 
and 1ater (an imminent counter-revolutionary attack 
aided and abetted by imperia1ism, see, for example, 
Gromyko and Ponomarev, Vol. 2, 1981, pp. 345-6) served 
only to make it even more difficult to deduce where the 
bounds of diversity were. 
In the aftermath of the crisis there was an 
internationa1 meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties 
in June 1969, attended by 78 parties and characterized 
by unusua11y frank discussion and outspoken criticism of 
the intervention (see the account in Fejt~, 1974, pp. 
480-2). A 10ng statement (the 1957 dec1aration was on1y 
5 pages 1ong, the 1960 and 1969 declarations were 15 
pages each) was issued after the conference on the state 
of the world and the current accepted interpretation of 
it ("Tasks at the Present Stage of the Struggle Against 
Imperialism and United Action of the Communist and 
Workers' Parties and A11 Anti-Imperia1ist Forc •• 
["Tasks")", 1969, pp. 25-39). 
Most of the statement was 
~ontinent-by-continent analysis 
taken up with • 
of the sharpening 
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historic struggle between socialism and imperialism. But 
it stated firmly and unambiguously in a short separate 
paragraph that "the defence of socialism is an 
internationalist duty of Communists" ("Tasks", 1969, p. 
31). It also stressed the need for cohesion. However, 
some of the forcefulness was immediately dispelled: 
amongst the principles of international relations 
between socialist states, the formula "non-interference 
in each other's internal affairs" was affirmed equally 
unambiguously. Moreover, there was explicit recognition 
of difficulties in the development of the world 
socialist system. Divergences could arise because of 
differences in the level of economic development, in 
social structure, in international position or because 
of national distinctions. These differences could and 
should "be settled on 
internationalism, through 
the basis of proletarian 
comradely discussion and 
voluntary fraternal co-operation" ("Tasks", 1969, p. 
31). The declaration carried a mildly worded warning 
about the danger of both "Right- and Left-opportunist 
distortions of theory and policy", as well as of 
revisionism, dogmatism and left-sectarian adventurism. 
But there was no 
Czechoslovakia. 
mention of either China or 
The "comradely discussions" mentioned in the document 
were one of the ways in which ideological conformity was 
maintained within 'the socialist commonwealth after 1968. 
Annual me.tings of East European Party first secretaries 
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and the CPSU, as well as individual visits by bloc 
leaders to the Crimea became an institution, during 
which problems were aired and views reconciled (Petrenko 
and Popov, 1981, p. 248). Attempts were also made to 
increase the role of Eastern European countries in the 
international organizations of the socialist 
commonwealth (see Brown, 1975 for an account of these 
efforts). the Political Consultative 
WTO became more regular. Soviet 
theorists paid increasing attention to the value of 
co-ordinating the foreign policies of the socialist 
Meetings 
pf the 
of 
Committee 
states (see, for example, Sanakoyev, 1972, pp. 403-4). 
The establishment of a committee of WTO foreign 
ministers was said to be particularly useful for this 
purpose (Brezhnev, 1981, p. 8). In one sense at least 
the events immediately preceding the Czechoslovak 
intervention must have comforted the Soviet leadership 
-- the Polish and East German support for intervention 
implied that ideological conformity was no longer the 
sole concern of the Soviet leadership, but was a shared 
value. In the aftermath of the intervention Soviet 
efforts were directed towards ensuring that it remained 
a shared value. The official Czechoslovak and GDR 
responses to events in-Poland in 1980 suggested that it 
had. 
The evident contradiction in the 1969 declaration 
between non-interference and the higher socialist duty 
to defend socialism was reflected in the Friendship 
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Treaties between the Soviet Union and the East European 
socialist states, most of which came up for renewal in 
the 1970s. The common defence of socialist achievements 
was a feature of the Soviet-Czech treaty of 1970 
("Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Aid 
between the USSR and the Socialist Republic ·of 
Czechoslovakia", 1970, pp. 30-1) and the Soviet-GDR 
treaty ("Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual 
Aid between the USSR and the German Democratic 
Republic", 1975, pp. 12-3). It recurred in other bloc 
agreement~, including the 1977 Soviet constitution 
(Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, 1985). But it was not mentioned in the 
Soviet-Romanian Friendship treaty ("Treaty of 
Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Aid between the USSR 
and the Socialist Republic of Rumania", 1970, pp. 
242-5). That this signified that Romania would not 
accept the formulation, rather than a change of heart in 
the Soviet leadership seemed to be confirmed by the 
definition of sovereignty which was conventionally 
offered: 
"Sovereignty of a socialist state implies not 
only the right to independence, but also 
responsibility to the community of fraternal 
countries, the international communist and 
working class movement for the destiny of 
socialism" (Grechko, 1977, p. 321). 
In theoretical terms, the contradiction between national 
sovereignty and socialist internationalism was expressed 
in warninga about the danger of nationalism to 
internationalist unity. Nationalism, it was pointed out, 
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IIdisappears from the minds of people more slowly than" 
other survivals of capitalism and produces more 
relapses II (Sanakoyev, 1972, p. 122). It was a 
particularly dangerous phenomenon when it surfaced in 
socialist countries. It led inevitably to disunity 
within Communist Parties and between socialist states 
(Zagladin, 1973, pp. 450-9). The antidot. offered by 
Soviet theorists and policy makers was tne extension of 
the principles which were said to govern inter-national 
relations within the USSR to relations between socialist 
states. In part this was merely a reiteration that 
proletarian internationalism applied to relations 
between socialist states. But it was also a call for 
closer political and cultural ties to accompany the 
economic integration which continued to be promoted. 
Closer ties would lead the socialist states from a 
condition of "drawing 
final communist aim 
1973, pp. 17-31 
together" (sblizheniye) to the 
of sliyanive or fusion (Katushev, 
and see the discussion in 
Rakowska-Harmstone, 1976). These terms had previously 
been used by Lenin (as we have seen in Chapter 6), and 
they were also used to characterize relations between 
nations within the Soviet Union (see, for example, 
"Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union", 
1961). 
The idea that socialist intern.tionalism undermined 
national sovereignty was rejected firmly .s a ploy by 
"imperialist ideologists ••• to undermine the co-operation 
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of fraternal socialist countries" (Sanakoyev, 1972, p. 
404). Socialist internationalism did not run counter to 
the principles of sovereignty, non-interference, 
equality and the right of nations to self-determination" 
(Sanakoyev, 1972, p. 269). But while stressing the 
principle of equality, Soviet theorists also drew 
attention to the special vanguard role played by the 
Soviet Union and the CPSU within the system (see, for 
example, Sanakoyev, 1972, p. 129). The contradictions 
between sovereignty and internationalism and between 
equality and the leading role of the CPSU were clearly 
not really closer to being resolved. The negative 
response to the phenomenon of Eurocommunism indicated 
that diversity among non-ruling Parties was no more 
welcome than diversity within the socialist commonwealth 
(see Whetten, 1983, for the various manifestations of 
Eurocommunism). 
Twelve years after the intervention in Czechoslovakia a 
similar 
control, 
set of changes in 
emergent pluralism, 
Poland 
the 
loss of Party 
collapse of the 
principles and practice of democratic centralism, the 
breakdown of censorship, with the added dimension of 
what seemed to be a revolution from below led 
inexorably to a re-establishment of authority, this time 
in the form of martial law (for the events preceding 
martial law, see Sanford, 1984). The explanation offered 
in Soviet literature was that extremist forces within 
Solidarity, together with the Committe. for Social 
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Defence/Committee for Defence of the Workers, were 
planning a coup for 17 December 1981 (Alekseeva, Babak 
and Kokeev, 1982, p. 87). 
Most Western commentators assumed that martial law was 
Soviet inspired (see, for example, Lowenthal, 1982, 
Sanford, 1984). But the prolonged impotence of those who 
objected to the Polish reforms and the form the clamp 
down took were unexpected. Moreover, there was 
considerable evidence of indecision about the best way 
to deal with an appalling economic situation and a 
grass-roots popular movement 
some of the evidence). Prior 
(see Anderson, 1982, fo~ 
to the declaration of 
martial law the situation in Poland was explained by 
Soviet theorists as the result of "mistakes and 
miscalculations" in internal policy and subversion on 
the part of imperialism which combined to create an 
ideal environment for anti-socialist elements within 
Poland (Zagladin, 1981, p. 17). But Soviet theorists 
seemed reluctant to explore the nature of Solidarity and 
the implications of its mass appeal. The fear was voiced 
that the Polish United Workers' Party had irretrievably 
lost its leading role and events in Poland were said to 
confirm how important it was for Communist Parties to 
remain in close touch with the masses and to fight 
against bureaucratism and voluntarism (Brezhnev, 1981, 
p. 13). Soviet theorists echoed Brezhnev in warning 
sternly that "no-one should have any doubts about the 
common determination of the fraternal countries to 
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protect the socialist gains of the Po~ish people from 
any infringement by counter-revolution, internal or 
external" (Bykov, 1981, p. 5). This was an unambiguous 
re-statement of the Brezhnev doctrine. 
The declaration of martial law made it unnecessary for 
theorists to explain how this common determination 
fitted with the equality, respect for sovereignty and 
non-interference inherent in social internationalism. 
They did not attempt to demonstrate that martial law was 
consonant with the leading role of the Party. 
4. Conclusion 
o~ 
If one examines the historical developmentLthe use of 
the concepts of proletarian . and socialist 
internationalism by Soviet theorists from Lenin onwards, 
it becomes clear that Lenin, while promoti~q the right 
to self-determination and supporting the freedom to 
secession, expected that individual socialists and 
socialist parties would rise above the bourgeois appeal 
of nationalism and place the interests of 
internation-alism above those of their own parties. The 
union that followed the revolution would be voluntary. 
When his optimism proved ill-founded during the Civil 
War, the assertion of the right.to secede was retained 
in respect of the border nations of Russia, _ but the-
freedom to d-o so became questionable. 24 Stalin was far 
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more explicit in identifying international interests 
with the interests of the Soviet Union. But the context 
in which the term proletarian internationalis~ was used 
was primarily in connection with the relations between 
nations within multi-ethnic states. 
It was only after Stalin's death that proletarian 
internationalism was promoted to a fundamentally new 
type of international relations and the organizing 
principle of relations between socialist states. But 
there were theoretical problems in applying the concept 
to inter-state relations. In its new capacity it was 
called socialist internationalism, and to begin with it 
seemed to imply that the other socialist states would be 
allowed a certain measure of independence and equality. 
But the interventions in Hungary in 1956 and 
Czechoslovakia in 196B demonstrated that the extent of 
their room for manouevre would be defined by the Soviet 
leadership (increasingly supported by the more 
conformist leaders of other socialist states). As a 
result, the term socialist internationalism began to 
have far more sinister connotations than those who first 
used it had intended. The reaction to events in Poland 
from the middle of 19BO to the end of 19B1 seemed to 
confirm that the equality and sovereignty allowed by 
socialist internationalism were limited. 
The high poin~ of theoretical activity in the field of 
inter-socialist relations occurred in the 1950. and 
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19605. In the post-Czechoslovak period most of the 
writing referred to the 1957, 1960 and 1969 declarations 
and repeated earlier definitions and analyses. ~ After 
the events of 1968 it was admitted that conflict was 
possible within the socialist commonwealth and some 
attempt began to be made to analyze it. The possibility 
of "divergences" was mentioned in the 1969 declaration, 
but a book on international conflict published soon 
afterwards (Zhurkin and ?rimakov, 1972) did not include 
inter-socialist conflict in its elaborate typology (see 
Chapter 8). Later Soviet scholars began to distinguish 
between acute political conflicts, which retarded 
development and were foreign to socialism, and 
non-antagonistic conflicts which could be found in the 
socialist system and which were caused by specific 
differences (in level of socio-economic development, 
historical traditions, vestiges of national hostility, 
geographic position). Non-antagonistic conflicts of thi~. 
type were said to aid mutual understanding (Butenko, 
1975, pp. 255-8). In fact, they were harking back to a 
distinction drawn by Zhdanov (1947b, p. 21) who posited 
that in the case of non-antagonisiLc conflict, 
development could occur through criticism and 
self-criticism (as opposed' to the struggle which 
resulted from antagonistic conflict). Criticism and 
self-criticism was now called IIfraternal exchange of 
experience and opinion" but since there has also been & 
plea for more theoretical work on the· subject (Butenko, 
1975, p. 270), Soviet scholars seem to recognize that 
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they have yet to find a way to resolve non-antagonistic 
conflict amicably. 
As far as proletarian and socialist internationalism are 
concerned, the definitions have remained unchanged. 
Socialist internationalism has its own entry in a 1980 
political dictionary, but the reader is referred to the 
entry for proletarian internationalism, where socialist 
internationalism is defined as: 
"the application and the development of the 
principles of proletarian internationalism 
both in the relations between nations and 
nationalities who have started on the ,path of 
socialism and between sovereign socialist 
states" (Onikov and Shishkin, 1980, p. 335). 
Proletarian internationalism is said to include both the 
independence of parties and their answerability to the 
people of their own country and to the toilers of other 
countries (Onikov and Shishkin, 1980, p. 335). No 
published theoretical writing or political statement has 
ever included guidelines about how to resolve the issue 
when a conflict is perceived between answerability to 
the people of a particular country and answerability to 
the toilers of other countries, except to imply that 
unity always takes precedence. It is difficult, 
therefore, not to conclude with Brzezinski (1967, p. 
Z67) that Marxism-Leninism is "rich in guidelines for 
coping with enemies, but that it offeres) little scope 
for resolving conflicts and organizing relations among 
Communist state. II •. 
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If one examines the conflicts which have occurred in the 
bloc since 1945, three of them (Yugoslavia, Albania and 
Poland before 1956) were related to leadership of the 
national party, one of them (China) concerned the 
leadership of the communist world and six of them had to 
do with the nature of domestic society and its 
relationship with the Soviet Union (East Germany in 
1953, Poland after 1956, Hungary, Romania, 
Czechoslovakia and Poland 1980). With the exception of 
the Polish case, the first and second types of conflict 
led to excommunication from the bloc and had little 
positive influence on theory. Indeed, there was a 
deleterious effect as mutual insults took the place of 
creative theoretical development. 
In the third type of conflict, the national parties lost 
the battle in all cases (in Poland not because of 
external intervention, but because of regression of the 
national leadership after 1956 and martial law in 1981), 
but they did not lose the war entirely. In other words, 
theoretical development resulted from the conflicts. 
More importantly, in most cases there were also 
significant changes in political practice both 
domestically and in relation to the Soviet Union 
(although in the case of Czechoslovakia it i. the other 
bloc members, rather than Czechoslovakia, which have 
benefitted). Since the late .ixtie. there have been 
attempts to reconcile difference. and to change the 
nature of inter-bloc relations, but there has been very 
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little theoretical change. 
It would seem that the concepts of proletarian and 
socialist internationalism have been stretched as far as 
they can qo. If the recognition of national differences 
is extended to its logical conclusion, it must also 
include the kind of diversity proposed in Czechoslovakia 
or Poland. Similarly, equality logically means that 
individual members of the socialist system no lonqer 
need to tailor their interests to those of the Soviet 
Union or the other socialist states where the two are 
perceived to be in conflict. In theory and in practice, 
however, diversity and equality, like sovereignty, are 
limited. Removing the limits would lead to the 
legitimation of the very national communisms that the 
theory has been concerned to prevent. 
In essence, the theoretical dilemma resembles the 
difficulties with the concept of peaceful coexistence 
which were described in Chapter 3. Proletarian 
internationalism refers to class relations, while 
socialist internationalism subsumes both class and state 
relations. As long as no clash is perceived between 
class and national interests there is no problem. Any 
limitation to diversity, equality and sovereignty is 
voluntary And therefore does not infr-inge the normal 
legal status of international relations. But when a 
conflict exists (or iii perceived to exist) between the 
two, class intere.t. take precedence in theory and in 
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practice. The question of who it is that defines what 
the class interest is becomes extremely important. If 
the definition is not accepted by those who perceive 
that a contradiction exists, the voluntary nature of the 
aid and co-operation inherent in socialist 
internationalism is called into question. And in that 
case, the respect for internationai legal norms which is 
also said to be inherent in socialist internationalism 
seems no more than a convenient fiction. 
The cases of Yugoslavia, Albania and China illustrate 
another inadequacy in proletarian and socialist 
internationalism. The concepts are neither broad enough 
to explain relations between all socialist states or 
between all socialist parties nor acceptable to all 
socialist leaders. Soviet theorists implicitly 
recognized this by accusing China of having a foreign 
policy which had nothing in common with 
internationalism. But there was a far more explicit 
recognition in Brezhnev's offer to the Chinese of 
relations based on peaceful coexistence (see Chapter 3, 
footnote 16). If Soviet relations with some socialist 
states can be based on peaceful coexistence, however, 
there seems to be no logical reason why the relations 
between all socialist states should not be based on that 
principle. 
As for the claim that socialist international relations 
are a new type of relations: it is fairly cl.ar from an 
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analysis of both events and theory that they are, in 
fact, a very old type of relations, a mixture of 
coercion and conciliation, based on a changing (and 
often not shared) perception of national and system 
interests. The most novel element, perhaps, is that they 
are so frequently and so insistently called new. 
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Note. 
1. Lowenthal (1964, p. 9) contends that it was the need 
to sort out relations with China in the first place that 
prompted Khrushchev's internationalism, and that its 
application to Yugoslavia was merely a byproduct. 
2. Even more disconcerting to the non-Soviet analyst is 
the method sometimes used of insisting that the new 
theory (or the new policy) has been in use all the time. 
3. For an account of the Polish October and the 
Hungarian Revolution, see Brzezinski (1967, Chapters 10 
and 11). One legitimate reason for complaint.may perhaps 
have been thought to be the term People's Democracy, 
which implied a status inferior to socialism. The term 
gradually disappeared from use after 1956. The People's 
Democracies were referred to as socialist states, 
members of the socialist world, camp or commonwealth. 
4. Suslov did not mention the role of the Soviet army in 
suppressing the revolutiori, but other commentators have 
consistently maintained that the Soviet army provided 
aid at the request of the new Hungarian government (see, 
for example, Farberov, 1957, p. 51). At the time there 
was no mention of the Warsaw Treaty, which had been 
signed the previous year· (for an account of its origins, 
see Remington, 1971, Chapter 2). But later versions have 
maintained that "the Hungarian people, with the help of 
other socialist states ... routed the 
counter-revolutionary forces" and that, "acting in 
accordance with Article 5 of the Warsaw Treaty, the USSR 
helped the revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' 
Government of Hungary" (Sanakoyev, 1972, p. 205). 
5. For China's role in reconstructing Communist unity, 
see Brzezinski (1967, pp. 271-308) and FejtO (1974, pp. 
124-37). 
6. A lively account of the Yugoslav position as reported 
personally by various Yugoslavs is given by Lowenthal 
(1964, Chapter 4). 
7. This list of 10 general laws was much more 
comprehensive than the four laws which Suslov had 
enumerated in 1956 (see Suslov, 1956, p. 3). Earlier in 
1957 some of the unique characteristics had been 
described in an authoritative article: there were 
national differences in the form taken by the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, in the franchi.e 
restrictions which had been required, in the number of 
political parties which could be permitted to function, 
in the existence of broad national fronts", in the way in 
which private ownership had been eliminated, in the 
speed and manner of introducing collectivized 
agriculture and in the way in which the national 
question had been dealt with (Farberov, 1957, pp. 42-8). 
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S. Most Western scholars agree that although unity was 
reimposed at the November 1957 conference, it was 
qualitatively different from the unity imposed by 
Stalin. Skilling ~alled it "pluralistic monism", a 
system which combined autonomy of action with voluntary 
solidarity, and allowed for policy differences within 
the bounds of common action and reforms (Skilling, 1964, 
pp. 12-13). ~rzezinski called it "divergent unity" and 
pointed out that although rev1s1onism was defeated, 
"many of its assumptions had penetrated, informally ... as 
part of the prevailing climate of political opinio~" 
(Brzezinski, 1967, p. 367). 
9. For a detailed analysis of the draft programme, see 
Brzezinski (1967, pp. 322-37). 
10. Those People's Democracies which were considered to 
have entered the period of building developed socialism 
had been promoted particularly rapidly. In 1957 all the 
People's Democracies were still said to be at a 
transitional stage from capitalism to socialism 
(Farberov, 1957, p. 42). Moreover, although Lenin's law 
of uneven development meant that the capitalist stage 
could be skipped, the socialist stage was considered 
essential, since communism was merely a higher form of 
socialism. In fac~, the discussion about the transition 
to communism should be understood in the context of 
Soviet reactions to the Chinese Great Leap Forward 
initiated in 1958,' with its claim that China would be 
the first to attain communism. Soon afterwards 
Khrushchev began to make detailed calculations to show 
that the Soviet Union would reach communism in 1980. For 
reactions to the Great Leap Forward, see Lowenthal 
(1964, Chapter 6) and for Khrushchev'S equally 
extravagant claims and calculations, see Medvedev (1982, 
pp. 199-202). 
11. 81 Communist and Workers' Parties attended the 
conference (the 1957 conference had been restricted to 
ruling parties). The difficulty in reconciling opposing 
views is demonstrated by the three weeks it took for 
agreement to be reached. 
12. Lowenthal (1964, Chapter 6) points out that 
inadequate Soviet aid prompted the Great Leap Forward. 
It was a radical attempt to modernize rapidly without 
the necessary financial means. Moreover, Khrushchev had 
increasingly shown that Chinese interests were low in 
his priorities. Lowenthal deduces that lithe confli,ct was 
not 'about ideology': it was a clear conflict of 
national interest which took ideological forms" 
(Lowenthal, 1964, p. 216). 
lS. It should be stressed that there were a number of 
important contentious foreign policy i •• u.. in the 
disagreements between the USSR and the CPR. The Chin.s. 
resented the inadequate support given by the USSR in the 
1958 Taiwan Strait. crisis and the neutral position 
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adopted in relation to the Sino-Indian border dispute in 
1959. They were deeply offended by the way Khrushchev 
reneged on the nuclear aid he had promised. When China 
began to lobby for allies within the international 
movement, Khrushchev responded in July 1960 by reducing 
Soviet economic assistance to China and withdrawing 
Soviet technical .advisers (see Griffiths, 1964). 
14. The countries which belonged· to the world socialist 
system were listed as Albania, Bulgaria, China, Hungary, 
the GDR, North Vietnam, North Korea, Mongolia, Poland, 
Romania and Czechoslovakia, together with the USSR. 
15. Albania had been opposed to the Soviet rapprochement 
with Yugoslavia, and upset by the secret speech at the 
20th Congress of the CPSU. They thus distrusted 
Khrushchev. 
16. These letters and a number of documents which record 
the Soviet-Albanian dispute and the positions taken by 
other Communist Parties are translated in Dallin (1963). 
17. Dallin (1963, pp. xxviii-xxxvii), for example, 
categorized the issues dividing the international 
communist movement at this time as: (1) Organizational 
Problems of the International Movement (role of the USSR 
and CPSU; relevance of Soviet experience; polycentrism; 
membership of the international movement; forms of 
interparty behaviour; fractionalism) and communist 
perspective and strategy: whether revlslonism or 
dogmatism was the greatest danger, (2) Problems of World 
Affairs (nature of the epoch; war and peace; peaceful 
coexistence; relations with the national bourgeoisie; 
economic aid to underdeveloped nation~, and (3) Problems 
in Domestic Policy (personality cult and the role of 
Stalin; stages in building socialism and communism; 
dictatorship of the proletariat and the class struggle; 
importance of Soviet economic development; affluent 
communism; freedom and controls; peaceful transition to 
socialis~. After some years, and when the dispute was 
more mature, Brzezinski (1967, pp. 398-403) divided the 
issues into (1) Ideological (role of CPSU; revisionism 
or dogmatism; nature of the epoch; war or peace; 
peaceful transition to socialism; dictatorship of the 
proletariat and the class struggle~ nature of the 
communist society; Stalin; Albania and the bloc; 
Interparty polemics) (2) Foreign policy issues (grand 
strategy; national liberation struggle, detente; Test 
Ban Treaty; neutrality on Indian frontier issue and 
continued aid to India) and (3) Conflict. of interest 
(military assistance; economic assistance; territorial 
claim~ In fact, long though their .lists were, th.y did 
not exhaust all the causes neither, for example, 
included historical reasons or pure geopolitics (i ••• 
the theory that neighbouring great continental powers 
are bound to be rivals). 
18. For a discussion of Soviet typologies of conflict, 
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see Chapter 8. Chinese accusations that the Soviet Union 
had ceased to be socialist preda~ed the reverse charge. 
In 1964 they already maintained that capitalism was 
being restored in Russia. But they believed then that 
Khrushchev was the culprit. In 1965, disappointed that 
the new leadership had changed Soviet policy so little, 
they renewed the charge ( Brzezinski, 1967, pp. 424-7). 
Soviet theorists, on the other hand, have vacillated 
(often in one and the same book or article), sometimes 
calling the Chinese Trotskyite and anti-Leninist, 
sometimes claiming that their socialism is anti-Marxist 
and anti-scientific. It is also chauvinistic, 
nationalistic and the Chinese are left-wing opportunists 
(see Zagladin, 1973, p. 414 and passim). Just before 
Brezhnev's death, when serious efforts began to be made 
to improve relations, China began to be classified as a 
socialist state again. For an analysis of the 
Sino-Soviet polemics prior to this, see Low (1976). 
19. Although the impetus for integration is usually 
credited to Khrushchev, Brown has pointed out that the 
integration and specialization proposals were initiated 
by Czechoslovakia in 1958 and accepted by· Khrushchev 
only. after 1960 (Brown, 1966, pp. 205-6). In fact 
evidence suggests that the idea was accepted in the 
Soviet Union before 1960. In his report to the 20th 
Party Congress, for example, Khrushchev spoke of the 
co-ordination of economic plans and the advantages of 
industrial specialization based on utilizing the most 
favourable natural and economic conditions in particular 
countries (Khrushchev, 1956a, p. 30). 
20. For the full text of the CMEA Charter, see 
Szawlowski (1976, pp. 181-9). Szawlowski has pointed out 
that the 1962 amendments were illegal (as has been the 
subsequent incorporation of Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam) 
because Albania, still formally a member, was not 
present at the session when they were adopted and the 
statutes require ratification by all members 
(Szawlowski, 1975, pp. 50-2). 
21. For accounts of Soviet-Romanian relations in the 
Khrushchev era, see FejtO (1974) and Skilling (1964). 
22. A discussion of the Programme and its implementation 
can be found in Szawlowski (1976, pp. 71-102). 
23. There are many accounts of the Prague Spring, and 
analyses of why and how the decision was made to 
intervene. See, for example, Windsor and Roberts (1969); 
Remington (1971); Skilling (1976); Valenta (1979); 
Dawisha (1980), to name but a few. 
24. As we have seen in Chapter 6, both Lenin and Stalin 
were clear that there were times when unity took 
precedence over secession, or proletarian interests over 
the interests of separatist movements. Soviet attitudes 
towards secession movement in post-independent Africa 
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(for example, Tshombe's movement in ~he Congo, the 
Biafran declaration of independence and Eritrean 
separatism after the Ethiopian coup) have always been 
negative. 
25. See Lynch (1984, pp. 248-65) for the argumen~ that 
there is little serious Soviet theory relating to 
socialist internationalism. 
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CHAPTER B. CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SVSTEM II 
WAR. NEUTRALITV AND PEACE. 
All states and statesmen advocate peace and the Soviet 
Union and its leaders are no exception. But few other 
states have put as much effort into public peace 
campaigns as the Soviet Union, and few statesmen and 
scholars have been 50 frequently insistent that theirs 
is a policy of peace. Yet Marxist-Leninist teaching has 
always maintained that war is an endemic feature of 
capitalist society and that therefore it will only 
disappear when there is universal socialism. According 
to the Leninist version of the ~heory, imperialism is 
implacably hostile to socialism. A war launched by 
imperialist states against socialiSM was, therefore, 
particularly to be expected and feared. 
Soviet policy makers and theorists have seemed to retain 
both beliefs, the necessity for peace and the 
inevitability of war, with equal firmness and equal 
sincerity. Vet there is a contradiction between the two. 
From the practical point of view, the problem has been 
to invest in peace while preparing, both psychologically 
and militarily, for inevitable war. It has entailed 
convincing the external world of the peaceful nature of 
Soviet foreign pol~cy, while maintaining a level of 
dome.tic tension high enough not only to promote 
cohesion but also, particularly in the early y.ars of 
325 
Soviet history, to act as an exhortation to greater 
effort in strengthening the economic and military 
potential of the state. Theoretically, the dilemma has 
concerned two images central to Soviet Marxism-Leninism: 
the depiction of international relations as a struggle 
between capitalism and socialism and the 
characterization of imperialism as inherently 
aggressive. Neither image is consonant with promoting 
peace. Moreover, the dichotomy of the first image leaves 
little conceptual leeway for a third force like 
non-alignment which disassociates itself from both 
capitalism and socialism. 
The practical problems have led to a tendency (not, of 
course, unique to the Soviet Union) to talk, or even to 
act, in two voices. Thus in the 1920s, for example, 
while the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs [NarkomindelJ 
pursued the adroit diplomacy which resulted first in the 
Rapallo Treaty in 1922 and then in de jure recognition 
,by other capitalist states, Stalin constantly warned of 
the imminence of a capitalist attack. Similarly, Soviet 
participation in the League of Nations Disarmament 
Conference in 1928 and Litvinov1s radical disarmament 
proposals at that time and his enthusiastic response to 
the Kellogg-Briand pact were accompanied by a scathing 
denouncement of both Conference and pact by the 
Communist International [CominternJ (Degra~, Vol. 2, 
1960, p. 449). At the 6th Comintern Congress in 1928 the 
world was said to be "pregnant" I with both 
inter-imperialist wars and war against the USSR 
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(Communism and 
5-32). These 
the International Situation, 1928, pp. 
contradictory attitudes and the 
preparations for possible war produced (and their modern 
analogues still produce) accusations that Soviet peace 
offers have always been empty propaganda. In fact the 
contradictions epitomize the difficulties of preaching 
revolutionary theory 
diplomacy. 
while practising traditional 
This chapter considers the way in which Soviet theory 
about war, neutrality and peace has dealt with the 
dilemmas and evolved to accommodate the changing nature 
of war, the growth of the phenomenon of non-alignment 
and the need for a prolonged peace in which to construct 
communism. It is divided into three parts. The first 
examines Soviet thinking about war. Lenin's theories 
about the inevitability, causes and types of war, and 
the relationship of war to revolution are described 
first; and then the changes in each of these aspects are 
examined. 
The second part of the chapter concentrates on the 
period after the Second World War and considers how the 
growth and growing authority of the phenomenon of 
neutralism has impinged on Soviet theorists, forcing 
them to incorporate a third zone of peace in their world 
view. The third part of the chapter deals with peace and 
poi~ts to the prevalence of peace campaigns and the 
dearth of peace theory. The chapter concludes by 
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considering why there should be such an imbalance 
between war theory and peace theory. 
1. War 
(a) The Marxist-Leninist theory of war 
Although Marx and Engels were primarily concerned with 
relations within states, rather than between states, 
issues of war and peace and the effects of war on the 
class struggle were not matters they could ignore. Later 
Soviet writers credit them with laying the foundations 
for dividing wars into just and unjust wars and 
discovering that war is caused by antagonistic 
formations and exploitation (Petrenko and Popov, 1981, 
pp. 46-7). In fact, although they wrote a great deal 
about particular wars, as Carr has pointed out, they 
were rather vague about what the socialist attitude to 
war in general should be (Carr, Vol. 3, 1966, pp. 
541-9). Engels, in particular, wrote extensively on 
military affairs, gaining considerable expertise in 
military strategy and leaving a body of work to which 
Trotsky and later Soviet strategists have referred. But 
Soviet theory distinguishes between military strate·gy 
which, "starting from general considerations, develops 
and investigates concrete problems" (Soko!ovskiy, 1963, 
p. 42), and military doctrine, to which it 
subordinate and which is: 
MA scientifically based system of views on the 
nature and character of war ••• aDd OD the 
is 
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preparation of the country and the Armed 
Forces for repulsing any possible aggression" 
(Ogarkov, 1981, p. 85).1 
Military doctrine has two aspects technical and 
political -- and it is the political aspect which is the 
concern of this chapter. 
The inevitability of war 
The authority to whom modern Soviet theorists refer most 
in writing about military doctrine is Lenin. When the 
First World War began, most European socialists 
supported their own national war efforts, ignoring the 
1907 decision of the Second International that any 
future war would be an imperialist war and should, 
therefore, not be supported. Lenin, on the other hand, 
contended that a policy of national defeatism would turn 
the imperialist war into civil war, speeding up the 
disintegration of capitalism and bringing the socialist 
revolution closer (Lenin, 1915b, pp. 158-64). He argued 
that war was bound to be a constant feature of monopoly 
capitalism: once the world had been divided up into 
colonies and semi-colonies, the only way in which the 
imperialist states could compete for markets, raw 
materials and investment opportunities was through a 
re-division which would provoke inter-imperialist wars 
(Lenin, 1916d, pp. 189-90). War between imperialist 
powers was thus inevitable. But it would serve to weaken 
them and therefore to hasten the revolution. 
Lenin believed tha~ 
engendered a second 
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monopoly 
kind of 
capi~alism 
war, since 
inevitably 
the new 
international exploited class, the indigenous peoples of 
the colonies, would fight for ~heir independence (Lenin, 
1916d, p. 297). Wars of na~ional libera~ion, like 
inter-imperialist wars, would serve to weaken an already 
moribund capitalism, speeding up the disintegration of 
capitalist society and the subsequent socialist 
revolution. It was clear, therefore, that metropolitan 
socialists should practise national defeatism in respect 
of inter-imperialist wars and support colonial peoples 
in their wars of national liberation. 
It was only later in 1916 that Lenin began to predict a 
third kind of inevitable war: war between socialism and 
capitalism. As we have seen in previous chapters, Lenin 
argued that the uneven development of capitalism would 
make possible the existence of one or a few socialist 
countries. In an attempt to crush the proletarian 
revolution, the bourgeoisie of other countries were 
likely to attack the socialist countries. This kind of 
war would, like the other two ~ypes of inevitable war, 
disappear only after the bourgeoisie of the entire world 
had been vanquished and expropriated (Lenin, 1916e, pp. 
77-93). Lenin's categorization of inevitable wars 
remained an active component of Soviet theory until the 
19S0s. 
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The cau.e. of war 
The cause of war, aooording 
economic conflict. In the 
almost always the desire for 
to Marxist thinking, was 
age of imperialism it was 
conquest which motivated 
monopoly capitalists to take up arms. This desire was 
foreign to sooialists. Thus the international socialist 
revolution would be followed by the disappearance of 
classes and class conflict within societie~ and the 
elimination of war between societies. 
Although Lenin was firm about the economic bases of war, 
he was deeply impressed by Clausewitz's dictum that war 
is the continuation of politics by other means. The 
1914-1918 war, he said, was the continuation of the 
imperialist polioies of two groups of Great Powers. But 
policies 
policies 
of colonial struggle against oppression, and 
of proletarian struggle against the 
bourgeoiSie, oould similarly produce wars which would be 
a continuation of those policies (Lenin, 1916e, p. 80). 
For this reason, Lenin was against disarmament before 
the viotory of the international revolution (Lenin, 
1916b, pp. 94-104) and against pacifism, both of which 
could prevent the proletariat "turn[ingJ its guns 
against its ~ governments" (Lenin, 1917a, p. 186, 
emphasiS in the original). Sooialists could not be 
opposed to sli wars, since soma of them "in their social 
content and implications, serve the cause of democracy, 
and consequently socialism (Lenin, lS17f, p. 23, 
331 
emphasis in the original). 
Types of war. 
Which wars served the cause of socialism could be 
determined, Lenin thought, by evaluating the politics of 
which the war was the continuation. He distinguished 
between just (or progressive) and unjust wars. The 
former were to be supported by socialists, the latter 
opposed. The questions which should be asked were: 
"What issues are at stake in the war, which 
classes are waging it, and with what political 
objectives" (Lenin, 1916a, p. 33). 
Colonial or national wars, civil wars which were an 
intensification of the class struggle and defensive wars 
fought by socialists against attempts to crush socialist 
states were just wars from the point of view of the 
colonial peoples, the exploited classes and the 
socialist states (Lenin; 1916e, pp. 77-9). As we shall 
see, Soviet theorists have continued to divide wars into 
those fought for just aims which are deserving of 
support (for example, wars of national liberation), and 
reactionary, unjust wars fought for predatory purposes 
which are sometimes to be resisted and always to be 
condemned. 
Lenin did not conceive of wars between socialist states, 
civil wars against socialist regimes, or wars between 
ex-colonies, so he did nqt include them in his 
categories of just and unjust war •• Sub.equent theorists 
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have had considerable difficulty in applying 
Marxist-Leninist criteria to such wars. 
War and revolution 
Whether revolution can occur without violence has always 
been a contentious issue in Marxist-Leninist theory and 
practice. Marx himself seemed to change his mind on the 
matter (see, for example, the discussions in McLellan, 
1971, pp. 201-2 and Bottomore et al, 1985, p. 574) and 
the social-democratic wing of the socialist movement has 
preferred his later, non-violent 
Lenin added an element of 
evolutionary 
voluntarism to 
opinion. 
Marxist 
historical determinism: it was not that revolution would 
not occur when the correct historical conditions 
occurred, but properly organized revolutionaries need 
not wait for history to take its course. Revolutionary 
moments should be seized. He defined a revolutionary 
situation as one in which the lower ~lasses no longer 
wanted to, and the upper classes no longer could, live 
in the old way, in which the suffering of the oppressed 
class was more acute than usual and, as a result, it was 
drawn into independent historical action (Lenin, 1915a, 
pp. 213-4). From 1914 to 1917 he grew increasingly 
certain that the war had brought about such a situation. 
The revolution which occurred in February 1917 in Russia 
confirmed his view. 
Lenin believed that imperialist wars acted as the 
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"locomotive of history" and 
revolution (Lenin, 1917d, 
practised national defeatism 
the forcing 
p. 330). If 
house of 
socialists 
during imperialist wars, 
bourgeois society would disintegrate and revolution take 
place. But he did not rule out revolution via civil wars 
which were "the natural, and under certain conditions, 
inevitable, continuation, development and 
intensification of the class struggle" (Lenin, 1916e, 
pp. 77-8). Nor did he think revolution via external 
intervention impossible, as the decision to continue the 
Polish War in 1920 attests (see Carr, Vol. 3, 1966, pp. 
167-9, 213-20 for an account of Polish War). 
The Polish War occurred at a time when Lenin and his 
fellow Bolsheviks still believed and hoped that the 
revolutionary moment existed and that international 
revolution was imminent. Its failure, and the need for a 
breathing space for domestic reconstruction, served to 
make bo~h Leninist revolutionary theory and Sovie~ 
international practice more cautious. The task of 
encouraging international revol~tion was left to the 
Comintern, while Narkomindel became preoccupied with 
more traditional diplomatic concerns. 
(b) War after Lenin 
Stalin repeatedly warned of an imminent capitalist 
atback on bhe Soviet Union. Indeed, as one Western 
theorist has poinbed oub, capibalist encirclement and 
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the danger of a capitalist war against the Soviet Union 
became the corollary of Stalin's doctrine of socialism 
in one ·country (Burin, 1963). Towards the end of the 
1920s the expectation of war was used to explain the 
need for rapid industrialization. In urging that the 
tempo of ~he First Five Year ·Plan be increased, Stalin 
maintained that if the Soviet Union did not catch up 
with the advanced countries in ten years, it would be 
crushed (Stalin, 1931, p. 366). Stalin thus clearly 
subscribed to Lenin's theory of inevitable war, although 
he did not really add to it. The Comintern issued a set 
of theses on war in 1928 which followed Lenin's analysis 
very closely (Eudin and Slusser, Vol. 1, 1966, pp. 
124-41). 
Yet by 1935, when efforts to create a collective 
security system were launched in earnest, Stalin had 
begun to emphasize the avoidability of war, rather than 
its inevitability. Comintern members were instructed to 
struggle for peace and for the defence of the USSR by 
forming united people's fronts. The teaching about 
inevitable war was not entirely abandoned, however. The 
Comintern pointed out that it was an illusion to believe 
that war could be eliminated while capitalism existed. 
Nonetheless, communists would 'Iexert every effort to 
prevent war" (Degras, Vol. 3, 1965, pp. 372-8, quote on 
p. 378). When the long predicted war began, Soviet 
theorists classified it as an unjust, predatory, 
imperialist war until June 1941. Once the Soviet Union 
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had been attacked, however, it became a just war by the 
anti-fascist forces against the menace of Nazi 
aggression. This has remained the way it is 
characterized (see, for example, Milovidov, 1977, p. 
27). But after the Second World War the Soviet theory of 
war gradually began to change. 
The avoidability of war 
Once the destructive power of nuclear weapons was 
recognized, it was difficult to continue believing in 
the inevitability of a war that was certain to destroy 
both sides. As we have seen, Lenin saw war as the 
forcing house of revolution because it would lead to 
socialist revolutions in the belligerent capitalist 
powers. But the destruction caused by nuclear weapons 
would leave no capitalist society to undergo revolution. 
Moreover, .the military victory of socialism was unlikely 
in a war between the two camps, since the Soviet 
teaching about peace held that the imperialists would 
start the war. 
Stalin is often accused of failing to understand this. 
He is also said to have underestimated the potential of 
atomic weapons. It is true that he continued stressing 
the importance of the five "permanently operating 
features" of war (Stalin, 1942).2 He also denied that 
surprise was a vital element in modern warfare or that 
nuclear weapons would be the decisive factor in a.future 
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war (S~alin, 1946a, p. 56). None~heless, there is 
considerable evidence that he understood how dangerous 
nuclear war would be and how important it was to avoid 
such a war. In a zealously pro-Stalin book, for example, 
it is claimed tha~: 
"Now, when capi~alism has ceased to be the 
only all-embracing world economic system, when 
the camp of socialism is becoming more and 
more united and powerful, war engendered by 
capitalism has ceased to be a fatal. 
inevitable phenomenon. War can and must be 
avoided ~ow" (Korovin, 1951, p. 595, my 
emphasis) . 
Similarly, another author pointed out that although the 
principle of the inevitability of war in ~he era of 
imperialism was correct for some historical conditions, 
it could not "be transferred unreservedly to new 
historical conditions" (Seleznev, 1951, p. 37). 
In liThe Economic Problems of S·ocialism ll (1952a, pp. 
469-13) S~alin himself strongly implied that although 
intra-imperialist wars were inevitable, war between 
socialism and capitalism was avoidabl~ both because the 
capitalis~s realized that it would mean the demise of 
capitalism/and because they knew that the USSR would not 
attack them. In his brief speech at the 19th Congress of 
the CPSU he maintained that although the contradictions 
between the socialist and capitalist camps were greater 
than intra-imperialist contradictions, it was within the 
capitalist world that war continued to be inevitable 
(Stalin, 1952b, pp. 7-8).3 
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Despite these hints of doctrinal change, the idea that 
war was no longer inevitable did not gain wide currency 
immediately. The de-Stalinization of Soviet military 
doctrine is said to have played 
struggle between Malenkov and 
a role in the power 
Khrushchev and was the 
subject of a long controversy amongst Soviet strategists 
(documented in Dinerstein, 1962). As late as 1955 some 
theorists were still maintaining that although war could 
be avoided, "as long as capitalism exists, wars are 
inevitable" (Marksizm-leninizm 0 vOine, armii i voennoi 
nauke [MVAVNJ, 1955, p. 30). But there was a caveat:. the 
peace movement could prevent particular wars (MVAVN, 
1955, pp. 37-40). 
Thus Khrushchev's announcement at the 20th Party 
Congress in 1956 that war was not a fatal inevitability 
was not a complete innovation (Khrushchev, 1956a, p. 
37). What was new was the way that Khrushchev blurred 
the distinction between different kinds of war, implying 
that all wars had ceased to be fatally inevitable: the 
forces of peace in the world camp of socialism had the 
moral and material means to prevent aggression. But the 
danger of war would continue as long as imperialism 
existed. Three years later Khrushchev still maintained 
that "the conclusion drawn by the 20th Party Congress 
that war is not fatally inevitable has been completely 
justified" (Khrushchev, 1959b, p. 58). Because of the 
new balance of forces in the world, world war could be 
excluded from the life of .ociety before the complete 
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triumph of socialism. Once again he made no distinction 
between different kinds of war. By the following year, 
however, Chinese objections to this formulation had 
caused him to modify the doctrine. World war could be 
prevented, but national liberation. could involve armed 
struggle. Moreover, there was a possibility that the 
transition to socialism would not be peaceful 
("Statement of the Meeting of Representatives of the 
Communist and Workers' Parties", 1960, pp. 8-14). At the 
22nd Congress Khrushchev reiterated that war between 
states had ceased to be inevitable. Soviet power had 
deterred the imperialists from unleashing war 
(Khrushchev, 1961, pp. 42-3). 
The phrases "war is not fatally inevitable" and "the 
elimination of world wars from the life of society" were 
used constantly during Khrushchev's tenure of office. 
But it was made increasingly clear that what was 
avoidable was war between socialism and capitalism. 
Sokolovskiy (1963, pp. 176-7), for example, listed 
possible new wars of conquest by imperialists; wars 
betwee~ imperialist countries; revolutionary wars to 
bring about SOCialism; and national liberation wars. He 
maintained that: 
" ... despite the unrelenting struggle of the 
Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp 
as well as all men of good will -- for ,peace, 
the occurrence of wars is not excluded 
(Sokolovskiy, 1963, pp. 202-3). 
The emphasis on Soviet power as the means of averting 
world war increased. In 1956 Khrushchev had mentioned 
339 
the moral and material means to preven~ war. By 1959 ~he 
new balance of forces was said to prevent war and in 
1961 it was Soviet power. Sokolovskiy (1963, p. 49) 
attributed· ~he avoidance of war to the increasing 
defence po~ential of ~he Soviet Union and other 
socialist countries. The moral means (in other words, 
the peace movemen~) was not excluded, bu~ there was a 
distinct shift in the balance of emphasis. 
When Brezhnev came to power he endorsed the formulations 
of the 20th, 21st and 22nd Congresses (Brezhnev, 1965, 
p. 154). But from the beginning of the seventies there 
was a distinct change in terminology. From time to time, 
~heorists still used the formulation that world war was 
no longer inevitable (see, for example, Milovidov, 1377, 
p. 18), but Brezhnev began to stress the need to avert 
war, the danger of the arms race, the positive benefits 
of arms negotiations and the peaceful nature of Soviet 
foreign policy, often omitting whether war was 
inevitable (Brezhnev, 1971, 1976, 1981). The 
avoidability of war was explained in the 1961 edition of 
Mark.sizm-leninizm 0 voine i armi i (MVAJ in these' words: 
" ... Thus wars do not emerge spontaneously or 
automatically. They are prepared and unleashed 
by the conscious and organized action of 
particular parties and governments in the 
imperialist states. Therefore when there are 
sufficiently powerful and well-organized 
forces within society struggling to maintain 
peace, it is quite possible that wars can be 
avoided, even if the majority of countries· 
have a bourgeois system. Wars are not fatally 
inevi tabl." (MVA, 1961,. p. 37). 
In subsequent editions the formulation had been reduced 
to: 
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"Thus wars emerge neither spontaneously nor 
automatically. They are deliberately prepared 
and unleashed by definite parties and 
governments of the imperialist states" (MVA, 
1965, p. 21; 1968, p. 20; 1972, p. 25).4 
The omission of the avoidability of war seemed to 
coincide with the contemplation within the Soviet Union 
of the possibility of winning nuclear war. Already in 
1962 SOkolovskiy had contradicted Khrushchev by claiming 
that the chances of attaining decisive political goals 
in a modern war had been enormously increased and that 
communism would be victorious in such a war 
(Sokolovskiy, 1963, pp. 170, 203). But other writers 
were graphic in portraying the hollow Victory that this 
would represent: 
"Without a doubt, if the imperialists were to 
launch a new world war, the result would be 
that the whole system of capitalism would find 
its grave in it. But will socialist states and 
the struggle for sooialism throughout the 
world gain from that war? Of course it will 
not. The revolutionary transition of peoples 
to socialism and the building of communism are 
incompatible with thermonuclear war" (MVA, 
1965 edition, p. 88). 
By 1977 peaoe was still said to advance the cause of 
revolution more effectively than war, but there was said 
to be "profound error and harm in the disorienting 
claims ••. that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear 
world war •.• The existence of sophisticated hardware 
making possible the annihilation of hundreds of millions 
of people by no means signifies the irrevocable doom of 
mankind if a nuclear war erupts· (Milovidov, 1977, pp. 
17 It 129). 
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It was almost as if Soviet theorists had begun to "think 
the unthinkable" for which they criticized the Chinese 
in the 1950s and 1960s and Herman Kahn later 
(Shakhnazarov, 1984, pp. 170-1). Nuclear war should be 
averted. But if it could not be averted, there were 
still grounds for .optimism, because socialism would 
emerge victorious. More than any other aspect of Soviet 
theory of war, this reflected the problem of putting the 
dictum "if you want peace, prepare for war" into 
practice in the nuclear age. The problem was not, 
however, unique to the Soviet Union. It was inherent in 
the concept of deterrence. If the price of peace was the 
demonstration that war would, if necessary)be fought, 
then the armed forces and people had to be prepared for 
war. And to prepare them, they had to believe that war 
could be won. Moreover, they had to be convinced that it 
would be a war worth winning. 
The causes of war 
Although war seemed to become more inevitable as Soviet 
military doctrine shifted towards the need to be 
prepared to fight and win a future war, Soviet theorists 
an~ policy makers have remained adamant that any future 
war would be caused by imperialism and not by socialism. 
The cause of the First and Second World Wars was thought 
to be the uneven development of capitalism. It was the 
most likely stimulus of any future world war, since it 
had already caused' many existinq military conflicts 
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(MVA, 1965, p. 34). 
Contradictions within the capitalist system and the 
imperialist struggle for world domination were further 
causes of war. There was also a danger of accidental war 
(Sokolovskiy, 1963, p. 183), although this had decreased 
with the establishment of the hot line and the beginning 
of Soviet-American negotiations. But Soviet theorists 
recognized that the most likely cause of nuclear war was 
the escalation of international crises: 
"The danger of slipping to the edge of a 
general war as a result of attempts of the 
aggressors to take revenge for their failures, 
thus increasing the scale of the conflict, has 
become more likely" (Zhurkin and Primakov, 
1972, p. 19). 
It was thought to be the contradictions within 
imperialism which led ~o international crisis and 
conflict. Moreover, the increasing complexity of the 
world had increased the number of possible 
contradictions. The main contradictions ware, first, 
those between the capitalist and socialist worlds, 
second, contradictions between imperialism and the 
national liberation movement, third, intra-imperialist 
contradictions, fourth, contradictions between 
imperialist states and developing countries, and fifth, 
between countries of the Third World. A new danger of 
crisis arose from the divisive, chauvinistic forces in 
China (Zhurkin and Primakov, 1972, p. 1'). 
AQcording to Soviet theorist. the world became a far 
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more dangerous place at the end of the seventies because 
the intra-imperialist contradictions which were the root 
cause of war had become more acute. The 
intra-imperialist struggle for markets, raw materials 
and energy had increased, and so had the aggressive, 
adventurist tendencies of imperialism. (Petrenko and 
Popov, 1981, pp. 171-2).5 
No Soviet theorists have ever suggested that socialist 
policies (apart from the deviant policies of China) 
could cause war. Imperialism has always been seen as the 
sole instigator of war and armed conflict. As proof of 
this fact, theorists and politicians have repeatedly 
pointed out that war is inimical to the aims of 
socialism. The general consensus on this matter is aptly 
reflected in the following: 
"The Soviet Union, like the other countries of 
real socialism, do not need war ... because it 
brings death and suffering to the toilers •.• 
because ·the construction of a new social 
system demands the concentration of the 
material and spiritual forces of society on 
the resolution of tasks of a completely 
peaceful nature: the building of a 
material-technical base sufficient to create a 
surplus of material goods and the transition 
to distribution according to need. They do not 
need war because the two other main tasks of 
building communism the construction of 
entirely just and harmonious relationships 
between people and the educating of a new, 
completely developed individual can ·.150 
only be succe.sfully completed in conditions 
of peace" (Petrenko and Popov, 1981, p. 154). 
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Type. of war 
The Leninist division of wars into just and unjust has 
been retained by all subsequent theorists. Just wars 
have been defined as those the population regards as 
just, or "any war which is waged by the people in the 
name of freedom and social progress, for liberation from 
exploitation and national oppression, in defence of 
state independence against an aggressive attack" (MVA, 
1965, pp. 70-1). But Soviet writers have tended to 
equate just wars with those that serve the interests of 
the proletarian class struggle or the interests of the 
Soviet Union. The characterization of the Second World 
War as an unjust war until the Soviet Union participated 
in it is an example of this. 
The justness of a war has been said by Soviet theorists 
to influence the "moral factor" in war. 4:'\ut, ""tire 
supported by the population and therefore they generate 
energy, enthusiasm and high morale, cementing society 
into a single, monolithic whole (Grechko, 1977, pp. 
164-5). When the moral-political factor is high, the 
population displays the "readiness ••• to endure the 
extremely heavy trials of modern warfare without losing 
the will to fight and to defea.t the enemy" (KVA, 1968, 
p. 275). The reason why this has been considered 
particularly important is that the moral-political and 
psychological capabilities of both population and army 
are considered to be one of the •• ven factors which 
345 
determine the outcome of the war (the other six are: the 
qualitative and quantitative correlation of military 
forces at the beginning of the war; the correlation of 
military potentials; the political content of the war; 
the correlation of military-economic capabilities; the 
correlation of economic capabilities and the correlation 
of scientific potential, MVA, 1974, pp. 89-99). Since 
socialism, by definition, only fights just wars, and 
imperialism almost invariably wages unjust wars, 
socialists are thought to be superior to imperialists in 
this respect. 
Although socialists do not initiate war, it has always 
been considered that it is their duty to support the 
just wars of oppressed peoples, whether these are 
colonial wars of national liberation or civil wars 
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie (Problems of 
War and Peace, 1972, p. 97). ,Historically the 
requirement to support just war has been the cause of 
some embarrassment to the Soviet leadership. There have 
been occasions when the Soviet Union has lacked the 
material and logistic means to offer more than verbal 
support. At other times verbal and/or material support 
have contradicted the particular image the Soviet 
leadership wished to project.6 With increasing Soviet 
military potential and loqistic capability, military aid 
became an important instrument of foreign policy in the 
1970salthouqh, as we saw in Chapter 5, this has 
sometime. been at the expense of other, hi;her prio%ity 
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foreign policy goals. This dilemma has not been 
explicitly discussed in the literature, but it must 
figure prominently in Soviet foreign policy decision 
making. 
Soviet theorists are inordinately fond of typologies. 
Lenin's initial categories have been elaborated and 
expanded to cover a wide range of theoretically possible 
wars. Sokolovskiy (1963, p. 178) listed three possible 
types: world war between socialist and capitalist camps; 
small imperialist wars either against national 
liberation forces or between capitalist countries and 
national liberation; and other popular wars. The editors 
of the 1965 edition of Marksizm-leninizm 0 voine i armii 
divided Sokolovskiy's second and third types into civil 
wars; national liberation wars) and wars between 
bourgeois states (pp. 80-1). 
Gantman (in Zhurkin and Primakov, 1972, pp. 34-6) 
offered a more ambitious typology, dividing conflicts 
into 3 main categories. The first category, caused by 
the struggle between the two socio-economic systems, 
contained 6 subtypes; conflict between individual North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO) and Warsaw Treaty 
Organization (WTO) members; between the two alliances; 
between the two superpowers; conflict caused by an 
imp~ialist power interfering in the domestic affairs of 
a WTO member; conflict resulting from blockade or the 
threat of aggression against a non-WTO Bocialist state; 
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and finally, conflict resulting from direct aggression 
by an imperialist state against a non-WTO socialist 
state. There were 5 possible subtypes in Gantm~n/s 
second category, conflict resulting from imperialist 
attempts to suppress the national liberation movement: 
conflict could be caused by attempts to suppress a 
national liberation revolution by economic, political or 
military means; or it might be caused by the export of 
counter-revolution to a socialist oriented state. The 
imperialists could support expansionism on the part of 
medium and small capitalist oriented states or, as 
colonial and neocolonial forces, they could cause 
conflict in areas not yet liberated. The fifth 
possibility would arise from imperialist attempts to set 
Third World countries against one another. G~ntman/s 
third main category reflected intra-imperialist 
contradictions. It contained three possible subtypes: 
conflict resulting from economic, political or military 
conflict between large imperialist powers; between 
medium and small NATO members; or between NATO members 
and neutral countries. 
Although Gantman did not claim that his categories were 
exhaustive, he clearly did not think that the omission 
of • category for "inter-socialist conflict was 
significant. He allowed for the possibility of 
intra-s6cialist conflict (caused, for exampl~, by 
China), but contended that it was an isolated phenomenon 
and therefore did not require a category in his 
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typology. Grechko (i977, pp. 267-77) offered a less 
ambitious typology, classifying wars according to 
socio-political character (4 types which corresponded to 
those listed in Marksizm-leninizm 0 voine iarmii and 
mentioned above); political aims (just and progressive 
or unjust and reactionary) and geographic scope (local, 
confined to a few countries or w,orld wars). 
In the Khrushchev era the term "local war" was reserved 
for small, unjust, imperialist wars. Later it was 
extended to include civil wars and national liberation 
wars, which meant that the term also included wars that 
were considered just. But Soviet theorists in general 
have been increasingly conscious of the danger that 
local wars can escalate into East-West confrontation: 
"History has shown that lim{ted wars serve as 
the prelude to world wars and hasten their 
occurrence ... given the tense and complex 
international situation, the complex system of 
mutual treaty obligations among the states of 
the different camps and the rapid advance in 
nuclear technology, there is always the danger 
that [local conflict will develop into a world 
conflict], especially where nuclear weapons 
are employed II (Problems of War and Peace, 
1972, p. 90-1). 
Although the idea of a limited conventional war for 
limited political objectives has gradually become more 
acceptable, Soviet theorists have "continued to point out 
that -there exists no insurmountable barrier between a 
limited war and a world war" (Milovidov, 1977, p. 48). 
The concept of a limited nuclear war, however, has been 
completely rejected and roundly condemned by Soviet 
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theorists and politicians. Sokolovskiy's assertion 
(1963, p. 189) that a nuclear war would spread 
instantaneously over the entire globe has been 
reaffirmed over and over again. When President Reagan 
seemed to support the view that a limited nuclear war 
was possible (The Guardian, 21 October 1981), Soviet 
fears that they were dealing with someone who did not 
understand that fact were greatly heightened. 
Few theorists have grappled in print with the problem of 
conflicts which do not easily fit into a 
Marxist-Leninist schema. The tendency has been either to 
ignore them, or to attribute them to imperialist 
intervention. Conflicts between developing countries 
(the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, for example) are usually 
attributed to imperialism, not only because the roots of 
these conflicts lie in 'the colonial past, but also 
bec~use of the imp.rialist tendency to form military 
blocs, arm and encourage chauvinistic and adventurist 
circles within the developing countries and aggravate 
. existing conflicts (Zhurkin and Primakov, 1972, pp. 
139-40). Occasionally it has been admitted that not all 
Third World conflicts fit into the existing 
Marxist-Leninist typology and the need for a new 
Leninist analysis has been voiced (Milovidov, 1977, 
33-4). But there has been little evidence in 
literature of new Marxist-Leninist analy~es of 
World conflicts. 
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Those theorists who have admitted and discussed 
intra-socialist conflict have blamed chauvinistic, 
nationalistic tendencies in the case of the Sino-Soviet 
dispute (Sanakoyev and Kapchenko, 1973, pp. 49-53) and 
the Chinese-Vietnamese war (Gantman, 1981, pp. 303-4). 
Conflict within the Warsaw alliance, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, has usually been blamed on forces of 
internal and external reaction. As a result, Soviet 
intervention in Hungary in 1956 and WTO intervention in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 have been considered defensive 
and just. Neither intervention has been defined as a 
case of war. As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the 
standard explanation is that the Soviet Union acted in 
fulfillment of its treaty obligations. The intention was 
to help the Afghan government to defend its "national 
sovereignty, freedom and independence ... against external 
armed actions" (Petrenko and Popov, 1981, p. 173). While 
the need to analyse intra-socialist conflict has be~n 
recognized, a new analysis does not yet exist. In the 
same way that the existence of a doctrine of limited 
sovereignty has always been refuted vehemently 
(Sanakoyev and Kapchenko, 1973, pp. 58-9 and see Chapter 
7 above), it has been inconceivable to Soviet theorists 
that - intervention wi thin the WTO or the socialist 5yst.em 
can be classified as a war by the Soviet Union or the 
WTO against the country in which the intervention has 
taken place. 
Clearly, if Soviet theorists and policy mak.r. • •• 
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imperialism as the cause of war always and everywhere, 
~hen the over~ or hidden hand of imperialism mu~t also 
be responsible for intra-socialist dissent. This is no 
more than a mirror image of the tendency in the West to 
at~ribu~e domestic strife, terrorism and 
conflict to the hidden hand of Moscow. But in 
foreign 
the West 
there is almost always a parallel attempt to establish a 
less simplis~ic cause and effect relationship. Similar 
at~empts probably occur in the secret corridors of power 
in the Soviet Union, but they do not often reach the 
public ear. 
War and Revolution 
In the early years after the October revolution there 
seemed little question that revolution would be violent. 
Indeed, the purpose of the 21 conditions of admission to 
the Third International (Degras, Vol. 1, 1956, pp. 
166-72) was to ensure that the Bolshevik model would 
prevail. Although the Comintern tactics changed often, 
the expectation that revolution would probably require 
violent struggle remained constant. In 1924, for 
example, the Comintern theses on tactics maintained that 
the job of true adherents to the proletarian revolution 
was "to mobilize the proletarian army for irreconcilable 
revolutionary struggle II (Degras, Vol. 2, 1960, p. 147). 
At the sixth, more radical, Comintern Congress in 1928, 
armed insurrection at the correct revolutionary. moment 
was called "the high.st form of struggle" which followed 
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"the rules of the art of war" (Degras, Vol. 2, 1960, p. 
522) • 
The desire for collective security in the 1930s and the 
need to project a peaceful image turned revolution into 
a secondary issue. The Comintern concentrated on forming 
popular fronts to govern bourgeois states, rather than 
revolution. When war broke out in 1939, Molotov called 
it an imperialist war (Degras, Vol. 3, 1953, p. 390). 
But there was little talk of turning it into a 
revolutionary, civil war. The connections examined 
earlier in this chapter that Lenin had made between war 
and revolution seemed to have been forgotten. When 
Germany attacked the Soviet Union, European communists 
were instructed to fight for democracy against fascism, 
rather than for socialism and international revolution. 
The coming of socialism to Eastern Europe occurred 
gradually and without the violent overthrow of bourgeois 
regimes. There has been no suggestion in Soviet 
literature that the presence of the Red Army was 
responsible in any coercive way, although according to 
the 1980 dictionary of Scientific Communism (transl&t~d 
in 1984), "following World War iI old reactionary 
governments were overthrown (by armed forces at home or 
with the assistance of the Soviet army)" (Rumyantsev, 
1984, p. 14). Soviet power has also been discounted aa a 
reason for "the establishment of s~cialism in Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia and the incorporation of the •• 
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coun~ries into the Sovie~ Union (Narochnitskii, 1979, 
pp.ll0-25). Whatever the facts might have been, the 
principle was thus established for non-violent 
revolution. Once again it was Khrushchev who turned this 
principle into an articulated tenet of Soviet theory. 
As we have seen in Chapter 7, at the 20th Congress of 
the CPSU Khrushchev announced that there were many 
possible roads to socialism, not excluding the election 
of communist governments in democratic elections 
(Khrushchev, 1956a, pp. 37-8). Although by 1960 he no 
longer excluded violent revolution, the peaceful 
transition to socialism remained a 
Subsequent policy makers and theorists have continued to 
allow for both peaceful and violent revolution: 
"Revolutionary class violence is the law and 
method by which (socialist] revolutions are 
brought about. But the forms in which they are 
brought about can also be varied, both 
peaceful and non-peaceful" (Butenko, 1975, p. 
306). 
As far as the indirect effects of war were concerned, 
the Second World War was thought to have been 
instrumental in creating the requisite domestic turmoil 
for the countries of Eastern Europe to become "national 
democracies" (Malenkov, 1952, p. 106). Since both the 
First and the Second World Wars had caused parts of the 
globe to become socialist, it seemed logical to assume 
that a third world war would cause the collapse of the 
entire capitalist .ystem (Malenkov, 1952, p. 106). 
Although, as we have seen, this formulation fell out of 
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use in the late fifties and sixties, once it was posited 
that socialism could emerge victorious from a future 
nuclear war, nuclear war, too, had the potential for 
making what was left of the world socialist. 
Nonetheless, Soviet theorists have stressed that there 
is no necessary connection between war and revolution: 
•.. Although at particular stages of historical 
development wars accompany revolution ... the 
revolutionary situation itself comes about as 
a .result of the maturing of internal 
conditions. It is indicative that the third 
stage of the general crlS1S of capitalism 
developed not in connection with a new war, 
but in conditions of peaceful coexistence" 
(Butenko, 1975, p. 317). 
In other words, it was decolonization, not war, that had 
prompted the third stage of the general crisis of 
capitalism. In any case, it was recognized that far from 
always acting as a catalyst for revolution, in some 
circumstances war postponed it because it .timulated 
nationalism in the working class. It could also provoke 
the ruling class to repress the workers' movement 
(Lebedev et al, 1981, pp. 27-8). 
Soviet theorists and policy makers have consistently 
refuted the idea that war by itself causes revolution or 
that revolution can be exported. A revolution can only 
occur when the necessary material requisites for it have 
matured within society (Zagladin, 1973, p. 168). 
Therefore ,socialism can neither be transferred from one 
country to another by means of military force (Brezhnav, 
1973, p. 128), nor made to order or be given a push 
(Butenko, 1975, p. 307). In fact, Soviet scholars ••• no 
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need for outside intervention. There has been a distinct 
move back from Leninist voluntarism to Marxist 
determinism in Soviet thinking. History itself will 
ensure that revolution takes place, since "the 
transition from capitalism to communism is an 
objectively determined, natural historical process" 
(Petrenko and Popov, 1981, p. 154). 
The most dramatic change which occurred in Soviet 
thinking about war was, of course, the shift from 
inevitable to avoidable war. But the other adaptations 
have been significant. The change in the nature of war 
made adaptation essential. Nuclear weapons and the 
danger of escalation to nuclear war have rendered war an 
irrational means of politics and an impossible way to 
spread revolution. As one Western scholar has expressed 
it, nuclear weapons have severed the connection between 
war and revolution (Lynch, 1984, p. 310). The only wars 
that can now be envisaged are wars in defence of the 
revolution. 
2. Neutralism and non-alignment 
There was very little in Marxist-Leninist theory to help. 
post-war Soviet theorists explain and accept the 
phenomenon of neutralism or non-alignment. Neutrality 
was a recognized phenomenon. Lenin had been rather 
contemptuous of it, calling it: 
NThe petty striving of petty states to hold 
aloof, the petty-bourgeois de.ire to keep as 
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far away as possible from the great battles of 
world history, to take advantage of one's 
relatively monopolistic position in order to 
remain in hidebound passivity ... ~ (Lenin, 
1916e, p. 86). 
But Soviet international lawyers have always accorded 
legal status to neutrality and recognized permanent 
neutrality. The latter was believed to limit sovereignty 
and to be incompatible with membership of international 
organizations (Pashukanis, 1935). Permanent neutrals 
should not even belong to a customs union, since : 
" ... there is no doubt that customs unions to a 
considerable extent determine the nature of 
the whole economic policy of a country and, 
consequently, its international conflicts" 
(Korovin, 1926, p. 57). 
But permanent neutrality and non-alignment did not 
really become issues in Soviet t~eory until after the 
Second World War. 
The initial ~esponse was to dismiss the phenomenon. 
There was no room for neutrality in the two camp image 
of the world which had replaced Stalin/s pre-war theme 
of an encircled Soviet Union. The national liberation 
movements were believed to belong to the same camp as 
the Soviet Union. Neutralism was merely an imperialist 
device. National leaders who wished lito 'remain on the 
sidelines' in relation to ••• the ~ideological conflict' 
between the USSR and the USA, in fact form a bloc with 
the reactionary bourgeoisie in slandering the USSR and 
are actively helping the imperialis~s" (Zhukov, 1949, p. 
58). Bu~ ~he new neutral na~ions were soon seen to be a 
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source of potential support and the neutralization of 
Germany and Austria seemed a possible solution to the 
problems of Europe. Although it was Khrushchev who 
translated this realization into policy, a change in 
Soviet attitudes was already perceptible in the speeches 
made at the 19th Party Congress in 195Z (Gruliow, 1953). 
Moreover, the offer of a re-united neutral Germany was 
made in 195Z, before Stalin's death. 7 
By 1955 Austria had joined Switzerland and Sweden as 
permanent neutrals with Soviet approval. Whether or not 
the bargain of German reunification in return for German 
neutrality was sincere, as Ginsburgs (1960) pointed out, 
the prospect of a united Europe had made neutralism a 
more palatable option. When the Soviet-Finnish 
Friendship Treaty was renegotiated in 1955, assurances 
were given that the treaty was based on respect for 
Finnish neutrality, a foreign policy which, it was said, 
had increased Finland's international authority.S 
Verbal approval was followed by appropriate deeds -~ the 
Soviet naval base at Porkala was returned to Finland 
(Ambartsumov, 1956). That this did not imply 'blanket 
approval for all neutrality was made abundantly clear in 
October 1956 when, in response to Nagy's declaration 
that Hungary was opting for neutrality rather than 
membership of" the Warsaw Treaty Organization, Soviet 
troops invaded Hungary. 9 
But it was the policies of the newly independent 
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ex-colonies that prompted theoretical work on permanent 
neutrality. 
(a) The zone of peace and non-alignment 
Although neutralism was not an option for Soviet allies, 
Soviet theory had already begun to change. In his report 
to the ZOth Congress· in February 1956 Khrushchev 
extended Stalin's two-camp world to include a third 
"zone of peace". In part the innovation was aimed at the 
new nations of Africa. But Khrushchev also hoped to 
attract Yugoslavia back into the Soviet sphere and he 
was aware of Tito's authority in the Third World. 
Moreover, the Bandung Conference had impressed him 
deeply: since both the socialist countries and the newly 
independent nations were anti-imperialist and believed 
in peaceful coexistence, they must be natural allies. He 
praised the "peace-loving European and Asian states 
which have proclaimed non-participation in blocs as a 
principle of their foreign policy" (Khrushchev, 1956a, 
p. 34). He promised Soviet support to 
refused to be involved in military 
relations with Finland, Austria and 
countries which 
blocs. Friendly 
other neutral 
countries would be developed and strengthened 
(Khrushchev, 1956a, p. 38). 
Soviet theorists began to explain that the existence of 
the socialist world was the ~ gua non for the 
establishment of what they variously called neutralism, 
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active neutrality, positive neutrality and 
non-alignment. The new correlation of forces and the 
certainty that the Soviet Union would counter Western 
aggression persuaded the imperialists to tolerate 
neutralism (see Modjoryan, 1956; Khabirov, 1973; 
Etinger, 1981). It was thought that neutralism had 
become a widespread aspiration after the Second World 
War because of the danger of becoming involved in a 
nuclear war. Refusal to participate in aggressive 
military blocs exemplified the higher political 
consciousness of the ex-colonial peoples (Melnikov, 
1956). 
Khrushchev had insisted in 1956 that the people in the 
zone of peace were only opposed to imperialist military 
alliances (Khrushchev, 1956a, p. 33). If that was the 
case, it might be thought that a more effective counter 
to Western aggression would have been to join the Soviet 
bloc. One Soviet theorist explained that: 
" ... the only sensible course of action would 
have been to JOln the camp of peace-loving 
states, but because of reasons of an internal 
and international nature, some states cannot 
do this. In such cases the only real poLicy 
which serves the interests of peace and 
security is non-participation in military 
blocs and coalitions" (Galina, 1958, p. 203). 
Later a less evasive explanation accepted that some 
countries genuinely wished to distance themselves from 
both capitalism and socialism: 
- ••• on the one hand, anti-imperialist 
tendencies and on the other, an unwillingness 
to co-operate too closely politically or 
economically with the socialist stat.. and 
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fear of th~ prospect of genuine socialist 
development" (Etinger and Melikyan, 1964, pp. 
10-11). 
The difference between the new neutralism and 
traditional permanent neutrality was seen to be, 
firstly, that it was based on the principles of peaceful 
coexistence (see Chapter 3, footnote 1). Secondly, it 
was anti-imperialist, active and based on broad popular 
interests. Thirdly, the new neutrals refused to own 
nuclear weapons. Like the traditional neutrals, they 
prohibited foreign military bases or the use of their 
territory by foreign planes (Tyulpanov, 1961). These 
prohibitions were interpreted as applying only to 
imperialist countries since socialist countries did not 
seek military bases on foreign territory (Tiyunov, 1965, 
p. 35). 
Soviet theorists were, to begin with, divided about 
whether'permanent neutrals could belong to international 
organizations. The debate concerned Austria, rather than 
Third World neutrals, but it became clear that behaviour 
considered unacceptable for European neutrals would be 
allowed to Third World states. In 1951 Korovin had 
maintained that membership of' collective security 
organizations was incompatible with neutral status. By 
1958 he had changed his mind. A second writer on 
neutrality thought that classical neutrality was 
incompatible. New neutrals, however, could belong to the 
United Nations without infringing international law, 
providing they accepted the precedence of the UN Charter 
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(Galina, 1958). A third objected, pointing out that it 
was the responsibility of the Security Council to 
respect the obligations of neutrals, once admission to 
<..1"\; k"e.Cl'l1 ''7(0) 
the UN had been recommendedt By 1977 non-alignment was 
said not only to be compatible with UN membership, but 
also to enhance the concept of collective security 
(Bobrov and Lukichev, 1977). 
By this time many other forms of participation were 
conSidered compatible with non-aligned status, but 
·unacceptable for the European neutral states. The 
association agreements of ex-colonies with the European 
Economic Community, for example, produced no objections. 
And although an influential Soviet authority on the 
Third World (Ul'yanovsky, 1972) continued to maintain 
that neutralism was unsuitable for states following the 
non-capitalist .path of development, 
socialist-orientation and non-alignment were soon seen 
as being compatible. 10 N~ither Soviet military aid nor 
association with the Council for Mutual Economic Aid 
[CMEAl were thought to transgress their non-aligned 
status. It was averred. that friendship and co-operation 
treaties between the Soviet Union and members of the 
non-aligned movement did not infringe non-aligned status 
because Soviet foreign policy was based on the same 
principles of peaceful coexistence (Tuzmukhamedov, 
1981) .11 
Soviet theorists and politicians hoped that the pre.ence 
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within the non-aligned movement of Cuba and socialis~ 
oriented states like Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, the 
P~ople/s Democratic Republic of Yemen and Afghanistan 
would bring about a shift in non-aligned policy. Two 
themes prominent in the movement at the beginning of the 
seventies caused them particular concern. The first was 
the concept of "equidistance" from the superpowers. It 
was firmly rejected as being irrelevant to current 
problems: 
"Life urgently requires not 'equidistance ' 
from imperialism and socialism, but mutual 
action and co-operation of the non-aligned 
movement and the socialist commonwealth in the 
business of ensuring peace and national 
liberation" (Artem/ev, 1981, p.69). 
It was hoped that the socialist-oriented states within 
the movement would oppose the concept (Tuzmukhamedov, 
1976}. The second disturbing theme was the demand for a 
New International Economic Order. As we have seen in 
Chapter 5, there was great indignation when the 
non-aligned movement included the socialist commonwealth 
among the countries which were expected to redress the 
economic wrongs of centuries.12 
That the Soviet leadership had misjudged the principles 
of non-alignment became clear in the wake of the 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1980. Members of the 
non~aligned movement voted against the Soviet Union in 
the United Nations. They also discussed Afghanistan at 
the New Delhi Non-aliqned Summit in 1983 in spite of 
pressure from the Soviet Union to remove the topic from 
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the agenda (for an account of the non-aligned response 
to the intervention, see Fullerton, 1983). Although the 
criticism was attributed to the "manoeuvres of 
imperialist forces, Pakistan and some non-aligned 
nations under their influence" (Artem'ev, 1981, p. 64), 
the Soviet Union had been served notice that the 
non-aligned movement expected the principle of 
non-interference to be honoured. 
(b) European neutralism 
The European neutrals have featured far less frequently 
in Soviet specialist literature and political speeches. 
But, with the exception of Finland's relations with the 
Soviet Union, Soviet theorists are more 
their interpretation of the demands 
stringent in 
of European 
neutralism than they are about non-alignment. The exact 
nature of the difference between Afro-Asian neutrality 
and imperialist neutrality has not really been made 
clear by Soviet theorists. European neutrality was 
thought to be akin to traditional permanent neutrality, 
primarily military, and therefore inferior to the 
positive neutralism of the Third World. Although one 
theorist suggested that "a change from Atlantio status 
to neutrality would be a move whioh would strengthen 
peaoe 
has 
and seourity" (Korovin, 1958a, p. 39), neutrality 
rarely been proposed as a viable option for 
individual European oountries. De.pite Western fears 
that the Soviet Union would like to HFinlandize" Western 
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Europe, a European collective security system has always 
been considered a superior and more reliable means of 
preserving peace. 
The compatibility of collective security and neutralism 
was finally accepted by Soviet theorists when Austria 
joined the United Nations. But membership of other 
international organizations caused more problems. The 
argument arose over the possibility of Austria joining 
the European Economic Community [EEC]. Although Austrian 
membership of the European Free Trade Area and the 
Council of Europe had not been criticized, the Common 
Market was seen to be the economic arm of NATO. In the 
process of arguing the case against Austrian membership, 
Soviet theorists broadened their definition of European 
neutralism. It was no longer primarily military, but was 
a policy with "military, political, economic and even 
ideological aspects" (Tyulpanov, 1961, p. 33), each of 
which was equally important. Association with the EEC 
was particularly unacceptable because the Rome Treaty 
was seen as the preparatory stage for political union. 
In any case, association would make a~ even-handed 
economic policy towards third countries impossible 
(Osnitskaya, 1962). Soviet fears about the consequences 
of Austrian membership seem to have been sincere, but 
since the association agreements of the non-aligned 
states had not produced any such outcry, it seemed that 
it was not Austrian neutrality that was at issue, but 
the intense distrust Soviet leaders felt for the EEC and 
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their anxiety about any enlargement of the Western bloc. 
As the advantages of East-West trade began to outweigh 
ideological objections, Soviet attitudes softened. 
Finland was allowed to sign a free trade agreement with 
the EEC in 1972, in return for a similar agreement with 
CMEA. Irish membership of the EEC was treated less 
generously, but Irish neutrality had always been treated 
with the same scepticism with which Finnish neutrality 
was regarded by the West. 
The European neutral which has always presented Soviet 
politicians and theorists with the greatest difficulty 
is Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia has usually been ignored in 
discussions of non-alignment, and Tito's role in 
founding both the concept and the movement has been 
passed over in silence, credit being given to Sukarno, 
Nasser and Nehru (see, for example, Etinger and 
Melikyan, 1964; a rare exception is Tuzmukhamedov, 1976, 
whQ praised Tito's contribution). When Soviet-Yugoslav 
relations have been bad, non-alignment has been a stick 
with which Soviet leaders have tried to beat Yugoslavia. 
Khrushchev, for example, maintained that ~ugoslav 
neutrality "carries a distinct odour of the American 
monopolies which nourish 'Yugoslav socialism'" 
(Khrushchev, 1959b, p. 62). The statement issued by the 
November 1960 meeting of 81 Communist and Worker's 
Parties accused Yugoslavia of using the pretext of being 
outside blocs to Uengage in activities which prejudice 
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the unity of all the peace-loving forces and countries" 
("Statement of the Meeting of Representatives of the 
Communist and Workers' Parties", 1960, p. 15). On the 
other hand, when Soviet-Yugoslav relations have been 
good, the subject of Yugoslav non-alignment has been 
tactfully ignored (for example, Brezhnev, 1981). 
As we have seen, it was h6ped that Cuba's presence and 
that of the socialist-oriented states would set the 
non-aligned movement on a more pro-Soviet course. 
Yugoslavia blocked the attempt. But Soviet policy makers 
have a longer standing reason for worrying about 
Yugoslavia's non-alignment. It represents a threat to 
socialist unity, in that it offers an alternative model 
to other European socialist states. 
(c) Non~aliqnment and national liberation 
An intriguing feature of the Soviet treatment of 
non-alignment and neutralism is the difference between 
the language which has been used 
literature and that uttered or 
statements and speeches. 13 Soviet 
in the specialist 
written in political 
political speeches, 
reports, statements and programmes have, since Stalin1s 
death, commended the adoption of the principles of 
co-existence by Third World countries, their stand 
against war and for peace, their anti-imperialism and 
anti-colonialism and, most particularly, their refusal 
to partiCipate in imperialist military blocs and 
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alliances. But the praise has almost always been given 
to the Afro-Asian nations or to the forces of national 
liberation and rarely to the non-aligned movement. 
At the 20th Party Congress, for example, Khrushchev 
(1956a) spoke of the countries which stand for peace and 
refuse to be involved in military blocs. In his report 
to the 21st Congress, he mentioned neutrality and 
non-alignment only to criticize Yugoslavia (Khrushchev, 
1959b, pp.60-2). At the 22nd Congress he maintained that 
the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America were Uby 
no means neutral when it comes to the fu·ndamental 
question of the day -- the question of war and peace" 
(Khrushchev, 1961b, p. 49). The Programme of the CPSU 
adopted at that Congress referred to the "growing number 
of countries that adhere to a policy of neutrality and 
strive to safeguard themselves against the hazards of 
participation in aggressive military blocs" <"Programme 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union", 1961, pp. 
84-5). In contrast, a vast amount of space was allotted 
in those speeches to the national liberation movement 
and the break up of colonial empires, both of which were 
said to have contributed to the third stage in the final 
crisis of capitalism. 
Brezhnev, too, showed a marked preference for the term 
national liberation movement. Neither non-alignment nor 
neutralism rated an entry in the index to the 1973 
collection of his speeches, although there were 77 
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entries for the national liberation movement (Brezhnev, 
1973). 
Soviet theory has at-tempted to adjust to the reality of 
the non-aligned movement and of the active neutralism of 
the European neutrals, but it has had difficulty in 
incorporating, them within the confines of the 
Marxist-Leninist world view. The European neutrals 
ft I tp~' eo tl "'" 
(apart from L Yugoslavia) are capitalist. They should be 
filled with conflict and prone to war. Yugoslavia, a 
socialist state, cannot both be socialist and affiliated 
to a separate group of states. The non-aligned movement, 
anti-imperialist though it may be, is a detour in the 
linear progression of history envisaged by 
Marxist-Leninist theory. Lenin predicted that the 
national liberation movement would progress towards 
socialism. He did not expect it to turn into a third 
force, one that does not always identify itself with the 
positions and actions of the leading socialist power. In 
using the terms neutral or non-aligned, it is this 
unpredicted and ahistorical aspect of the movement which 
is emphasized. As long as it is called the national 
liberation movement, it seems to be a more hopeful 
phenomenon. 
3. P.ac. 
The desire for peace was skilfully used by the 
Bolsheviks in the period following the February 
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revolution in their slogan "Peace, Bread, Freedom". It 
was immediately translated into the first foreign policy 
act of the new regime. The Peace Decree, issued on 
November 8, 1917, offered a just peace without 
annexations or reparations (Degras, Vol. 1, 1951, pp. 
1-3). Although one Western theorist has interpreted it 
and the accompanying armistice offer as 
"instrumentalities for the transformation of world war 
into a series of civil, revolutionary wars which.,.would 
bring about communist peace by extending social 
revolution to new areas" (Taracouzio, 1940, p. 66), it 
had little to do with Leninist theories of revolution. 
Peace was essential for the survival of the state, 
irrespective of the regime. 
Lenin understood the urgency rather better than his 
fellow Bolsheviks. It was only after the failure of 
Trotsky's "no peace, no war" strategy at Brest-Litovsk 
and the advance of the German army that he managed to 
persuade them that whatever his own theory predicted, 
there was no other option but to accept the terms 
offered by the Germans. The survival of the Soviet state 
was given priority over the immediate advance of 
international revolution. As we have seen, before long 
the future of the international revolution was to be 
, 
interpreted in terms of the survival of the Soviet 
state. 
The peace-loving nature of Soviet foreign policy has 
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been a persistent theme of policy statements, specialist 
literature and political speeches from 1917 onwards. 
Over the years a number of national and international 
campaigns have been launched in support of peace. Soviet 
disarmament and collective security proposals have been 
made in the name of peace. Yet there has been curiously 
little theory which deals with peace. 
The Soviet Peace Policy 
It is almost as if the meaning and content of peace have 
been taken for granted by Soviet theorists. Neither the 
1961 nor the 1985 diplomatic dictionaries (Gromyko et 
al, 1961 and Gromyko et al 1985) contain~entries for 
peace, although both had entries for peaceful 
coexistence. Nor does it appear in the 1980 Dictionary 
of Scientific Communism (Rumyantsev, 1984). To find a 
Soviet definition of peace, the analyst has to consult 
the literature on the Soviet peace policy. The aim of 
the Soviet peace policy is to exclude war (with the 
exception of just wars of independence and national 
liberation) from the life of humankind (Shakhnazarov,. 
1984, p. 21). Peace, therefore, is the absence of war. 
Khrushchev distinguished between peace and peaceful 
coexistence, and it was clear from his definition that 
p~aceful coexistence was more positive than peace: 
"Peace and peaceful coexistence are not quite 
the same thing. Peaceful coexistence is not 
simply the absence of war, not an unstable 
truce between wars. It is the coexistence of 
two opposing social systems, founded on the 
mutual renunciation of war as a means of 
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settling disputes between states" (Khrushchev, 
1961b, p. 49). 
The problem for Sovie~ ~heorists in cons~ruc~ing a more 
positive theory of peace is, perhaps, tha~ peace is an 
unattainable ideal before in~ernational revolution. 
According ~o Marxist-Leninist theory, it is only then 
that perfect peace will occur, because it is only then 
that class antagonisms will disappear, and with them, 
conflict and war. Marx predicted that: 
" ... in contrast to old society, a new society 
is springing up, whose International rule will 
be Peace, because its national ruler will be 
everywhere the same -- Labour" (Marx, 1871, p. 
490) . 
Modern theorists believe that peace is "a social ideal 
which can only be fully realized in a classless 
society ... and fully guaranteed when communism has 
finally achieved universal victory" (Petrenko and Popov, 
1981, p. 154). But before the ideal is realized, 
peaceful relations provide the best "exte.rnal conditions 
for the successful building of socialism and communism" 
(Korovin, 1951, p. 574). In part this is because peace 
creates the opportunity for domestic soci~l and economic 
development. But peaceful relations are also required 
because "in conditions of peace ... the superiority of the 
socialist social system is revealed most fully" 
(Narochnitsky ~ al, 1979, p. 22). 
Peace,' like war, is said to be the continuation of 
politics, but by non-violent means (Problems of War and 
Peace, 1972, p. 72). And like war, peace can b. just or 
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unjust, -depending on the particular historical 
circumstances, on the class whose policy it is, on the 
kind of peace which is proposed and to whom it is 
advantageous (Petrenko and Popov, 1981, pp. 153-154). 
Certain kinds of peaceful relations, those which 
"strengthen [Soviet] class positions and favour the 
development of the world revolutionary process" make the 
transition to socialism in other countries more likely 
(Butenko, 1975, pp. 307-8). 
As we have seen, even at the most optimistic period of 
Khrushchev's assertion that there was no fatal 
inevitability of war, the danger of war was said to 
remain. It has always, th~refore, been considered 
essential that the Soviet Union possesses a defence 
potential capable of deterring any imperialist attack, 
while pursuing policies and making proposals to further 
the peaceful aims of Soviet foreign policy. It has also 
always been considered important to mobilize the forces 
for peace. Khrushchev pointed out that: 
"Wind from words won't turn windmills •.. still 
less can the war machine of the aggressors be 
held in check with talk of peace. Decisive and 
vigorous action is needed" (Khrushchev, 1961b, 
p. 50). 
There are three ways in which Soviet politicians believe 
that their decisive and vigorous action has always 
promoted peace: by mobilizing world opinion in favour of 
peace~ by pursuing policies which enhance peace; and by 
ensuring that the level of Soviet armament. is 
sufficiently high ~o pr.v.n~ military conflict between 
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the two blocs, counter-revolutionary attacks against 
individual bloc members or against the national 
liberation movemen~ and the escalation of local wars 
into world war. All three aspects have been considered 
important, although more and more reliance seems to have 
been placed on the efficacy of Soviet power. 
Since propaganda has always been an important aspect of 
Marxist activity14, the efforts which have been put into 
peace propaganda are not surprising. The 1917 Decree on 
Peace has been invoked by subsequent Soviet theorists 
and politicians as concrete proof of the early origins 
of the Soviet peace policy (see, for example, Zhurkin 
and Primakov, 1972, p. 218). It was addressed both to 
the peoples of the belligerent countries and to their 
governments. Its purpose was thus as much propaganda as 
a practical proposal for ending World War I. It has been 
followed over the years by countless declamations on the 
theme of peace and the peaceful nature of Soviet foreign 
policy. To point out that these statements are directed 
both towards moulding Soviet public opinion in favour of 
government policy and towards influencing world public 
opinion in favour of the Soviet U~ion is not to make any 
judgement about their sincerity. But calling them 
declamations draws attention to the fact that they tend 
to be assertions, with very little reference to 
Maixist-Leninist theory. That "the Soviet Union is & 
profoundly peace-loving state" (Grechko, 1977, p. 22) is 
uttered and must be accepted as a basic article of 
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faibh~ Proof bends bo be offered in berms of past and 
presenb actions, rather than theory, the very reverse of 
the usual case in Soviet polibical discourse, where 
theory (often contradicted by reality) bears the brunb 
of proof. In 1940 a Western scholar pointed out that: 
"In comparison with proletarian policies in 
regard to war, Marxian dogmas relative bo 
practical peace efforts not only occupy less 
space in 'communist writings, but also are much 
less definibe" (Taracouzio, 1940, p. 59). 
The position is very similar in post-war Soviet writings 
on international relations and problems of war and 
peace.IS 
One of the actions which was initiated by the Soviet 
Union to strengthen the forces for peace after bhe 
Second World War was to sponsor a World Peace Movemenb. 
The Stockholm Appeal against atomic weapons attracted 
660 million signatures (Korovin, 1951, pp. 590-5). Peace 
conferences and congresses have been funded which have 
aimed at bringing together various parties and groups 
interested in peace. The popularity of the mov~ment has 
fluctuated rather like that of Western anti-nuclear 
movements. The Soviet Committee for Peace is • 
prestigious, well-funded organization and the size and 
discipline of the marches for peace it organizes would 
be the envy of the organizers of any similar Western 
event. Its domestic functions include the mobilizing of 
Soviet public opinion and the formation of a sense of 
cohesion around Soviet peace proposals. Given the belief 
that Soviet military strength is the corner-stone of 
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peace, i~ is perhaps no~ surprising ~hat ~he call is 
always for a reduction in Western nuclear weapons and no 
mention is made of Soviet arms. And given the na~ure of 
~he Soviet poli~ical sys~em, there is li~~le tolerance 
of independent peace groups. 
A~ the Z4~h Congress of ~he CPSU in 1971, Brezhnev 
proposed a peace programme (Brezhnev, 1971). It was 
reaffirmed in 1976 at the 25th Congress (Brezhnev, 1976) 
and updated for the 1980s at the 26th Congress in 1981 
(Brezhnev, 1981 and see Sanakoyev and Kapchenko, 1977, 
pp. 26G & 271 and Petrenko and Popov, 1981, p. 180). All 
three programmes list the current international problems 
which need ~o be resolved if there is to be peace. Each 
lists in rather general terms measures which, in the 
opinion of ~he Soviet leadership, will enhance peace. 
Mos~ of ~hese measures have been proposed in more detail 
to the West and are usually men~ioned in any discussion 
of the peaceful intentions of Soviet foreign policy. 
They concern arms con~rol and ~he es~ablishment of 
collec~ive security systems. 
From ~he ~wen~ies onwards ~he Sovie~ Union has 
al~erna~ed proposals for General and Complete 
Disarmament with arms con~rol and reduction suggestions. 
These have been rejec~ed by the Wes~ regularly, and 
Western counter-proposals have been rejected equally 
regularly by the Soviet Union. Whether or not Soviet 
theorists genuinely believe that the Soviet proposals 
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are practicable, books on Soviet foreign policy (both 
theoretical and historical) describe them and indicate 
that Western counter proposals have intended to 
undermine Soviet security. 16 They are used as evidence 
of the persistent efforts made by the Soviet government 
to ensure peace and reduce the danger of world war. The 
few treaties which have been negotiated successfully 
(e.g. the 1963 Partial Test Ban, the 1968 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the SALT agreements of the 
1970s) have been acclaimed as proof of the success of 
the Soviet peace policy. Every acceleration in the arms 
race, on the other hand, has been reported with alarm. 
The Soviet Union has also proposed atom-free and nuclear 
free zones, agreements on the non-use of force and on no 
first use of nuclear weapons. Rejection of these 
proposals has been interpreted as evidence of the 
continuing aggressive intentions of imperialism, and of 
the need to ensure that the West, particularly the USA, 
is never in a position to negotiate from a position of 
strength. 
A further series of proposals to enhance peace has 
concerned the establishment of collective security 
systems, particularly in Europe. The failure of Sovi.t 
attempts to form a collective security system against 
Nazi Germany in the thirties has been attributed to 
British and French hopes that Germany would attack 
Soviet Russia (se. Light, 1983,_ pp. 74-8 for an 
elaboration of the charges). After the war proposals for 
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a European collec~ive securi~y agreemen~ were resumed. 
Sovie~ scholars regard the Conference on Securi~y and 
Co-opera~ion in Europe in' 1973 as ~he final successful 
ou~come of ~hese proposals. Al~hough much less ~han a 
European securi~y sys~em was achieved, Soviet theorists 
have expressed ~hemselves well sa~isfied with the early 
results of the Helsinki Agreement of 1975 (see, for 
example, Narochnitsky et al, 1979, pp. 201-2). The 
slowdown in the Helsinki 
interpreted 
aggression. 
as a fur~her 
process thereafter was 
signal of imperialist 
The limited success of disarmament proposals and ideas 
about collective security have enhanced an already 
prevalent belief that Soviet power brings about peace by 
de~erring imperialism from launching war. (The West has 
been equally sure that its power has prevented both war 
and the onward march of communism). Stalin had used the 
threat of war to exhort the populace to greater 
productive feats in the industrialization drives of 
1928-1939. The Soviet victory against Germany was 
attributed to these efforts. When war ceased to be 
considered inevitable, this was thought to be due to a 
considerable extent to Soviet military power. 
Sokolovskiy pointed out that "the struggle for 
peace ... demands above all the steadfast strengthening of 
the military power of the Soviet Union and the entire 
socialist camp" (Sokolovskiy, 1963, p. 179). Although 
some credit hAS been given to the active struggle of 
378 
those in favour of peace (see, for example, Brezhnev, 
1973, p. 12), it has primarily been thought that the 
constantly growing military might of the Soviet Union 
was responsible for peace. The generally accepted view 
on the efficacy of Soviet power in bringing about peace 
is aptly summed up in the statement: "The stronger we 
are, the stronger peace is, and the greater the 
possibility of preventing war" (Milovidov, 1977, p. 
262). In other words, the Soviet view, like that of the 
West, is the time honoured "if you want peace, prepare 
for war". 
4. Conclusion 
The most obvious feature of Soviet thinking about war 
and peace is imbalance. There are innumerable books 
dealing with the theory of war, while very little has 
been written about peace theory. It should be noted, 
however, that a similpr situation pertains in the West. 
Although peace theory can be identified as a 
recognizable branch of Western international relations 
theory, it is very small compared to strategic studies. 
Moreover, it is often considered politically suspect 
both by lay people and by professional international 
relations scholars. There is no comparable' branch of 
Soviet international rel~tions theory. The primary 
reason is probably that peace belongs to the millenial 
future of communism. There is equally little theory or 
even speculation about what an international communist 
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system will be like (see, for example, how little 
speculation there is about it in The Coming World Order, 
Shakhnazarov, 1984). 
There is, however, another problem about peace theory. 
International communism (and therefore absolute peace) 
is only attainable via international revolution, but 
there has been a return to a deterministic view of how 
this revolution will occur. Since the Soviet Union does 
not launch war, it certainly cannot come about through a 
Soviet inspired revolutionary war. In any case, the risk 
that local war will escalate into nuclear war makes 
revolutionary war an extremely dangerous concept. And if 
peace is necessary for the construction of communism 
within the existing socialist bloc, logically war would 
retard that development. But the absence of war also 
retards the development of a revolutionary situation 
within capitalist states. Peace, therefore, promotes the 
transition from socialism to communism in states that 
are already socialist, but it is unlikely to promote the 
transition from.capit~lism to socialism in other states. 
The theoretical problems are similar to those which 
became evident when peaceful coexistence was discussed 
in Chapter 3. 
As far as the theory of war and neutralism are 
concerned, there has been more evidence of the impact of 
the real world on Soviet thinking in the.e fields than 
in any other area of Soviet international relations 
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theory. War between socialism and capitalism has ceased 
to be considered inevitable, because it would be fatal 
to both. Although the theory still holds that national 
liberation war is inevitable and will be supported, in 
practice the limiting factor to socialist support has 
been the likelihood of other nuclear powers becoming 
involved. In other words, the risk of small wars 
escalating to nuclear war has meant that all wars have 
ceased to be a rational means of policy. The other 
theoretical changes, including the separation of 
revolution and war, stem from this central fact. 
The other major adaptation in Soviet theory is the 
depiction, grudging at times, hopeful at others, of a 
third camp, neither socialist nor capitalist, or at 
least able to accommodate both 
socialist-oriented and socialist 
capitalist-oriented, 
states. Both the 
avoidability of war and the emergence of the non-aligned 
movement are attributed to Soviet power and this, too, 
represents a change. Soviet theorists object to Western 
deterrence theory, but they quite explicitly believe 
that Soviet power deters imperialist aggression. 
The conviction that Soviet power is a deterrent is, 
perhaps, merely a mirror image of Western deterrence 
theory. But So~iet theorists have three other reasons 
for insisting that the USSR must possess military power· 
which is at least equal to that of the West. Firstly, 
the need stems from the MarXist-Leninist theory of war, 
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which holds ~ha~ i~ is in ~he na~ure of imperialism ~o 
cause war. Even though war is no longer inevitable, ~he 
danger remains. Although good sense may prevail to 
preven~ it, something mus~ prompt tha~ good sense. It is 
clearly not dictated by selflessness or by a belief in 
peace, particularly since peace, according to the 
~heory, gives socialism an advantage over capitalism. It 
can only be that the risk of defeat is too high. It is 
Soviet military power which is though~ to create that 
unacceptable risk. 
S~condly, although Sovie~ peace campaigns contribute to 
creating a sense of cohesion and common purpose within 
Soviet society and a belief in the ultimate justness of 
Soviet political goals, it would be dangerous if this 
led to relaxation and a laok of vigilance. Soviet 
sooiety has for so long been held together by the threat 
of the enemy within and the danger of the external 
enemy, that it would be surprising if there was not some 
fear that it would disintegrate without this kind of 
tension. And it is not just the multinational sooiety of 
the Soviet Union which must cohere, but an allianoe 
whioh has shown frequent signs of stress. Invoking the 
continuing danger and emphas~zing the defenoe effor~ 
which must be made to comba~ it, retains ~he ~ension. 
Finally, ~he Communist millenium promi~es distribution 
based on need. This requires an abundanoe whioh is 
clearly beyond the present scope of the eoonomy. 
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Moreover, the goal seems to have been retreating, and 
the higher the investment in defence, the further away 
it must seem. On a less ideological level, consumer 
expectations have been disappointed and, even in the 
Soviet Union, explanations are required for budgetary 
allocations. If the peace which is required to build a 
communist SOCiety is thought to be bought at the price 
of heavy investment in arms, the Soviet consumer will 
accept the level of military spending more easily. 
It seems clear that the contradiction of investing in 
peace while preparing for war is more apparent than 
real. As in many other countries, the preparation for 
war has been seen in the Soviet Union as a major part of 
the investment in peace~ The change from Khrushchev's 
formulation of the non-inevitability of world war to a 
~reater emphasis on the Deed to avert war made it 
natural to concentrate on the means that would enable it 
to be avoided. The shift also corresponded to reality, 
in that it coincided with the attainment of the nuclear 
parity which Soviet theorists and politicians have 
believed essential for equal security. 
Preparing for war and explaining why this is necessary 
and propagandizing peace fulfill different functions in 
Soviet society. The former maintains vigilance and 
promotes the belief that war can be survived. The 
latter, on the other hand, supports faith in the 
ultimate justness of the' Soviet re;ime •. Most other 
societies use war and 
perhaps less stridently 
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peace in 
and less 
this way, although 
overtly. Nuclear 
weapons have produced a paradox for Soviet theorists and 
policy makers, but it is one that is shared by other 
nuclear powers. The citizens of nuclear countries must 
believe that a nuclear war can be won, or else their 
morale will affect any preparation for surviving such a 
war. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons rely on the 
opposing side believing it too. On the other hand, 
encouraging peace movements in antagonistic countries 
and persuading antagonistic governments to negotiate 
arms control agreements requires emphasizing that 
nuclear war can neither be won nor survived. How to 
convey both views with conviction is an insoluble 
problem. In the Soviet case the result has been the two 
voices referred to at the beginning of this chapter. The 
outcome is probably that neither audience is entirely 
convinced. 
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Notes 
1. Soviet theory also distinguishes between strategy and 
"operational art", defined as "the theory and practice 
of preparing for and conducting combined and independent 
operations by major field formations or major formations 
of the services" (Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, 
n.d., p. 144). A further distinction is made, in both 
military and political thinking, between strategy, lithe 
fundamental political line for an entire historical 
(strategical) stage" (Zagladin, 1973, p. 33) and tactics 
which derive from strategy and are subordinated to them 
and which determine "current policies in a given 
concrete situation" (Zagladin, 1973, p.p. 40-1). 
2. The features which were said to determine the outcome 
of any war were (1) the stability of the rear; (2) army 
morale; (3) the quantity and quality of divisions; (4) 
the armaments; and (5) the organizational ability of the 
army commanders (Stalin, 1942, p. 39). 
3. Dinerstein -(1962, p. 66) maintains that although 
Stalin limited his discussion to war between 
imperialists, he meant, and was read to mean, that as 
long as capitalism exists, war involving the Soviet 
Union was inevitable. It is equally plausible, however, 
that his sub-text was meant to imply the reverse and 
that he was harking back to the 1935 Seventh Comintern 
Congress formulation mentioned above. 
4. A - further demonstration of the progressive omission 
of the formulation that war is no longer inevitable can 
be found in Petrenko and Popov (1981). In an account of 
how the CPSU and the Soviet state has developed 
Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and peace, the authors 
quoted extensively and sequentially from the 20th and 
all- subsequent Party Congresses. They also quoted from 
Brezhnev's speeches and those of other Politburo 
members. They themselves used the "not fatally 
inevitabie" formulation when talking about the period 
1956-1966, and then ceased using it, dwelling instead on 
the danger of war and Soviet attempts to reduce it 
(Petrenko and Popov, 1981, pp. 142-93 and passim). 
5. As a rule Soviet theorists criticize Western studies 
of the causes of war for neglecting the class nature of 
war. In an extensive survey of Western conflict theory, 
for example, American research was characterized in 
general as "cQnserva-tive". Quincy Wright ignored the 
class interests which determine the character of wars 
(although his contribution to bourgeois political 
science is recognized). Scholars who study war from a 
socio-psychological perspective were accused of hiding 
the role of imperialism in international conflict, while 
John Burton was said to ·psychologize·, to be influenced 
by Freud and to formalize his re •• arch, ignoring cla •• 
and political aspects of conflict (Gantman ~ Ai, 1976, 
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pp. 334-82}. 
6. The Soviet Union, fo~ example, offered little more 
than verbal support to the post-war national liberation 
movements in Africa and very little aid was given to the 
Allende government in Chile. The Spanish Civil War and 
Stalin's attitude to the Greek communists in 1944 and 
later are graphic examples of cases where support would 
have contradicted the peaceful image projected by the 
Soviet Union. 
7. Vigor (1975, p.187) has maintained that this offer 
proves that the Soviet Union only favours "beneficial 
neutrality". In fact, this is hardly unique to the 
Soviet Union. Western responses to non-alignment were no 
less self-interested. There is some controversy about 
whether the offer of a neutral Germany was sincere. See, 
for example, Ulam (1974, pp. 535-7). 
8. When the treaty had first been signed in 1948 Finnish 
foreign policy was called independent, but there was no 
mention of neutrality ("Soviet-Finnish Treaty", 1948). 
9. Korovin quoted the General Secretary of the 
Netherlands Communist Party to explain the Soviet 
attitude to Hungarian neutrality: "For those countries 
over which America at present rules, neutrality 
guaranteed by both world camps, would be a step forward 
towards national independence. For a socialist country 
neutrality would be a step backwards towards 
subordination to American imperialism and its sphere of 
influence". He went on to say that as long as Western 
military alliances existed "not one of the [socialist 
countries] can hope to ensure its security from 
imperialist aggression by a declaration of neutrality" 
(Korovin, 1958a, p. 29, emphasis in the original). 
10. For an explanation of these terms, see Chapter 5. 
11. Treaties were signed with India and Egypt in 1971, 
with Iraq in 1972, Somalia 1974, Mozambique $~~77, 
Angola, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Vietnam in 1978,1~men 
in 1979 and Syria in 1980. Egypt and Somalia both later 
abrogated their treaties (Tuzmukhamedov, 1981). 
12. In fact these issues were dividing the non-aligned 
movement itself. Cuba supported the Soviet position 
while Yugoslavia insisted that there should be a return 
to the original principles of non-alignment. The 
Yugoslav view carried the day-at the Havanna Summit in 
1979 and Soviet hopes for a better understanding with 
the movement were -dashed (Burton, et Al, 1984, pp. 
75-9) • 
13. Vigor (1975, p.191) maintained that the terms 
"non-alignment" and "neutralism" went out of vogue at 
the beginning of the seventies, when it became clear 
that there was little advantage to be gained from the 
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phenomenon. In fact, the terms have always been used 
sparingly in programmatic speeches and statements. 
14. The term"propagand~ (and the activity) does not have 
the negative connotations in the Russian political 
vocabulary that it has in the West. The Bol'shaya 
Sovetskogo Entsiklopediya (2nd edition, 1955) defined it 
as "the dissemination of a broad spectrum of ideas, 
theories and teachings which require deep and detailed 
explanation", and pointed out that it was an integral 
part of the work of Communist and Workers' Parties. 
15. Nonetheless, it is difficult to agree with Vigor's 
contention (1975, pp. 166-70) that the word "peace" is 
never used by Soviets in our positive "peace and 
goodwill" meaning, but only in a negative, absence of 
war, sense. Nor is he correct in asserting that the word 
"peace-loving" refers to the situation after the victory 
of communism. He may doubt the sincerity with which the 
word is used, but it is frequently employed to refer to 
past, present and future Soviet policy. 
16. The 1981 edition of the second volume of Gromyko and 
Ponomarev (eds.) Istoriya vneshnei politiki SSSR, 
1945-1980, for example, contains three whole chapters 
and two sections of other chapters devoted to the 
subject. 
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CHAPTER 9. CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM II: 
THE CORRELATION OF FORCES. 
In 1974 a seminar was held at the Institute of World 
Economy and International Relations (IMEMO] in Moscow, 
the first of a series of meetings between members of the 
Centre for the Analysis of Conflict (CAC] and members of 
the International Theory Section of IMEMO. At one moment 
in the heated discussion about international relations 
theory, John Burton, leader of the British team, drew a 
diagram on the board depicting schools of theory. 
Pointing to the quadrant which represented power theory, 
he informed the Soviet scholars that if they really 
meant what they had been saying, they belonged in that 
quadrant, together with Morgenthau. The Soviet scholars 
were both genuinely surprised and rather angry at the 
accusation. Four years later, on a second visit to 
Moscow, CAe presented a paper which argued that there is 
a systemic process which leads great powers, including 
the Soviet Union, to be expansionist, irrespective of 
their political philosophy. This idea was rejected as 
preposterous. A few years later a Similar, but more 
elaborate theory was put forward "by "Ashley to explain 
the triangular Sino-Soviet~American relationship 
(Ashley, 1980).1 
Attempts like these by Western 
Soviet political behaviour in 
equate it with W •• tern political 
scholars to explain 
terms of power or to 
behaviour infuriate 
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Soviet scholars, even when the explanations are not 
offered with particularly anti-Soviet motives. 2 Large 
numbers of Soviet books have been written to criticize 
and refute Western theories, particularly those which 
purport to explain Soviet foreign policy in terms of 
power politics and geopolitics and which suggest a 
continuity between pre-revolutionary Russian policy and 
Soviet policy. 3 
Yet throughout this discussion of current Soviet 
international relations theory, it has been clear that 
Soviet theorists place considerable emphasis on the 
efficacy of power. It has also been evident that there 
is an explicit belief that Soviet power acts as a 
deterrent. Indeed, since Soviet theorists deny that the 
Soviet Union would ever use its power except in defence, 
it is particularly for its ability to deter that power 
is considered essential to the present well-being and 
future progress of socialist society. 
The sincerity with which the belief is held that it is 
only the deterrent power of the Soviet Union that 
prevents an otherwise inevitable imperialist attack is 
perhaps best illustrated by the anathema that unilateral 
Soviet disarmament represents to Soviet theorists and 
politicians. As Wettig (1984, p. 45) has pointed out, 
the size and activity of the international peace 
movement is considered one of the signs that the 
correlation of forces ha. changed and one of the factors 
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which have a moderating influence on Western 
decision-makers. As we have seen in Chapter 8, there is 
a parallel, quasi-independent Soviet peace movement 
which often demonstrates against nuclear weapons. It 
would add' to the credibility of the Soviet movement if 
it campaigned not only for Western, but also for Soviet 
disarmament. However, since Soviet weapons are defined 
as defensive and the only deterrent Against imperialist 
aggression, official Soviet peace campaigners do not 
protest against their own arsenal. The few dissidents 
who have taken up the issue of Soviet nuclear weapons 
have been accused of anti-Soviet behaviour. 
Parallel with the belief that Soviet power acts as a 
deterrent is the equally strongly held conviction that 
Soviet theory and policy do not rely on the concept of 
power in the way that Western theory and policy do. 
Contemporary Soviet theorists maintain that there is a 
world correlation of forces which is changing inexorably 
in favour of socialism. The theory of the correlation of 
forces, according to Soviet theorists, differs from 
balance of power t~eory. It is held to be a better 
reflection of reality, depicting a dynamic world which 
is changing inevitably in a particular direction, in 
contrast to the static and status quo-oriented model of 
balance of power. It is also claimed to be more 
scientific: the correlation at any particular time can 
be scientifically determined and precisely computed. 
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However, although many Soviet writers indicate what 
kinds of factors must be taken into account in analysing 
the correlation of forces in a particular historical 
epoch, none provide evidence to corroborate the claim 
that the correlation can be computed more scientifically 
than the balance of power, or that it is a more precise 
concept and a better guide to Action (imprecision and 
weakness in prescriptive power are criticisms that both 
Soviet and Western theorists level at power theories). 
Soviet theorists are unanimous in claiming that the 
correlation has changed and is still changing, that the 
change favours socialism and that it is therefore 
detrimental to capitalism. In other words, the 
correlation of forces, like the balance of power, is 
essentially a zero-sum concept a gain to the 
socialist world automatically represents a loss to 
imperialism. 4 
The concept of the correlation of forces is by no means 
new, but in the same way that peaceful coexistence has 
become pri~arily associated with Khrushchev, so the 
change in the correlation of forces belongs essentially 
to the Brezhnev era, in the sense that it was then that 
it became something to which theorists and politicians 
constantly alluded. Nonetheless, it had been in use long 
before Brezhnev became leader of the USSR. Similarly, 
power is a concept which is as old in Marxism-Leninism 
as Marxism-Leninism itself is. But the acquisition of 
power by the Soviet Union, and the point at which the 
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correlation of forces is thought to have changed, belong 
very clearly to modern times, specifically to the period 
from 1945 onwards. 
Despite Soviet claims to be able to measure power 
precisely, one of the central problems of considering 
both the Soviet and the Western versions of the concept 
is the many different (and often loose) ways in which 
the word and the concept are used. Does it mean 
political power or military power, for example, or a 
combination of the two? Clearly, when we say "the 
Bolsheviks took power in 1917" or "Khrushchev fell from 
power in 1964", we do not mean the same as when we talk 
of the power of the Soviet Union. Yet the two are not 
entirely unrelated. Soviet theorists (and their 
classical predecessors) similarly talk of the 
proletariat seizing power during a revolution and do not 
mean exactly the same as the power that is required to 
defend the revolution. Yet once again, the two are not 
entirely unrelated. For example, the political power 
inherent in the state is, according to Marxist theory, 
the 'power of coercion to establish and sustain the 
interests of the dominant class in society. Yet it is 
clearly not relative amounts of this co~rcive ability 
that are being compared in Soviet discussions of the 
correlation of forces. 
Another related difficulty in considering the Soviet 
concepts of power and· the correlation of forces and how 
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they relate t·o Western concepts concerns translation. 
The Russian word for correlation, sootnoshenie, has been 
translated into English variously over the years as 
correlation, alignment, distribution, arrangement, etc. 
In the last few years, however, when the term has been 
used far more frequently, it has usually been translated 
as correlation, the word which will be used throughout 
this chapter. But Soviet authors use a number of Russian 
words to denote power. The term correlation of forces is 
sootnoshenie silo Sili both means "forces" in this 
rather abstract sense and "forces" as in armed forces 
(vooruzhennye sili). But it is also sometimes used to 
mean power and at other times it means strength. Balance 
of power, for example, is usually translated as balans 
sil, and the much hated American policy "from a position 
of strength" is rendered as s pozitsii silo The word 
vlast' is usually used to denote political power. To 
make it even more complicated, there is another word 
nasilie, which is sometimes used to mean power, although 
its dictionary meaning is violence, force or coercion. 5 
The result of this linguistic profusion is that there is 
a danger of misrepresentation and misunderstanding on 
both sides. It is not always easy, for example, to 
establish whether a Soviet theorist is distinguishing 
between political power and military power, or whether 
an implicit distinction between the two by Western 
writers is understood by Soviet commentators. However, 
whatever terms are used, there seems to be unanimity 
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amongst Soviet scholars that Western and Soviet motives 
for possessing power differ. Soviet power is defensive, 
whereas in the West the intention is aggression. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the concepts 
of power and the correlation of forces in Soviet theory 
and to investigate the claim that the correlation of 
forces is both different from, and also better, more 
scientific and more valid than Western theories of power 
and balance of power. The chapter is divided into four 
sections. In the first the use of the concept of a 
correlation of forces by Marx, Engels and Lenin is 
examined, as in previous chapters, paying particular 
attention to those works which are most frequently cited 
by modern theorists to validate contemporary usage. 
Stalin and his colleagues used the term correlation of 
forces in an almost identical way to its later use. In 
the second part of the chapter Stalin's concept of power 
is considered. 
The third section of the chapter deals with the new 
correlation of forces. It focuses on Soviet definitions 
of the correlation, why Soviet scholars believe that it 
has changed in favour of socialism, and what they 
consider to be the effects of that change. The 
similarities in and differences between balance of power 
and correlation of forces are examined. In the 
concluding part of the chapter the new correlation of 
forces and the analysis of power in international 
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relations is compared to Western theories, in particular 
w~h respect to the claim that the former is more 
scientific than the latter. 
1. The correlation of forces in Marxism-Leninism 
Contemporary Soviet scholars neither claim to have 
invented the theory of correlation of forces nor to be 
the first to recognize the need for power. These aspects 
of Soviet international theory, like all other aspects, 
are traced back to Marx, Engels and Lenin, although 
original sources are quoted less frequently than is 
usually the case with other political concepts. In 
referring to the classical writers similar problems are 
encountered to those found when considering other 
international relations concepts. It is not so much that 
Marx, Engels and Lenin did not use the concepts, as that 
they envisaged a different kind of world when they used 
them. 
Whereas modern theorists prefer to concentrate on the 
way in which the mere possession of power by the 
socialist world will lead to peaceful revolutionary 
change elsewhere, Marx and Engels were more concern~d 
with the revolutionary process than with conditions 
after the revolution. Consequently they dealt with the 
need for power and the use of power in effecting and 
completing the revolution. They did not consider a 
prolonged situation of political stalemate after the 
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revolution when power would be required as a deterrent. 
Lenin was forced to consider such a situation, but by 
then, as we have seen, it was day to day policy, rather 
than theory, that concerned him. But the event that has 
cast most doubt on the usefulness of both the theory and 
the possession of power, the invention of a power of 
such magnitude that it is too destructive and dangerous 
to be used, could not, of course, be envisaged by any of 
the classical Marxist thinkers. Nonetheless, both power 
and the correlation of forces are concepts which can be 
found in their works. 
(a) Marx and Engels on power 
Marx and Engels were profoundly concerned with power in 
two ways: firstly, they analysed its origins in the 
economic base of society, and secondly, they believed in 
the inevitable conquest of power by the proletariat. 
Although they thought that this conquest should and 
would be universal (see, for example, Marx's belief that 
"the Hungarian shall not be free, nor the Pole, nor the 
Italian, as long " as the worker remains a slave, Marx, 
1850b, p. 163), it was essentially power within states 
that interested them, rather than power between states, 
since "in form, though not in substance, the struggle of 
the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is primarily 
national~ (Marx and Engels, 1848, p. 45). Political 
power would be seized by revolution and, since the 
ruling class would not forfeit its position voluntarily, 
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force would probably have to be used. According to Marx, 
"force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with 
a new one" (Marx, 1867, p. 916). 
Following a successful sc~ialist revolution, there would 
be a dramatic change in the correlation of forces as the 
victorious proletariat used the political power it had 
captured to transform the means of production into state 
property (Engels, 1877, p. 150). In the interim period 
before class distinctions finally disappeared, coercive 
power would be required to prevent the dispossessed 
bourgeoisie from trying to regain its position of 
pre-eminence. But as soon as class differences had been 
eliminated there would be no further need'for power and 
coercion: in a classless society or world there would be 
no antagonisms or conflicting interests, and therefore 
no need for coercive organs. Together with the withering 
away of the state, political power would wither away. 
Amongst the institutions that would disappear with the 
state would be both the army and the police. The absence 
of conflict within a communist society would do away 
with their domestic functions and the army would not be 
required for external purposes since 
the antagonism .between classes 
"in proportion as 
within the nation 
vanishes~ the hostility of one nation to another will 
come to an end" (Marx and Engels, 1848, p. 51), Marx 
admired the abolition of the standing army by the Paris 
Commune and its replacement by the Harmed people" 
397 
(Marx, 1871, p. 519). 
Later, however, Engels accepted that if the revolution 
did not spread immediately, - it would need to defend 
itself, and that it would require an army rather than a 
people.'s militia to do so. In his capacity as a military 
historian and commentator, he observed that military 
power depended on more than the number of guns or men 
available social and economic formations, means of 
production, level of development and the nature and 
class structure of the productive forces played an 
important part in determining relative military power 
(see his military writings in Marx and Engels, 1856-63). 
But in this analysis Engels was primarily co~cerned with 
military affairs and how military power functioned when 
there was overt inter-state conflict. He did not 
consider the role of military power in international 
relations in times of peace. 
In many ways Marx and Engels cast new light on the 
concept of power, as they did on so many other aspects 
of political analysis. The fact that it seems 
self-evident today that political power within a 
society is held by the class that controls the econo~ic 
base, or that military power is closely related to the 
level of economic development, is to a large extent due 
to the way in which they drew attention to categories 
which had previously been neglected in historical, 
social and political analysis. Their theories have had 
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an intellectual impact not only on Soviet political and 
international relations theory, but also on Western 
theories. Soviet theorists, however, tend to believe 
that it is only Marxism-Leninism which has been informed 
by classical Marxism. 6 In fact, the relationship between 
the original theories of Marx and Engels and the modern 
theory of the world correlation of forces is rather 
distant. Marx and Engels did not consider the use of 
power as deterrent -- power was an instrument to bring 
about change. Once the change had been effected there 
would be no further use for it. 
(b) Lenin, power and the correlation of class forces 
Non-Soviet scholars of Leninism disagree about whether 
Lenin was a true Marxist, or whether he corrupted the 
original doctrine. In part this is a debate about the 
extent to which he was a power politician and political 
realist. On the one hand it has been of practical 
interest because the Bolshevik revolution took place at 
all (the wrong revolution in the right country or the 
right revolution in the wrong country), particularly 
since in many ways it 
antithesis of the society 
seemed to produce 
envisaged by M~rx. 
the very 
On the 
other hand, the interest has been theoretical, provoked 
by the particular way in which Lenin adapted Marxism. 
Some of Lenin'. ideas derived from the Russian 
revolutionary . tr~dition which h~d first influenced him. 
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Power and revolutionary violence were strong elements in 
that tradition. ,Those who see him as a corrupt Marxist, 
believe that the elements of revolutionary violence and 
terrorism outweigh historical and economic analysis in 
his work and that he was, above all, bent on achieving 
power. He has been accused of being "a determinist in 
words and 
2, 1978, 
a Realpolitiker in action" 
p. 494), or at least 
(Kolakowski, Vol. 
of basing his 
international theory on class analysis only until about 
mid 1920, when he changed to a realist or Machiavellian 
view (Harding, Vol. 2, 1981, pp. 244-7). There is 
perhaps some justice in these accusations, but what they 
really point to is that it is one thing to theorize 
about revolution, another to foment it and yet a third 
to secure it. 
It is, of course, true that Lenin added a new and strang 
element of voluntarism to Marxism (and that this was, in 
part at least, due to the influence of the Russian 
Narodnik tradition), but it is difficult to see what "a 
determinist in action" would have done in his place. 
Lenin's revolutionary party differed from the kind of 
party envisaged by Marx and Engels, but he was 
constructing a party in a country in which other 
political parties had easily been repressed and in a 
society which had a small and relatively new working 
class. It may be accurate to describe Bolshevism as "how 
to make a revolution in an economically backward country 
having a d •• potic government- (C. Wriqht Mills, 1963, p. 
400 
132), but when Lenin urged the Bolsheviks to take power 
in 1917 it was not because he thought that Russia had 
the correct capitalist economy for a revolution, but in 
the conviction that the Russian revolution would serve 
as the spark for international revolution. The Third 
Communist International was to be the international 
institution to direct that revolution. It was when the 
hope of an immediate revolution elsewhere began to fade 
that the need to retain power became the pre-eminent 
domestic concern, and the relative power of Soviet 
Russia compared to that of the capitalist countries 
became an urgent matter. By then Lenin had little time 
for theory, both because these matters were so demanding 
and because he fell terminally ill quite soon 
afterwards. Consequently there is really very little 
Leninist theory which deals with the problems of 
retaining political power with a minority government in 
a hostile world. 
Lenin believed that a combination of military power, 
moral force and business acumen would save Soviet Russia 
from the hostility of capital"ism. In the absence of 
international revolution the only alternative to 
believing this would have been to give up the politic.l 
power which had been gained by the Bolsheviks in October 
1917. What Lenin gave up instead was the idea that 
revolution could be exported from Russia to other 
countries. He reverted (in "Left-Wing Communism An 
Infantile Disorder-, 1920&, pp. 17-118, for example) to 
401 
a longer-term programme for the Bolshevik party and the 
(nternationa1 movement. A revolutionary mood alone was 
insufficient for a successful revolution. A careful 
analysis of class forces, a "sober and strictly 
objective appraisal of all the class forces in a 
particular state (and of the states that surround it, 
and of all states the world over) as well as of the 
experience of revolutionary movements" (Lenin, 19Z0a, p. 
63, emphasis in original) would determine whether the 
moment was right for revolution. But in saying this 
Lenin was returning to his original view of the 
requirements for a successful revolution (see Lenin, 
1915a, pp. 213-4 and the discussion in Chapter 8 above), 
a view he had momentarily discarded in the e,xcitementof 
~he initial victory in the Polish War. He had always 
held that power without historical process was useless. 
In other words, like Marx and Engels, he believed that 
the rule of capitalism would only end when the 
conditions of revolution had matured within society: "no 
power could destroy capitalism if it were not sapped and 
undermined by history" (Lenin, 1917i, p. 417). 1 What he 
had misjudged in Poland was the extent to which the 
existing system had been undermined. In other words, the 
power of the Red Army would, he thought, initiate the 
revolution, but it was the seizure of political power by 
the Polish proletariat that wou~d be the essence of that 
revolution. 
It was in the context of the Civil War and the 
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diplomatic needs of the new Soviet state after the war 
that Lenin first considered the world correlation of 
forces, a term he had until then used to prescribe the 
method of analysing the relative strength of political 
forces within societies. Once Civil War had begun, it 
had become clear that the armed masses which Lenin had 
envisaged as combining the functions of army and militia 
(Lenin, 1917d, pp. 318-9) were neither sufficiently 
disciplined, nor experienced enough, to deal with the 
White Armies. The Red Army was established under Trotsky 
(and it soon acquired the ranks and discipline of a 
professional army). The relationship of its strength to 
that of the White armies and of Soviet Russia to that of 
the capitalist countries was vitally important. The 
correlation was clearly not in favour of socialism. 
Lenin was, therefore, enormously encouraged when foreign 
intervention in the Civil War was abandoned. Since 
Russia was incomparably weaker than the capitalist 
powers from the point of v.iew of military strength, he 
believed that the failure of intervention was due to 
disintegration within the Entente (Lenin, 1920b, p. 
411). It would clearly be to the advantage of Russia to 
encourage divisions within the capitalist. world. An 
a5sessment of the correlation of forces within 
capitalism, how they were grouped against one another 
and how they were deployed, would-enable the Bolsheviks 
"to draw the proper conclusions concerning our policy in 
general, and our immediate tasks in particula~"(L.nin, 
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1921c, p. 273). Marxism provided a methodology to make 
"a strictly exact and objectively verifiable analysis of 
relations of classes and of the concrete features 
peculiar to each historical situation" (Lenin, 1917e, p. 
43). Each situation could thus be correctly understood, 
and the tasks of foreign policy could then be formulated 
and solved. 
Power was not entirely synonymous with military strength 
in Lenin's analysis. It was not only that the Bolsheviks 
could, with skilful diplomacy, exploit the 
contradictions which existed between capitalist states. 
Socialism was also morally superior, and Soviet Russia 
had the enormous advantage of being able to count on the 
support of the proletariat in other countries: 
"Materially -- economically and militarily 
we are extremely weak; but morally -- by which 
of course, I mean not abstract morals, but the 
alignment of the real forces of all classes in 
all countries we are the strongest of all" 
(Lenin, 1921a, p. 151). 
Another factor which contributed to the strength of 
socialism was sheer numbers. One of the reasons why 
Lenin began to believe that revolution was inevitable in 
the East and why it would be successful was the 
numerical superiority of the population of the East: 
"In the last analysis, the outcome of the 
struggle will be determined by the fact that 
Russia, India, China, etc., account for the 
overwhelming majority of the population of the 
globe" (Lenin, 1923a, pp. 317-8). 
It can be seen from this brief summary that although 
contemporary Soviet theorists are correct in maintaining 
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that the concept of power was of theoretical and urgent 
practical concern to Lenin, there was very little in his 
work about power in intern~tional rel~tions. Moreover, 
while they quote him accurately AS recommending the 
analysis of the correlation of forces as an exact and 
precise Marxist method, he did not explain how this was 
to be done. A theory of the world correlation of forces 
may, perhaps, be extrapolated from his writings, but 
they do not contain a theory of a changing correlation 
of forces except in the loosest sense of his expectation 
that the revolution would spread. 
When the international revolution failed to occur, Lenin 
certainly thought that the Soviet state should rapidly 
acquire the accoutrements of power, but this was a 
matter of survival and-not the outcome of theory. It may 
be the case, as contemporary theorists claim, that he 
wanted strong military power both to win the Civil War 
and to bolster the Soviet international position, and 
that he understood that power involved economic and 
political power as well as military power (Gromyko, 
1962, p. 34). But as we have seen in Chapter 2, it was 
profit rather than power which Lenin expected would 
induce the capitalist countries to maintain relations of 
peaceful coexistence with the Soviet st6t9. 
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Z. Stalinism and Power 
Stalin had no doubt about the importance of power, both 
domestically and in international relations. "Socialism 
in one country" could only become a reality if that one 
country developed the economic power necessary to 
construct socialism and had sufficient military power to 
defend itself.S The "revolution from above" was 
designed to take care of these requirements, and Stalin 
was quite explicit that failure to overcome economic 
backwardness would result in the defeat of the 
revolution (Stalin, 1931, p. 366 and see Chapter 8 
above) . 
In order to retain his position as 
revolution, Stalin quite soon by-passed 
political processes of the Soviet 
l.eader of the 
the legal and 
state and the 
Bolshevik Party and relied for his 
entirely on brute force, coercion 
domestic authority 
and the fear they 
produced. Moreover, he proved the efficacy of power: 
socialism (though many may argue that this is not what 
either Marx or Lenin intended by socialism) did develop 
in one country, the Soviet Union acquired sufficient 
military power to defeat its enemies and Stalin retained 
supreme political power and survived to die a natural 
death. 
But Stalin also used Soviet military power to further 
the international revolution which, although it still 
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did not· occu~ in the countries predicted or prescribed 
by Marx, Engels and Lenin, nonetheless contributed to a 
new sense that their predictions had been correct. 
Ironically, Western statesmen seemed to be even more 
convinced of this than perhaps Stalin was. As a result, 
alliances were forged to contain Soviet expansionism. 
The first priority in the foreign and military policy of 
the industrialized West became the possession of 
sufficient power to deter the Soviet Union from further 
fulfilling those predictions. Since it seemed (and 
seems) inconceivable to successive Soviet leaders that 
this can be the only purpose of Western power, it has 
seemed no less essential for the Soviet Union to own an 
equal and opposite power, lest containment be replaced 
by roll-back. 
(a) Stalin and power before the war 
As we have seen in Chapter 6, before the revolution 
Lenin had been sure that the proletarian state would 
disappear gradually, but that the process would begin 
immediately. In 
question of the 
Stalin's theory, however, there was no 
process beginning before the final 
attainment of a classless society not only in Russia, 
but internationally," In 1939 he updated Engels' theory 
of the state to conform to the conditions of the 
thirties, reproaching Soviet propagandists and 
ideologists for expecting classical Marxist writers to 
have been able to for ••••• v.ry zigzag of history so 
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that their descen~ts "might calmly doze at the 
fireside and munch ready-made solutions" (Stalin, 1939, 
p. 659). The bourgeois state had both external and 
internal coercive functions, he maintained. After 1917, 
the new proletarian state had similarly performed the 
domestic function of suppressing the overthrown classes 
and the external function of defending the country from 
external attack. The exploiting classes had now 
disappeared, and therefore the Soviet state had no 
further domestic function. But the external function 
remained, and would continue to be vital until the 
capitalist encirclement had been eliminated and there 
was no further danger of foreign military attack. An 
army, navy, punitive organs and an intelligence service 
were required to fulfil this external function (Stalin, 
1939, pp. 660-2). 
From the reasons that Stalin had given ten years 
previously for the urgency of Soviet industrialization 
it seems clear that he never had any doubt that the 
proper execution of the external function of the Soviet 
state depended up?n economic and military power. Like 
Lenin, he maintained that a successful policy required 
an accurate analysis of class forces (Stalin, 1927f, p. 
176). But his initial interest in the way in which the 
October Revolution had "raised the strength, the 
relative weight, the courage and the fighting 
preparedness of the oppressed classes of the whole 
world R (Stalin, 1927c, p. 202) was soon replaced by the 
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more urgent preoccupation with the contribution made to 
Soviet power by the international working class. 
By the mid-thirties there was an undisguised 
preoccupation with Soviet national interest and the 
interests of the oppressed classes in other countries 
and of the international revolution were now considered 
to be identical to those of the Soviet Union. Stalin 
emphasized that: 
"Our orientation in the past and our 
orientation at the pres'ent time is towa,rds the 
USSR, and towards the USSR alone. And if the 
interests of the USSR demand rapprochement 
with one country or another which is not 
interested in disturbing peace, we take this 
step without hesitation" (Stalin, 1934, p. 
484) • 
It was Soviet power which served the national interest, 
and therefore the international interest of the working 
class. Soviet power acted as a deterrent. The Comintern 
was told by Kuusinen: 
" •.. the rapid growth of the power of the 
Soviet Union has, up to now, been the 
principal, although not the only obstacle 
(contradictions between imperialist countries 
are also important) which has restrained the 
imperialists from a piratical attack upon the 
land of the proletarian dictatorship" (Eudin 
and Slusser, Vol. 2, 1967, p. 555). 
Soviet power was, however, more than a det~rrent. It was 
also a factor for peace. The invitation to join the 
League of Nations, for example, was explained partly in 
terms of sharpening contradictions within the 
imperialist camp, but mostly as due to the greatly 
increased power of the USSR. Soviet power .erved. 
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diplomatic interests as well. Since it was no longer 
"the custom to give any consideration to the weak", the 
growth of the "strength and might of the USSR" had 
persuaded countries like Poland and France to adopt a 
more reasonable policy towards the Soviet Union (Eudin 
and Slusser, Vol. 2, 1967, p. 670). 
The international situation in the late 1930s aggravated 
Stalin's perception of capitalist encirclement and the 
urgent need for sufficient military power to deter an 
attack or to defend the Soviet Union if war could not be 
avoided. According to Stalin's public pronouncements, 
Soviet foreign policy relied for its success upon a 
number of factors: growing economic, political and 
cultural might; moral, political and national unity and 
amity within the Soviet Union; the Red army and navy; a 
policy of peace; the moral support of the international 
working class and the good sense of those countries 
which did not want to violate peace (Stalin, 1939, p. 
629). But the anxious attempts to negotiate a collective 
security agreement with Great Britain and France or, if 
that failed, to ensure that Germany would not attack the 
Soviet Union first, indicated rather less confidence in 
some of these factors than his public speeches 
suggested. Within a very short time, when the Great 
Patriotic War began and the last three factors proved to 
be unreliable, the survival of the Soviet Union became 
totally dependent on the first three: Soviet economic 
and political power, unity and amity within the country, 
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and military force. Stalin's emphasis on the acquisition 
of economic and military power seemed to b. vindicated. 
It is Stalin who is the unacknowledged progenitor of 
contemporary Soviet theory about power in international 
relations, rather than Lenin. From 1917 until Lenin died 
the central issue was the survival of Soviet Russia. 
Survival remained Stalin's prime concern. But he lived 
long enough to preside over vast changes in the Soviet 
Union and in the international political system. Both 
Lenin and Stalin believed that survival required power. 
The Soviet Union did more than survive, however; it 
became one of the two greatest powers in the world. 
Nonetheless the world did not become socialist. The 
inevitable war had occurred, but it had neither resulted 
in the collapse of capitalism, nor' in the defeat of 
socialism. If Soviet theorists had not been inclined to 
"doze by the fireside and munch ready-made solutions'l 
(as Stalin had reproached them in 1939) they might have 
used Marxist methods of analysis to examine why this was 
so. But they could not afford to do so because Stalin 
had produced his own ready-made solutions for them. 9 
Lenin had explained the failure of Marxist predictions 
with his theory 
predicting that 
disintegrate. But 
of imperialism. . Stalin 
imperialism would 
went on 
eventually 
onwards the 
future collapse was explained not so much as being 
caused by internal contradictions •• by a con •• quence of 
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Soviet power. Soviet power would not be used actively to 
produce the collapse. It would be a force for peace, it 
would deter the imperialists from attacking socialism 
and merely by existing it would encourage revolutionary 
change within capitalist societies. These functions of 
power have, as we have already seen in previous chapte~, 
remained important elements of modern Soviet concepts of 
international relations. 
(b) Stalinism and the post-war correlation of forces 
It is sometimes asserted in the West that Soviet 
theorists and politicians date the change in the 
correlation of forces from the achievement of rough 
parity with the United States in nuclear weapons (see, 
for example, Mitchell, 1982, p. 60).10 In fact, while it 
is true that the concept became far more popular in the 
seventies, most Soviet mezhdunarodniki began claiming 
immediately after the war that there had been profound 
changes in the correlation of forces. This had led to 
changes in the international system, and a new role for 
the Soviet Union in that system. As we shall see in the 
n.~t section, further reasons were given later for the 
new correlation of forces, but the starting point of the 
change has remained the outcome of the Second World War. 
It has also been suggested that the very imagery of 
capitalist encirclement was & reflection of Stalin'. 
pessimistic belief th&~ the distribution of power 
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between the socialist and capitalist worlds would 
inevitably remain weighted in favour of capitalism until 
its eventual demise (see, for example, Marantz, 1982, 
pp. 221-4). It is certainly true that the victory over 
Nazi Germany and the establishment of buffer states in 
Eastern Europe did little to change the depiction of an 
embattled and threatened socialist world surrounded by 
an implacably hostile imperialism. There were 
considerable advantages in playing up the dangers of 
capitalist encirclement. It served to explain why great 
sacrifices were required to reconstruct the Soviet 
economy quickly, and why it was important to continue 
strengthening Soviet defence capacities (see, for 
example, Malenkov, 1952, p. 104). It was also an 
excellent pretext for re-imposing a hard ideological 
line after the relative relaxation during the war. 
Despite the reinstated spectre of hostile encirclement, 
however, great credit was given to the growth in Soviet 
power and its ability to defend socialism. Soviet 
military power was acclaimed for defeating the German 
army (as little credit was given to th·e Soviet Union's 
allies for this defeat as popular· Western historians 
tended to give the Soviet army). Although the 
establishment of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe was 
not directly attributed to the Red Army, Soviet military 
power had liberated these countries and therefore made 
it possible for them to choose socialism. Whatever 
Stalin'. private perceptions were about the balance of 
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power, his public utterances and those of his colleagues 
paid fulsome tribute to the quantity and quality of 
Soviet military power and political authority. 
The Second World War was seen to have changed the 
correlation of forces in several different ways. The 
peace which, it was hoped, would soon be signed, would 
need to take these changes into account and reflect 
..... the gigantic changes in the correlation of 
forces between states, in the correlation of 
forces between democracy and reaction, in the 
correlation of forces between classes which 
have taken place in the international arena 
and within particular countries in the course 
of and as a result of the unprecedentedly 
extensive Second World War" (Lemin, 1946, pp. 
21-2). 
Within the imperialist camp a change in the correlation 
of forces was perceived in favour of the USA and to the 
detriment of Great Britain. As far as the Soviet Union 
itse~f was concerned, it had not only won the war, but 
had emerged stronger in all respects. It had regained 
the territories it had lost when it was weak and become 
a great sea power (Lemin, 1946, pp. 26-7). Soviet 
theorists insisted, however, that the aims and 
prinCiples of Soviet foreign policy remained unchanged: 
the Soviet Union stood, as always, for peace. All that 
had changed was the means of translating aims into. 
reality. 
The change was attributed, above all, to "the 
undeviating growth of power and might of the Soviet 
stat. it •• lf" (Korovin, 1947, p. 26). It was not that 
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the Soviet Union intended using that power. Indeed, "the 
use of force had never been seen by the Soviet state as 
a necessary attribute of sovereign power" (Korovin, 
1947, p. 12). But it was thought that the strength of 
the Soviet Union would deter the imperialist powers from 
attempting aggressive policies. War engendered by 
capitalism would no longer, therefore, be a fatal, 
inevitable phenomenon (as we have seen in Chapter 8, 
this particular formulation pre-dated Khrushchev's 
historic emendations to Soviet theory by several years) 
because "the great and mighty Soviet Union heads the 
camp of peace and democracy, because the camp of 
democracy has Stalin as its wise and experienced leader" 
(Korovin, 1951, p. 593). 
The role played by the Soviet Union in the military 
defeat of the fascist 
that the war was a war 
states, together with the fact 
of liberation from fascism, 
explained the alteration in the correlation between the 
capitalist system and the socialist system in favour of 
socialism (Zhdanov, 1947a, p. 2). But other factors were 
thought to contribute to this change. Firstly, the 
withdrawal from the capitalist system of 
democracies had initiated the second 
the people's 
stage in the 
general crisis of capitalism (the first had occurred 
during the First World War, when Russia became 
socialist). Inevitably, the crisis would weaken 
capitalism and contribute to the change (Stalin, 1952&, 
p. 481). Secondly, the development of the people'. 
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democratic regimes and the successes of the colonial 
na~ional liberation movement were, i~ was thought, 
particularly important in strengthening the 
peace-loving, democratic forces in the world arena 
(Korovin, 1947, p. 21). The Soviet Union was no longer 
~he isolated, sole defender of peace in the world 
(Korovin, 1951, p. 593). Since these countries 
represented "new links" which had fallen out of the 
imperialist chain, the imperialist camp had grown weaker 
(Korovin, 1951, p. 590). 
The people's democracies and national liberation 
movement were considered both cause and effect in the 
changing correlation. On the one hand they formed part 
of the detectable change in the correlation of forces. 
On the other hand, the change that had already taken 
place, particularly the growth in Soviet state power, 
had made them possible. Thus, Zhukov, for example, 
claimed that the new successes of the national 
liberation movement were due to: 
" •.. the changes in the correlation of class 
forces on the world level in favour of 
democracy and socialism and to the detriment 
of imperialism. It is the result of an 
increase in the power of the USSR" (Zhukov, 
1949, p. 56). 
It can be seen from this that the change in the 
correlation of forces was perceived in zero-sum terms. 
Anything which weakened capitalism contributed by 
definition to the strength of socialism (or the camp of 
democracy or of peace -- the terms tended to be used. 
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interchangeably) and any increase in Soviet power 
implied an equal and opposite loss in the power of the 
capit~list camp. But the change was also seen as a 
continuous process which had been initiated by the 
Second World War, and was continuing inexorably in line 
with the laws of historical development (Seleznev, 1951, 
p. 37). 
Certain phenomena within the capitalist states were 
thought to contribute to the change in favour of the 
camp of peace. Western communist parties were increasing 
in strength and so were "non-partisan democratic peace 
forces" who were demanding the prevention of a new war. 
It was feasible that war could be avoided since "the 
present ratio of forces between the camp of imperialism 
and war and the camp of democracy and peace" made this 
prospect quite real (Malenkov, 1952, p. 104) • 
Nonetheless, the Soviet Union would "tirelessly 
•.• strengthen the defense power of the Soviet state and 
increase preparedness to deal any aggressors a crushing 
rebuff (Malenkov, 1952, p. 106). Warmongers were warned 
of the inevitable outcome of a new war: 
..... facts show that as a result of the first 
world war Russia seceded from the capitalist 
system and that as a result of the second 
world war a whole series of countries in 
Europe and Asia seceded from the capitalist 
system. There is every reason to believe that 
a third world war would cause the collapse of 
the world capitalist system" (Malankov, 1952, 
p. 106).11 
It can thus be seen that the concept of a chanq1nq 
correlation of forces was prevalent after the war in the 
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statements made by Soviet politicians and theorists. But 
although the term correlation of forces was used widely, 
there was very little theoretical analysis of it or of 
the nature of power. It was not until the Khrushchev 
era, when political science and international relations 
became respectable areas of academic study, that both 
topics became the subject of serious analysis. 
3. The new correlation of force. 
It took some time after Stalin's death for Soviet 
theorists to develop the self-confidence to analyse 
subjects which had previously been considered the domain 
of Party ideologists. But gradually, as Soviet political 
science and international relations emerged as academic 
disciplines, theoretical discussions about power grew 
increasingly sophisticated. The use of the term Kworld 
correlation of forces ll increased noticeably in the 
seventies. This section considers the various causes to 
which the change in favour of socialism has been 
attributed. The constituent elements of the correlation 
and how they might be measured are examined before 
considering what the effects of the change are thought 
to be. In the concluding part of this section the claim 
by Soviet theorists that the correlation of forces is a 
superior theory to that of balance of power is analysed. 
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(a) The causes of the change in the correlation of 
forces 
Sovie~ scholars have differed sligh~ly in wha~ ~hey 
consider the main contributing causes' to the change in 
the correla~ion of forces, according to when they 
believe the change began. In general, however, they have 
believed the change to be intimately tied to the general 
crisis of capitalism. According to Soviet theory, the 
first s~age of ~he crisis occurred during the First 
World War, in particular in 1917. The crisis itself, and 
the exacerbation of socio-economic contradic~ions, are 
thought to have weakened capitalism,. and consequently 
strengthened socialism, thus initiating a change in the 
correla~ion of forces. (Sanakoyev, 1974, p. 46). But 
Russia's departure from the capitalist world system 
after the October revolution is thought to have 
cont.ributed even more to the general crisis of 
capitalism. It marked the first substantial change in 
the world correlation of forces: 
"Socialism came out into the world arena not 
only as an ideological and political force, 
but also as a state force. This led to radical 
changes in the correlation ·of conflicting 
forces in the world arena in favour . of 
socialism .•• " (Il'ichev et al, 1958, p. 76). 
The existence of a socialist state is thought to have 
changed the very nature of international relations 
(Il'ichev et al, 1958, p. 17). States began to personify 
classes rather than nationalities; political, economic 
and ideological factors became more important in 
calculating the correlation of fore •• ; and the balance 
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of power could no longer be reduced ~o a balance be~ween 
grea~ powers. Smaller s~a~es began ~o influence 
in~erna~ional rela~ions and o~her in~ernational actors 
like interna~ional poli~ical movemen~s and interna~ional 
organizations began to be impor~ant factors in a 
"complex parallelogram" of forces (Shakhnazarov, 1974, 
pp. 77-82). 
Despi~e ~hese modifications in ~he na~ure of 
international relations, however, imperialism retained 
i~s dominating position (Gromyko, 1962, p. 3). The 
economic and mili~ary balance still favoured it 
(Kortunov, 1979, p. 38), although the balance of moral 
and poli~ical forces had begun ~o favour the Sovie~ 
s~ate and to deter imperialism. With the revival of ~he 
Soviet economy, industrialization and the re-arming of 
~he Sovie~ army, Soviet economic power and defence 
potential became important factors in the correlation 
(Sergiyev, 1975, pp. 104-5). 
Soviet theorists believe that the second stage of the 
general crisis of capitalism occurred at the end of ~he 
Second World War and caused a more drama~ic change in 
the c6rrelation of forces12: 
"One of the most significant features of the 
international si~uation was the radical change 
that had taken place in the balance of forces 
in the world arena, in favour of socialism and 
to the detriment of capitalism- (Ponomarev, 
1960, p. 606). 
Once again, it was not only the cri.i. which caused the 
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change. More important was the formation of a world 
socialist system which changed the correlation of 
economic and political forces in the world arena 
dramatically (Gromyko, 1962, p. 52). One of the more 
obvious indications of the change was the great increase 
in the geographic extent of socialism (Il'ichev, 1958, 
p. 119). A second sign was the increased population 
which now lived under socialism, from 8 per cent between 
the wars to 35 per cent after the success of the 
revolution in China (Kuusinen, 1961, p. 322). But the 
continual crises in all spheres of bourgeois life, as 
well as within the imperialist alliances, and the 
contradictions between imperialist states, are thought 
to have continued to weaken the capitalist system and 
strengthen socialism: 
"The permanent economiC, political and social 
crises are factors which directly influence 
the economic potential, military might and the 
home and foreign policies both of imperialism 
as a whole and of individual countries or 
groups of countries in the Western world. 
Consequently, they decisively influence the 
alignment of class and political forces ..... 
(Sanakoyev and Kapchenko, 1977, pp. 233-4).13 
The very reverse is claimed for socialism: close 
economic and political co-operation between the 
socialist countries and the absence of crises multiplied 
their power (Il'ichev.et al, 1958, p. 84). 
The diSintegration of the colonial system marked a new 
stage in the general crisis of capitalism. Soviet 
scholars explained decolonization.s a result of the 
change in the correlation of forces which had already 
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occurred: 
"The most favourable conditions for the 
development and suc~ess of ~he 
national-liberation movement were created by 
the new balance of forces in the international 
arena resulting from the defeat of German 
fascism and Japanese imperialism, the 
consolidation of the power of the Soviet Union 
and ~he emergence of the People's 
Democracies .... the crisis of colonialism 
entered its final stage the stage of the 
break-up of the colonial system" (Kuusinen, 
1961, p. 495). 
Moreover, the fact that this particular stage of the 
crisis had been initiated without war was attributed to 
the changes which had already taken place (Gromyko, 
1962, p. 63). But decolonization also contributed to the 
change. It was a symptom of the continuing and 
accelerating disintegration of imperialism (Sanakoyev, 
1974, p. 47). Even when newly-independent countries did 
not adopt the path of non-capitalist development, they 
tended to support Soviet peace policies. Thus the zone 
of peace was growing, shif~inq the correlation even 
further away from imperialism (Khrushchev, 19S9a, pp. 
7-8). 
Various other positive economic, scientific and military 
developmen~s within the socialist world were considered 
important contributory factors to the change in the 
correlation of forces. The fact tha~ the socialist 
sys~em would win the economic competition between 
socialism and capitalism was in itself symptomatic of 
the ineluctable nature of the changes which were taking 
place. Nore generally, the economic and cultural 
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achievements of socialism, particularly 
with 'the 
demonstra'te 
bankrup'tcy of capitalism, 
to the peoples of the 
in comparison 
were said 'to 
world that the 
socialist path of development was the only possible way 
forward. This enhanced the influence of 'the working 
people in the capitalist countries, con'tributing to the 
change in the correlation of class forces (Sanakoyev, 
1974, p. 49). 
In other words, the correla'tion was seen to be no't just 
between 'two blocs of countries, but between two systems. 
Thus it was neither confined to the increasing military 
and economic s'treng'th of the socialist world, nor to the 
increasing influence of communis't par'ties within 
capi'talist countries. And al'though the formation of new 
socialis't s'ta'tes was impor'tan't, 'the change was no't 
entirely dependent on this. Support for Sovie't peace 
policies by newly-independent countrie~, or from wi'thin 
the capitalist world by peace-loving forces and 
realistically-minded bourgeois politicians were also 
contributory factors (Sanakoyev, 1974, p. 49). 
This is no't to suggest that economic and military 
developmen'ts have 
bringing about 'the 
been considered unimportant in 
new correlation. Amongst the 
achievements in the military field whi.ch have been 
thought p&r'ticularly significant are the elimination of 
the American atomic monopoly in 1949, the explosion af a 
Soviet hydrogen bomb in" the early 1950., the launching 
4Z3 
of the first Soviet sputnik in November 1957 and, more 
generally, the change in the strategic balance (Butenko, 
1975, p. 346). More important than the actual 
achievements, however, was their recognition, in 
particular by the United States (Shakhnazarov, 1974, p. 
85). 
One could sum up what Soviet theorists believe to have 
caused the change in the correlation of forces as a 
combination of economic, political, social and 
scientific and technical factors. The change was 
initiated by the formation of the first socialist state 
but only really became significant when socialism spread 
to a number of other countries. It was (and is) enhanced 
by the close co-operation 
their increasing economic and 
of those countries and by 
military strength. They 
also possess a moral force which has the power of 
attracting further members to the socialist system or, 
at least, support for its policies. Soviet military 
strength is thought to have contributed to the changing 
correlation in three ways: directly, by increasing the 
sum total of socialist power; and in two indirect ways, 
by acting as a deterrent and preventing any attempt to 
stem or reverse the change, and by forcing a change of 
attitude in some sections of the population in 
capitalist countries. 
Other contributory factors to change are thought to have 
been upheavals within the imperialist world, ranging 
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from the perpetual economic and political crises whtch 
arise from the inherent contradictions within 
imperialism, to the sense of self-preservation which 
makes ordinary people want peace and therefore support 
the Soviet Union. As a result bourgeois politicians are 
persuaded to adopt more rational policies vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union. In general the change has been considered 
historically inevitable, "the natural process of 
development of society in the modern epoch" (II'ichev et 
. al 
-, 1958, p. 329). Moreover, it is said to be 
irreversible, although the process takes place "at 
different rates and in some periods may even include 
phenomena which contradict the general tendency" 
(Shakhnazarov, 1974, p. 86). 
(b) The constituent elements and how to measure them 
The constituent elements of the correlation which are 
identified by Soviet theorists are closely related to 
the perceived causes of change. Because there are 
believed to have been a variety of causes, both temporal 
and occurring at different levels of domestic and 
international society, the elements are extremely 
complex. All Soviet theorists agree that the units 
between which there is a correlation of forces are ndt 
coterminous with countries or alliances. Consequently, 
the correlation cannot be reduced to mere military 
power. As one theorist has expressed it: 
AIn the present time the relationship of power 
between capitalism and socialism is produced 
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by numerous factors, mostly economic and 
social. It can on no account be taken as 
equivalent to the sum of military power" 
(Problems of War and Peace, 1972, p. 198). 
A second theorist has identified the elements which are 
correlated as economiC, moral, political, and military 
(Kapchenko, 1975, p. 5). A third defined them as "a 
combination of economic, socio-political, scientific and 
technical, military-strategic, ideological, 
international and other factors taken in their 
quantitative and qualitative correlation" (Butenko, 
1975, p. 345). 
To complicate the issue, various states, parties and 
political forces are said to have united into groups or 
coalitions, based on common class or state interests. As 
a result, the factors which constitute the correlated 
forces consist not only of the resources of individual 
countries, but depend also upon "the existence of 
allies, national contingents of congenial classes, mass 
international movements and other political forces" 
(Sergiyev, 1975, p. 103). Thus in modern times the 
correlation of forces: 
'1 ••• implies not only the correlation of fore •• 
between individual states, but first and 
foremost, the correlation of contemporary 
class forces, namely the international working 
class and the bourgeoisie, the forces of 
progress and those of reaction" (Sergiyev, 
1975, p. 103). 
Marxism-Leninism is said to demand that ".J.il the 
available class forces, Ali the factors, both material 
and moral n be considered in assessing the correlation of 
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forces (Sanakoyev, 1974, p. 41, emphasis in original). 
This requires an analysis of lithe class forc~s and the 
struggle of classes ... taking into account the real 
forces economic, political, moral and others -- which 
stand behind these classes" (Sanakoyev, 1974, p. 42, 
emphasis in original). 
Bourgeois scholars have been taken to task by Soviet 
theorists for concentrating on economic and military 
factors alone, although there is general agreement that 
these factors are very important elements in the 
correlation, since "economic potential and military 
might ... form the material base of the policy of a state, 
including its foreign policy" (Sanakoyev and Kapchenko, 
1977, p. 224). As far as military power is concerned, 
Soviet theorists and politicians all agree that there is 
rough parity between American and Soviet strength. It is 
considered imperative to retain the equilibrium. The 
balance is delicate 
superiority by the 
Union ••. could exert a 
and "even a relatively 
United States over the 
destabilizing influence 
brief 
Soviet 
on the 
international situation throughout the entire world" 
(Kulish, 1972, p. 226). 
Notwithstanding this complexity, all 
have pOinted to the importance of 
Soviet theorists 
an objective and 
accurate assessment of the correlation at any particular 
historical pariod. It is essential in working out the 
strategy or political line of the entire international 
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communist movement, since "a change in the alignment of 
class forces can lead to a change in the general line, 
in the entire strategy of the world communist movement" 
(Zagladin, 1973, p. 36). It is also required so that the 
correct tactics for a particular task are adopted 
(Zagladin, 1973, pp. 40-1).14 It is considered equally 
important for Soviet foreign policy: a precise analysis 
of the current state of affairs and an objective 
estimation of the correlation and interaction of forces 
is required to elaborate long-term policy and to work 
out immediate practical tasks (Sergiyev, 1975, p. 99). 
Moreover, it is not just the correlation between the 
systems that is important. The correlation within the 
camps needs to be studied, so that differences between 
groups or parties can be exploited (Zagladin, 1973, p. 
37). 
Despite the intangible nature of 
, 
many of the factors 
which are thought to contribute to the correlation of 
forces, Soviet theorists have always insisted that it is 
an objective category. It is not static, however, since 
it expresses changing variables (Petr~nko and Popov, 
1981, p. 261). While it is relatively easy to find 
criteria for measuring the economic, political or 
military balance, Soviet scholars have admitted that the 
general correlation is far harder to calculate, both 
because of the number of factors and because of the 
difficulty of measuring many of them. Nonetheless, it i. 
vital that the assessment be made on a scientific b •• is. 
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One scho~ar has maintained that: 
"An analysis of the combination of phenomena 
of international ~ife in historical context 
and from the point of view of the laws 
discovered by Marxism-Leninism of social 
development allow an objective evaluation of 
the odds on the class forces opposing one 
another in the world arena" (Shakhnazarov, 
1974, p. 86). 
When it comes to explaining how this objective 
evaluation is done in practice, however, very little 
indication has been given. 
Despite the constant stress on the scientific nature of 
the Marxist-Leninist approach to international relations 
in general, and the correlation of forces in particular, 
the correlation has usually been described in 
traditional terms. The list of important factors ranges 
rather more widely than- the variables which a 
traditional Western power theorist might give, but in 
all other respects it bears a remarkable resemblance. 
There is no suggestion of any mathematical values which 
might be accorded to the various factors, nor is any 
formula offered to suggest how they might combine, or of 
a possible hierarchy of factors, or of the relative 
weight of each factor. Indeed, mere mathematical means 
have been said to be inadequate -- what is required is a 
"system of co-ordinates" (Shakhnazarov, 1984, p. 18). 
But in essence the system of co-ordinates offered _ by 
this theorist comprises a list of important factorS 
without any real indication of how it could be applied 
to measure the correlation in a precise way. Nor have 
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any concrete examples been given. 
Moreover, although Soviet theorists constantly emphasize 
the importance of methodology, there has been no 
detailed explanation of what methodology is used apart 
from the reminder that Marxist-Leninist scholars must 
proceed "from an account of all factors in their 
dialectical interconnection and determination" 
(Sanakoyev, 1974, p. 49). In fact, the accounts given by 
Soviet scholars usually consist of very general 
descriptions of the changes which have taken place in 
the correla~ion, followed by the claim that what has 
been given are "some of the considerations pertaining 
chiefly to the methodology of determining the 
correlation of forces in the world" (Sanakoyev, 1974, p. 
49). The similarity to early decision-making models in 
Western literature is striking (for example, Snyder et 
al, 1962). It is useful to have a checklist, but this in 
itself does not constitute a methodology. 
In the absence of any demonstration of scientific 
method, it is difficult not to conclude that the 
correlation of forces, like power in Western literature, 
is assessed by Soviet theorists and decision-makers in a 
rather impressionistic way and that scholars may strive 
for objectivity, but they suffer as much risk of being 
subjective as they would if their starting point were 
some other political philosophy. Furthermore, and again 
this resambles the treatment of power in Western 
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literature, what is called analysis of~en turns out to 
be description. 15 
(c) The effects of the changing correlation of forces 
Whether or not Soviet theorists succeed in measuring the 
correlation at any given moment, the way in which it has 
changed is perceived to have brought immense benefits to 
the international political system. Although military 
power has always been accorded a low priority in the 
lists drawn up by Soviet theorists of the causes and the 
constituent elements of the changing correlation of 
forces, many of the beneficial effects of the change 
have been said to be the result of Soviet power. As one 
Western analyst puts it: 
..... the only acknowledgeable reasons for which 
the capitalists are ever said to do anything 
praiseworthy are that their profits will 
increase, that their system wil~ be 
strengthened, or that they have been compelled 
to do so" (Hough, 1980, p. 527). 
In modern Soviet theoretical literature and political 
statements, however, profit has been considered less 
important. Compulsion has become the standard 
explanation for any modification in Western behaviour 
since the Second World War. Moreover, most of the other 
positive changes which have occurred in the 
international system have been attributed to the 
possession of po~er by the Soviet Union. In other words', 
the deterrent nature of Soviet power has been til common 
theme in the writings of contemporary Soviet 
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mezhdunarodniki. 
As far as the general effects of the post-war change in 
the correlation of forces are concerned, one of the 
major results of the growth in socialist might has been 
that the Soviet Union has become sufficiently strong and 
authoritative to influence the nature of international 
relations. According to Soviet theorists, this fulfills 
Lenin's predictions that this would occur (Gromyko, 
1962, p. 22). Soviet policy makers and theorists 
reiterate that there can no longer be a situation where 
one country dictates over others (see, for example, 
Sanakoyev, 1974, p. 46). The entire system of 
international relations has been restructured as a 
result of the change in the world correlation of forces. 
The reason, it is stressed, is not that the nature of 
imperialism has changed, but that imperialism has been 
weakened ("Statement of the Conference of the Communist 
and Workers' Parties of Europe", pp. 25-6). The series 
of treaties and agreements signed by the Soviet Union 
and other socialist countries with the principal 
capitalist states in the 1970s are thought to be the 
products of the new correlation. They "amount to 
official recognition and establishment, in the norms and 
principles of international law, of the new balance of 
forces... and its establishment in the 
international-legal super-structure" (Sergiyev, 1975, p. 
106). 
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Since imperialism has not, and cannot, change its 
nature, imperialist aggression remains what it has 
always been: the greatest threat to world peace. As we 
have seen in Chapter B, Soviet theorists and politicians 
believe implicitly that Soviet power has been 
responsible for the maintenance of peace. The main task 
from 1917 onwards has been to force peace on capitalism 
and compel it to abandon any- attempt to destroy 
socialism by war. However, history has taught that 
aggressors cannot be appeased by concessions 
(Khrushchev, 1961, p. 49). Nor are they dissuaded by 
"the force of theoretical argument" (Arbatov, 1973, p. 
264). Remonstrations and invocations are insufficient to 
restrain imperialist aggression. The only thing that 
imperialists have always understood has been 
characterized as " ... the language of power ... economic, 
political and particularly military power" (Gromyko, 
1962, p. 58). Thus military power has always been 
required by the Soviet state to counter aggression. 
At one end of the spectrum of coercion, Soviet power has 
been said to render impossible any resort to political 
or economic pressure as a means of changing Soviet 
policy (Kapchenko, 1978, p. 13). At the other end of the 
spectrum, the power of world socialism has prevented 
(and continues to prevent) thermonuclear war: 
"Imperialism ..• would have nothing against 
checking the advance of history by means of a 
thermonuclear war against the socialist 
countries. Fortunately for mankind, however, 
imperialism is today obliged to take into 
account the revolutionary fore.. standing 
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opposed to it, and, first and foremost, the 
world socialist system. The might of socialism 
is a strong curb on the aggressive designs of 
imperialism" (Zagladin, 1973, p. 50). 
Soviet theorists have never, however, believed in the 
balance of terror. Theybelieve that if thermonuclear war 
is to be averted forever, nothing short of complete and 
general disarmament will be sufficient. The problem is 
that disarmament cannot depend on "the bourgeoisie 
voluntarily renouncing their weapons" (Zagladin, 1973, 
p. 182). Soviet power is thought to have compelled them 
to enter into arms negotiations. 16 But until the 
negotiations are successful, the combination of Soviet 
deterrent power and the growth in the number of people 
who wish to avert war, has made it possible to exclude 
world war from society even before the final 
disappearance of capitalism ("Programme of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union", 1961,· p. 13). There is also 
the possibility that local wars can be avoided (Gromyko, 
1962, pp. 53-4).17 In essence, Soviet power is thought 
to have prevented the competit~on between the two 
systems, the main feature of modern international 
relations, from turning into armed conflict (Khrushchev, 
1961b, p. 42). Soviet theorists hope that it will 
continue to make possible the resolution of 
contradictions between the two systems without recourse 
to war (Kortunov, 1979, p. 38). 
Soviet power is credited with much more than the mere 
avoidance of war. In Chapter 3 it became clear that 
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peaceful coexistence has been attributed, above all, to 
Soviet and socialist power and the change in the 
correlation of forces or, to quote Brezhnev, "the 
passage from cold war ... to detente was primarily 
connected with changes in the correlation of world 
forces" (Brezhnev, 1976a, p. 20). One Western scholar 
has described the relationship between the theme of the 
changing correlation of forces and the theme of peaceful 
coexistence in Soviet perceptions as follows: 
"The first theme represents a historical 
process, the second theme a political 
strategy ... The relations between the two are 
such that it is the first which makes the 
second possible and fruitful, and the second 
which reinforces the tendency represented by 
the first" (Bialer, 1982, p. 243). 
The way in which peaceful coexistence was mad~ possible 
is sometimes described as persuasion. As a result of the 
new correlation of forces, Bsober-minded 
representatives" of the Western powers began to take a 
more realistic approach to international relations 
(Kapchenko, 1975, p. 8). Thus "realistically-minded 
bourgeois politicians" have understood that they need to 
create "a stable network of international relations" 
(Shakhnazarov, 1974, pp. 87-8). But more often than not, 
the process has been depicted by Soviet writers less in 
terms of a dawning realization of the benefits of 
peaceful coexistence than as the outcome of compulsion 
(see, for example, Sanakoyev, 1974, p. 43). 
Another effect of the changing correlation of forces has 
been to assist the national liberation movement. The 
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very existence of the first socialist state has always 
been said to have inspired the movement. But the victory 
over Germany in the Second World War, the establishment 
of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and, more 
importantly, Asia, and the ability of the socialist 
world to deter imperialist aggression have been thought 
to have been of particular benefit to national 
liberation revolutions (Lebedev, 1982, pp. 129-30). 
Soviet scholars note "an intimate connection between the 
growing might of the world 
successes of the revolutionary 
liberation" (Zagladin, 1973, 
the increasing strength of 
socialist system and the 
struggle for national 
p. 91). On the one hand, 
socialism has been 
accompanied by a weakening of imperialism, making it 
less able to resist national liberation. On the other 
hand, because the contradiction between socialism and 
capitalism is the main feature of the present age, 
imperialist forces have been diverted away from the 
newly independent countries. Furthermore, the 
imperialist monopoly of international economic relations 
has been broken. The imperialists have thus been forced 
to make political and economic concessions to the less 
developed countries (Gromyko and Ponomarev, 1980, p. 
273) • 
By the mid-fifties all these factors had caused a 
further stage in the general crisis of capitalism. What 
was unique about the third stage of the crisis was that, 
unlike the previous tiwo stages, it had taken place "not 
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as a resu~t of the wor~d war, but in conditions of 
competition and struggle between the two systems, an 
increasing change in the balance of forces in favour of 
socialism" ("Statement of the Meeting of Representatives 
of the Communist and Workers' Parties", 1960, p. 4). 
There was, however, a dangerous aspect to the crisis and 
the change in the corre~ation of forces. It had: 
" ... provoked fear in the imperialist camp for 
the fate of the capitalist system and the 
burning hatred of international imperialist 
reaction towards the socia~ist states and 
towards all progressive forces of the world" 
(Gromyko, 1962, p. 52). 
This fear and hatred explained why imperialists tried to 
prepare for and unleash a new world war against the 
socialist world, and more particularly, against the 
USSR. 
It should be noted there has never been any suggestion 
by Soviet policy makers or theorists that the Soviet 
Union needs its military power in order to use it, or 
even to threaten to use it. On the contrary, they have 
always been unanimous that the use of force is alien to 
the nature of socialism (see, for one of the innumerable 
examples, Shakhnazarov, 1974, p. 88). Power, according 
to Soviet theory, can be used in various ways. 
Imperialists use it to enslave people and unleash .wars. 
But in the hands of socialists it can be an instrument 
of liberation and a means of curbing the forces of war 
and aggression. Thus socialism has transformed power 
into a positive phenomenon: 
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D ••• the birth of socialism ... , the development 
of socialist states and their community ... has 
turned force as a definite socio-economic 
concept into an instrument of progress, into 
an instrument of safeguarding peace and 
delivering mankind from the threat of war and 
all kinds of military ventures" (Sanakoyev, 
1974, p. 50). 
Where socialism has been forced to use its power, it has 
never been for purposes of aggression, but "exclusively 
with the aim of counteracting the provocative acts of 
imperialist circles or the intrigues of 
counter-revolutionary elements" (Karenin, 1971, p. 29). 
It can thus be seen that Soviet theorists have 
attributed to the changed and changing correlation of 
forces all the improvements which have been attained in 
international relations since 1917. Moreover, by 
deterring aggression, the correlation facilitates 
further change. It is this dynamic feature of the 
correlation which is thought to distinguish it from 
Western balance of power theories. 
(d·) The correlation of forces and the bala.nce of power 
Ea.rlier in the discussion it became clear that there is 
a close resemblance between many of the constituent 
elements which, according to Soviet theorists, make up 
the forces which must be correlated, and those which 
.Western theorists consider important in calculating the 
power of a state. Although Soviet "theoris"ts are 
universally critical of Western concepts of power and 
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dismissive of the usefulness of the balance of power, 
there is, in fact, a marked similarity between the 
Soviet concept of correlation and the traditional 
Western concept of balance. Yet Soviet theorists devote 
considerable energy pointing out the weaknesses and 
misguided nature of the Western concepts, contrasting 
them to the strength and usefulness of the correlation 
of forces. 
Their most important objection to the Western concept of 
power, and to the realist and idealist schools of 
thought, is that power theorists assume that power is 
the single most important factor in politics and the 
main means by which all social and international 
problems can be solved (Il'ichev et al, 1958, p. 312). 
They claim that Marxists have a more plural approach to 
the nature and use of power. As one theorist has 
expressed it: 
"Marxists do not deny that force plays a role 
in politics. But at the same time they 
emphasize that it constitut~s only part of the 
political process, and that it is not the 
entire process. Let us take the example, of 
such a thoroughly political phenomenon as a 
socialist revolution. If the reactionary 
cla$ses actively oppose the popular 
uprising .•• the suppression of 
counter-revolution is connected with the use 
of force. However .••. the proletarian 
revolutionaries storm the old state machine 
not for the purpose of winning power as such, 
but because seizing power is the political 
means necessary to undertake the economic task 
of turning capitalist SOCiety into socialist" 
(Karenin, 1971, pp. 26-7). 
Western theorists have also been criticized for' not 
distinguishing between types of power and the di,fferent 
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ways in which power can be used. I~ is absurd, for 
example, ~o apply the term 'domination' to both the 
Soviet Union and the United'States, since they use their 
power in completely different ways (Shakhnazarov, 1984, 
p. 48). Western political realists have been accused of 
being subjective and ignoring the course of historical 
development, as well as objective economic laws and the 
growing role of the popular masses and the vanguard 
proletariat 
importantly, 
(Il'ichev et 
they distort 
1958, pp. ,314-25). More 
the main essence of 
international relations, that is "the historic conflict 
between two opposing systems, socialism and capitalism" 
(Petrovsky~, 1976, p. 80). 
By ignoring socio-economic factors and the class nature 
of foreign policy, political realists give a completely 
false picture of the behaviour of states belonging to 
different social systems. While it is oonsidered to be 
in the nature of imperialism to strive for world 
domination, "the foreign policy of socialist states is 
determined by the interests of the working clas~ and 
directed towards ensuring peaceful conditions for 
building communism, towards exposing and frustrating the 
actions of aggressive imperialist forces and towards 
defending socialism, 'the freedom of other peoples and 
peace" (Petrovsk ~, 1976, pp. 80-1). 
Soviet mezhdunarodniki claim that, while recognizing 
that politics is a "form of relations whioh is direotly 
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or indirectly connected with the manifestation of power 
and the wielding of power", Marxist political scientists 
have never, as Western sociologists have always done, 
ignored the class content of power (BurlatskJ· and 
Galkin, 1974, pp. 15-6). Furthermore, they have not made 
the mistake often found in Western theory of equating 
power with military and economic power (Sergiyev, 1975, 
pp. 100-1). Power is a far more complex category than 
Western theorists realize, particularly when it is 
applied to the study of international relations. 
Capitalist countries, for example, are said to have come 
to terms with Soviet foreign policy 
-
" ... not only because of its economic power, 
the might of its armed forces, but because of 
the unprecedented ideological, moral and 
political influence exerted on the peoples of 
the world by the successful building of 
socialism within the Soviet Union" (Kokoshin, 
1975, p. 17). 
Because they underestimate the ideological and political 
factors, which in turn is the result of not 
understanding the socio-economic processes which take 
place in international relations, Western power 
theorists, according to their Soviet colleagues, are 
incapable of comprehending the real nature of power. 
Their definitions suffer either from "extreme 
empiriCism, denying the philosophical conception of 
power, or from abstract sociologization, removing the 
real content from the .concept" (Burlatsk~~ and Galkin, 
1974, p. 16). 
As far as the balance of power is concerned, the major 
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Soviet objection to the theory has been that it is 
directed towards maintaining an equilibrium or the 
status quo in the international system (Sergiyev, 1975, 
p. 102) .. It therefore ignores historical process. The 
fact that Western decision-makers share the theory, 
"attests to a striving of the monopoly bourgeoisie to 
stem by all means the process of the revolutionary 
renovation of the world" (Sanakoyev, 1974, p. 44). 
Soviet theorists have been particularly critical of the 
idea that there has been a bipolar balance of power 
between the Soviet Union and the United States since the 
Second World War. This view is thought to reduce the 
entire system of international relations to 
Soviet-American relations and~underestimate the role 
played by other states, including the newly liberated 
states. More importantly, it depicts the main 
contradiction of the modern era as "an objectively 
impersonal struggle of two powers for superiority over 
one another" and it allows political realists to come to 
the "pseudo-scientific conclusion" that the Soviet Union 
is expansionist (Karenin, 1971, p. 75). On the positive 
side, the return to balance of power thinking- amongst 
Western theorists has reflected lOa forced admission .•• of 
the new realities in world economic, military and 
political relations, recognition of the role and might 
of the world socialist system, the world revolutionary 
and liberation movements and the final bankruptcy of all 
doctrines and institutions of the Cold War" (Sanakoyev, 
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1974, p. 44). 
The multipolar balance of power theory, on the other 
hand, is considered to be slightly more realistic. For 
one thing, it reflects the fact that new centres of 
imperialist competition have sprung up. For another it 
subsumes both the centrifugal tendencies which have 
become evident in NATO and the effect of the developing 
countries on the international system (PetrovskJ , 1976, 
pp. 193-6). It is therefore thought to amount to 
"indirect recognition of the great changes which have 
taken place in the correlation of forces in the world 
arena, above all the collapse of American imperialism'S 
plan to dominate the world" (Shakhnazarov, 1984, p. 37). 
Compared to the bipolar theory, the multipolar balance 
is thought to have the advantage of having shifted the 
emphasis from military confrontation of the two systems 
to other factors, in particular to the contradictions 
between the industrially developed and developing 
states. But the theory of a multipolar balance is 
suspected of being a tactical move to deflect attention 
from the totally different foreign policies of socialism 
and capitalism, and from the radical changes which 
reflect the objective laws of social development. 
Moreover, many Western theorists have used the theory of 
a multipolar ~alance to attribute to socialism the same 
problems that afflict capitalism. The result is either 
distortion, or omission of the reasons for the 
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socio-political changes which have taken place in the 
world. (Petrovskvt, 1976, pp. 196-9). 
In the final analysis the only real differences between 
bipolar and multipolar concepts, according to Soviet 
theory, are quantitative. Western international 
relations specialists who postulate either version have 
made the same mistake of assuming "a unitary system of 
international relations, irrespective of the class 
nature of the participating national states and other 
political entities ... [and] a single set of rules ... the 
priority of power" (Shakhnazarov, 1984, p. 39). They 
have therefore ignored the changes wrought by socialism 
in the system of international relations. 
Soviet objections to Western power theory 
colourfully summed up in the following: 
"Trying to solve international problems today 
on the basis of 'power' theory, is more or less 
like trying to calculate the periodicity of 
the tides on the basis of the ptolemaic system 
of the universe .•. "(Shakhnazarov, 1984, p. 
45). 
are 
In essence, the main objections to balance of power 
theories have been that they give a false view of the 
present state of international affairs and that th.y 
lead inevitably to the use of power. Moreover, the 
theories cannot resolve the global problems which now 
confront mankind. The theory of the correlation of 
forc~s, on the other hand, has been called "the key to 
understanding inter-relations on the world arena", 
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particularly if it is seen as the application of the 
class struggle to the sphere of international life, if 
force is understood to be more than military power and 
if "all the contributing factors are taken and assessed 
in all their dynamism and with all their contradictions" 
(Burlatsk)V. and Galkin, 1974, p. 260) . But the 
underlying cause of Soviet criticism of balance of power 
theory is that it posits equilibrium as the ideal state 
of the international system. It is, therefore, 
incompatible with a theory that postulates ineluctable 
and continuing change. 
4. Conclusion 
Western criticisms of Soviet theory of power and the 
correlation of forces are legion. It has been maintained 
by two critics of Soviet international relations theory,. 
for example, that Marxism-Leninism is, above all, about 
power: 
UFor Marxist-Leninists it is not a question of 
theory QX power: for them that theory is most 
truly marxist which contributes most to the 
acquisition and maintenance of power and 
'national interests'; ideology, in other words, 
is neither an apology nor a disguise for power 
politics. Marxism-Leninist (sic) ideology is 
all about power politics" 
(Kubalkova and Cruickshank, 1980, p. 292). 
An analogous view implies that the major ideological 
change in Soviet theory has been ~he loss of the 
elements of social and economic reform. In its modern 
variant I'communism •.• has no social or economic 
postulates save as they are considered the means of 
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achieving and perpetuating political power" (Ulam, 1952, 
p. 230). A third view claims that is not political power 
which is important in contemporary Soviet doctrine, but 
physical power and its effective organization (Mitchell, 
1982, p. 122). 
Similar faults have been found in the theory of the 
correlation of forces. It has been called an elegant 
theory in that it: 
" ... has provided a conceptually flexible tool 
enabling its practitioners to define, pursue 
and rationalize their policies simultaneously 
at the complementary levels of ideology and 
power. politics... Managing the 
correlation ••. puts a premium on seizing every 
possible opportunity to adjust the system 
opportunism is built into the concept" (Pick, 
1981, p. 4). 
More negatively, it has been accused of being "dynamic 
and manipulative, as much a definition of power as a 
calculus for the application of power ll (A. Dawisha and 
K. Dawisha, 1982~ p. 149). It has also been implied that 
it is devious, in that "it is designed not so much for 
m~thodological and cognitive clarity as to send out 
conflicting Signals to separate aUdiences" (Aspaturian, 
1980, p. 12). Despite their insistence that the 
co'rrelation is between class forces and not between 
military forces, Soviet theorists are said still "to 
regard the employment of military resources and power as 
the central and even the ultimate factor of 
international relations" (Sialer, 1982, p. 258). There 
are some grounds for these criticisms, but they have 
tlon£tt.ele~ little to do with the theory itself.·.{TIne theory of 
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the correlation of forces does have certain 
shortcomings. 
What must be in doubt is, firstly, the extent to which 
the correlation of forces differs from balance of power 
theory and therefore avoids the weaknesses of that 
theory. Secondly, there is room for considerable 
scepticism about the claim that the correlation can be 
measured. If it cannot, is it really more than a loosely 
descriptive metaphor (in much the same way that the 
metaphor of a balance is used)? Thirdly, and this is 
perhaps the most important criticism in terms of its 
possible usefulness, the extent to which the theory of a 
changing correlation of forces reflects the present 
state of affairs is open to .question. If it diverges 
from reality, does this mean that it functions as a 
programmatic statement about the future, a modern 
version of the inevitable international revolution, 
rather than as the theory upon which Soviet foreign 
policy is based? 
There are two obvious similarities between balance of 
power and correlation of forces. For one thing, both are 
based on a zero-sum concept of power. For another, they 
define the components of power in very similar ways. But 
these are the .very featUres which call into question the 
usefulness of balance of powe~ and they must also cast 
doubt on the theory of the correlation of forces. Even 
if one accepts the questionable assumption that all 
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politics, including international politics, is motivated 
by the search for and retention of power, it is clearly 
not (and never has been) the case that the 10s5 of power 
by one side means the gain by the other of an equal 
amount of power, or vice versa. In terms of military 
power, the relative advantage of one side may be 
increased or decreased by the gain or loss of military 
power on the other side, but in an age of nuclear 
overkill this is scarcely relevant. In any case, neither 
balance of power nor correlation of forces theorists 
claim that the military factor subsumes the entire 
theory and, as we have seen, Soviet theorists insist 
that there is, and needs to be, strategic parity. 
With regard to all other components of power the 
zero-sum concept clearly does not apply -- a fall in the 
morale of the Western bourgeoisie, for exa.mple, is 
unlikely to cause an equal and opposite rise in 
socialist morale and a rise in the Soviet standard of 
living does not detract from capitalist wealth. The 
perceived final capitalist crisis may cause a change in 
the correlation of forces in favour of socialism, but it 
is unlikely to do so before the very last stage of that 
crisis, unless the absolute number of socialists and 
their political influence within capitalist society 
increase and unless those socialists are sympathetiC to 
Soviet socialism rather than committed to another 
variant. Empirical evidence suggests that far from this 
being the case, there has been a shift to the right in 
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capitalist countries and that even in those countries 
where socialist parties are influential, they tend to be 
independent (Halliday, 1983, pp. 165-71). 
As far as the second similarity is concerned, that is, 
the components which comprise the balance or 
correlation, many of them are intangible and therefore 
not susceptible to measurement. As both the American 
experience in Vietnam and the Soviet position in 
Afghanistan suggest, measuring what can be measured may 
give a very false picture. If measurement is impossible 
or even misleading, it is difficult to see that either 
theory can be called accurate (far less scientific), or 
that either can safely be used as a guide to policy. 
Insofar as the theory of the correlation of forces 
resembles balance of power, therefore,- it suffers from 
similar shortcomings. 
But the two theories are also different in at least two 
important respects. 
based on the premise 
international system 
Firstly, the 
that the 
balance of power is 
ideal 
is equilibrium 
state of 
(though 
the 
not 
necessarily, despite Soviet charges, the existing status 
quo). The correlation of forces, on the other hand, 
postulates continual change until the desirable e~d 
state a stateless socialist world has been 
reached.18 But it goes even fUrther than this. It claims 
that the correlation began to change after 1917, that 
the process accelerated in 1945 and that it has been 
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continuing. 19 Moreover, it is a change that can both be 
observed and measured. 
It is certainly true that the formation of the first 
socialist state changed the balance and that the change 
was particularly marked after 1945. But although there 
has been an increase in the number of socialist and 
socialist-oriented states in the last ten years, with a 
consequent enlargement of the geographic extent of 
socialism and of the socialist population, it is 
debatable whether the new socialist states have added 
very much to the other components of the correlation. 
They are economically underdeveloped and, in the case of 
Afghanistan at least, unstable. Moreover, their 
conversion was preceded by the far more significant 
defection of China.~ There is thus little superficial 
evidence to support the claim that the correlation has 
continued to change in favour of socialism. Since Soviet 
theory does not allow for the export of revolution (and 
disclaims the existence of, or wish for, military 
superiority), the theory that the change will continue 
seems to be based more on historical determinism than on 
hard fact. In other words, the correlation is believed 
to have changed and to be certain to continue changing 
because it is an historically inevitable feature of 
history that this will occur.~ 
It could be argued that Soviet scholars do not claim 
that the change will occur by linear progression. There 
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may be reverses, for example, and there are 
"intermediate sections" of class allies which can 
vacillate and thus cause the correlation to move first 
in one direction and then back, at least temporarily 
(Zagladin, 1973, p. 41). But the overall trend is said 
to be in the direction of socialism. Moreover, it is 
never explicitly suggested that a temporary reversal 
occurred as a result of the Sino-Soviet split. And in 
this respect the theory seems to take little account of 
the present situation. It may, of course, still be a 
guide to action, but if it does not start from a 
dispassionate assessment of the present stave of 
affairs, it is unlikely to prove a reliable guide. 
The second major difference between balance of power and 
correlation of forces is that balance of power theorists 
usually use the state as the unit of analysis and 
compare their national attributes. The correlation of 
forces, on the other hand, concerns class attributes as 
well as state attributes. This is why Soviet theorists· 
can claim both military parity and the desire to retain 
strategic equilibrium and, at the same time, insist that 
the correlation is changing in their favour. It has 
already been pointed out that it is debatable whether 
changes within the capitalist world necessarily benefit 
socialism. There is, however, another problem. If state 
attributes are difficult to assess accurately (AS Soviet 
theorists themselves admit), class attributes are almost 
impossible to pin down. It can, therefore, be no more 
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than an article of faith-that the corre~ation of class 
forces is changing in favour of socialism. And if that 
is so, the claim that it is a more accurate model than 
balance of power is dubious. It is difficult, therefore, 
not to conclude that the differences between the two 
theories do not save the correlation of forces from the 
weaknesses of balance of power. 
If class attributes are even more difficult to pin down 
than state attributes, if there are intermediate forces 
which vacillate, and if various ca~egories change in 
importance depending on time and circumstance, then 
there must. be considerable scepticism about the claim 
that the correlation of forces can really be measured. 
It may be true, as Soviet theorists maintain, that it is 
an objective category. But Soviet theorists also point 
to the importance of subjective factors. They do not 
indicate how the subjective factors are to be evaluated 
and nor, as we have seen, do they demonstrate how the 
measurement might be done. Although most Soviet 
theorists insist that the correlation of forces is a 
scientific category and that it can be and is accurately 
measured, the following, more modest view of the 
potential usefulness of systems analysis seems to be 
more likely to reflect the true stage of development of 
the use of measurement in Soviet political theory: 
"The identification and analysiS from. a 
Marxist viewpoint of the impulses which go 
from the environment to the system of 
international relations and back lays the 
ground for formal-izing the process of their 
in~erac~ion as a prerequiSite for the wider 
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use of mathematical methods, constructing 
strict models of -the system and gradually 
moving from qualitative description to 
quantitative" (BurlatskJ _ and Galkin, 1974, p. 
264} • 
This was, of course, written more than a decade ago. But 
it is difficult not to believe that if the move had 
already been made to quantitative studies of the 
correlation of forces, there would be more convincing 
evidence of this in modern literature. 
In the absence of accurate measurement, it is open to 
question whether the correlation of forces is a superior 
and more reliable theory than balance of power. It must, 
it would seem, function in very much the same way that 
balance of theory functions as a rather loose 
metaphor of the changing international system, the 
changes being assessed in an impressionistic and 
intuitive way. Of course, the point must be made that 
even as a mere metaphor, it can still serve as a guide 
to action. There are many who would argue that this is 
how all policy is made (or even that this is how the 
best policy is made). And it could also, as power theory 
often does, act as a self-fulfilling prophecy (although 
its function in this respect is limited by the 
insistence that strategic equilibrium is the ultimate 
aim of Soviet military policy and that revolution is not 
for export). The point here, however, is not whether 
social science can be scientific or whether science can 
or should serve politics. It is that Soviet theorists 
claim that it doe •• But there is no evidence to suggest 
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that a Soviet foreign policy based on the theory of 
correlation of forces is any more scientific than a 
Western policy based on balance of power. 
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Notes 
1. Ashley's ideas were based on the concept of lateral 
pressure, proposed by Choucri and North. See Choucri and 
North (1975). 
2. I mean to distinguish here between books on Soviet 
foreign policy which are overtly ideological and authors 
who believe a priori that Soviet policy is aggressive 
and expansionist and that communism is spreading and 
inherently evil, and those books and authors which, 
though they may have a latent ideology, do not prejudge 
Soviet behaviour but aspire to understand and explain 
it. 
3. See, for example, Kokoshin (1975); Petrovsk~. (1976); 
Chirkin (1980); Shakhnazarov (1984), to mention just a 
few. 
4. Marantz (1982) believes that one of the changes 
wrought by Khrushchev was a shift from zero-sum thinking 
to a more flexible stance which allowed for compromise 
and concessions in East-West relations. While there 
clearly was a change in the Soviet negotiating posture, 
power and the correlation of forces continued to be 
perceived in zero-sum terms. 
5. See, for example, Karenin (1971). The title of his 
book could be translated as The Philosophy of Political 
Coercion or The Philosophy of Political Violence, but in 
fact The Philosophy of Political Power makes far more 
sense since it is a critique of the Western school of 
political realism. Of course, the English word power is 
also used in more than one sense and this gives Russian 
writers equal difficulty. Karenin uses not only vlast' 
and sila, but also moqushchestvo and moshch (both 
meaning might) to explain what political realists mean 
by power. Still not su;e that his readers will 
understand the concept, he sometimes simply resorts to 
using the English word power in inverted commas 
(Karenin, 1971, p. 30). For a discussion of the polysemy 
of power, see Burlatsky and Galkin (1974, pp. 15-20). 
6. See C. Wright Mills (1963, p. 13) on the 
"historically provincial" nature of reflective men which 
leads Western social scientists to deny the influence of 
Marxism on their disciplines and Soviet social 
scientists to deny it equally vehemently. 
7. Kolakowski (Vol. Z, 1978, pp. 494-5) accused Lenin of 
ignoring economic ripeness in his preoccupa~ion with the 
existence of revolutionary situations and power. But in 
one sense the whole of ulmperialism" was concerned with 
the economic ripene.s of the world of monopoly 
capitalism. Moreover, in "War and Revolution" (1917i, p. 
417) he maintained that the rule of capitalism would end 
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because the whole course of economic development had led 
to its end. 
8. Some Western theorists believe that it was the 
doctrine of socialism in one country which allowed power 
to become the prime component of Soviet Marxist thinking 
and practice. Mayer, for example, maintained that "the 
new doctrine of 'socialism in one country' permitted 
political theory to coincide with power considerations, 
and thus made possible its use in the future development 
of the USSR" (Mayer, 1968, p. 21). 
9. The experience of 
analyses which did 
solutions would not 
footnote 25). 
Varga, of course, proved that 
not endorse Stalin's ready-made 
be acceptable (see Chapter 4, 
10. Deane (1976, p. 630), on the other hand, identified 
three stages in the change in the correlation of forces 
in Soviet writing: the first in 1917, the second in 1945 
and the third in 1969/70, when the Soviet Union achieved 
rough parity. As will be seen in the next section, the 
first two stages c.n easily be documented in Soviet 
sources. However, there are several intervening points 
of change prior to 1969/1970 and Soviet authors usually 
point to the mid-fifties as the beginning of the third 
stage in the crisis of capitalism, and therefore of the 
change in the correlation. As far as 1969/1970 is 
concerned, it was not only the achievement of parity 
that was important but also the recognition by others, 
particularly the United States, that it had been 
achieved. 
11. Both war and peace were predicted to cause the 
collapse of capitalism. Peace was to be preferred, 
obviously, because there would be less suffering. But at 
this stage peace was proposed for its own sake, rathe~ 
than because it would bring about socialism. See Chapter 
S. 
12. Some Soviet theorists maintained that the existence 
of the Soviet Union began to change the nature of 
international relations immediately after 1917, but 
there was no real change in the correlation of forces 
until the end of the Second World War. See, for example, 
Butenko (1975, p. 336). Others, including those quoted 
in the preceding section, have claimed that change began 
immediately after the October revolution. 
13. The permanent crises within the capitalist system 
and the uneven development which is a feature of 
imperialism are thought to have led to a change in the 
correlation of ~orces within the capitalist system as 
well. After the war, for example, Germany and Japan were 
insignificant, Britain and France had been seriously 
weakened and the United State. emerged as the dominant 
capitalist power (Kuusinen, 1961, p. 323). For a 
discussion of the post-war chang.s in the correlation of 
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forces within the imperialist world, see Butenko (1975, 
pp. 337-45). Soviet theorists contend that the 
intra-imperialist correlation . has changed in recent 
years. American dominance has begun to be challenged 
both because it is less powerful and because it has lost 
moral authority (Shakhnazarov, 1984, p. 93). 
14. For the distinction between strategy and tactics, 
see Chapter 8, footnote 1. Strategy requires "due 
account of the alignment and distribution of class 
forces within a particular country or on the world 
scene" (Zagladin, 1973, p. ~3), while tactics require "an 
appraisal of the changes in the alignment of class 
forbes" (Zagladin, 1973, p. 40). 
15. The intention here is not to imply that either the 
correlation of forces or the balance of power can be 
measured with scientific precision and that what is in 
question 'is the standard of Western or Soviet 
scholarship. Indeed it is precisely because it is so 
difficult to define and measure the numerous 
unpredictable, ineffable and intangible elements of 
power that the concept is not particularly useful in 
considering political events either in the domestic 
polity, or in the international system. For a Western 
discussion of the Western literature on power, see de 
Reuck (1985). A Soviet comparison of Western power 
models and the Soviet model of the correlation of forces 
can be found in Shakhnazarov (1984, pp. 33-63). On using 
Western techniques to measure Soviet political power, 
see Hough (1977, Chapter 10). 
16. For a discussion of the dangers of the balance of 
terror and the need for arms control, see Shakhnazarov 
(1984, pp. 103-16). Soviet theorists and politicians 
insist that the change in the correlation of forces does 
not mean the superiority of Soviet military power. The 
emphasis in discussions of the strategic balance is on 
parity and equilibrium and the importance of maintaining 
both. See, for example, Brezhnev (1976b and 1981). 
17. Although Gromyko maintained in 1962 that the new 
correlation of forces could deter local wars,. later some 
doubt was expressed. As we have seen in Chapters 6 and 
8, the shift away from claiming that all war could be 
avoided was originally made in an attempt to placate 
Chinese criticisms of the theory that war was no longer 
inevitable. But presumably the empirical evidence of 
innumerable local wars, some of them remote from 
imperialist involvement, also contributed. 
18. It should be noted' that 
similarity, in that both 
positing desirable end states. 
even here there is a 
theories a're normative, 
19. It is ironic (but also almost self-evident) that 
most credence is given to the claim that the correlation 
of forces is changing inexorably in favour of socialism 
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by Western politicians and theorists who are least 
sympathetic to the Soviet Union and most fearful of the 
Soviet threat, expanding communism and Soviet 
aggression. They also tend to agree most closely with 
the Soviet view of the components of the correlation. 
Any Third World radical movement, for example, is 
automatically considered a Soviet client (and often is 
made one by self-fulfilling prophecy and policy). 
Similarly, the Western peace movement is considered 
treacherous precisely because it is thought to 
contribute to the change in favour of socialism. 
20. See Halliday (1983). The thorniest question in the 
whole theory of the correlation of forces is where 
Soviet theorists "weigh" China. -Mitchell maintained that 
China has been classified as part of the imperialist 
camp since 1971 (Mitchell, 1982, pp. 39-47). But the 
most frequent tendency seems to be simply to omit it 
from the correlation of forces, while criticizing it for 
its pro-capitalist policies. 
21. Steele quotes Brezhnev asking Carter "Why pin on the 
Soviet Union the responsibility for the objective course 
of history and, moreover, use this as a pretext for 
worsening our relations?" (Steele, 1983, p. 62). 
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CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION. 
This study began by posing two questions: what is the 
theoretical framework which is said to underlie Soviet 
foreign policy and is it powerful enough to fulfil the 
roles claimed for it? 
The preceding chapters have offered a reply to the first 
question. The claim that there is a substantive 
philosophy and theory of international relations in the 
Soviet Union has been amply vindicated, even if only by 
the length of this description and critique. The number 
of works consulted and authors cited suggests that 
writing about Soviet international relations theory is 
no longer the preserve of a select few. International 
relations may be a relatively new discipline in the 
Soviet Union, but the number of people who practise it 
is sizeable. While many of them are academics, there are 
influential theorists who work in the Central Committee 
apparatus. This underlines a connection between theory 
and politics which bears on some of the functions that 
theory plays in Soviet society. It also serves to 
substantiate the assertion by Soviet scholars that there 
is a relationship between theory and practice. Whether 
that relationship is the one depicted by Soviet scholars 
and policy makers, and whether the theory is 
sufficiently powerful to fulfil the roles of 
interpreting the past, guiding the present and 
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forecasting the future are the questions which form the 
agenda for this concluding chapter. 
The assertion that theory dictates 
feedback effect policy, in turn, has a 
examined in the first 
policy and that 
on theory is 
section, which concludes that 
Soviet theory probably cannot fulfil the role claimed 
for it. But the amount of writing there is on Soviet 
theory and the seniority of some of the writers suggest 
that, whether or not policy is based upon it, theory 
must play some role in Soviet society. Some of those 
functions are considered in the final section of the 
chapter. 
Theory and practice 
There are three striking conclusions which can be drawn 
from the preceding chapters of this study. Firstly, 
Soviet theory has changed, although the changes have 
occurred slowly and with difficulty. It is also clear 
that while Khrushchev encouraged and pUblicized the 
doctrinal changes, he did not initiate all of them. They 
had begun before Stalin's death. Secondly, there are 
theoretical and practical difficulties in combining the 
basic principles of Soviet foreign policy -- proletarian 
and socialist internationalism and peaceful coexistence. 
These difficulties affect the coherence of Soviet theory 
regarding socialist-capitalist relations, relations 
between socialist states and less developed countries 
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and the new type of relations which are said to exist in 
the socialist commonwealth. They also affect Soviet 
peace theory. Thirdly, Soviet theory has relied 
increasingly on 
device for past 
security and 
the concept of power as an explanatory 
events, the assurance of present 
the promise of future change. 
Paradoxically, however, the theory seems to have become 
more deterministic at the same time. It will be argued 
that these three conclusions detract from the 
relationship between theory and practice. The third 
conclusion, the parallel reliance on power and on 
history as the agent of change, indicates that the 
Soviet concept of socialist power concentrates on its 
use as a deterrent. It is also closely connected to the 
political function of Soviet theory. 
As far as the changes which have taken place in Soviet 
theory are concerned, there are two related aspects 
which affect the connection between theory and practice. 
The first has to do with the relationship of 
contemporary theory to the writings of Marx, Engels and 
Lenin. The second and related issue concerns the 
methodology that is used by Soviet theorists, and the 
way in which it differs from that employed by their 
intellectual forbears. 
There is some justice in the claim that modern theory is 
based on the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin. It 
demonstrably is based on their works, but that does not 
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mean that the Soviet claim is entirely justified. It is 
not surprising that the classical works are not all 
relevant to present-day conditions, that some of the 
original theories have been invalidated by history and 
that Marx, Engels and Lenin could not have known about 
the scientific and technical developments which have 
occurred in the twentieth century. On the other hand, it 
is clear that if Soviet theory had not taken account of 
these changes, it would have ceased to bear any relation 
to reality. In fact, it could be argued that a good 
theory is one that can be adapted or expanded to reflect 
new circumstances so that it explains the past, serves 
as a model of the present and has some predictive value 
for the future, while at the same time still remaining 
recognizably itself. 
One of the strengths of Marxism-Leninism is said to be 
the fact that it can change in this way (see, for 
example, Kosolapov and Oizerman, 1984, p. 46). It is not 
only offiCially accepted Soviet theorists who believe 
this. Roy Medvedev, for example, a dissident Marxist, 
identifies this ability as the feature which gives 
Soviet socialist ideology a "rich inner potential". But 
he believes that "it is precisely the ability of Marxism 
to develop that is employed. very little to-day" (R. 
Medvedev, 1986, p. 32). Instead, he argues, both theory 
and practice in the contemporary USSR systematically 
violate the potential of the founding ideology. In 
regard to practice, "Many of the forms Tof the 'real 
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socialism' which exists in the Soviet Union] have 
nothing in common with genuine Marxism or even with 
'Marxism-Leninism' II (R. Medvedev, 1986, p. 9). In regard 
to theory, he objects to the way critics of 
Marxism-Leninism selectively cite what Marx, Engels or 
Lenin said sixty or a hundred years ago to prove that 
their theories do not accord with contemporary reality. 
He maintains that outdated or disproved elements are 
omitted from modern Soviet works not necessarily for 
tactical reasons, but because times have changed. 
There are clear reasons for the situation noted by 
Medvedev, that Soviet Marxism-Leninism is not developing 
as it might have. Amongst them is the fact that those 
tenets which are still held to be operative are never 
challenged. Moreover, outdated tenets are hardly ever 
mentioned in modern Soviet texts and there is little 
discussion about why they no longer hold true. Modern 
theorists do not engage in debate with the old theory. 
Their omissions, or at least the attitude which leads to 
them, and therefore to the absence of a visible 
interplay between old and new theory or between new 
theorists and old theory, tend to retard and discourage 
development and change. 
It is also the case that modern Soviet theory is not 
only based on the theory of Marx, Engels and Lenin, but 
also quite strikingly on the theorie. of Stalin and 
Khrushchev. Neither of them, however, are formally 
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acknowledged as precursors of current theory. It could 
be argued that neither of them ~ theorists in the way 
that Marx, Engels and Lenin were. This is undoubtedly 
true. But, as we have seen in the case of Stalin 
particularly, this did not prevent their contemporaries 
from showering them with accolades for their theoretical 
genius, in the same way that Brezhnev, almost certainly 
also no theorist, was acclaimed as an original thinker 
and a creative Marxist-Leninist. It could also be argued 
that there is no need to acknowledge Stalin's and 
Khrushchev's contributions, for the very reason that 
they are integral parts of current theory. Again, there 
is justice in this argument. But it is not just their 
names that are omitted. Certain of the events of their 
times are either glossed over in silence or rewritten. 
This too has implications 
theory. In describing the 
for the quality of Soviet 
origins of contemporary 
theory, therefore, Soviet scholars and policy makers are 
accurate in saying that modern theory is based on 
Marxism-Leninism, but they omit their other sources. 
Moreover, the relationship is neither as organic nor 
necessarily as good for the theory as Soviet theorists 
imply. 
The reason why those aspects of Marxism-Leninism which 
are irrelevant or wrong cannot be publicly disavowed has 
partly to do with the status of classical theory. This 
raises the question of the kinds of evidence used by 
modern theorists compared to that used by their 
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classical predecessors. The selectivity which is 
practised in deciding what becomes history must also 
affect the kind of evidence that Soviet theorists can 
use. Both the status of classical theory and the nature 
of the evidence certainly affect what can be called the 
"idiom" in which the theory is presented. They also 
relate to the question of what it is that Soviet 
theorists do with their evidence and, in particular, 
what precisely they mean when they talk about the 
dialectical method. Broadly speaking, these are the four 
main methodological issues which, it will be argued, 
reduce both the accuracy and value of the theory, and 
its usefulness in practical policy making. 
As far as the status of classical theory is concerned, 
it seems to be the case that ,classical theory can 
neither be entirely disregarded, nor used freely. Nor 
can it be challenged. It can and has been tampered with, 
however, and it has been argued, most notably by the 
Chinese, that it has been reinterpreted. This might seem 
to be contradictory but, to return to the term that was 
used in Chapter 1 in connection with the question of who 
makes theory in the Soviet Union, the principle of 
democratic centralism seems to determine the way in 
which the classical theory can be used. It is never left 
to individual theorists to tamper or reinterpret. At any 
one moment there is an acceptable interpretation and 
deviations from it are unacceptable and unlikely. But 
the accepted formulation seems then to acquire the 
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status almost of proof. The form in which theorists can 
use classical works is limited, therefore, and they seem 
sometimes to adduce Marx, Engels and Lenin as if their 
works were, in themselves, infallibly accurate and 
therefore proof that modern theory is equally 
infallible. But if Soviet scholars have inherited a mode 
of analysis from the classical writers, there is no 
visible sign of them using it to test the current 
validity of classical theory. Nor, as we shall see 
later, do they seem to use it to develop new theory. 
A closely related issue concerns the quality and 
quantity of evidence used by Soviet theorists. The 
Soviet predilection for rewriting history is well known. 
It has serious implications for the kinds of historical 
evidence that can be used to create theory or test it 
for accuracy. It also probably accounts for what 
sometimes appear to be tendentious intepretations of 
history. There are limitations, too, on the kinds of 
contemporary data that can be used. This may explain why 
the reader frequently finds unsubstantiated assertions 
in Soviet theoretical writing which, on the face of it, 
could easily be proved, amended or disproved by using 
empirical data.l 
It could be argued firstly, that the unconscious 
rewriting of history is universally practised2 , and 
secondly, that the role of the theorist is to write 
theory, and that there is no need for evidence to be 
466 
produced or visibly used. After all, there are many 
Western international relations theorists who do not 
seem to use empirical data. But two of the claims that 
Soviet scholars make for their theory are relevant here: 
if it is to be considered a scientific theory, there are 
implications for the use of data. And if Soviet theory 
claims direct descent from classical theory, Marx, 
Engels and Lenin all used a great deal of empirical data 
which they published as part of their theoretical work. 3 
A third problem connected with methodology was referred 
to above as the "idiom" of Soviet theory. In other 
words, it concerns the style in which Soviet theory is 
presented. Firstly, there is frequently less argument 
and analyis than description and typology, the 
underlying theory being offered as self-evident truth. 
Secondly, when there is an attempt at substantiation, it 
often takes the form of quotations from the classical 
writers or the present leaders. Thirdly, there is a 
marked absence of criticism of previous or present 
Soviet theory or policy (except in cases like the Varga 
controversy to which reference has been made several 
times, where the argument about theory acquired a 
political dimension). On the other hand, Soviet theory 
is often very polemical, particularly with regard to 
Western authors who are frequently cited, paraphrased 
and criticized. 
A polemical style and frequent recourse to quoting and 
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extolling the classics might well seem to have been 
inherited from the classical writers themselves. Engels, 
for example, published many commentaries on Marx's 
theories (see his prefaces to later editions of Marx's 
works, for example, in Marx, 1851, pp. 245-6). Lenin 
cited long passages from Marx and Engels (in, for 
/ 
.example, "The State and Revolution", Lenin, 1917g, pp. 
381-492) and often engaged in published polemics, 
particularly with the colleagues he regarded as deviant 
socialists or even "renegades". But in these cases, 
citations and polemics were accompanied by argument, and 
the use, expansion and acknowledgement of ideas, both 
original and borrowed. These accompaniments are rarely 
found in modern Soviet theory. 
Objecting to presentational style might seem to be an 
exercise in literary criticism, misplaced in a work of 
social science. But style, absence of evidence and the 
curious status of classical theory all contribute to the 
fourth methodological problem. Given that theoretical 
writing tends to be descriptive rather than analytical, 
that little evidence is offered and that the classics 
are used in specific, limited ways, it is difficult to 
understand what Soviet theorists mean when they say that 
they use the dialectical method. As we saw in Chapter 1, 
the way in which Soviet theorists define the dialectical 
method is not very illuminating. And it has become 
evident from an examinabion of various aspects of Soviet 
theory that little further clarification can be gained 
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from examining the theoretical work itself. As a result, 
the dialectical method at times seems to mean no more 
than that two mutually exclusive principles do not 
necessarily produce cognitive dissonance, or that it is 
expected that a synthesis will eventually be found for 
them. 
These four methodological problems seem to cast doubt on 
the practical usefulness of Soviet international 
relations theory. If the classics can only be used 
selectively, if significant aspects of historical and 
contemporary data cannot be used, if there is little 
analysis and if the method which has been used to reach 
the conclusions is not clear, then the reliability of 
the theory as an aid to making day-by-day decisions must 
be questionable. But it is still conceivable that the 
theory itself could be sufficiently coherent and 
comprehensive to act as a general guide for Soviet 
policy. The next task, therefore, is to examine whether 
it is. 
One way to investigate whether Soviet theory really does 
have an impact on policy is to inquire whether there is 
a connection between particular foreign policy actions 
and the relevant theory. But in practice, no scholar 
seems to have evolved a way to conduct this test 
efficiently. It is quite possible to take one and the 
same action and argue convincingly both for and against. 
For example, aid to bourgeois national liberation 
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movements is consonant with Leninist precepts but has 
often adversely affected local socialists, and therefore 
seemed to be counter to the interests of international 
revolution. 
A second method of assessing whether there is a close 
connection between Soviet theory and practice would be 
to consider the relationship of theory to reality as a 
whole. Soviet theory is said to reflect reality and, 
indeed, it is difficult to see how an effective foreign 
policy could be based upon it if it were a poor 
reflection of the real world. Since events in the real 
world are, according to Marxism-Leninism, the product of 
the objective laws of history, Soviet scholars contend 
that their theory reflects these objective laws. 
But as we saw in Chapter 1, theory is also said to 
influence the objective laws, thereby actively affecting 
the course of historical development. Indeed, Medvedev 
(1986, p. 50) points out that one of the things that 
distinguishes Marxism from other ideologies is that it 
claims not only cognition of the world, but also the 
ability to change the world by changing people's 
consciousness (and, once political power has been 
attained, the productive relations which determine that 
consciousness). It is, in consequence, difficult to 
judge either the effect of Soviet theory on reality or 
its effect on the objective laws of historical 
development. It is less difficult to consider whether 
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the theory is a good reflection of reality. If it is 
not, Soviet foreign policy must be based upon something 
other or more than theory (or one could conclude that 
Soviet foreign policy is ineffective and, while it is 
clearly not as successful as either Soviet theorists or 
staunch opponents of the Soviet Union claim, it cannot 
be accused of being entirely ineffective). 
A third way to investigate the possible impact of theory 
on policy is to look at the inner logic of the theory 
itself. If it lacks coherence and contains internal 
contradictions or incompatibilities, then it is unlikely 
that the relationship between policy and theory can be 
as close as Soviet scholars and policy makers both 
insist it is. Coherence, or the lack of it, will also 
affect the kind of reflection the theory contains of 
reality. 
Throughout this work an attempt has been made to 
evaluate each aspect of the theory as it has been 
discussed. It should perhaps be stressed that the 
intention has not been to imply that any other theory is 
better (in fact, little comparison has been made with 
other theories), but to assess whether Soviet theory 
really can play the role claimed for it. It has become 
clear in respect of most of the areas of theory 
investigated that there are unresolved theoretical 
problems which probably detract from the usefulness of 
the theory. It would be otiose to repeat in detail the 
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criticisms which have already been made. 
But the most intractable problem arises when the areas 
of theory are put together and looked at as a whole. As 
we have seen, the external relations of the Soviet Union 
are held to be governed by two major principles, 
proletarian internationalism and its new form, socialist 
internationalism and peaceful coexistence. Proletarian 
internationalism is the principle underlying Soviet 
relations with the international working class, as well 
as relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union and other Communist and Workers' parties. 
Socialist internationalism, on the other hand, although 
it is derived from proletarian internationalism, refers, 
like the other major principle, peaceful coexistence, to 
inter-state relations. Peaceful coexistence defines 
relations between socialist and capitalist states, while 
socialist internationalism is the principle upon which 
relations among socialist states are constructed. 
The crux of the problem is that in respect of the three 
major types of relations which have been examined in 
this work, socialist-capitalist, socialist-LDC and 
socialist-socialist, both class and state principles 
pertain. There is a section of the international working 
class in all three kinds of state (reflected by the 
existence of communist, socialist or workers' parties in 
most of them) and the Soviet Union has extensive 
inter-state relations with a variety of countries. What 
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causes the problem is that the two kinds of relations, 
and the principles on which they rest, are incompatible, 
or at least not always congruent. That there are 
dilemmas in practice must, of course, be self-evident to 
Soviet policy makers and theorists because of the 
disputes within the socialist system, as well as the 
difficulty caused by the vulnerability of East-West 
/ detente to Soviet policies in the Third World. Dilemmas 
are also evident from time to time in bilateral Soviet 
relations with the less developed countries. The 
practical difficulties, in short, are numerous, and 
significant. It is less clear, however, that Soviet 
scholars accept that there is a basic theoretical 
problem. 
There is a legal component to the lack of congruency 
between class and state relations. Inter-state relations 
are based on the principles of international law and the 
acceptance of sovereignty (and this is frequently 
acknowledged by Soviet scholars and policy makers). The 
concept of sovereignty is entirely alien to class 
relations, however, since Soviet analysts still rely on 
the assumption that "the working men have no country" 
(Marx and Engels, 1848, p. 51), which logically requires 
that workers can have no interests and no loyalty 
outside of their class. While the goals of the state are 
to defend sovereignty and, by definition, separateness, 
the goals of the class are (or should be) to abolish 
national distinctions. 
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But it is not just the goals of the two types of 
relations that are incompatible, but also the kinds of 
behaviour that Soviet policy makers and theorists have 
expected from the subjects of each. While Stalin/s 
definition of an internationalist ("one who is ready to 
defend the USSR without reservation", Stalin, 19Z7d, p. 
53) would probably no longer be proclaimed publicly, a 
certain loyalty still seems to be expected from those 
with whom the Soviet Union has proletarian class 
relations. In part this is because it is taken for 
granted that class interests are internationally 
identical. But it is also because the Soviet Union is 
considered to be the state of the proletarian class and 
therefore no distinction is made between Soviet state 
interests and the interests of the Soviet working class. 
The class interests of the international proletariat are 
therefore usually assumed to be identical not only to 
the interests of the Soviet working class, but also to 
Soviet state interests. 
The problems arise when this assumption is not shared by 
other contingents of the international proletariat 
(theoretically it is possible that the Soviet 
proletariat itself could challenge the assumption) or 
when it is not entirely clear what the international 
class interest is. Who is to be judge or arbiter? No 
theoretical answer has been offered. In practice the 
answer has usually taken the form of the impOSition of 
the Soviet interpretation (as in Czechoslovakia in 1968) 
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or schism (as in the Sino-Soviet dispute). In the 
theory, however, the possibility of a clash of interests 
is held to be relatively unimportant because the 
conflict that arises is non-antagonistic. In the case of 
antagonistic conflict, considerable theoretical effort 
has been devoted to finding a way to resolve it without 
violence. Peaceful coexistence displaces the conflict to 
the less dangerous levels of economics and ideology. 
Soviet theory has not yet found a parallel way of 
displacing non-antagonistic conflict. Nor has it found a 
means of resolving the legal problem that if class 
relations are extended across national borders, the 
principles on which state relations are based are 
automatically eroded. If the theory denies the existence 
of manifest problems, it cannot serve as a guide in 
resolving the problems. 
The methodological problems discussed above, and the 
lack of internal compatibility when the separate 
components are put together, suggest that if Soviet 
international relations theory serves as a guide to 
action, it is probably not a very reliable guide. In 
discussing both sets of problems, the answer to the 
question whether Soviet theory reflects reality as 
closely as its proponents contend has begun to be clear. 
If there are restrictions on the kinds of evidence that 
can be adduced and if manifest problems are ignored, 
theory can at best offer only a partial reflection of 
reality. And if it only contains a partial reflection of 
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reality, policy must be based on something more than the 
articulated theory. 
The difficulties which would arise if Soviet theory were 
the only basis of day-to-day decision making are 
apparent. But this is not to say that theory has no 
effect at all on Soviet policy. Marxism-Leninism affects 
Soviet foreign policy at what might be called a more 
abstract level because of the other functions that 
theory has in Soviet society. This work will conclude 
with a brief look at some of those functions. 
The functions of theory 
The fact that so many people are concerned with Soviet 
theory and that it is not just theorists who claim that 
it is important, but also policy makers, suggests that 
it must serve some important functions in society, even 
if they are not the functions of analysis or scientific 
forecasting claimed for it. One of the most obvious of 
these functions is to legitimize leaders and their 
policies. The use of theory for· purposes of legitimation 
has a long and powerful history in the Soviet Union. 
Indeed, if theory had not been used in this capacity, 
Marxism-Leninism would probably never have evolved from 
Marxism. In disapproval of what had been done with his 
theory, Marx claimed not to be a Marxist. Lenin might 
well have wanted to deny that he was a Leninist, but the 
opportunity never arose because Leninist. were only 
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invented after his death. And the term was invented not 
as a mark of reverence, but rather as an instrument in 
the power struggle. Its purpose was to make the 
Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin triumvirate the true heirs to 
the leadership of the Bolshevik Party and thereby to 
deprive Trotsky of the mantle. It succeeded in its aim 
Trotskyism became the worst kind of deviance and the 
claim to Leninism a mark of the highest authority. 
Subsequent Soviet leaders have similarly claimed and 
been accorded the role of disciple and have thereby 
gained legitimacy. But the use of theory to perform the 
function of legitimation became particularly important 
once Stalin had died and de-Stalinization had begun. At 
a superficial level there was a vacuum to be filled in 
speeches and in written works since, as we have seen, in 
the last years of the Stalin cult nothing was written or 
said without reference and fulsome tribute to Stalin. At 
a deeper level, there were urgent political reasons for 
invoking past theory and theorists. The authority of the 
Party and its leadership had to be re-established and a 
crisis of legitimacy avoided. In the process of 
de-Stalinization, the slogan became the return to the 
proper norms of Leninism. And this meant that policy had 
to be seen to accord with those norms and had to be 
explained in terms of theory. Although de-Stalinization-
(in the sense of admitting the past and rehabilitating 
the victims of Stalinism) did not last for very long, 
the use of theory to legitimize policy has been 
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retained. 
The borderline between using theory to legitimize and 
using it to justify is delicate. Justification is most 
required when policy seems furthest from theory. Vet it 
could be argued that in respect of foreign policy, one 
of the major functions of Soviet theory is to justify. 
The reason is that although Soviet state interests and 
the interests of the international working class (or, 
for that matter, the interests of the international 
communist movement or of the socialist commonwealth) are 
usually said by Soviet theorists to be identical, it is 
not necessarily the case that this is obvious either to 
the Soviet public or to other members of the 
international working class. When it is not uniVersally 
perceived 
explaining 
served. 
to be the 
how the 
case, theory has a vital role in 
international interest is best 
Theory is used not only to legitimize and to justify. It 
also acts as a cohesive device. Its usefulness in this 
capacity has always been important in a multi-ethnic 
country such as the Soviet Union and it has become 
equally important in the multi-national socialist 
system. The establishment of the Third Communist 
International and the adoption of its twenty one 
conditions of admission (Degras, Vol. 1, 1956, pp. 
166-72) was primarily intended to ensure ideological 
purity and cohesiveness, the two things the Second 
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International had failed to bring about. The Communist 
Information Bureau, as its name suggests, was also 
conceived as a means of propagating a uniform theory. 
The difficulty for successive Soviet leaders since the 
Cominform was disbanded has been to retain cohesion and 
ideological conformity in the bloc without an 
international institution. The statements issued at the 
1957, 1960 and 1969 international meetings of 
representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties were 
successively longer 
that particular stage 
attempts to set out the theory for 
of historical development. It 
became apparent, however, that unless cohesion already 
existed, international meetings of that kind could 
produce the very opposite effect to what was intended. 
They were replaced by Brezhnev's meetings with bloc 
leaders in the Crimea, which may have been useful in 
terms of agreeing policy, or even for informing leaders 
of the member countries of the socialist commonwealth 
what the general line was on particular issues. But they 
did not help with the function of propagating theory 
more generally. Although most published theoretical 
works carry less authority than an analysis issued by an 
international meeting, they perform a useful function in 
disseminating theory. If the theory is generally 
accepted and adhered to, cohesion will follow. 
To talk about theory as a legitimizing or cohesive 
device or as something that is used to justify policy 
may make it seem as if theory is only used cynically. 
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That is not the case, however. Although there probably 
are some people who use it cynically, for the vast 
majority of people there is by now no other language in 
which to talk about politics or international relations. 
The role of theory goes deeper than language, however. 
It affects mental frameworks. Theoretical categories 
have been internalized, and there is no other set of 
concepts which can be used to explain policy. It is 
this, above all, that determines the role which theory 
must play in relation to practical policy, domestic and 
foreign, at a more abstract level. For while it seems 
unlikely that the relationship of theory to practice is 
the one depicted by Soviet theorists, if there is no 
other language in which to think or talk about politics 
and if theoretical categories have been internalized, 
then theory must determine how the world is perceived. 
What this means is that even if Soviet theory cannot 
easily be applied to concrete issues, it influences the 
way those issues are interpreted, the way the world is 
categorized, the evaluation of past and present actions 
and the range of options which are available to the 
policy makers. But these are the effects of all theory, 
of course, and by no means unique to Soviet theory. It 
is for this reason that theory can present a major 
obstacle in attempts to turn relations of enmity into 
relations of amity. 
It can be argued that there are particular features 
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about Soviet theory that make it an inappropriate source 
of amicable relations. For one thing, one of the main 
features of the present age is seen to be a struggle 
between socialism 
inauspicious basis 
and 
for 
capitalism. This is an 
peaceful coexistence. For 
another, the reliance on Soviet power as an explanatory 
device for the past and the basis of present security 
fits uneasily with the insistence that Soviet foreign 
policy is peace-loving. These features seem to be 
related to a function that Soviet theory plays which 
makes it rather different from other international 
relations theories. It arises from the close connection 
between theory and politics in the USSR. The distinction 
that Easton makes between government and politics is 
useful in understanding this function (Easton, 1965). 
Theory, as we have seen, is primarily the preserve of 
the Party Central Committee and not the state Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. As a result, its function is not 
only to serve state policy, but also Party policy. In 
terms of government policy, theory serves to legitimize. 
In relation to politics, however, its purpose is to 
identify issues, resolve differences and raise support, 
particularly from Party members, but arguably in a 
one-party state, also from the populace as a whole. 
In its relationship to the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, international relations theory has similar 
functions to those played by Party political programmes 
or manifestoes elsewhere. It is the Party's programme 
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and plan of action, a means of rallying the electorate 
to the Party's cause. It has more to do with the future 
than the present in this capacity, and its visionary 
qualities are particularly important. But it also needs 
to explain why, if past promises have not been kept, 
international revolution is still the inevitable agenda 
for the future. Lenin's theory of uneven development 
provides the escape clause explaining why the past has 
not followed the pattern predicted by Marx and Lenin. It 
makes it theoretically possible to postpone the 
achievement of the final goals of socialism and 
communism. Soviet power explains 
will come true in the future. It 
why the predictions 
is not that Soviet 
power will be used to promote progress. Its function is 
to prevent regression. History will take care of the 
future. The function of Soviet power (and of Soviet 
theory) is to keep socialism intact while history takes 
its course. 
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Notes 
-to 
1. Soviet scholars often find it easier~analyse their 
own society indirectly by examining other societies 
critically and leaving their readers to draw inferences 
about the Soviet Union. For an analysis of the relevance 
of the study of China to Soviet sociology and political 
science, for example, see Rozman (1985) and for an 
account of post-Mao China which could be read as a 
historical parable on the post-Stalin Soviet Union, see 
Burlatsky (1982). 
2. I am endebted to A.V.S. de 
observation. 
Reuck for this 
3. The question arises whether policy makers, too, 
suffer from inadequate or tendentious information. In 
other words, does hard evidence exist in the Soviet 
Union and if it does, who has access to it? Clearly it 
must exist -- Soviet foreign policy decisions could not 
be based on the flimsy evidence presented by theorists. 
Roy Medvedev (1986, p. 76) describes the enormous volume 
of information which is collected in the Soviet Union 
and the way in which it is channelled both upwards and 
downward. He does not believe that there is any 
information lacking to the members of the Politburo, the 
General Secretary of the CC CPSU and their special 
advisers. Some of the information will be available to 
theorists too, but that does not mean that it can 
necessarily be used in published works on international 
relations and foreign policy. Whether there are 
unpublished theoretical works using this information for 
the guidance of decision makers, as there are said to be 
unpublished and more accurate economic statistics (Z. 
Medvedev, 1986) must remain speculation. 
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